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FORWORD
From May 1?63 until late fall 1?64 Indians living west of the 
Appalachian Mountains fought a brief, though costly, war with the 
English. This conflict, popularly known as the "conspiracy of Pon­
tiac", was in fact the outcome of a nearly five year effort on the 
part of Great Lakes and Ohio Valley Indians and a variety of English 
and colonial interests to control the future of the west in the wake 
of the conquest of Canada during the Seven Years' War.
Historians have traditionally regarded this conflict either as 
a footnote in the history of the first British empire or as a con­
test between inherently inferior native people and the on-coming 
tide of Anglo-American civilization. A variation on this latter 
theme has been a fixation with the Ottawa war leader Pontiac and the 
question of whether his activities at Detroit in 1?63 represented a 
pan-Indian "conspiracy" directed against English pretensions to con­
trol the west. Regardless of the theme, however, an air of inevita­
bility hangs over these analyses that assumes English victory and 
tends to focus on the military aspects of the Anglo-Indian conflict, 
Having limited their attention to British imperial politics or a 
single native leader, previous studies have largely ignored the con­
text within which this Anglo-Indian conflict developed and was played 
out.
Examined from an ethnohistorical perspective the 1763-1764 con-
vi
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flict appears as another episode in the long-standing effort by In­
dians and English colonists to deal with each other in ways that 
would ensure their own security and independence. A close examination 
of events surrounding the 1763-1764 war itself reveals that the col­
lapse of the French colonial empire in North America after 1758, cul­
minating in the surrender of Canada in 1760, presented both English­
men and Indians with several problems never before encountered. For 
colonists and royal authorities, the conquest of New France enlarged 
Britain's American domain ana offered new opportunities for settle­
ment and economic exploitation. At the same time, howevez-, conquest 
created managerial and security problems made more difficult due to 
the absence of any coherent policy for dealing with the new lands and 
the numerous, potentially hostile, people they held. For army and 
Indian service officers and their men, security issues, paramount of 
which was the control of western Indians, dominated their relation­
ships with the natives. Bound by war-time commitments to protect In­
dian lands and to create a fair trade in return for peace, these offi­
cials had also to confront renewed colonial interest in land and trade 
in a region long coveted and denied.
The numerous trans-Appalachian Indian societies confronted their 
own problems after 1758. For them the end of the inter-colonial wars 
brought little promise of security and the threat of renewed invasion 
by people still defined by many Indians as enemies. The war that led 
to the defeat of France exposed Indians to population loss as well as 
social, political, and economic disruption! the French defeat having 
upset a century-old alliance system based on trade and mutual interest
vii
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that had created a familiar, advantageous environment within which 
Indian communities could pursue their own interests. At the same time, 
however, increased trade since the l6j)0s had left western Indians more 
dependent on European sources of supply, especially for such economi­
cally necessary items as muskets, powder, and lead without which hunt­
ing, and therefore trade, were nearly impossible by I76O. The French 
defeat shattered this stable world and forced western Indians to con­
front a victorious, aggressive invader who threatened the natives' 
own political and economic security.
Neither English Americans nor Indians responded to the rapidly 
changing circumstances in the west as cultural monoliths. Rather, 
local , particular economic and political interests and timing de­
termined the pattern of relationships that emerged as various Indian 
groups— defined largely in terms of village communities— attempted to 
create new, peaceful relations with an equally fragmented collection 
of English colonial and royal interests. In the pattern of relations 
that emerged between 1758 and 1762 there emerged a complexity that 
belies the notion of a pan-Indian movement to forestall the English 
at any price. The leaders within native communities that emerged at 
this time, among them Pontiac, represented a wide range of responses 
from armed resistance to accommodation. At the same time, regional 
differences in native approaches to the English appear, based on local 
conditions, regional history, and patterns of inter-societal relations 
that further call into question the validity of arguing either for or 
against the notion of "conspiracy". Rather, the evidence suggests that 
the dynamics of Anglo-Indian relations during this time are best under-
viii
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stood in terms of local, often competing interests. While land was an 
overriding concern of Indians living in the Ohio country, for example, 
it was less so for Great Lakes Indians whose interests lay in making 
the English conform to older patterns of inter-societal relations.
This was equally true of the English Americans, whose traders, land 
speculators, and soldiers sometimes cooperated but more often collided 
as official efforts to rationalize Indian policy conflicted with private 
interests.
Cooperation, taking many forms, developed between specific In­
dian groups and the English as royal forces continued to occupy west­
ern forts abandoned by the French. This cooperation was never uni­
versal and was ultimately wrecked largely by official English refusal 
to conform to patterns of .inter-societal relations that had develop­
ed in the west over the previous century. On the contrary, orders 
issued by the American commander-in-chief, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, were 
directed toward altering Anglo-Indian relations in such a way as to 
make those relations conform to the new political realities in the west 
as defined by royal officials. For western Indians, however, such an 
alteration amounted to a wholesale revolution in relations that threat­
ened native security and independence. This, coupled with the sudden 
realization by the end of 1?62 that the French— and with them the old 
order— would not be restored as many had assumed, led to a growing, 
though never universal, awareness that resistance now represented the 
only alternative to submission to a hostile, aggressive invader. Rath­
er than the inevitable clash between "Indian" and "white", the I763- 
176^  war was the outgrowth of a failed process of cultural interaction 
as all parties attempted to create a world in the west best suited to 
their needs.
ix
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ABSTRACT
Between May 1763 and the fall of 1764, Indians living west of 
the Appalachian Mountains waged a war they hoped would rid them of 
the growing menace posed by English military forces and colonial 
traders and settlers. These Anglo-Americans had begun to occupy 
the trans-Appalachian region in 1758 as French power in North America 
declined during the last years of the Great War for the Empire.
Historians since Francis Parkman have tended to deal with this 
Anglo-Indian war in two ways. First, the conflict has been interpret­
ed in terms of a pan-Indian conspiracy led by a single visionary 
figure, Pontiac. This interpretation tends to ignore causation in 
favor of assumptions about Anglo-Indian relations rooted in concepts 
of civilization versus savagery and directs attention to the military 
conflict itself. A second interpretation, represented in studies of 
British imperial politics during the eighteenth century, deals with 
the dynamics of Anglo-Indian relations only insofar as they relate 
directly to larger issues of imperial policies and administration.
This London-centered perspective precludes any understanding of events 
in America on their own terms. Neither of these general interpreta­
tions has placed the events of 1763-1764 in a context of on-going 
Anglo-Indian relations nor satisfactorily explores the reasons why 
these relations degenerated into a war that had ramifications both 
for those directly involved and the larger pattern of English and 
colonial frontier policies.
By looking at the conflict as the result, of efforts by colonists, 
royal officials, and western Indians to deal with each other on several 
levels, a new interpretation based on an ethnohistorical approach to 
largely traditional sources emerges. In the wake of the French de­
feat, both Indians and Englishmen faced a number of pressing security 
problems generated by the radically altered political and economic 
balance of power. Far from being immediately hostile to the on­
coming English, western Indians displayed a variety of strategies 
in their efforts to deal with the new invaders, strategies rooted in 
cultural values as well as past experience. Difficulties arose when 
English military leaders increasingly defined their solution to an 
expanded American empire in terms of reducing Indians to a level of 
impotence and manageability through trade regulation and armed force.
In the process and in the absence of direction from London, these of­
ficials revolutionized Indian relations in ways that compelled in­
creasing numbers of natives to define war as their only option.
The conflict that erupted reveals the lack of "pan-Indianism", 
the complexity of Anglo-Indian relations that precludes simple defi 
nition, and the weakness of Englan'"'' hold over the west prior to the 
the American Revolution.
xii i
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CHAPTER I
The Trans-Appalachian Indian World in 1?60
On December ^ 1758, a delegation of Ohio Indians led by the 
Delaware sachem Tamaq.ua arrived at the forks of the Ohio River to 
hear the words of British General John Forbes and to determine the 
Englishman's intentions. The Indians were not the least intimidated 
by the presence of Forbes' troops and had frustrated Colonel Henry 
Bouquet's occupation plans by warning the English to leave the Ohio 
at once. Three such warnings were issued before a compromise was 
struck; Bouquet could keep a token force in the ruins of Fort Du- 
quesne bat the Ohio Indians would accept no responsibility for their 
safety and would offer no assistance. The English proceeded to es­
tablish "Pittsboro," none too secure in the knowledge that their
hosts had made it clear that the land was theirs and the troops re-
1
mained at native sufferance.
Two years later, in mid-November 1760, delegations of the Wy- 
andots, Ottawas, and other native groups living along the south shore 
of Lake Erie conferred with another representative of His Majesty's 
arms, Major Robert Rogers. Following the surrender of Canada, Rogers 
and a body of troops had been dispatched by the British commander-in- 
chief in America, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, to take possession of the 
French posts on the Great Lakes. In addition, Rogers, like Forbes 
and Bouquet on the Ohio, was to assure the local Indians of English 
friendship, or at least to allay their suspicions until stronger
. 2
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3garrisons could be sent west. At the Cuyahoga River and later at 
Sandusky and Detroit, the Ottawas and Wyandots agreed to give the 
English safe passage through their territories, but only in return 
for gifts and pledges of a renewed trade on native terms, the giving 
of which underscored native possession and control over what Amherst
2
and his subordinates recognized as England's newest American territory.
The sachems and war leaders who met the English on the Ohio and
at Detroit represented a large number of Indians who, regardless of
French losses or English victories, still retained effective control
over what had become England's reward as victor of the Great War for
the Empire. Until recently, many of these people had taken up the
hatchet against the English and some, notably the Delawares and Shaw-
nees, had taken serious losses or had been forced to re-locate towns
as a result of English and colonial retaliation for costly and effec-
3
tive raids against frontier settlements and forts. Any understand­
ing of subsequent relations between these Indians and the on-coming 
Anglo-Americans in the early 1760s must necessarily begin with the 
natives who occupied Britain's "conquest"j their locale, numbers, 
culture, and conditions as Anglo-Americans began arranging for the 
military and commercial exploitation of the trans-Appalachian region.
I
The Indians who spoke with the English at Fort Duquesne and De­
troit occupied a territory extending from the headwaters of the Alle­
gheny River to the upper Mississippi valley and south to the Ohio.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4Their lands included what the French called the pays d1 en haut— the 
upper countryi the lands drained by the upper Great Lakes and 
the upper Mississippi River. For the purposes of this study this 
region will be more closely defined as including the lands lying be­
tween the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, bounded on the east by the 
Appalachian Mountains and the Genesee River of New York and on the 
west by the upper Mississippi and Fox Rivers. This region contained 
a variety of landforms and vegetation ranging from the rolling hills 
and numerous secondary streams of the Allegheny Plateau to the prairie 
lands along the Mississippi and the mixed forests and lake-riverine 
network of the Canadian Shield.
The native inhabitants of this region included parts or all of 
fourteen groups. The majority of these were Algonkian-speaking peo­
ples belonging to the Delawares, Shawnees, Ojibwas(including the 
Mississaugas and Saulteaux bands), Ottawas, Potawatomis, Sauk, Fox, 
Kickapoos, Illinois, Mascouten, Menominees, and Miamis(including the 
Weas/Ouiatanons and Piankashaws). In addition, there were the Iro- 
quoian Senecas, Wyandots, and a hybrid group known as the Ohio Iro­
quois or Mingos. Finally, there were the Siouan-speaking Winnebagos. 
Though living outside the area defined above, the eastern Sioux and 
the remaining five of the Six Nations Iroquois played an important 
part in determining the politics and power relationships within the 
region.
Trade, inter-societal and inter-colonial wars, dispossession, 
disease, and depletion of food reserves had, in various combinations, 
led to significant re-locations of native groups. As a result, by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the end of the Seven Years' War few of the Indians in the Old North­
west were living on lands occupied by their predecessors in the early 
seventeenth century. Generally speaking, however, the upper Great 
Lakes witnessed less large-scale migration and re-settlement after 
1?00 than did the Ohio River valley which, after 1?20, saw widespread 
settlement by Indians from western New York, eastern Pennsylvania,
k
and southern Michigan. This process of settlement continued during, 
and was disrupted by, the English occupation of the region after 
1758. In addition, the fur trade had the effect of creating inter­
national trading communities composed of elements of several native 
groups. The best example of this is Detroit.'’ Observations made by 
travelers, soldiers, and fur traders, and the narratives of English 
men and women taken prisoners during frontier raids permit a relative­
ly complete reconstruction of the location of the trans-Appalachian 
Indians at the end of the Seven Years' War and the circumstances 
that brought them to these places.
Along the Niagara River one or more settlements of Iroquois had 
earned a living for several decades carrying supplies and trade goods 
for the French over the portage road. In 1718 a French report men­
tioned a "Seneca village of about ten cabins" whose occupants were 
"employed by the French, from whome they earn money by carrying goods 
of those who are going to the Upper Country."^ The back-breaking 
task of carrying heavy loads up the steep Niagara escarpment— the 
Seneca named the carrying place "Duh-jih-heh-ah" or "walking on all 
fours"— did not prevent a number of western Senecas, and perhaps other 
Iroquois, from talcing advantage of the employment opportunity or of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
7
having occasional confrontations with their French employers. It 
was this latter problem that led. the Senecas to dispatch a sachem to 
Buffalo Greek, near present Buffalo, New York, to oversee the work 
and act as labor mediator. Around him grew a small village in ad­
dition to the cabins reported downstream. The number of those living 
and working on the road is difficult to determine with any accuracy, 
although in 1750 the Swedish scientist Peter Kalm estimated that
"above 200 Indians, most of them belonging to the Six Nations." por-
8
taged furs for the French. In 1759 Captain Pierre Pouchot, French
engineer and commandant of Fort Niagara, placed several "Indian huts"
9
on his plan of the fort and its environs. Whether these represent­
ed yet another portage settlement or a camp for French auxiliaries 
is not certain. While there is no direct evidence of any Indian 
laborers on the road at the time of the English occupation in July 
1759 > it is reasonable to assume that some, if not all, of the Iro­
quois living there would have continued their lucrative work, even 
under new management.
Across Lake Ontario from Niagara, bands of Mississaugas had 
settled at what was known as the "Head of the Lake" and in the vicin­
ity of the French trading post at Toronto. These, like the Senecas 
on the portage road, were initially drawn to the Niagara area by the 
presence of French traders and the proximity of the English emporium 
at Oswego. These Mississaugas remained in the area after the French 
surrender of Niagara and attempted to re-establish trade with the
r, . 1 0English.
South of the Niagara River, the Ohio valley represented the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
most recently occupied as well as the most heavily settled part of 
the trans-Appalachian region. From the Seneca towns on the upper 
Allegheny to the forks of the Ohio, the valley was dotted with at 
least eight towns and numerous smaller hunting and farming camps on 
the eve of Forbes' march on Fort Duquesne. While the inhabitants in­
cluded some Wyandots and elements of the Shawnees and some refugee 
Fox Indians, the majority were Delawares and Mingo Iroquois. In 1748 
the Pennsylvania Indian agent Conrad Weiser estimated the number of
warriors on the Ohio as 789; the Delawares and Iroquois were repre-
11sented by 180 and 292 repsectively. First settled in the 1720s
by bands of Shawnees and Delawares seeking a haven from conflicts
with both the Six Nations and the colony of Pennsylvania, the valley
had witnessed rapid population growth as other Indians sought to es-
12
cape food shortages and land-hungry whites.■ Ill the 1730s and 1740s 
movement into the valley was given further impetus by the arrival of 
both Anglo-American and French traders who followed earlier native 
migrations and established trade networks throughout the region.
Since the mid-1740s the Ohio country, and the trade and settle­
ment opportunities it offered, had been the object of a three-way 
contest between the Indian inhabitants, the Anglo-Americans of Penn­
sylvania and Virginia, and the Canadian French. The result had been 
a more or less continuous shifting of population as bands and villages 
moved into and out of the area seeking trade or security from enemies,
13
Indian as well as European. By the fall of 1758 yet another series 
of movements was taking place in response to the sudden change in the 
military balance of power brought on by the French retreat from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8forks of the Ohio.
The Shawnees, who had been the pathfinders of the Indian move­
ment west, had all but abandoned the upper Ohio by November 1758. 
Prior to that time they had maintained, with French support, a siza­
ble community at Logstown below Fort Duquesne, on the site of an
l*tearlier Iroquois town. Shortly after the English arrived at the
fort, Christian Frederick Post made a trip to Logstown and found the
remains of "about thirty houses" built by the French for the Shawnees.
The ungathered corn reported by Post suggests the haste with which
15
the occupants left the town. Post further observed that "Between
Saccung/sic/ and Pittsburgh, all the Shawanas towns are empty of peo- 
16
pie." That the Shawnees feared English retaliation for their sup­
port of the French cannot be doubted. However, an observation made 
a year later by George Croghan sheds additional light on why the Shaw­
nees abandoned their upper Ohio towns. Croghan's Indian informants 
told him that the "Shawnesse have sent to bring all their people who 
have been several years amongst the Creeks, home" and appeared to
17want to concentrate their whole population farther down the Ohio.
If so, those on the upper Ohio may have had political reasons for 
leaving, which the English invasion made more compelling.
Upon the removal of the Shawnees the upper Ohio valley was left 
to the Ohio Iroquois and Delawares, with the exception of raiding 
parties of Ottawas, Wyandots, and others from across the Lakes. Iro­
quois hunting and trading parties had begun moving into the Ohio coun­
try in the 1730s and 17*10s, drawn by the plentiful game and by the
18
presence of French traders on the Cuyahoga River and at Sandusky.
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9By 1749 the French reported a Seneca town known to them as "Paille
Coupe"— or Broken Straw— on the upper Allegheny. This town, known
to the English as Buckaloons, and another at Conawango, appears to
have been occupied through the early 1760s. Croghan reported in
March 1761 that Iroquois from "Connawaga a Town at the head of the
Ohio" had come to Fort Pitt.^
Other Iroquois communities on the upper Ohio included a small
settlement above the junction of French Creek and the Allegheny
River. Known simply as the "Mingo Cabbins" in 1760, this town under
the leadership of White Mingo moved down the Ohio in 1761 to build a
20"Small Town where the Game is plenty." That this group should have 
felt compelled to move in search for food suggests an economic prob­
lem that the Anglo-American military presence only exacerbated.
Finally, in 1760, another town, known as "the Crow's Town", had been 
founded at Cross Creek, seventy miles below Fort Pitt. The Crow, a 
Seneca leader, had first made his plans known late in 1?59- No men­
tion was made of where the Crow and his people came from; possibly 
they represented another phase of the continuing— and to the English
and Six Nations, troublesome— out-migration from the Iroquois towns 
21
in New York.
By the 1750s those Delawares living on the Ohio had emerged as 
a political and military force in regional affairs. Their numbers 
alone commanded respect and during the border war with Pennsylvania
22from 1755 to 1758 raiding parties had wreaked havoc upon the province. 
Their authority and influence continued after the withdrawal of the 
French from the Ohio in 1759* Delaware sachems and war leaders in-
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itiated diplomatic contacts with the Anglo-Americans, negotiated 
commercial relations and served as intermediaries between the English 
and other Indians to the west.
From the time of Colonel John Armstrong's raid against their 
villages at Kittanning in 1756 through 1762, the location of the 
Delawares on the Ohio River was in a state of flux. This was due 
primarily to the state of war that existed between the Delawares and 
Pennsylvania and the larger Anglo-French conflict that threatened 
the Ohio country. Nonetheless, a trend can be observed. From the 
abandonment of Kittanning and smaller villages on the Allegheny In 
1756, the Delaware population moved generally west and southwest to­
ward the upper reaches of the Beaver River and the Muskingum River 
in central Ohio, This trend accelerated after the French failed to 
stop the advance of Forbes' army at Fort Ligonier on October 12, 1758. 
According to one captive, after the battle "They/the Delaware^ 
brought their wives and children from Lockstown, Sackum, Schomingo,
Mamalty, Kaschkaschkung, and other places ... to Moschkingo about
23
one hundred and fifty miles farther west." By mid-November 1758, 
several towns had been established, including Beaver's Town or Tus­
carawas at the junction of the Tuscarawas and Big Sandy Rivers in 
Ohio, Newcomer's T0wn on the upper Cuyahoga, and Mahoning Town on the 
Mahoning River near modern Youngstown, Ohio. In addition, Kseekheoong
or Salt Lick Town, fifteen miles north of Mahoning, may have been
2k
founded at this time. A Delaware community on the Hockhocking
River dating from 1751 and known as White Woman's Town continued to
25
be occupied at least through 1759*
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Not all Delawares moved, so far west. The complex of villages
known collectively as Kuskuskies T0wn at the confluence of Neshannock
and Mahoning creeks continued as a focus of Delaware population and
influence in the Ohio country. Initially settled by Iroquois and
Wyandots in the l?4f) s, the Kuskuskies towns were Delaware by the mid-
1750s. In 1?58» there were four towns containing about ninety houses.
Further upstream were the villages of Shenango and Pymatuning, both
27
of which seem to have been occupied into the 1760s. Downstream,
at the mouth of the Beaver River, a community variously known as
Beaver's Town or Saucunk was still occupied in 1759- This town was
associated with the well-known Delaware war leader Shingas, whose
raiding parties had done so much damage to the Pennsylvania and Vir- 
28
ginia back country. At the mouth of French Greek was the village
29
of Venango and, above it on French Greek Custaloga's Town. Other
30
Delawares lived with the Iroquois at Conawango and at Ganestio. 
Finally, although many Delawares were resettling to the west and 
south, others were moving into the Ohio country. In 1762 and again 
the following year reports reached the Anglo-Americans that Delawares 
from the Susquehanna River were being encouraged to join their kins­
men on the Ohio. Kuskuskies was the focal point of this migration 
and Delaware leaders hoped that "a Great Town" could be founded there.
Others went to the Salt Licks Town and talked of re-establishing
31Saucunk, then abandoned.
Below the new Delaware towns on the Muskingum was the Shawnee
settlement of Waukautamike. A new town, it had only existed since 
32
the fall of 1759. The center of Shawnee polity and population, how-
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ever, lay to the south and. west on the Scioto River at the town
known as Scioto, "Lower Town", "Chillicothe", or "Meguck", Founded
in 1758, it remained the center of the Shawnee people in the Ohio
country through the 1760 s. Both Wuakautamike and Scioto reflected
the continuing movement of the Shawnees. Prior to 1758 they had been
located in two villagesi Scioto at the mouth of the Scioto River,
and a community known as the Upper Town located on the south side
of the Ohio above the mouth of the Kanawha River. Both of these
older towns were abandoned in the late 1750s. The town of Scioto
was finally moved in 1758 after periodic flooding made the site un- 
3^desirable. In the move north of the Ohio the two older towns appear
to have maintained their older relationship of "upper" and "lower",
with the new Lower Town or Scioto growing up on the site of an older
Shawnee town known as Meguck; hence the persistence of that name in
35the records until 1761.
To the west and north of the Shawnee towns, along the Wabash
and Maumee river systems, several groups known collectively as the
Miamis or Twightwees had their villages. By 1760 the original six
groups had been reduced through a process of combination to threei
the Wea, also known as the Ouiatanon, the Piankashaw, and the Miamis 
36
proper. The Weas and Piankashaws had, by the middle of the eight­
eenth century, settled along the Wabash River near the French posts
37of Ouiatanon and Vincennes. The Miamis were located at the head 
of the Maumee River at the village of Kekionga, established in 1718.
The French later built Fort Miami on the site to maintain influence 
over the Indian town and to protect the inland trade routes which
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on
followed the river. In 1733 this town was temporarily abandoned 
in the wake of a smallpox epidemic, but was fully re-established
39when visited by Ensign Thomas Hutchins in 1762. In addition to 
the town of Kekionga, at least two other bands of Miamis were locat­
ed on tributaries of the Maumeei the group led by Le Pied Froid on
40
the Eel River, and the Tepicon on Tippecanoe Greek. Closely asso­
ciated with the Miamis groups were the Mascoutens and Kickapoos.
These Indians had lived at Kekionga until the late 1730s, then moved
to the Waba.sh where, in 1762, Hutchins found them living with the
4lWeas near Fort Ouiatanon.
Another Miamis village, known as Pickawillany, had a short but 
significant existence on the middle Miami River between 1747 and 1752. 
Founded by the pro-English leader La Demoiselle or "Old Britain", Pick­
awillany quickly became a haven for Scotch-Irish traders from Virginia 
and Pennsylvania and a threat to the security of French trade and 
settlement in the mid-west. After the failure of repeated efforts to
negotiate with La Demoiselle, the French finally took punitive action
4-2
in 1752, destroying Pickawillany and La Demoiselle.
The lands lying between the Muskingum and Scioto rivers and
Lake Erie were claimed by the Wyandots, whose principal village was
at Detroit. However, this group had only begun to settle south of
Lake Erie in 1738, when a village known as Anioton or Ganuta was
43
founded near Sandusky Lake. This town, and subsequent Wyandot 
settlements to the south and east, resulted from a dispute between 
that, people and the Ottawas of Detroit over--Wyandot negotiations with 
the southern Chickasaw Indians. Threats of Ottawa attack and a lack
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of French support led to the migration of at least one band of Wyandots
44
which resulted in the Anioton settlement.
A larger Wyandot migration occurred in the mid-^^iOs when the 
sachem Nicholas Orontony, miffed at the earlier response to his 
people's needs and attracted by promises of trade and alliance from 
Anglo-American traders, led a substantial number of his people to San­
dusky. There he and his Anglo-American partners planned to overthrow 
the French in the west— a plan that came to naught in 1747. Subse­
quently, Nicholas and part of his group moved south to the forks of 
the Muskingum where they established Conchake. Others went east to
45
the trading community at Cuyahoga and then to Kuskuskies. The Con­
chake settlement continued until about 1750 or 1752 when it was aban­
doned. Smallpox and French promises of reconciliation appear to have
46
been behind the decision to return to Detroit.
During the 1750s the Sandusky settlement was augmented by a 
French trading post and an intermittent Wyandot-Mohegan settlement on 
Pickerel Creek, near Sandusky, and another town on the Sandusky River 
known as Lower Sandusky. The Pickerel Creek settlement, known as 
Sunyendeand, consisting of only a handful of cabins near the French 
post, appears to have been a way-station for returning war parties
47
during the Seven Years'War. Both Major Robert Rogers and George
Croghan mentioned the existence of both Sandusky towns in the winter 
✓ 48
of I76O-I76I. By this time Anioton was known as Junundat. In 1762
49
the English built a blockhouse on Pickerel Creek near Sunyendeand.
The principal Wyandot village remained at Detroit throughout the 
eighteenth century, where it formed part of a large trading community
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which included, resident Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas as well as 
others who came on a seasonal basis. At the time of Major Rogers' 
arrival, the Detroit Indians occupied at least four villages along 
the Detroit River above and below the French settlement. A summary 
of western Indian population, compiled in 17&3» mentions a single 
Wyandot town opposite Detroit. The Potawatomis, who had arrived be­
tween 1?12 and 1717 from the St. Joseph River, occupied a town below
50
the fort on the west side of the River. An English captive report­
ed that in 1756 there were three Ottawa townsj one two miles above 
the Wyandot village, another, smaller, town on Lake St. Glair, and 
a third settlement about two miles below Detroit on the west side of 
the r i v e r . I n  1762, Ensign Hutchins' map of the trans-Appalachian
region shows one Ottawa village just above the Wyandot town 011 the
52
east side of the river.
The Potawatomis and Ottawas at Detroit represented only parts 
of these people. The Potawatomis had towns at both Chicago and on 
the St. Joseph River where, in the aftermath of the first Fox War, 
the French established Fort St. Joseph to sustain and protect the 
Potawatomis who had come there from their former settlements at La
53
Baye. The Ottawas likewise had several other towns, primarily along 
the western shore of Lake Huron. Those Ottawas who had gravitated 
to the French post at Michilimackinac moved in 17^2 to the west and 
established the village of l'Arbre Groche, which remained their prin­
cipal village in the area into the 1760s. At the head of Saginaw
54
Bay a village of Ottawas shared the area with groups of Ojibwas.
In addition to these towns, Ottawa hunting parties were found
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along the south shore of Lake Erie and, in I76O-I76I, one group 
from Detroit attempted to resettle at Sandusky, away from their more
55militant neighbors and closer to English trade. During their 
trip to Detroit in the fall of I76O, Rogers and Croghan reported en­
counters with Ottawas at Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, and Cedar Point. The 
group at Cuyahoga may have remained in the area through 176^ , at 
which point references to Ottawas there ceased. Finally, bands of
Ottawas were located on Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron and, by 1763i
£{1
at Chicago and Milwaukee.
The region north of Saginaw Bay through the Straits of Mackinac
and across the northern shore of Lake Superior was the home of several
bands of Ojibwas. Their hunting culture, based on small, mobile,
groups with only seasonal gatherings of bands, makes precise location
over time difficult, but several locations can clearly be associated
with one or more groups of Ojibwas. Their principal focus was Fort
Michilimackinac. The Ojibwa village was on nearby Mackinac Island
but, in their discourse with the trader Alexander Henry, the Indians
made it clear that their claims extended to the mainland. Henry also
mentioned a "village of Chipeways" located at Sault Ste. Marie, but
observed that the site was only occupied suring the summer, probably
57as a fishing and trading center. According to a French report of 
1736, these sites had been occupied at least from that time. In ad­
dition, this document placed Ojibwa bands at Keneewa and Chequemegon 
*53
on Lake Superior.' A 1757 French report listed nine Ojibwa villages
59including one near Detroit. Henry mentioned both Lake Superior
. 60
sites between 1763 and 1765.
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At La Baye, on Lake Michigan, lived another mixed community 
of Indians, Aside from a small group of Potawatomis, the territory 
adjacent to French Fort La Baye and the Fox River was occupied by 
groups of Sauk and Fox Indians, the Menominees and Winnebagos. The 
Fox community represented the remnants of a people who had been en­
gaged in two wars with New France and her native allies earlier in 
the eighteenth century. Although the French were never able to des­
troy their enemy as they had hoped, the Fox groups were sufficiently 
reduced in numbers and power to remove them as a threat to French in­
terests in the west. The close association between the Fox and Sauk
Indians dates from this time and parts of both groups were already
6l
moving west to the Missouri River.
Available sources from the time of the English occupation are 
extremely vague on the location of the several Indian communities in 
the area. Thomas Hutchin's map shows only a single Menominee town 
near the fort. Beyond that the map is imprecise, noting only Winne­
bago, Sauk-Fox, Potawatomis and Menominee towns "some distance to the
62Westward of the Bay." The English commander at La Baye, Lieutenant 
James Gorrell, was little more precise. However, he did make it clear 
that there were at least three Winnebago towns when, in 1762, he men-
Zo
tioned the arrival of the "chief of the third town of the Puans."
Even more imprecise are references to the eastern Sioux who had 
used the French post as a source of trade goods for re-sale to Indians 
farther west on the Plains. The best Gorrell could do was to note 
that they numbered over 30,000 warriors and lived "On west side Missis­
sippi, near 300 leagues off." In his enumeration of western Indians
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in 1762, Hutchins failed to mention the Sioux at all.
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II
Making an accurate determination of the size of Indian populations 
is difficult for any time in the eighteenth century. In some cases 
a simple lack of sources makes population estimates all hut impossible. 
For the trans-Appalachj.an region, a wealth of information exists for 
individual villages or even larger areas, such as the upper Ohio 
valley. Aggregate figures, when available, do not readily reflect 
changes in population that are suggested in other references to mi­
grations, warfare, and disease. At no time before 17&3 did the Eng­
lish have accurate figures for any part of the west. Indeed, Lieu­
tenant Gorrell's comment upon reaching La Baye in I76I adequately sums 
up English knowledge. According to Gorrell, the number of Indians
65near his post was "more than was ever thought of." Fortunately, 
the French periodically compiled figures on Indians living within 
their trade and diplomatic orbit. These, when coupled with figures 
available from English sources, allow a general, but by no means flaw­
less, assessment of how many people occupied the lands that Britain 
inherited through conquest.
The Six Nations have been studied and counted at great length and
f i f )little can be added here beyond some general observations. By 1763 
the best estimates assigned 1950 fighting men to the Iroquois, or
67
between seven and nine thousand people. To this figure may be 
added the Iroquois League’s various clients living in New York and
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along the upper Susquehanna River. This would add another 200
warriors, something less than a thousand people, to the total. It
should be noted, however, that these figures may not include the
68
sizable Iroquois population living in the Ohio country.
Three decades of settlement and exploitation had given the Ohio 
valley a rather heavy concentration of people by the early 1760s.
The earliest reliable figures for the region, dating from 17^ 8, give 
a total of 789 warriors from at least five Indian groups. This 
would suggest a total population of between three and four thousand 
people occupying the dozen-odd towns and camps discussed above. It 
is impossible to state with any accuracy how many of these people 
were temporary residents— in the valley only to hunt or trade— but 
any seasonal losses would have been off-set by other groups moving 
in for similar reasons or to settle. How long the population con­
tinued to grow is also uncertain, but one authority has concluded 
that by the mid-1750s "the Indian population of the area probably
69
reached and passed its peak."
Contemporary sources indicate that the majority of the Ohio
valley towns were located on, or very close to, the Ohio River and
its major tributaries. While this made sense from the standpoint of
communication, subsistence, and trade, this preference for riverine
locations also made the towns much more vulnerable to attack. In
addition, these towns appear to have varied considerably in size.
Pymatuning, located north of Kuskuskies, contained only fifteen
70
houses and about forty warriors. At the other extreme, towns such 
as the Kuskuskies complex, Logstown, Saucunk, and Kittanning were
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swollen by an influx of warriors from both the Ohio and Great Lakes
areas during the Seven Years'War. As bases for military operations
against Anglo-American settlements,, these towns also benefited from
French largess. George Croghan observed that all thirty-eight houses
at Saucunk were "built by the French for the Indians, some with stone 
71chimneys." Further, Logstown, Kuskuskies, and the Lower Shawnee
Town at Scioto were trading and diplomatic centers, making them
unusually large and cosmopolitan.
Little descriptive information on the Ohio towns exists for the
period. However, what is available permits some generalizations.
The larger towns appear to have actually been clusters of clan or
family communities sharing a common council house or farming areat
The Moravian John Heckewelder described Tuscarawas as a complex of
three villages and a trader's establishment lying along the Muskingum 
72
River. Kuskuskies consisted of four distinct towns "each at a dis­
tance from the others", the whole community consisting of ninety 
73
houses in 1758.
A map of Kittanning, drawn at the time of Colonel Armstrong's 
raid in 1756, gives the clearest representation of what such communi­
ties looked like. On a terrace overlooking the Allegheny River was 
the "Long House", or council house. In all directions from this cen­
tral point lay clusters of cabins each inhabited by distinct family 
groups. Those of the Delaware leaders Pisquetomen, Tamaq.ua, Shingas,
and Captain Jacobs are clearly marked. Near the river's edge are the
7/),
cornfields extending the entire length of the village complex. Un­
doubtedly most if not all of the larger Iroquois, Delaware, and Shaw-
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nee towns in the Ohio country reflected a similar pattern. The
smaller towns, such as Pymatuning or Hockhocking, consisted of a
75small cluster of cabins, a council house, and fields.
The extent of agricultural activity at these towns also varied
with size and function, but the magnitude may be understood from an
observation by Major Rogers of the new Delaware town at Tuscarawas.
Aside from its population of 180 warriors, Tuscarawas was the center
of farming activity that included "about 3>000 acres of cleared 
7 6
ground." Whi3.e this town may have been unusually large, English 
observers seldom failed to remark on the presence and extent of farm
77land near these towns.
The Wyandots of Sandusky were reported to have had about 200
78
warriors or about 800 people. How many of these lived at the village 
of Junundat and at Sunyendeand can only be inferred from the sources. 
Ensign Pauli, commandant of Fort Sandusky in 1762, gave the total 
population near his post as 200. The fact that this is identical to 
Hutchins' estimate of the total number of warriors suggests that Pauli 
was referring to fighting men, rather than to the entire population.
The town of Junundat held between seventy and eighty men, or roughly 
300 people. Assuming Pauli's estimate at Sunyendeand was for the total 
population, this would leave between seventy and eighty warriors at
79
Lower Sandusky and any other satellite villages in the area.
Ensign Hutchins' 1762 survey of the west revealed 230 Miamis and 
Ouiatanon warriors at and near Fort Miamis(Kekionga). On the Wabash 
he estimated 300 Ouiatanons and Piankashaws. Based on this information 
the total Miamis population would have been at least 2100. To this
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can be added the Mascoutens and Kickapoos living on the Wabash, the
✓ 80former having ninety warriors, the latter 180 in 1762.
As might be expected, Detroit was in the midst of a substantial
native population at the time of its occupation by English troops.
Hutchins' estimates for the Indians residing there reveal a total of
970 warriors or at least 4,000 people, all living within twenty miles 
8lof the fort. Information supplied by English captives points to
Ottawa villages that were band-local and averaged between 200 and
300 people each. As early as 1736, French sources reported a "Sinago"
village and one known as "Kiskakon". These names refer to two of the
82
Ottawas' kinship groups. No such information exists for the Wyandots, 
Potawatomis, or Ojibwas, but it can be assumed that their towns were
Oq
similarly ordered along kinship lines.
The Potawatomi village at Fort St. Joseph was estimated by Hutchins 
as having 200 warriors in 1762. A neighboring Ottawa town contained 
150 men. No information is available for the third Potawatomi town 
at Chicago.
Population estimates for the upper Great Lakes in the early 1760s 
exist, but are less precise in linking numbers to locale. Hutchins 
gave the number of Ojibwa warriors "At Missilimackinack" as 400, or 
perhaps between 1,200 and 1,600 people. This number probably repre­
sented both the Saginaw Bay and Michilimackinac bands and was only a 
fraction of the 4,000 Ojibwas and Ottawas reportedly "settled about 
Lake Huron & Erie & Ontario, who have no fixed residence." This latter 
figure would undoubtedly include some, at least, of the Mississaugas 
living near Niagara, but cannot be accepted as reflecting the total
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Obiwa-Ottawa population throughout the Great Lakes north and west 
85of Detroit. The one specific piece of information on Ojibwa village
size comes from Alexander Henry. He observed that in 1761 the village
on Mackinac Island held one hundred warriors, or between three and 
86four hundred people.
Like its counterparts to the east, the trading post at La Baye 
was the center of a large cosmopolitan population. The four Indian 
groups resident at the post and along the Fox River were reported by 
Hutchins to have had 1,090 warriors between them in 1762. This would 
suggest a total population of between thirty-two hundred and forty-
87
three hundred people for the area.
The Sioux, least known of all the Indians the English would en­
counter after 1758, were estimated as having in excess of thirty 
thousand warriors, a number more reflective of English ignorance than 
Sioux strength. On the strength of a closer association through trade 
and exploration, French estimates for the 1730s may be taken as some­
what more accurate. In 1736, the Sioux living west of Lake Superior
were said to have had three hundred warriors; those of the "Prairies"
88
were said to number two thousand men.
These numbers, while limited in accuracy and usefulness, suggest 
a formidable native population west of the Appalachians. Other in­
formation suggests, however, that by 1760 there had been a general de­
cline in the region's population. This decline did not affect all 
groups equally, and the causes were manifold. But primary among them 
were warfare and disease. Separately, either of these phenomena had 
the potential to play havoc with native groups. What made the middle
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decades of the eighteenth century particularly threatening and un­
settling for trans-Appalachian Indians was the coincidence of the 
two, with consequently greater impact.
Smallpox, agues, fevers, and other ill-defined sicknesses period­
ically swept the trans-Appalachian region. In 1?33 an outbreak of
smallpox forced the temporary evacuation of the main Miamis town at 
89Kekionga. ' In 1751-1752 a more widespread outbreak of the disease
struck the west. It was centered in the Wyandot town of Conchake, but
apparently spread to Detroit, perhaps by Wyandots fleeing the Ohio
town. The political repercussions were equally severe. At the same
time that large numbers of Miamis were defecting to the English, the
90epidemic killed the Miamis leaders most inclined toward the French.
Coinciding with these outbreaks was both inter-societal and inter­
colonial warfare. The second Fox War of the late 1720s and early 
1730s and sporadic fighting between French-allied Indians from the 
Great Lakes and the Chickasaws from 1731 through the early 1750s took 
their toll. Indeed, the devastation wrought against the Fox was such 
that the group's survival was ensured only through alliance with the
91Sauk. Finally, between 1744- and 1760, the western Indians were
directly or indirectly caught up in the last of the Anglo-French wars
for empire. The short interim between the peace of 1748 and renewed
fighting in 1754 saw little stability in the Ohio country and eastern
Great Lakes. Rather, a "cold war" continued as rival traders and
their Indian partners kept tension high in their struggle to control 
92
the Ohio fur trade.
The large-scale military operations and stepped-up frontier raid­
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ing that marked the Great War for the Empire involved large numbers 
of Indians from as far away as La Baye and the Illinois country.
While battle losses among native auxiliaries appear to have been com­
paratively light, the war took its toll in other ways. Returning 
warriors brought home scalps, booty from dead enemies, live captive 
for adoption or ritualistic execution, and smallpox. The worst out­
break of the disease came in the wake of the capture of Fort William 
Henry in the summer of 1757- In the looting and limited killing of 
sick and wounded English prisoners that followed the fort's surrender, 
the western warriors contracted the disease. In the months that fol­
lowed it swept through villages throughout the Great Lakes, depleting
numbers and weakening both the will and ability of western Indians
93to aid the French in future campaigns.
As the Iroquois no doubt discovered, allies could be as deadly
as enemies. In 1757» Sir William Johnson reported an outbreak of
smallpox among the Mohawks, some of whom apparently caught the sick-
9 4
ness while at the English garrison of Fort Johnson. Given the gen­
erally unsanitary condition of military camps, it was only a matter 
of time before the redcoats' native allies were stricken. The same 
was true of those Indians dealing with or aiding the French. One 
hundred Caughnawaga Mohawks from the St. Lawrence region died in 1756
from smallpox contracted during their stay at forts Niagara and Catar-
< 95 aqui.
Illness did not abate with the end of active warfare. Thomas 
Hutchins reported sickness in virtually every Indian town he visited 
in 1762. His report and those of others suggest a combination of
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diseases. The Indians at La Baye were stricken by smallpox, the 
Ouiatanons and Miamis were suffering from "a Severe Sickness", the 
Shawnees— the worst afflicted— suffered from an "Epidemical disorder." 
It would be safe to assume that much, if not all, of this suffering 
was directly related to contact with English and French military 
forces. In fact, at Fort Pitt the correlation seems inescapable.
In 1762 the Quaker trader James Kenny reported the garrison suffer­
ing from a "Gold & Gough", five days later Kenny himself was taken 
sick with the "Epidemic Cold & Fever". On the very next day he ob­
served that the Indians in and around the fort "are all chiefly Sick 
with ye Gold & Gough." Such was the return on trade and alliance.^
To the twin burdens of war and disease must be added starvation, 
either threatened or real. Food shortages, like illnesses, appear 
to have been largely a function of the general dislocation caused by 
war. While warriors could be assured food and other supplies while 
on campaign, their families were at the mercy of post commanders or 
traders and often did without. With men gone for months at a time, 
fields were not cleared and game was not secured. Finally, European 
troops must have seemed at times like plagues of locusts as they 
trampled or stole crops, drove cattle through fields, and generally
97disrupted native life. Taken together, the three decades before 
the Anglo-American occupation of the west, especially the last five 
years, had been an unsettling, traumatic time for the Indians living 
in the region. Their response to Anglo-American expansion would be 
conditioned by this prior experience as well as the cultural milieu 
in which they lived.
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I I I
The Indians living in the trans-Appalachian region had been en­
gaged in trade and diplomacy with one another for centuries and with 
Europeans for a century and more before 1760. It has been customary
for historians to examine Indian-European inter-cultural contact in
98
terms of eventual— and inevitable— native cultural demise. In reality, 
the contact between the trans-Appalachian Indians and Europeans was 
far more complex. Change did not influence all aspects of native 
culture equally nor did it occur quickly. Rather, some elements of 
native cultures changed quite rapidly while others persisted through­
out the centuries of contact. Further, cultural change and the tensions 
created by differential change were phenomena which were neither unique 
to the post-contact period nor to Indians alone. Native cultures 
had been evolving and changing for generations and, in the fluid
human frontier that was colonial North America, Englishmen, French-
99men, and other Europeans experienced culture change as well. What
must be recognized is that the Indians of the west, like their English
and French counterparts, engaged in the process of cultural contact
and exchange from a position of self-recognized cultural superiority
and were selective in what they borrowed and added to their own cul- 
100
tural inventories.
Finally, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
at least until the collapse of the French colonial empire in America, 
the changes evident within native cultures were largely non-directed.
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What was borrowed was integrated into Indian societies in ways
101determined by native, not European, values. Try as they might,
the imperial agents of New France and New England could not bring
Indians to the kind of "civility" dreamed of by the early promoters 
102of western planting, In short, the Indians who met Robert Rogers
and Henry Bouquet along the line of Anglo-American expansion were
still Indian, even if their outward appearance often suggested other­
wise.
This is not to say that western Indians did not feel the effects 
of contact or that inroads were not made by colonial cultural agents. 
There is abundant evidence to suggest that changes, however super­
ficial, occurred in many aspects of native life. Nowhere was this 
more apparent than in the growing dependence of western Indians on 
European material culture.
The principal agency for material culture change as well as 
other, more subtle, changes in native society was the fur trade.
While largely viewed as a system of economic exchange, the trade was 
moz'e than business. It was, in fact, a complex web of diplomatic,
social, and economic relationships that resulted in inter-cultural
exchange on many levels. And not only between colonists and Indians.
The trade nexus involved and altered relations between native groups 
as well.
This inter-cultural exchange system required cooperation and 
peace, without which the accumulation of wealth for either side would 
have been impossible. Cooperation, however grudgingly given, was 
quickly seen by all sides as having distinct advantages beyond economics.
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Trade could be, and was, used as the avenue toward useful alliances
that could maintain peace as well as give some groups advantages over
others. The Six Nations Iroquois, preeminent arbiters of Indian-
colonial relations in the east before 1?60, neatly summarized this
relationship when they declared that "Trade and Peace we take to be 
104
one thing." As the numerous "beaver wars" of the seventeenth cen­
tury attest, trade often brought war and was ultimately self-destruc­
tive, but while it lasted it gave Indians and colonists a common 
ground on which to engage in the larger, creative struggle for cultural
105
control and independence.
The traders who displayed their wares at Logstown, Detroit, La 
Baye, and elsewhere offered their Indian customers a wide variety of 
goods, some of which were more popular than others. By using inven­
tories of trade goods, contemporary observations, and the available 
archaeological record, it is possible to determine with some accuracy 
what Indians were buying and to what extent the traders' goods had 
replaced the natives' own by the middle of the eighteenth century.
Cloth and household items such as kettles and tools, including scissors, 
needles, knives, and hatchets appear to have dominated Indian interest. 
In addition, by mid-century, muskets and the ever necessary gunflints, 
lead, and powder were present in quantity, suggesting the extent to 
which European weapons technology had superceded native items. Final­
ly, trade inventories always included what might be called cosmetic
items. These included paints, jewelry, hawk bells, ribbon, and 
106
trade silver.
Contemporary observations confirm the widespread use of European
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goods by western Indians, as well as the apparent changes wrought in 
native cultures as a result. Captives such as James Smith, Hugh 
Gibson, and Alexander Henry were able to observe native societies 
at close quarters. All reported substantial adoptions of at least 
some European products by their captors. Smith, soon after his cap­
ture in 1?55» was given a new set of clothes consisting of a ruffled 
shirt, cloth leggings decorated with ribbons, and quill-worked garters.
Similarly, Hugh Gibson, taken by the Delawares in 1756, was given a
108
"Breech-cloth, leggins, porcupine-quill moccasins" and a shirt.
Alexander Henry, whose narrative is one of the best sources on upper
Great Lakes Indian life, was given face paint, a shirt "painted with
vermilion", a wampum collar, trade silver, and scarlet cloth mitasses
✓ 109(leggings) by his adoptive Ojibwa family in 1763* He further par­
ticipated in trade with Frenchmen at Michilimackinac, during which
110
the Ojibwas purchased shirts, mitasses, blankets, and tobacco.
These observations are supported by those other colonials who
saw the Indians at a distance. The missionary John Heckewelder,
active in the Muskingum valley before 1763, reported blue, red, and
black cloth, trade silver, bells, thimbles, and vermilion among the 
111
Delawares. Warren Johnson, nephew of British Indian Superintendent
Sir William Johnson, observed "Check shirts" with ruffles of the same
material, "Indian shoes Stockings & Night Gaps" among his Mohawk and
112
Oneida neighbors in New York. Indeed, the eastern Iroquois appear 
to have done their western counterparts one better by accepting the 
luxuries and comforts of Europe and the colonies. According to Warren 
Johnson, straw beds and sleighs could be found in several Mohawk
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✓ 113households in 1761.
Along with the use of manufactured goods, the western Indians 
augmented their cultural inventories in another direction, one large­
ly ignored by students of Indian history in the eastj through the 
acquisition of domestic animals. For the agricultural communities 
of the Ohio valley and western New York such an adaptation would not 
have been difficult. On the contrary, it appears to have been wide­
spread by the 1760s. Moravians arriving at the Delaware town of 
Tuscarawas were given several chickens by a village leader. Among 
those things destroyed by Sir William Johnson's Indian raiders at 
Ganestio in 176^  were horses, cows, hogs, and saddles. The mission­
ary David Zeisberger noted that the Delawares among whom he lived
11^
satisfied their fondness for milk and butter by obtaining cows.
Less studied than the general use of domestic animals by west-
115
era Indians was the particular fondness of these people for horses.
This attraction is reflected both in references to the appearance of
and desire for the animal among Indians and in the numerous incidents
of horse theft which occurred in the Ohio country as young Indians
availed themselves of the British army's seeming overabundance of
116
these prized animals. Among the Potawatomis, it has been argued
that horses represented another form of technological improvement,
akin to that brought with brass kettles or firearms. To what ertent
this was true of other Indians in the region has yet to be determined.
Clearly, however, the horse offered an alternative to walking or canoe
117
travel and could give warriors greatly increased mobility.
The archaeological record provides another window through which
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to view the process of culture change. However, this record is not 
without limitations. For the trans-Appalachian region prior to 1800 
few sites have been excavated and fewer still reported in a meaning­
ful way. Most of those excavated are single or multiple burials, thus
skewing the record away from habitations or other forms of human 
US
activity. Further, while the earth yields some items, it obliterates 
others. Metal, glass, wood, ceramics, stone and, sometimes, leather 
usually survive while cloth, paper, and delicate metal objects so not. 
Thus, the artifact record is further distorted in the direction of 
certain types of materials which may or may not have been as abundant 
on a site as the remains indicate. However, the sites do show arti­
facts in context, contexts sometimes overlooked by contemporary ob­
servers. Taken together, written accounts and sites can yield as com­
plete a picture of a native society at a given point in time as we 
are likely to have.
The available sites offer confirmation of what the historical 
record suggestst that by the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
trans-Appalachian Indians had replaced a substantial portion of their 
traditional artifact inventories with material imported from Europe 
and the colonies. Specifically, the sites show how this process took 
place and the relative speed of artifact displacement. The earlier 
sites contain a wide variety of European goods including beads, kettles, 
Jesuit signet rings, and some metal tools, yet in no great quantities.11  ^
Remains dating from circa 1750 through the 1780s show a marked change 
in three directions.
First, the number of native artifacts declined relative to those
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of European origin. Second, the inventories have expanded to in­
clude silver ornaments of various kinds. Finally, toward the end 
of the eighteenth century, utilitarian items appear to have given way 
to materials that were ornamental in style and function. Again, some 
utilitarian items may not have survived the ravages of time. Further, 
the context of many sites— burials— would dictate what was placed in 
the site. Ornamental objects may have been closely identified with 
the deceased and therefore interred with them. Nonetheless, the 
variance is striking. By the turn of the century, the transition is
even more pronounced, with virtually no items of native manufacture
120included in site remains. Thus, on the one hand, historical and 
archaeological records reflect a steady and pronounced change in the 
material culture of trans-Appalachian Indians during the eighteenth 
century.
On the other hand, however, these same records reveal the degree
to which native material, and thus cultural values, persisted during
the period. Further, and of greater significance, the context of
European materials reflects the adaptation of these objects to native
needs and uses, not the reverse.
In most of the sites pre-dating 1780, some material of native
manufacture appears. These include effigy pipes, ceramic or shell
121
beads, pottery, and some stone tools. Adaptation of European mate­
rials to native uses is also reflected. Sheet copper was re-worked 
into tinkling cones, brass wire was coiled for use as facial hair re­
movers, and the ever-popular glass beads were sewn onto skin garments, 
undoubtedly as an attractive, and less time-consuming, substitute for
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traditional quill-work.
At the same time, the majority of these objects were found in 
a special and wholly native contextj graves. The custom of plac­
ing a deceased's personal possessions in the grave had been part of 
funeral rituals of western Indians for centuries prior to contact 
with Europeans. The appearance of iron axeheads or copper kettles 
in a grave instead of their stone and clay counterparts suggests 
only a concious decision to acquire and use what were manifestly more 
efficient forms of well known tools. The function, however, remain­
ed native throughout.
The accounts of European observers give further evidence of 
cultural continuity and the adaptation of foreign form to native 
function. James Smith's observations on Delaware sugar manufacturing 
are revealing. He noted that the Indians used bark buckets for collect­
ing the maple sap, but brass kettles for boiling it into sugar. Clear­
ly a decision had been made to substitute a metal vessel for boiling 
as being more efficient for the task, while the traditional bark 
bucket remained better suited— and more cheaply and easily made— for 
the task of collecting and transporting large quantities of maple sap. 
The wardrobes given to adopted captives included some items of native 
manufacture, such as wampum collars and quill-worked moccasins. In 
addition, trade items were altered to fit native needs and styles.
Stroud cloth became mitasses— a trade variance of traditional deer- 
123
skin leggings. Shirts were painted, usually with vermilion, per­
haps in imitation of the painted or shell and quill-worked skin gar­
ments formerly worn. Trade silver ear coils, bracelets, or beaded
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garters were again only substitutes of material; the function con­
tinued to be defined in native terms.
While the strong persistence of Indian cultural values and 
practices tended to define the role that European materials would 
play in native societies, the trade did bring about significant 
changes in native societies in at least three ways. In the first 
place, by replacing even a few traditional articles with their Euro­
pean counterparts, the natives were placing themselves in a position 
of dependence upon the suppliers of such goods. It has almost become 
a truism that the trade resulted in the Indians' economic dependence 
in that they became trapped in a market economy they could not fully 
comprehend, let alone control, and that without the trade the goods 
to which they had grown accustomed could not be replaced or repaired.^ 
To a large extent this was true. As the supplier of a semi-finished 
product, the Indian hunter was on the outer edge of a market system 
that responded more and more to the politics and economic conditions
of Europe and colonial America than it did to decisions made in native 
125
villages. Further, European and colonial officials had become
126
adept at manipulating various Indian groups through trade. This
manipulation became easier due to the growing native dependence on
alien goods and accompanying services. As the archaeological evidence
suggests, this dependence grew over time as more and more items in the
Indians' inventories came from Venice, Stroudwater, and Amsterdam.
While dependence grew, however, native abilities to reproduce
European materials did not. Little evidence exists for the trans-
127Appalachian region that would indicate success in this respect.
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Rather, the repeated requests of Ohio valley and Great Lakes Indians
for blacksmiths and gunsmiths reflects a growing dependence on Euro-
128
pean technology, not only for supply, but also for maintenance.
One of the ironies of western Indian resistance to Anglo-American ex­
pansion after 1758 was the natives' efforts to maintain poltical and 
cultural autonomy at a time when economic and technological dependence 
had become a way of life for many Indians.
The second direction of trade related change was toward what 
one anthropologist has called a "pan-Indian" culture in the Great 
Lakes region. Basing his conclusions on both archaeological and 
historical evidence, George Quimby observed that "by 1760 or shortly 
afterwards the Indians of the western Great Lakes region had discard­
ed most of their material culture in favor of new things introduced 
129
by fur traders." This systematic replacement led to the creation
of a universal material culture in which most Great Lakes Indians parti- 
130
cipated. While the degree to which this change overtook specific 
native groups at specific times is open to debate, such a transform­
ation was well underway when British and colonial agents began moving 
into the region in the wake of the conquest of New France. The crea­
tion of cosmopolitan trading communities at places like Detroit and 
Michilimackinac accelerated this trend. But the blurring of cultural 
distinctions between Indian societies did not end with the artifacts 
of trade.
The trade altered inter-group relations to a marked degree, trans­
forming older alliances into emnity and changing local power relation­
ships throughout the west. In both diplomacy and belief systems a
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transformation, at least among some societies, appears to have taken 
place that further reflects the development of a pan-Indian culture 
in the Great Lakes region. The use of the calumet as a symbol of 
peace began to appear among Great Lakes Indians in the late seven­
teenth century. Originating with Indians to the west and north, it
became a necessary part of international relations among the Ojibwas,
131
Ottawas, and Potawatomis. The use of the calumet also appears to
132have extended into the east. The reason for its adoption seems
to have been the need by Great Lakes Indians to negotiate with Indians
farther west over such questions as rights of passage through band
133
territories and access to hunting grounds.
The same thing may have been happening with the spread of the 
medicine society known as the Midewiwin. According to one scholar, 
the Mide cult "developed in response to a need for pantribal institu­
tions which could aid in the unification of independent clan groups"
at a time when the trade was serving to atomize western Great Lakes 
13^Indian society.
The third transformation of native societies brought about by the 
trade resulted for a far more intimate contact than that experienced 
over the trader's counter. Beginning in the 1730s a generation of 
children of mixed French and Indian parentage began to appear. This 
group and its offspring became common elements of all the French trade 
posts and settlements in the west. Over time they coalesced into a 
group defined both from within and without as racially, culturally 
and, at times, politically distinct. These "Metis" people ultimately 
became an influential force in western Indian relations. With their
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bi-cultural background. Metis men and women could move with relative
ease between two societies, serving as interpreters, political agents,
and culture brokers. Not limited to the Great Lakes region, the
M^tis were to be found throughout the Canadian sub-arctic and, in
the region exploited by the Hudson's Bay Company, included children
135
of Anglo-Indian marriages as well.
The burial sites in the west reflect a marked degree of continuity 
of values in the face of the kinds of changes discussed above. This 
was due in large part to the inherent flexibility and cohesiveness 
of Indian societies and institutions. Another factor was the prox­
imity of European cultural agents. While fur traders and their ser­
vants were a common sight in Indian towns, these men were less inter­
ested in altering native cultures than they were in maintaining a. flow 
of pelts out of the west and into ships bound for the European market­
place. Missionaries, on the other hand, went west specifically to 
reduce Indians to both western civilization and Christianity. How­
ever, the only sustained missionary effort in the west was that main­
tained by the Jesuits. At mission stations established at forts and 
trading stations, Jesuit fathers continued their efforts to win the 
bodies and souls of the native population for France and the Church.
By and large, this undertaking was a failure. The missions were too 
few and the Indians too many and too widely scattered to allow effective 
conversions. Further, the close association of missions and trade 
posts presented the Indians with a first-hand look at the contradic­
tions of European society and further undermined their interest in, 
or respect for, Christianity. Finally, the growth of the Midewiwin,
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the persistence of vision guests and other forms of traditional
ritual and "belief attest to the continued resilience of native cul- 
136
tural values.
The cumulative impact of cultural exchange on the non-material 
aspects of trans-Appalachian Indian life is more difficult to de­
termine. European observers tended to ignore those aspects of native 
culture not directly related to the business at hand, whether trade, 
diplomacy, or conversion. Nowhere is this more true than with native 
religious practices. Any discernible changes in this facet of Indian 
life may suggest a tear in the social fabric that could affect res­
ponses to outsiders or toward other members of society.
One historian has recently theorized that northeastern Indian
values and beliefs guickly succumbed to the material, biological, and
137
spiritual aspects of European contact. While this may have been 
the case with some specific groups in the northeast, the application 
of such a model to the Indians of the trans-Appalachian region appears 
to be inappropriate.
Site reports from the west show no clear movement toward accept­
ance of Christian mortuary practices or any major disruption of tra­
ditional culture patterns for burials dating from circa 1670 to 1800. 
The only significant intrusion is the appearance of wood or bark
coffins, sometimes held together with iron nails, in sites dating 
1
after 1730• This may signify some attempt to accommodate the in­
truding European cultures, but may reflect only the adoption of a 
different form of covering the dead, which had previously been done 
with skins, sheet bark, or stone or wood-lined burial chambers."'”'^
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The b u r ia ls  a ls o  r e f l e c t  a m ix tu re  o f  ty p e  and o r ie n t a t io n .  By th e
middle of the eighteenth century extended burials appear to have been
most common, but variations of body position occurred both within
140
and between Indian groups. One possible example of post-contact 
influences may be the changes evident in Seneca burial customs. Un­
til the middle of the seventeenth century Seneca burials continued 
to be universally flexed, or fetal, in position. By the 1670s this 
had changed significantly with an increasing number of supine burials."^  
The documentary evidence on Indian burials in the west under­
scores the basic continuity of traditional practices. A 1731 de­
scription of a Seneca burial ceremony includes mention of all the 
elements of ritual behavior» the painting of the corpse, the emotion­
al mourning and refusal to mention the name of the deceased, and the
142
inclusion of the deceased's personal possessions in the grave.
The same pattern was observed by missionary John Heckewelder who, in 
1762, witnessed the burial of the wife of the Delaware war leader 
Shingas. In addition to the traditional mourning ceremonies, Hecke­
welder observed another example of the adaptation of European forms 
to native function. He watched as the coffin lid was secured and a 
bag of vermilion placed next to the corpse by way of a hole cut through 
the lid at the head of the coffin. The Delawares explained that
"This hole is for the spirit of the deceased to go in and out at
143pleasure until it has found the place of its future residence."
F in a l l y ,  th e  p r a c t ic e  o f  co v e rin g  th e  dead through  g i f t s  was v e ry  
much in  ev id e n c e . S h ingas d is t r ib u te d  a v a r ie t y  o f  c lo th in g  and 
hardw are to  th e  m ourners to  q u ie t  t h e i r  g r i e f  and a ls o  to  compensate
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his wife's lineage for its loss. This redistribution of wealth also
served to enhance Shingas1 stature as a man of both material wealth
and generosity. The gifts may have been of English origin, but their
144
use was dictated by Delaware beliefs and practices.
Among the Iroquois, the condolence for the dead was still an
integral part of diplomatic as well as social behavior. Among the
Mohawks, the practice of including grave goods with the dead seems
to have fallen off by the middle of the eighteenth century. This may
have been a reflection of the continuing acculturation of these peo-
145
pie to the ways of their Anglo-Dutch neighbors. At the other end 
of the League's symbolic longhouse, the Senecas continued the tradi­
tional practices, including grave goods, mourning rituals, and the
146
avoidance of using the names of the dead.
This same kind of cultural persistence is to be found among the
Ojibwas as well. Alexander Henry witnessed the funeral of a child
accidentally killed at a sugaring camp in 1764. A temporary scaffold
burial was erected until the body could be taken to the family grave
site. Upon final interment grave goods, including a "carrying-belt
and paddle" to reflect her status as a female and food, were placed
in the grave. The burial ritual concluded with the interment of trade
147
blankets and the sacrifice of a dog.
The socio-political aspects of trans-Appalachian Indian life also 
reflected both continuity and change. In this facet of native life 
the stress and tension created by the conflict between change and 
tradition was also most evident. Upon approaching this subject, two 
methodological points are in order. First, I have used the term
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"socio-political" to reflect a fundamental fact of western Indian 
societies. Unlike the institutionalized European societies with 
whom they dealt, trans-Appalachian Indians made no distinction between 
social and political activities. Rather, their societies were seam­
less webs with the spiritual, social, and political aspects of life 
interacting. Rituals satisfied the spirit and also served to sanction 
warfare and bind communities together. Decisions governing group 
activities were achieved by the whole community with each family or 
clan segment being represented in council. To isolate poltical ac­
tivity from its social context is to distort such activity and deprive 
1kg
it of its meaning.
Second, any discussion of American Indian history necessarily
means confronting the notion of "tribe". In the traditional literature
on Indian-white relations, the tribe has always been equated with the
basic native social and political unit. This approach may have lent
order to narratives, but it has distorted the realities of native
societies. As the findings of anthropologists and ethnohistorians
have revealed, the term "tribe" and related labels such as "chief"
and "nation" have tended to cover up more than they reveal. While
there is as yet no consensus over when or whether "tribe" can be
applied to Indian groups, there is agreement that looking to the
local communities, or even individual clan segments and lineages, will
lead to a better understanding of the nature of native society, decision
149
making, and contests for influence. It was the extended family 
and the local community that gave an individual his identity and sense 
of place. Within each village or band families or clan segments
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selected their own leaders; village councils consisted of all these 
lineage representatives acting together to reach a consensus on issues. 
The village chief or headman was usually someone elected to represent 
others of equal rank and authority, though such offices were often 
transformed as a result of contact with Europeans.
Beyond the village community, organization and identity were
more poorly defined and allegiance less compelling. For none of the
Indians in the west during the eighteenth century was there anything
akin to a tribal system that bound local communities together into a
single polity in such a way as to permit unified action over a de- 
150
finable area. What has been called "tribe" could better be term­
ed ethnic identity. Such identity was based on common language, rit­
uals, and inter-marriage. But among western Indians social and polit­
ical affairs continued to be determined at the local level, with little 
regard for any tribal identity or obligations. When Indian leaders 
purported to speak for the "tribe" or "nation" they were engaging in 
a kind of political posturing not unknown to European politicians.
Even the seemingly most obvious exception to this pattern con­
firms the central place of local communities in native life. The Iro­
quois League, with its six "nations" and central council at Onondaga, 
presented a picture of unity and power that placed it in the center 
of international affairs on the colonial frontier and in much of the 
literature on early European-Indian relations. But as the dean of 
Iroquois studies, William Fenton, reminds us, the six confederated 
nations and the League itself were composed of semi-autonomous 
villages bound together by spiritual and ethnic ties into a confederacy
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which was often divided and sometimes at war with itself. The
Onondaga c o u n c il,  composed o f  f i f t y  c la n  le a d e rs  re p re s e n tin g  th e
v i l la g e s  o f  th e  S ix  N a tio n s , gave th e  Iro q u o is  a u n iq ue  in s tru m e n t
with which to project the image of unity even when such unity did
n ot i n  f a c t  e x is t .  I n  o rd e r to  understand  Ir o q u o is  a c t io n s , as  w e ll
as th o se  o f  o th e r  In d ia n  groups, how ever, i t  i s  necessary  to  go to
the local level where issues were debated, decisions reached, and 
152actions taken. For these reasons I have conciously avoided the
use o f  th e  term s " t r ib e "  and " n a t io n " . In s te a d , a t  th e  r i s k  o f  some
g ram m atica l c lu m sin ess , I  have chosen to  employ words t h a t  more accu -
153rately reflect contemporary conditions.
There is little contemporary material reflecting the degree to 
which the kinship networks that bound trans-Appalachian Indian societies 
together had changed by the middle of the eighteenth century. Given 
the conservative nature of native societies and the fundamental im­
portance of kinship in determining human relations, the traditional 
systems undoubtedly persisted to a large degree unchanged. Among the 
farming villages of the Ohio country and in western New York, the 
matrilineal system of clans continued through the century. The few
captivity narratives that refer to domestic life suggest coherent
15A
family and band systems.
Information on housing further reflects the continuity of tradi­
tional kinship systems while at the same time suggesting that, for 
some Indians, kinship ties may have been weakening. Travelers to the 
Iroquois villages in western New York in 1750 found "large and roomy" 
structure "with three or four fireplaces" and entrances at both ends,
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all of which indicates housing similar to the traditional long-
house. Such a structure was representative of the matrilineages and
clan segments which comprised the village system among the Six Nations.
Further, "the huts were ornamented with red painting of deer, turtles,
bears, etc. designating to what clan the inmates belonged.""''^
However, alongside the older dwellings and the kinship system
they reflected, new forms appeared. One scholar has concluded that
by the middle of the eighteenth century single family log houses had
156
begun to supplant the longhouse among the Senecas. This change
is reflected in a report on the destruction of the Delaware-Seneca
town of Canestio in 176^ . There, Sir William Johnson's agents found
two hundred houses "most of which were well built of Square loggs 
157
with good Chimneys."
This transition to different forms of housing and nuclear,
rather than extended, family units occurred among the Shawnees and
Delawares as well. The Shawnees appear to have moved away from their
traditional winter houses to log structures similar to those found
158
in Anglo-American frontier communities. On the other hand, the
traditional summer house survived among the Shawnees into the nine- 
3 59teenth century. ' Among the Delawares David Zeisberger observed
that "each family prefers to live in its own house, hence they /the 
_ 160
houses/ are small." The Delawares' Ohio Seneca neighbors, however,
continued to use the traditional longhouse, perhaps reflecting a more
161
conservative outlook than their kinsmen in New York.
For Indians living west of the Ohio River less is known about 
residence and dwellings. What information exists points to the con-
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tlnuance of traditional residence patterns. The Miamis seem to
have adopted the log house for the summer but continued to use
163
family-size, easily transportable huts in winter camps.
While more research needs to be done on the subject of residence
and housing among trans-Appalachian Indians, the evidence available
suggests changes among farming societies that may in turn reflect
changes in kinship systems, though no conclusive determination can
be made. While smaller cabins point to the atomization of the family
and community life, the presence of council houses in the larger
towns reflects a continued sense of community and identity through 
164-
ritual. Information about other aspects of western Indian life 
may shed more light on changes in residence and housing styles.
The status of women among'farming societies in the west appears 
to have been reinforced by those influence— trade and war— that were 
threatening other facets of native culture. Among the Delawares and 
particularly among the Iroquois, the elder women who led the matri- 
lineages had traditionally enjoyed much influence. Chiefly titles 
were inherited through the female line, passing, for instance, from 
a man to his sister's sone. These leaders were selected by the elder 
women of each lineage.Among the Oneida Iroquois, these clan 
matrons could speak in council, either directly or through male spokes­
men, and serve as "Agoianders", the group of village councilors ad- 
166
vising the sachems. Among the Miamis and Shawnees two parallel 
leadership systems existed, one male, the other female, with each 
having certain rights and powers in directing the activities of the
167
village. Beyond this, Delaware and Iroquois women controlled
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agricultural capital, including the land and output. As heads of
households they had the right to adopt outsiders to replace de-
168
ceased members of the lineage. These rights combined to give 
Iroquois women, at least, a decided influence over the most funda­
mental issues facing the community. Women also engaged in other
activities. There is evidence to suggest that Delaware women active-
169
ly engaged in trade on behalf of their families. In both Delaware 
and Iroquois society, women played prominent roles in ritual activities, 
funerals, and other village-wide gatherings. And, like their counter­
parts in other western Indian communities, some of these women could, 
through sexual liaisons or skills as interpreter, become mediators 
between their societies and various European interests.
Warfare and the fur trade tended to increase the influence of
Iroquois women, although this pattern is less clearly defined for 
170
other groups. Both war and trade tended to keep men away from 
the villages for extended periods. This resulted in women shoulder­
ing more of the routine responsibility for community affairs. Further, 
the increase in war-related deaths enhanced the matrons' already con­
siderable influence because new leaders needed to be selected and the 
dead replaced. In the complex negotiations over peace, war, and
trade, clan matrons were active, both directly and through their own
1?1
male representatives.
If warfare tended to enhacne the influence and prestige of clan 
matrons, it tended to eat away at kin groups and thus the social fab­
ric of native communities. During the last of the inter-colonial wars, 
all the Indian societies in the west suffered losses which placed a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
strain on their socio-political structures. In order for families 
to survive, and in order for the psychological trauma resulting from 
lost kinsmen to be overcome, deaths had to be avenged and gaps in 
the family structure filled. One method, but by no means the only 
one, of mending the social fabric was through the adoption of pris­
oners. These became not merely members of the community at large,
but living replacements for specific dead kinsmen whose names, status,
1?2
and attributes were given to the adopted individual.
The extent to which native communities had been hurt by the
Great War for the Empire can be inferred from the prolonged and
never completely settled contest between Indians and Anglo-American
officials for white captives taken and adopted. The great reluctance
and emotion that accompanied the return of Anglo-American captives
attests not only to bonds of friendship and love between individuals,
but als~ to the important role captives played in maintaining and
173
perpetuating native societies.
The tension and uncertainty that resulted from attacks on the 
structure of society surfaced in many forms, the most obvious being 
the use of alcohol. There is little doubt that by the 1750s the con­
sumption of rum, whiskey, and brandy had become common among western 
Indiansi so much so that liquor was a common item of trade and a
constant source of concern for colonial officials as well as native 
174leaders.
Aside from being a form of group and individual recreation, drink­
ing took on other, culturally defined, meanings for Indians. Sufficient 
consumption of liquor could result in a stuporous state during which
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the individual could experience dreams. Dreams were considered a 
link with the supernatural and an avenue by which a person could com­
municate with the spirit world and seek his own special supernatural 
guardians. In pre-contact times such dreams were acquired through
rigorous vision-quests which included fasting, other forms of self-
175denial, and isolation. Alcohol simply made the desired goal more 
readily and easily attainable. In addition, liquor and drunkenness 
provided an emotional "time out", an excuse for behavior that would 
not have been sanctioned under other circumstances. Theft, assault, 
or, occasionally, homocide, could be overlooked or pardoned since, 
by native rationale, the guilty party was in a state of possession 
due to the liquor and not responsible for his actions. Neverthe­
less, trans-Appalachian Indians did acknowledge limits of drunken be-
177
havior beyond which no one was expected to go.
That most, if not all, drunken behavior was directed at the in­
group rather than toward outsiders indicates such limits on such be- 
178
havior. At the same time, in-group drinking provided an excellent 
opportunity for venting frustrations and anger against those in the 
community who were, or were perceived to be, responsible for problems 
or a general lack of social harmony. Further, drunkenness may have 
released a flood-tide of aggressive emotion and frustration that could 
not have been expressed in any other way. While acting as a catharsis, 
such behavior could be destructive and add further to social trauma.
The violence that seemed to mark so much social drinking, and the re­
sulting injuries and deaths, may suggest a heightened sense of anxiety 
stemming from losses of kin, a decline in status, or uncertainty about
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the future.
The grow ing problem  l iq u o r  c re a te d  f o r  w estern  In d ia n s  can a ls o  
be in f e r r e d  from  th e  words and a c tio n s  d ir e c te d  a g a in s t  i t s  use by 
th e  n a t iv e s  th em se lves . R e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  fo u r  w e s te rn  groups com­
p la in e d  in  1753 t h a t  "The Rum ru in s  us" and asked t h a t  i t s  t r a n s p o r ta -
180
tion west by traders be stopped. A decade later these words were 
echoed by Indians at the 17.61. Easton conference in Pennsylvania. In 
this case, the Indians' request was especially revealing 1 they did 
not want rum sent to them. Rather, they would come to the settlements 
to buy it as their needs arose. They further pointed to the diplomatic 
problems which could arise from drink by accusing the English of employ­
ing drunken Indian messengers who "some times lose the Belts and mes-
181
sages, and sometimes drink them away." While these Indians talked 
others, notably the Oneidas, acted. In 1?62 men and women from the 
main Oneida town attacked and destroyed a military sutler's store
l82n e a r F o r t  S tan w ix  in  an a tte m p t to  r i d  t h e i r  community o f  l iq u o r .
Anglo-American officials also voiced their concern, but the lure 
of profits, geography, and willing Indian customers combined to under­
mine the limited attempts made to control the flow of rum into native 
I83
tow ns. W h ile  th ese  o f f i c i a l s  were la r g e ly  concerned w ith  remov­
in g  a  p o t e n t ia l  cause o f  A n g lo -In d ia n  c o n fro n ta t io n s , th e y , l i k e  
n a t iv e  le a d e rs , re c o g n ize d  th e  harm drunken b e h a v io r  d id  to  In d ia n  
s o c ie t ie s .
The o b s e rv a tio n  made by Dav id  Z e is b e rg e r  t h a t ,  among th e  D e la ­
wares " th e  young no lo n g e r  r e v e r  th e  aged as  used to  be th e  case" 
p o in ts  to  a n o th e r problem  c o n fro n tin g  m id -e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry  w estern
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Indiansi inter-generational conflict. The driving force behind 
this conflict was the desire of young men, the warriors, for status 
and a voice in community affairs. Additionally, rapid changes in 
material culture and similar, if less profound, changes in other 
facets of culture combined to create a cultural gap between parents
185
and children. When taken out of the family and placed in the con­
text of village and inter-societal relations, however, this inter- 
generational conflict creat one of several political problems faced 
by trans-Appalachian Indians.
Traditionally, the Indian societies in the west maintained a 
division of war and peace functions. Elder men who had turned from 
active participation in warfare, were charged with the conduct of day- 
to-day affairs and the preservation of harmony both within the com­
munity and with outside groups. The younger men whose tasks includ­
ed protecting the village, were normally expected to keep still until 
war had formally been declared in council. Upon learning of such a 
decision, emergent war leaders would call for men, usually kinsmen, 
to join them in raids, the planning of defenses, and would, to vary­
ing degrees, take over management of affairs from civil chiefs. Then, 
with peace restored, these war leaders and their followers were ex­
pected to once more recede into the political background and yield
186the council to the older men. Further, each native society had
clear rules governing the selection of leaders and succession to offices
187
upon the death or removal of a headman or councilor. This system 
of parallel war and peace functions carried within it the seeds of 
conflict. By definition, peace leaders were responsible for main­
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taining the status quo. However, young men naturally saw warfare as
one of the traditional avenues to status and influence and as a way
of demonstrating manhood. By blocking this avenue, civil leaders
guaranteed that tension would exist between these two competing ele-
188
ments of the community.
This problem may have been resolved, or allowed to continue as 
it had in the past, had it not been for the wars of trade and empire 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Fox Wars, the 
Chickasaw conflict, and the larger inter-colonial wars created a 
crisis within Indian communities, a crisis that Europeans could turn 
to advantage. The endemic warfare provided the perfect opportunity
189
for warriors to gain status and power at the expense of civil leaders.
In order to ensure continued Indian participation in military campaigns,
French and English officers negotiated directly with warriors, rather
than through civil chiefs and thus further enhanced the former's status
190
and influence at home. As a wartime problem, this situation was 
bad enough. But, as was the case with the Iroquois, warriors, having 
tasted power, were loath to give it up. Rather than receding into 
the background once the hatchet had been taken from their hands, they 
continued to challenge the civil chiefs, accusing them of "keeping 
them in the Dark by misrepresentations" and referring to village lead­
ers as "a parcell of Old People who say much, but who mean & aot very
little," and asserted the warriors’ position as "in fact the People
191of Consequence for managing Affairs." These sounds of discord 
could be music to the ears of Anglo-American officials, such as Sir 
William Johnson, to whom these remarks were directed. This inter-
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generational struggle, and the factional disputes it engendered, 
could be used as a means of dividing and controlling Indian communities 
at a time when England was faced with the problem of reducing a vast 
territory and its people to order and obedience.
This conflict over status and influence did not occur in a 
vacuum. Rather, it represented only one of a number of changes and 
problems which occurred in the areas of leadership and decision mak­
ing. Some of these were rooted in the traditional values and struc­
ture of native societies. Others arose from the peculiarities of 
eighteenth century relations between Indian peoples and the English 
and French colonies. Among them, the loss of leaders due to warfare 
and disease may have provided added impetus for warriors seeking to 
assert their influence.
Losses among native leaders were both widespread and disruptive. 
The smallpox epidemic resulting from the siege of Fort William Henry
in 1757 killed as many as three hundred Menominee warriors, includ-
192ing many civil and war leaders. The same event may have caused
similar losses among the Ojibwas. In 1761 they apologized for not
addressing issues raised in council with the English at Michilimackinac.
The reason given was that "we have nobody in our Nation who speaks
well or hath understanding, We have had Great Chiefs & fine Speakers,
but they are all dead, and there only remains the Sons of those great
193
Men, who have not understanding like their Fathers." While this 
explanation of why some Ojibwas were acting as "villans" toward the 
English may have been contrived, the minutes note that the Ojibwas 
were using a Delaware speaker. The worst such losses appear to have
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occurred among the Shawnees who, by 1756» had had many of their
warriors and war leaders killed in raids against the Anglo-Americans.
So severe were these losses that the Shawnees were "forced to borrow
19^
a Captain from their Cousins the Delawares."
The social and political problems stemming from the warriors' 
challenge to traditional authority and the loss of substantial num­
bers of leaders and potential leaders was further complicated by a 
growth in the variety of Indian leaders and the evolution of leader­
ship categories previously unknown among western Indians. This phe­
nomenon was directly related to the demands placed on native communities 
as a result of contact with Europeans. Simply put, new leaders emerg­
ed whose talents made them more suitable for dealing with Europeans 
than traditional village leaders. For example, the office of Iro­
quois council speaker, the man whose special oratorical and memory 
skills were sued by sachems as the voice of authority, was adapted 
to contact with colonial and imperial agents. Out of this came an 
entirely new position, that of "pine tree chief", men who held chief­
ly rank based on certain skills and contacts with Anglo-American com­
munities and officials rather than by virtue of lineage. In many cases 
these "pine tree" or "merit" chiefs were men who could exploit special
relationships of trade, marriage, or friendship with Anglo-Americans
195
to the advantage of themselves and their kinsmen.
Among the Potawatomis another pattern emerged. By the early 
eighteenth century there emerged in the larger Potawatomi towns the 
"chief" or principal spokesman, a position not connected with tradion- 
al practices or social structure. The reason for the emergence of
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this leader type was French insistence on dealing with one designat­
ed representative of a town rather than a confusing array of family 
and clan elders. This role came increasingly to be filled by non- 
Potawatomis; specifically Sauk, whose ties to the Potawatomis by 
marriage gave them legitimacy but who, as outsiders, could exploit 
their positions free of many of the social or cultural restraints 
that a Potawatomi felt. Their status as "chiefs" was further guaran­
teed by French support, both political and economic. While this sit­
uation was undoubtedly a boon to both French officials and the individ­
ual Indians concerned, the result for the Potawatomis as a people was,
according to a recent study, "personal and group conflict" as a gap
196
appeared between idealized and actual behavior.
The kind of European manipulation of native societies reflected 
in the Potawatomis' experience was by no means new to Indian-white 
relations and became more pronounced as European colonial power grew 
during the eighteenth century. On the other hand, such interference 
could, and did, meet stiff resistance from Indians bent on preserving 
their independence. David Zeisberger noted that the successor to the 
Delaware leader Netawatwees, Gelelemand, was not given the respect due 
his office since he "was chosen by Europeans prominent in Pittsburg." 
Sir William Johnson likewise recognized the limits of Anglo-American 
influence, observing that English-chosen leaders among the western 
Indians would generate jealousy and would prompt the Indians to re-
197ject such men.
Finally, in discussing the changing pattern of leadership and 
power prevalent in the west by 1760, those people cannot be overlook-
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ed who, without official sanction, used their special skills and 
relationships to establish positions as mediators and power brokers.
The Metis have already been mentioned. This group would also include 
native women who engaged in relationships with Anglo-American army 
officers and traders in the west, and men who acted as messengers, 
interpreters, or suppliers of food for military posts or settlements.
The result of this proliferation of leaders was a general de­
cline in the prestige and authority of traditional leaders, both 
peace and war. Those whom Anglo-American observers and subsequent 
generations of historians called "chief" or "sachem" were not always 
the people of authority within an Indian community. They may have 
been representatives of the nameless, faceless power brokers behind 
the scene or men who, apart from Anglo-American or French support, had 
no legitimate claims to authority at all. All of this means that inter- 
cultural relations were becoming more complicated as well as more 
prone to misunderstandings between Indians and Anglo-Americans and 
within native communities as lines of legitimacy blurred and power 
vacuums were created and filled in ways not always in accord with 
former practices.
Conflicts between warriors and civil leaders also contributed
to factional disputes. Factionalism was rooted in the past and was
a part of traditional social dynamics. Among the Iroquois, for whom
the best information exists, factionalism may have pre-dated contact
and appears to have become institutionalized to an extent, with the
parties involved maintaining their identities over long periods of 
198
time. The Iroquois experience suggests that factionalism reflect-
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ed a social flexibility that allowed dissident groups to move away
199and re-establish social order elsewhere to their own liking. The 
Iroquois migrations into the Ohio country may, in part, be attributed 
to such separations.
What had long been a part of the dynamics of Indian societies 
took on an added dimension as a result of contact with Europeans. 
Again, old issues and conflicts were exacerbated as they were played 
out against a backdrop of inter-colonial war, the influx of an alien 
culture, and the arrival of men intent on propagating new beliefs.
The result was an increase in factionalism. But is would be a mis­
take to place such conflict in the simplistic idiom of "pro-French" 
of "pro-English". Doing so robs the disputes and their resolutions 
of any meaning for the Indians involved and reduces the native actors 
to cyphers or pawns of European colonial powers. While it is true 
that conflicts arose over issues involving relations with English or 
French colonials or their European masters, at heart was always the 
question of how best to preserve Indian identities and freedom of 
action. The Ottawas who delcared their intention to move from Detroit 
to Sandusky in 1760 and 1761 did so out of a desire for peace and 
economic stability, not necessarily because they perceived the Anglo-
Americans as particularly benevolent or because of direct English in-
200
fluence in Ottawa decision-making.
Rather than a conflict between pro-English or pro-French groups, 
much Indian factionalism centered on findamental questions of identity, 
changes, and social values. Conflicts within the Wyandot community 
at Detroit from 1712 to the 1730s appear to have revolved around the
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growth of a Christian element within the town. Whether this was 
later reflected in Nicholas's decision to side with Anglo-American 
traders against the French in the 17^0s is as yet unclear. Among 
the Senecas shortly after the end of Anglo-Indian hostilities in 1?6^, 
the missionary Samuel Kirkland witnesses a protracted conflict be­
tween those who wished to preserve traditional values, primarily 
warriors and war leaders, and the sachems who desired closer cooperation 
with the English, cooperation which included the establishment of 
missions in Seneca towns. In this dispute the issue was not "pro" 
or "anti" English but rather one of how best to preserve community
values and harmony and still face the reality of declining Seneca power
202
vis-a-vis the Anglo-Americans. The presence of the missionary did
203
not cause the dispute, but certainly leant it special urgency.
The ramifications of factionalism were many. It further compli­
cated Anglo-Indian relations by increasing the number of parties who 
claimed a voice in inter-cultural affairs. Conversely, this factur- 
ing made outside manipulation of native societies and decision-making
easier. Finally, intra-community conflicts made a united front against
20^
expanding English imperialism harder to maintain.
The problems caused by population losses, drinking, and various 
forms of social and political conflicts based on questions of legitimacy 
and the goals of public policy may well explain the evident changes 
in residence patterns among some trans-Appalachian Indians. The con­
tinued migration of Iroquois people to the Ohio country may further 
reflect discord at home. For many of the Indians living west of the 
Appalachians, the years prior to the arrival of English troops were
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years of unrest, loss, and uncertainty.
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IV
The changes and conflicts evident in community affairs were re­
flected in the web of international relations in the west. By the 
mid-eighteenth century some patterns of inter-societal relations, in­
cluding those involving Europeans, had become clearly established.
On the other hand, the region witnesses shifts in power relationships, 
changes in alliances, and the emergence of new political forces} changes 
that were still ocurring when the Anglo-Americans first appeared on 
the Ohio and at Detroit.
Patterns of relations between Indian groups reflected both tra­
ditional practices and changes brought by intensified competition for 
furs and alliances with European colonists. The warfare between the 
Shawnees, Delawares, Ohio Iroquois, and some Great Lakes Indians and 
the Gherokees and Catawbas had its source in earlier blood feuds the 
origins of which were at best dimly remembered by the participants 
in the 1750s. Much of the importance of this warfare lay in the op­
portunity it gave young men on both sides to achieve full membership 
in their societies as successful warriors. This aspect became more 
important by mid-century as other avenues to status and influence were 
blocked. While this north-south fighting increased as first the French 
then the English drew native allies into wars against Indian enemies, 
it would be incorrect to subscribe this wholly to European machinations. 
Though Anglo-American officials, for instance, used this warfare as a
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way to divide and control western and southern Indians, the native
participants were motivated by more traditional goals! captives,
booty, and personal glory.
I n  th e  Lake S u p e rio r  re g io n , f u r  t r a d e  induced  c o m p e tit io n  had
altered patterns of group relations, resulting in conflict between
the eastern Sioux and the Ojibwas. This warfare was of recent origin,
dating from the 1730s, and supplanted an earlier period of Sioux-
O jib w a c o o p e ra tio n  as O jibw a middlemen exchanged French tra d e  goods 
205
for Sioux furs. Direct French contact with the Sioux resulted 
in the demise of this symbiotic relationship. The Ojibwas fought to 
restrict Sioux contact with French traders and also for the now-vital 
furs, no longer coming from Sioux trading partners. For their part, 
the Sioux sought to maintain their newly found contacts with New 
France as a way of holding on to their own middleman's position rel­
ative to Indians on the northern plains, a role that originated before
20 {S
contact with Europeans. The disruption of trade caused by the 
Great War for the Empire thus strongly influenced the responses of 
both Indian societies to the English who arrived at La Baye in 1761.
To further complicate matters in this area, a smoldering feud 
between the Menominees of La Baye and the Ojibwas of Mackinac, result­
ing from the killing of a Menominee at the latter place, existed in 
the early 1760s. English observers noted the Menominees' desire for 
revenge and the possibility that this blood feud would involve other
In d ia n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  Sauk, whose in t e r e s t s  la y  i n  th e  economic
207
impact of the dispute.
The Indians living in the vicinity of Detroit and eastward into
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the Ohio country experienced far less conflict of the kind common
to the Ojibwas and their neighbors. Part of the reason for this was
the affiliation between the Detroit Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Ottawas
known as the "three fires". While each group acted independently in
the eighteenth century, the bonds of this affiliation served to limit
208
conflict and provided a basis for cooperation. Another factor 
was the presence of the French trading establishment and French dip­
lomatic efforts which, over a century prior to 17 0^, had served to 
weave the independent Indian communities into an alliance system.
This system was continually subjected to stress, particularly as Anglo- 
American traders began to penetrate the French trading empire and 
offer alternative sources of goods and friendship to the native pop­
ulation. However, as the Fox wars, the Chickasaw war, and the Picka- 
willany raid make clear, the French could rely on a core of native 
allies whose own interests were best served by supporting specific
French policies. Foremost among these were the Potawatomis and Ottawas
209
of Detroit and St. Joseph and the Ojibwas of Mackinac. Given the 
long standing economic contact between these Indians and the French, 
and the inter-marriage of these two peoples, it is not surprizing that 
these native communities were among the most threatened by the French 
defeat in 1760 and those least likely to welcome the intrusion of a 
former enemy into their lands and economic system.
Another feature of inter-societal relations in the west was the 
influence of the Wyandots of Detroit. While not militarily powerful, 
they parleyed their contacts with the English, their earlier ties to 
New France, and their relations with other Indians at Detroit and the
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Ohio co un try  in to  a  r o le  as re c o g n ize d  spokesmen f o r  a number o f  I n -
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dians in their relations with the Anglo-Americans after 175°. In
1759i f o r  exam ple, th e  Wyandots a c te d  as  in te r m e d ia r ie s  f o r  e ig h t
other Indian communities in a conference with the Anglo-Americans
and D elaw ares a t  P it ts b u r g h . I n  th e  wake o f  t h is  g a th e r in g  th e
Wyandots and M iam is acc e p te d  D elaw are speech b e lts  on b e h a lf  o f
211
o th e r  w estern  In d ia n s . T h is  s p e c ia l Wyandot p o s i t io n  was con­
f irm e d  two y e a rs  l a t e r  when S i r  W il l ia m  Johnson acknow ledged two Wy­
an do t sachems as le a d e rs  o f  a new A n g lo - In d ia n  a l l ia n c e  based a t  De-
4 u  212t r o i t .
In the Ohio valley, the emergence of the Delawares and Ohio Iro­
quois as local power brokers marked a change in the power relation­
ships in that important area. By 1758 the Delawares had become the 
leaders in native negotiations with the newly arrived Anglo-Americans. 
Far from being a sudden occurrence, this situation developed over more 
than a decade and was tied to shifts in population and the regional 
balance of power that combined to make the Ohio country the focus of 
the Anglo-French conflict.
Those Delawares who were to play a leading role in the history 
of the Ohio country represented groups which, due to a desire for
better sources of food and because of dispossession, began moving in-
214
to the Ohio River valley in the late 1720s. By the 1740s they, 
along with their close associates the Shawnees, and the Ohio Iroquois, 
found themselves in the middle of the growing Anglo-French struggle 
for possession of the trade and territory of the middle west. Pre­
liminary negotiations initiated by Ohio Indians and Anglo-American
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traders led in 17^8 to a formal alliance between the Indians and the
21 'dcolonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania. J This alliance was initially 
managed by two Ohio Iroquois, the "half-kings" Tanaghrisson and Scarouady.
As the Anglo-American position in the Ohio country rapidly de­
teriorated between 17^8 and 1753> it became clear that the Six Nations 
were unable or unwilling to maintain the status quo in the region.
The Iroquois position in the region was an increasingly anomalous one.
On the one hand, the Onondaga council railed against the "mere hunters" 
and "giddy young men & children" on the Ohio for entering into ne­
gotiations with the Anglo-American without working through the League.
On the other, the Six Nations were reluctant to let themselves be
drawn into a conflict at a time when their own relations with the Anglo-
218
Americans were on the verge of collapse. The result was, in effect, 
Iroquois abandonment of the Ohio country and the creation of a power 
vacuum into which stepped the French and, upon their departure begin­
ning in 1758, the Ohio Indian groups led by the Delawares.
The evolution of a Delaware identity and negotiating position in
219
the west had begun in the 1720s and was still evolving in 1758.
At the core of this Delaware community were a number of towns identi­
fied with one of three totemic clanss Wolf, Turkey, and Turtle, each 
clan having recognized spokesmen. Whole these clans and their con­
stituent towns still maintained a large degree of autonomy, they did
cooperate in the face of outside threats and, by the late 1760s, tended
220
to recognize and lend support to a Delaware "head chief".
At the time of General Forbes' arrival at Fort Duquesne, the most
221visible Delaware leaders were Pisquetomen, Shingas, and Tamaqua.
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From the summer of 1758 through 1762 Tamaq.ua appears most frequently 
as chief spokesman for the Ohio Indians. As his role grew, those of 
his brothers declined until only glimpses of them appear. The reason 
for Tamaqua's rise to authority seems to be connected to his non­
participation in the recent war with Pennsylvania. Thus, unlike his 
brothers and many other Delaware leaders, Tamaqua could pursue negoti­
ations with the Anglo-Americans untainted.
Paralleling the rise of the Delawares on the Ohio was the growing 
independence of the Ohio Iroquois. Between 1748 and the early 1760s, 
these people used the volatile state of affairs in the west to con­
firm their independent status in relation to their elders in New York. 
The two "half kings" had given the Ohio Iroquois a voice in regional 
affairs, in defiance of the Six Nations' declaration that they were 
only hunters and could not act in a politically independent manner.
With the deaths of Tanaghrisson and Scarouady in 1755 and 1756 new
'222Ohio Iroquois leaders emerged, best known of whom was Kayahsot.a.
Several things are clear about the large and varied Indian pop­
ulation of the trans-Appalachian region as it prepared to respond to 
the on-coming Anglo-Americans. For these Indians traditional values, 
social organization, beliefs, and customs were still very much a part 
of every day life. Yet the native societies in the west were not 
static. Change was ocurring throughout the region, most notably in 
the growing dependence of Indians on European materials and the trade 
through which these were obtained. European trade goods were just one 
aspect of a complex system of cultural exchange which, while selective
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on th e  p a r t  o f  a l l  concerned , n on e th e less  produced s tre s s  in  n a t iv e  
s o c ie t ie s  as  new id e a s  and v a lu e s  c o ll id e d  w ith  t r a d i t i o n .  The war­
fa r e  between In d ia n  groups and between n a t iv e s  and Europeans d u rin g  
much o f  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  th e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry , and th e  r e c u r r ­
in g  and tra u m a tic  ep idem ic  i l ln e s s e s  t h a t  o f te n  accom panied th e s e  
w ars, f u r t h e r  s t r a in e d  th e  n a t iv e  s o c ia l f a b r i c .  The r e s u l t  was an  
In d ia n  p o p u la t io n  in  a  s ta t e  o f  f l u x .  To a l l  o f  t h is  was added th e  
c o lla p s e  o f  French power in  th e  west and w ith  i t  much o f  th e  economic 
and d ip lo m a t ic  s t r u c tu r e  upon which many w estern  In d ia n s  had come to  
depend. T h is  s e t o f  c ircum stan ces  would h e lp  d e te rm in e  w estern  I n ­
d ia n  responses to  th e  A ng lo -A m erican  s o ld ie r s ,  t r a d e r s ,  and s e t t le r s  
who began to  ap pear in  th e  wake o f  th e  French d e fe a t .
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CHAPTER II 
The Anglo-American West to 1?5^
By 1760 the largest number of Anglo-Americans close to the trans- 
Appalachian region and its inhabitants were embodied in the armies 
that had recently occupied Canada and the Ohio country. These forces 
were comprised of a mix of English regulars and provincial troops 
from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. In 
all, some twenty thousand men were arrayed on the periphery of the 
west.^ While most of these troops were stationed in Canada to ensure 
the loyalty of the French population there, garrisons were establish­
ed on the Niagara River and at Fort Pitt in numbers that exceeded 
those previously mustered by the French. And, as Major Rogers embark­
ed on his mission to Detroit, British detachments were being pushed 
into the upper Ohio River basin and being readied to move west through­
out the Great Lakes region.
While these troops were preparing to consolidate and hold Eng­
land's conquest, Anglo-American settlers were beginning to return to 
lands immediately west of the Appalachians. These earlier farms had 
been abandoned in the face of French and Ohio Indian raids that swept 
over the Pennsylvania and Virginia back country in the wake of Braddock' 
defeat in 1755*
Although Anglo-Irish traders from these colonies had been well
established throughout the Ohio country be 175^ , settlements had only
2
begun to  p e n e tra te  th e  re g io n . In  New Y ork , th e  presence o f  th e  S ix
83
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Nations served to limit actual expansion, if not land speculation, 
west of the Mohawk River, while in Pennsylvania the mountains, pierced 
only by the West Branch of the Susquehanna River, presented a formida­
ble barrier to westward migration. As a result, many of those peo­
ple who wanted land followed the Great Valley into central and west- 
3
ern Virginia. Nevertheless, some Anglo-Americans did succeed in 
crossing the Appalachians. Prior to the outbreak of war there were 
settlements of a sort on both the Greenbriar and Kanahwa rivers, and 
a small settlement at Stewart's Crossing(present Oonnellsville, Penn­
sylvania). Christopher Gist, agent for the newly-formed Ohio Company 
of Virginia, had a "plantation" on the Monongahela River, although 
it appears to have been more of a plan than a reality in 175^ .
Aside from Gist's plantation and the tentative settlements along 
the Greenbriar, Anglo-American schemes to settle west of the mountains 
remained largely on paper in the form of charters for the Greenbriar 
Company and the larger Ohio Company. Both groups had been given 
land grants along tributaries of the Ohio River on condition that the 
grants be surveyed and occupied. In the Ohio Company's case, however, 
settlement took second place as the Company attempted to establish 
its own trade with the Ohio Indians. Such efforts further complicated 
the growing Anglo-French trade and imperial struggles in the region. 
These conflicts reached a climax early in 175^ when French forces 
evicted Ohio Company employees from the forks of the Ohio and built 
Fort Duquesne where the Company's store was to have been.^
The outbreak of war in the Ohio country put an immediate and 
effective end to Anglo-American trade and settlement ventures. Traders
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
were driven out of the region and their establishments either destroy­
ed or appropriated by the French, with substantial losses to the mer- 
chant houses that supplied the trade. Imm diately after disposing 
of Colonel George Washington's motley force at Fort Necessity on July 
4, 175^ > the French officer, Coulon de Villiers, burned Gist's settle­
ment and the Ohio Company storehouse on Redstone Creek, thus making
7
French control of the region complete.
Having routed Anglo-Americans in the west, the French and their
Indian auxiliaries from Canada and the Great Lakes began to carry the
war to the settled parts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, as well
as the Mohawk Valley of New York. In 1755* as Braddock's army crawled
toward the Ohio, French-led parties struck Will's Creek, Maryland.
In the aftermath of Braddock's defeat, the Indians living on the Ohio
began their own war against the Anglo-Americans. Pennsylvania and
Virginia experienced a new round of attacks that continued through
1756 and only began to subside after the Delawares' forward base at
Kittanning was abandoned in the wake of Colonel Armstrong's raid in
8
September of that year. Although the entire Anglo-American back
country lay open to attack during this period, Pennsylvania appears
9
to have suffered the heaviest losses. By the spring of 1758, Harris'
Ferry and Carlisle represented the westernmost pockets of settlement
in the colony as Cumberland County and parts of York County were all
but abandoned in the face of raid, the inhabitants streaming back to
10
Lancaster and Philadelphia. Lines of stockades and blockhouses 
proved ineffective both as a barrier to raiding parties and as a psy­
chological boost to the civilian population.11 The raids had a similar
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e f f e c t  on th e  m ora le  o f  those to  th e  so u th . V ir g in ia n s  and Mary­
la n d e rs  abandoned t h e i r  w estern  s e tt le m e n ts , le a v in g  W in c h e s te r and  
F o r t  Cumberland to  s ta n d  as advanced b a s tio n s  a g a in s t  th e  French and 
In d ia n s.^
Though p re c is e  f ig u r e s  a re  n o t a v a i la b le  i t  appears  t h a t  th e
inhabitants of the colonies bordering the west suffered as heavily
from  th e  war as th e  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  on th e  Ohio and G re a t L akes . In
November 1757 th e  P a la t in e  German s e tt le m e n t of German F l a t t s  on th e
Mohawk R iv e r  was d e s tro y e d . Losses in c lu d e d  some two hundred peop le
killed or captured and the destruction of large numbers of buildings 
13and l iv e s t o c k .  L is t s  o f  p r is o n e rs  com piled  by re tu r n e d  c a p tiv e s
and th e  re c o rd s  o f  A ng lo -A m ericans re tu rn e d  by In d ia n s  a f t e r  th e  war
further suggest the magnitude of losses in Pennsylvania and Virginia.
The c a p t iv e  M a rie  Le Roy knew th e  w hereabouts o f  t h i r t y - e i g h t  persons
among th e  In d ia n s . More com prehensive, but my no means e x h a u s tiv e ,
a re  th e  re c o rd s  k e p t by A ng lo -A m erican  o f f i c i a l s  o f  r e tu r n e d  c a p tiv e s .
Between August 1759 and A p r i l  1763> th e  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  in  th e  Ohio
country and lower Great Lakes returned at least 403 men, women, and
c h ild r e n  to  th e  g a r r is o n  a t  F o r t  P i t t .  The D e t r o i t  g a r r is o n  re c e iv e d
✓ 14
a n o th e r tw e n ty  by th e  end o f  1760 .
While only a sample, these lists give some indication of the num­
ber of people taken in frontier raids between 1755 and 1758. The total 
was certainly greater since Indians were reluctant to part with those 
they had adopted and some captives resisted repatriation to what, after 
several years spent in native societies, seemed an alien world. ^  
Finally, the figures of returned captives only hint at the total losses 
in dead and injured. Assuming the number of killed to have been at
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least twice the number carried off, due to those who chose to re­
sist or who failed to survive wounds or the trip west, losses in 
Pennsylvania and Virginia could easily have exceeded two thousand 
people, exclusive of other, military losses.
Like their Indian counterparts and enemies to the west, Anglo-
American settlers were hurt in other ways by the war. The loss of
numbers of people did not produce the same degree of social disruption
it did among native groups due mainly to the fact that Anglo-American
families were not the sole basis for the socio-political system. This
is not to say, however, that Anglo-American settlers were immune to
the effects of war. Losses of kin and neighbors weakened families
and communities and led to a heightened sense of insecurity, making
panic and flight more likely. In Carlisle, William Trent reported
that "a Lad who went from McDowell's Mill to see what fire it was
/at a neighbor's farm/ never returned, the Horse coming back with the
16
Reins over his back." Such a scene must have been all the more 
terrible for people who had lost homes and families and who had fled 
to Carlisle for safety. From the summer of 1755 through the fall of 
1758 episodes such as this were common all along the ever-contract­
ing line of settlement.
Along with the problems of staying alive and keeping ones family 
together under conditions of guerilla warfare, Anglo-American settlers 
were confronted with other difficulties. While the number of enemy 
raiders in the field at any given time was small, their effective­
ness tended to keep the inhabitants in a state of siege. Believing 
that "the Woods from Juniata to Shamokin are full of Indians, seeking
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for plunder and scalps", farmers were reluctant to sow and reap and
1?thus faced the possibility of loss of both subsistence and livlihood.
As the raids reached a peak those living in outlying farms and settle­
ments began to "geather in the greatest consternation" in the larger
communities or in the dozens of private "forts" that sprang up around
18
mills, stone houses, and trading posts. Those who fled to the 
towns found confusion, overcrowded conditions, filth, and disease. 
Smallpox broke out in Philadelphia in July 1757 and appeared the
19following spring in Lancaster. While the illness was probably in­
troduced by sailors or soldiers coming into Pennsylvania, the less than 
healthy environment in the refugee communities created ideal conditions 
for its transmission.
The anxiety and frustration created by this border warfare was 
revealed in a number of ways, both by provincial governments and 
their citizens. Confronted by an unconventional war which seemingly 
could not be won by conventional means, the governments of Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia by 1756 resorted to the one element of In­
dian warfare that did so much to terrorize civiliansj scalping. Pro­
vincial scalp bounties marked a serious departure from accepted Euro­
pean methods of warfare and reflected an attempt to "fight fire with 
fire" as well as a search for an inducement to get otherwise reluctant 
fighting men into the field. While the effects of scalping and scalp 
bounties as a deterrent to enemy activities is problematical, the 
bounty system became an acceptable method of financing frontier mil­
itary operations throughout the latter half of the war, and in later
20conflicts with western Indians.
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Scalp bounty proclamations reflected the frustration of colonial
officials and their search for more effective defensive measures.
For those under fire, the border was took its toll in other ways.
In Pennsylvania, for example, those living' in exposed areas began to
turn their anger and frustration against all Indians and their own
government. Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian agent, reported
that the survivors of the November 1755 raids called for attacks on
Indians "without Distinction", an attitude that boded ill for those
small groups of Indians still living at peace within or close to the
21
settled part of the colony. Worse than any emerging Indian-hating, 
from the point of view of the Philadelphia officials, was the growing 
bitterness over the government's inability and seeming unwillingness 
to respond to the obvious need for defense. The belief that an un­
responsive, indeed criminally negligent, government must be made to
act in the public interest, prompted hundreds of frontier farmers to
22descend on the capital late in 1755 to demand action. The tactic
worked, after a fashion. In response to public outrage as well as
shifts in the currents of provincial and imperial politics, steps were
taken to raise troops, fortify the frontier and to initiate negotiations
23with local Indians in the hope of ending the colony's Indian war.
What ultimately spared those Anglo-Americans facing the west was 
the success of military campaigns led and composed largely of English 
troops. In the summer of 1758 Colonel John Bradstreet destroyed the 
French depot at Fort Frontenac at Cataraqui on the eastern end of Lake 
Ontario. The subsequent abandonment of Fort Duquesne and its occupation 
by General Forbes' army in November ensured the Anglo-Americans a foot­
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hold in the Ohio country. Both of these successes hampered the French 
war effort and tended to relieve the pressure on the border settle­
ments. These victories also increased French logistical problems 
by interdicting supply lines to troops and Indian allies in the west. 
The loss of the vital entrepot of Fort Niagara in July 1759 effective­
ly severed the western territories from their administrative and logis­
tical center in the St. Lawrence Valley. By the end of 1759 the re­
maining French posts in the Ohio country had been abandoned, bring-
24
ing military operations in the west to an end.
The opportunities presented by the quasi-peace that existed in 
the trans-Appalachian region after 1758 were quickly exploited by Anglo- 
Americans. Those who went into the west; whether military or civilian, 
rode on a wave of conquest that heightened the conviction that a prize 
so dearly won should be at the disposal of the victors. In this, the 
Anglo-Americans who moved west after 1758 differed from the Indian 
people they would meet. For the former, the surrender of Canada re­
presented security and opportunity; for the latter it meant insecurity 
and apprehension about the future. For both, the conquest of Canada 
created problems that made peace difficult to achieve. What underlay 
these problems was the difference between the invader and those being 
invaded.
Like the Indians they would encounter, the Anglo-Americans who 
went into the west did not comprise a monolith. While these people 
all sought, in one way or another, to take advantage or opportunities 
presented by military victory, they did so in ways defined by particular 
interests or responsibilities. These, in turn, tended to fracture the
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Anglo-American presence into a number of often competing, sometimes 
antagonistic groups. This interest group competition tended to com- 
plicate official efforts to consolidate the battlefield gains and con­
trol expansion, both because of the conflict thus generated and be­
cause these competing groups presented something less than a unified 
front to the Indians whose cooperation, or at least acquiescence, was 
needed if the west was to be secure. What was for provincial and royal 
officials often a problem and complicating disadvantage could, how­
ever, be of potential value to Indian interests in their efforts to 
deal with this new wave of Anglo-American expansion.
Responsibility for maintaining royal control of the ceded ter­
ritories in the west, and crown policies toward the Indians was vest­
ed in the office of the American Commander-in-chief. Sir Jeffrey 
Amherst, who held that post from 1?59 until the fall of 1763, had at
his disposal two agencies with which to carry out policies originating
25
in London: the regular army and the Indian service. In theory, policy
would originate in London, based on recommendations and information 
supplied by military, provincial, and Indian service officials. Policy 
decisions would, in turn, be carried out in a coordinated fashion by 
Amherst, using the enforcement powers of the army in conjunction with 
the diplomatic skills of the Indian agents.
The Indian Department, the northern division of which was con­
trolled by Sir William Johnson, reflected both the crown's determination 
to coordinate and centralize Indian affairs and the largely de facto 
nature of Anglo-American policy toward the west and its inhabitants. 
Created in 1756, the Indian superintendencies and the handful of agents
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who comprised, the northern and southern departments were to have 
responsibility for coordinating and carrying out Indian policy in the 
wake of colonial mismanagement. Throughout the period from 1756 
through the Revolution the Indian service was administratively a 
sub-branch of the military command in America. The two superinten­
dents— Johnson in the north, John Stuart in the south— held their
26offices by royal commissions issued through the commander-in-chief. 
Further, the service was wholly dependent on the army for its budget, 
both for diplomatic expenses and salaries. Since the superintendents 
were to act as the primary conduits of information between London and 
the various Indian groups in and bordering the colonies, they were 
privileged to correspond directly with the Board of Trade and the Secre­
tary of State for the Southern Department, while at the same time being 
subordinate to the army command. Sir William Johnson, whose district 
came to include the newly-conquered territories west of the Alleghenies 
and north of the Ohio River was technically in sole charge of relations
27between the western Indians and both the crown and individual colonies.
The army, aside from its role as a conquering force, was assigned 
the additional responsibility of policing the trans-Appalachian region 
and of enforcing whatever policies and regulations governing Indian 
affairs the government might decree. For a number of reasons, the 
forces available were ill-suited to the task assigned them. Among 
other things there were far too few soldiers and too much territory 
to govern to make enforcement effective. Nevertheless, local commanders 
did attempt to fulfill their regulatory duties and, in so doing, came 
into direct confrontation with traders, settlers, and speculators.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
The end o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  was a  boon to  those  in  th e  A nglo-A m erican
business  community who sought th e  q u ic k  p r o f i t s  a v a i la b le  th rough  th e
f u r  t r a d e .  In d e e d , t r a d e r s ,  a c t in g  in d e p e n d e n tly  o r  as fa c to r s  f o r
th e  com m ercial houses o f  A lb an y  and P h i la d e lp h ia ,  moved west even as
28
i n i t i a l  peace n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  th e  In d ia n s  were b e in g  h e ld . I n  a 
few  cases tr a d e r s  managed to  re a c h  th e  G re a t Lakes t r a d in g  posts  w e ll  
ahead o f  th e  tro o p s  d is p a tc h e d  to  p r o te c t  and r e g u la te  t r a d in g  a c t i v i t i e s .  
The tr a d e  was s t i l l  s ig n i f ic a n t  enough to  th e  economies o f  New
30Y ork , P e n n s y lv a n ia , and Canada to  make i t  an a t t r a c t i v e  u n d e rta k in g .
The p r o f i t  m arg in  a ls o  made th e  In d ia n  tra d e  a  good in v e s tm e n t, e s p e c ia l ly  
f o r  com m ercial companies see k in g  to  d iv e r s i f y  and o b ta in  q u ick  re tu r n s .  
E vidence suggests a  n e a r ly  300 p e rc e n t r e tu r n  on goods c a r r ie d  to  
D e t r o i t  from  M o n tre a l in  1762 and 1763* and th e  tra d e  re g u la t io n s  p ro ­
m ulgated  by Johnson a llo w e d  f o r  generous p r o f i t s — as much as 50 p e r -
31
c en t o r  b e t t e r  a t  th e  p o s ts  on th e  u pp er G re a t Lakes. In  a d d it io n ,
s e v e ra l e n tre p re n e u rs  from  th e  o ld e r  c o lo n ie s  and a  number o f  r e t i r e d
army o f f i c e r s  went to  M o n tre a l and th e  w estern  p o s ts , a t t r a c te d  by th e
re p o r te d  b a c k -lo g  o f  p e l ts  r e s u l t in g  from  th e  war and bent on ta k in g
32
o v e r d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  fo rm e r F ren ch -C an ad ian  tra d e  system . F in a l l y ,  
some o f  th o se  who engaged in  th e  p o s t-w a r tr a d e  d id  so to  recoup lo s s e s  
s u ffe r e d  d u rin g  th e  French  o c c u p a tio n  o f  th e  Ohio co u n try  between 1752  
and 1755 .
E q u a lly  conspicuous and  p o t e n t ia l ly  more damaging to  A n g lo -In d ia n  
r e la t io n s  were th e  in c re a s in g  numbers o f  fa rm e rs  and h u n te rs  who moved 
in to  th e  w es t, l a r g e ly  from  th e  b o rd e r a re a s  o f  P en n s y lv a n ia  and V i r ­
g in ia .  Many o f  th e s e  p eo p le  fo llo w e d  E n g lis h  tro o p s , u s in g  th e  new
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33military roads which led to the Ohio River. The garrison at Fort
Pitt itself became the center of a thriving community of hunters,
3k
traders, sutlers, soldiers' families, and various hangers-on.
This migration into the Ohio region, especially along tributary 
streams such as the Monongahela, Youghiogheny, and Kanahwa rivers, 
represented the continuation of the tentative expansion that had been 
interrupted by the war. Some of those involved undoubtedly hoped to 
re-claim farms abandoned in 175^ -17551 others attempted to stake claims 
through squatters' rights. Still others went west with the encourage­
ment of land companies, often supported by provincial governments.
Foremost amorj these was the Ohio Company which sought after 
1758 to re-assert its pre-war claims to several hundred thousand acres 
of land south of the Ohio River. Added impetus was given by the war­
time promise of Virginia's Governor Dinwiddle of western lands as a 
bonus for those who served in the colony's forces. As the war drew 
to a close, Virginia officers, among them Ohio Company members George
Washington and George Mercer, lobbied for land grants in the western
35
lands claimed by Virginia through her royal charter.
The Ohio Company's activities were only one example of what Sir 
William Johnson called "the Pestilential Thirst for Land" running
36
through the colonies. In Pennsylvania the Susquehanna Company of 
Connecticut, again through claims based on provincial charters, made 
its first attempt to plant settlements on the upper Susquehanna River, 
near Wyoming. The Company and its agents, most notorious of whom was 
John Henry Lydius of Albany, had acquired through questionable means 
a deed to the desired lands from several Iroquois at the 175^ Albany
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conference. Ignoring the later repudiation of the sale by the Six 
Nations and the ban on settlement west of the Susquehanna made pro­
claimed at Easton in 1758, the Company persisted in its efforts, to 
the alarm of local settlers and Iroquois, not to mention to proprie­
tary government of Pennsylvania.^
In New York, along the Mohawk River, similar attempts were being 
made by land interests. The practical necessity of maintaining Six 
Nations friendship during the war had led to a reduction, though never 
a cessation, of estate-building and speculation in the area west and 
south of Albany. 3y 1760, however, pre-war claims to large tracts 
were being pressed which, if successful, would embrace most or all of 
the lands used and occupied by the Mohawks and Oneidas. The most no­
torious of these claims was the Kayaderosseras Patent, embracing eight 
hundred thousand acres north and west of the Mohawk River. As with 
the Ohio and Susquehanna companies, the New York patentees had been 
issued titles by their own government but had not succeeded in extin­
guishing native claims in a manner satisfactory to all parties con­
cerned.^
Land speculation was one area in which individual colonies could 
advance their claims to attractive western lands through semi-private 
companies. In the case of Pennsylvania, however, determination to pre­
serve and enhance provincial claims extended into the realm of Indian 
affairs as well. Since the formation of the royal Indian service, the 
colony had been reluctant to part with its control of local Indian re­
lations. In addition, Pennsylvania's relations with both its Indian 
neighbors and the crown were complicated by the on-going feud between
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elites. While largely political in nature, the conflict led to re­
percussions in Indian affairs as the Quakers, through their Friendly 
Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians, used 
the proprietary's less than admirable record of Indian land purchases 
as ammunition. Using their political clout and they support they came 
to enjoy with the military command in the colony, the Quakers worked 
to establish provincial trade regulations and their own control of 
government-supported trading stores. The object was to maintain peace 
by guaranteeing a fair, plentiful trade. One result of this was to
introduce another unwelcome entrant into an increasingly competitive,
39crowded business.
The response of the English army and Indian service to trade and 
settlement activities varied from active attempts to enforce the emerg­
ing, somewhat confused program toward the west and its native inhabitants, 
to cooperation. Relations at any given time were largely governed by 
local circumstances and often based on decision made on the spot rather 
than after consultation with higher authority.
The largest point of conflict between the army and traders was 
over the transportation and sale of liquor. A cheaply produced item 
much in demand among Indians, rum could yield greater profits than 
bulky, more expensive hardware and cloth. From the official point of 
view, however, the liquor trade induced drunken violence and encourag­
ed sharp practices by traders that left Indian customers stripped of 
their means of support and a lingering bitterness toward Anglo-Americans 
in general. On a more practical level, Indians destitute of clothing
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and food from dealing with unscrupulous traders became an unwelcome
40
public charge on the garrisons' own, often meagre, stores.
The same desire to ensure fair treatment of Indians to maintain 
the peace led the army to confront speculators and squatters on west­
ern lands. Bound by treaty promises to preserve those lands still 
claimed by native groups, the royal government acted to restrain those 
Anglo-Americans who sought to appropriate protected lands for them­
selves by legal or illegal means.
The army was not uniformly opposed to western settlement, how­
ever. As early as l?6l, Sir Jeffrey Amherst made known his wish to 
locate farmers and ex-soldiers at the western posts as a way of support­
ing the garrisons. Reminiscent of European frontier garrison settle­
ments in Eastern Europe and Iz’eland, those in America were to aid in
4l
the defense of England's new territories. Practical military con­
siderations also prompted Amherst to encourage the settlement of the 
vital Niagara portage by a partnership of traders and former army officers. 
He hoped that such a scheme would ensure the passage of supplies to the 
upper posts by putting their transportation in the more trusted and,
presumably, more reliable hands of Anglo-American, rather than Seneca
42
of Mississauga, porters.
By the same token, military-trader relations were often cordial, 
or at least cooperative. The merchant houses that supplied traders 
also held contracts to supply the army and Indian agents, thus provid­
ing one avenue of cooperation. Beyond this, traders performed valuable 
services as interpreters, messengers, sources of intelligence, and, in 
the face of fiscal restrictions, suppliers of goods for soldiers as well
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as occasional gifts for Indian negotiations.
The Indian service, like the army upon which it depended, found 
itself in a similar relationship with private interests. As the resident 
authority on Indian affairs in the west, Sir William Johnson was expect­
ed, and indeed, sought, to propose and promote policies designed to 
create a climate of peace within which Anglo-American interests could 
flourish. In carrying out his responsibilities, Johnson and the service 
he led became a focal point for royal and private interests. Through­
out the 1760s, Johnson, to the extent that he had an Indian Depart­
ment bureaucracy at all, tended to enlist traders such as George Groghan, 
Alexander McKee, and Jean Baptiste de Couagne as agents. As a major 
New York land baron whose estates resulted from his special relation­
ship with the Mohawk Iroquois, Johnson was sympathetic to the desires 
of others to expand their estates. Throughout his tenure as superin­
tendent, Johnson added to his holdings and those of political allies,
using his contacts with both Iroquois and English politicians for private
ij4
gain as well as public good.
The combination of private interests and public policy present­
ed a tempting opportunity for employees of the Indian service. Among 
the stores of liquor confiscated by the commander of Fort Niagara in 
1762 were 286 gallons belonging to de Couagne. At the same time that 
military and Indian service officials were complaining about the il­
licit liquor trade at Toronto, Indian agents went there to dispose of 
goods anf rum that could not be sold in the over-stocked marketplace 
at Niagara. George Croghan, Johnson's deputy in the Ohio country, used 
his position to acquire extensive landholdings north of Fort Pitt,
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technically in contravention of the ban placed on western settle- 
he
ment. J
Trade and land interests also found themselves cooperating. At
the time of its organization in the late 1740s, the Ohio Company saw
the Indian trade as another, perhaps major, source of revenue and as
a means of gaining Indian acceptance of the Company's land schemes.
Traders such as Hugh Crawford, Thomas Cresap, and Hugh Parker in the
Company’s employ established trading stations in the Muskingum valley 
46
and a t  K u sku sk ies . What i s  more, P a rk e r , Cresap, and W illia m  T re n t ,
as well as Christopher Gist, acted as advance men and surveyors for 
47the Company. In the aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, many 
Ohio country traders and their merchant employers sought ways of re­
covering the losses they had suffered at the hands of the French and 
hostile former Indian customers. The plan developed by the "Suffer­
ing Traders"— a land grant from the crown— made cooperation with land­
ed interests once again attractive. Speculators and traders began to 
combine their resources in an effort to circumvent restrictions on 
western expansion by calling for land grants as recompense for war-
48
related losses.
Though they often appear as a single force in western affairs, 
the traders themselves cannot be seen as a unified group. Regional 
differences led to conflicts over trade regulations and methods that 
were never fully resolved before war errupted in 1763* The problem 
grew out of efforts by a number of Scottish merchants to take control 
of the French-Canadian trade network in the Great Lakes region. Re­
lying on the expertise of Canadian voyageurs and methods developed
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during the French regime, these entrepreneurs sought to re-open the 
northern trade in its old form, which included permitting traders to 
go directly to Indian customers rather than being restricted to a few 
posts. Under this plan, the garrisons on the Great Lakes would serve
4 9
as periodic rendezvous where pelts would be trans-shipped to Montreal. 
This scheme, while well adapted to the realities of the Great Lakes 
trade system, collided both with royal interests and those of traders 
from the older colonies. On the one hand, Johnson and Amherst object­
ed to anything that hinted of unrestricted activity on the part of 
traders. On the other, traders from Albany and Philadelphia, lacking 
the geographic advantages held by the Canadians, complained of unfair 
competition. Conflicts were exacerbated by the presence of British 
officer-traders at Niagara Falls who were accused of attempting to in­
tercept Indian traders before they reached Fort Niagara, where trade 
was supposed to be conducted. Finally, Pennsylvania traders resent­
ed the Quaker-operated provincial store at Fort Pitt, both because it 
was Quaker and because it appeared as an attempt to fix prices and 
create a provincial monopoly against which independent traders could 
not compete.^
While the conquest of Canada presented some private interests with 
opportunities in the west, it also presented a number of problems for 
Anglo-American officials charged with the responsibility of consolidat­
ing and defending the trans-Appalachian region. Fundamentally these 
officials worked to realize two closely related goalsi the security 
of the west and its integration into the imperial system, and peace 
with the large native population of the region. While the capitulation
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of Montreal effectively ended the Anglo-French conflict, such was not 
the case between English colonials and the western Indians who had 
taken up arms against them between 1755 and I76O. Peace with the In­
dians was a recognised prerequisite for the successful occupation a.nd 
exploitation of the Great Lakes basin as well as the actual trans­
fer of sovereignty to England.
The problem which confronted the American commander-in-chief 
and his subordinates reflected both the nature of England's war effort 
and immediate post-war concerns and the character of the Anglo-American 
position relative to the west. As the Canadian scholar W.J. Eccles 
has so aptly pointed out, England's war leaders had made no plans for 
peace, particularly a peace that included the transfer of a vast ter-
51
ritory to the crown. What this meant in practical terms was a lack 
of guidance and a clear understanding of precisely how colonial and 
crown officials were to go about imposing order on and managing what 
had once been New France. Of necessity, much was left to the discretion 
of officers on the scene who tended to fall back on military expediency.
Another facet of this problem was the question of what status 
should be accorded the Indians living within the conquered territories. 
Whereas the Canadian French living in the west were automatically assum­
ed to be under direct British rule, this assumption did not necessarily 
extend to the Indian inhabitants. On the one hand, the lands on which 
these people lived and depended had passed under English rule by right 
of conquest. On the other, however, no clear statement emerged as to 
the status of the Indians themselves. Rather, they were defined as 
being under the protection of the crown, which assumed a moral obligation
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to protect native rights. From the Anglo-American point of view, 
this obligation proceeded from the recognition that protection and 
aid were the crown's to give or withhold and that decisions to that 
end did not have to be made in consultation with the Indians them- 
sslvos•
Although no policy existed at the time of the conquest of Canada, 
there was little doubt about who should be responsible for securing 
the west and maintaining peace. The crown continued on the course 
it had embarked upon in 1756 of consolidating both defense and Indian 
affairs in royal offices empowered to act in the best interests of 
the home government. Both Amherst and Johnson recognized that a well 
regulated trade was the surest way to peace because "trade is undoubt-
53edly the strongest cement to bind the Indians to our alliance." At 
the same time, the newly-conquered lands could best be secured by a 
standing force rather than a part-time militia responsible to one or
54
more provincial governments.
A number of circumstances worked to limit the extent to which 
royal control could be imposed over the west and to limit the army's 
and the Indian service's ability to maintain peace. Britain's enor­
mous war debt forced her political leaders to cut expenses wherever 
possible and to earch for new sources of revenue. This post-war economic 
mood appeared in Anglo-Indian relations in two ways. First, the size 
and efficiency of the army steadily declined as troop establishments 
were reduced as a cost-cutting measure. Second, the commander-in-chief 
was under pressure to trim extraordinary expenses wherever possible.
Since the largest of these was the budget for Indian diplomacy, the
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In d ia n  s e rv ic e  found  i t s e l f  c a l le d  upon to  c u r t a i l  g i f t - g i v i n g ,  ex­
p e n s iv e  d ip lo m a tic  m e e tin g s , and o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  had lo n g  heen 
p a r t  o f  th e  r e c ip r o c a l  n a tu re  o f  In d ia n  d ip lo m acy .
Money was ju s t  one problem  t h a t  p lag u ed  Johnson and th e  In d ia n  
s e rv ic e  as th e  French  w ar ended. S in c e  i t s  in c e p t io n , th e  In d ia n  
s e rv ic e  had been s u b o rd in a te  to  th e  arm y. Both i t s  budget and i t s  
o rd e rs  came from  th e  m i l i t a r y  h e a d q u a rte rs  i n  New Y o rk . T h is  made 
p e r f e c t ly  good sense in  tim e  o f  war when Johnson 's  p rim a ry  ta s k  was 
to  f u r t h e r  B r i t is h  war aim s by engaging In d ia n  a u x i l i a r i e s .  B ut th e  
new r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  t h a t  came w ith  peace exposed s e r io u s  weaknesses 
in  In d ia n  a f f a i r s .  A d m in is t r a t iv e ly  s u b o rd in a te , charged w ith  th e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  d e v e lo p in g  r e g u la t io n s  f o r  t r a d e  and. s e tt le m e n t,
55
Johnson was g iv e n  no enforcem ent pow ers. H is  s m a ll group o f  agents  
com prised an ad  hoc departm ent w ith  l i t t l e  more th a n  a d v is o ry  powers. 
Johnson and h is  s t a f f  were f u r t h e r  ham strung by h a v in g  to  d e a l w ith  an  
army b ureaucracy  s ta t io n e d  in  New Y o rk , is o la te d  from  th e  r e a l i t i e s  
o f  i n t e r - c u l t u r a l  r e la t io n s  and l i t t l e  in c l in e d  to  remedy th e  s i t u a t io n .
A s id e  from  problem s a r is in g  from  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and f i s c a l  c ircum ­
s tan ces  t h a t  grew o u t o f  th e  w ar, A ng lo -A m erican  a u t h o r i t ie s  were con­
f r o n te d  w ith  problem s p e c u l ia r  to  any conquering  power b en t on in v a d ­
in g  and h o ld in g  a l i e n  la n d s  and p e o p le . The most obv ious o f  th e s e  was 
s p a t ia l :  th e  sh eer s iz e  o f  th e  tra n s -A p p a la c h ia n  re g io n  made i t s  oc­
c u p a tio n  an im posing ta s k . G iven  th e  s m a ll number o f  s o ld ie r s  th a t  
Am herst f e l t  a b le  to  r e le a s e  f o r  w estern  d u t ie s ,  th e  ta s k  was even 
more m onum ental, The n e c e s s ity  to  econom ize both  money and manpower 
and th e  need to  show th e  f l a g  th ro u g h o u t th e  w est w ould  d e te rm in e  th e
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methods and means used to occupy the region.
Finally, Anglo-American knowledge of the human geography of the 
west was at first incomplete and limited. While good information sup­
plied by traders and other western travelers could he found in the 
maps of John Mitchell and Lewis Evans of 1755> these were of little 
use to officials trying to ascertain the whereabouts and numbers of 
Indians in the post-war period. As in former times, much information 
was provided by traders and native informants, supplemented by reports 
on local conditions by post commanders. In each case, however, such 
information tended to be localized. It was not until late 1?62 that 
Anglo-American officials received a first-hand account of the numbers 
and location of Indians living south of the Lake Erie and Lake Michigan. 
In that year, Ensign Thomas Hutchins made a fact-finding tour from 
Fort Pitt to La Baye. His findings, embodied in the so-called "Hutchins
Map" became, with later revisions, the basic source on trans-Appalachian
56
Indians until the Revolution.
From 1755 until their troops reached the Ohio River in 1758, 
Anglo-Americans, like the Indians they would encounter, had experienced 
warfare and the losses and dislocation that the Great War for the Em­
pire brought in its wake. Also like the Indians of the west, the En­
glish colonials and their royal protectors had only incomplete and 
equally culture-bound notions of how to deal with those on the other 
side of the Appalachians. For each society the war brought profound 
changes, especially since it permanently altered the pre-existing power 
relationships in the west. In the years immediately following the 
arrival of Anglo-American troops in the west, both sides would work
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to  d e ve lo p  p o l ic ie s  and responses to  changes wrought hy w a r. In  t h is ,  
th e  A ng lo -A m ericans had a  d is t i n c t  p s y c h o lo g ic a l, i f  n o t m i l i t a r y  o r  
p o l i t i c a l ,  advantage! th e y  emerged from  what th ey  d e fin e d  as a  con­
t e s t  between two em pires th e  c le a r  v ic t o r .
The c o n fro n ta t io n  o f  v ic t o r io u s  A ng lo -A m ericans and In d ia n  groups  
who d id  n o t count them selves  a p a r t  o f  th e  conquest was, how ever, n e ith e r  
a b ru p t n or w ith o u t p recedence. D urin g  th e  p re v io u s  decade E n g lis h  
c o lo n ia ls  and a number o f  In d ia n  groups had a tte m p te d  to  accommodate 
each o th e r  and to  l i m i t  th e  im pact o f  war th ro u gh  and e la b o ra te  system  
o f  economic and p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t ia t io n s . W h ile  n e v e r w h o lly  success­
f u l ,  th e s e  p re v io u s  c o n ta c ts  p ro v id e d  th e  b a s is  f o r  a tte m p ts  a t  accom­
m odation in  th e  p e r io d  between 1758 and 1763.
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CHAPTER III
The R oots o f  A n g lo -In d ia n  R e la t io n s  in  th e  Wests 
1755-1758
The ways in  which tra n s -A p p a la c h ia n  In d ia n s  and A nglo -A m ericans  
responded to  each o th e r  a f t e r  1758 was, in  p a r t ,  c o n d itio n e d  by th e  
p a t te r n  o f  r e la t io n s h ip s  t h a t  had developed  between them in  th e  y e a rs  
p re c e d in g  th e  G re a t War f o r  th e  E m pire . Even d u r in g  th e  w ar, when 
t r a d e  was d is ru p te d  and A ng lo -A m ericans r e t r e a te d  from  th e  w e s t, d ip ­
lo m a t ic  exchanges c o n tin u e d . A t no tim e  b e fo re  1758 were r e la t io n s  
between th e  two peop les  r i g i d l y  p re s c r ib e d . R a th e r , th e s e  r e la t io n s ,  
economic and p o l i t i c a l ,  co n tin u ed  to  e v o lv e  and were re d e f in e d  in  
l i g h t  o f  c u rre n t c ircum stan ces . In d e e d , even as A ng lo -A m erican  tro o p s  
appeared  on th e  Ohio in  November 1758, w e s te rn  In d ia n s  and c o lo n ia l  
o f f i c i a l s  had a lre a d y  begun to  search f o r  ways to  d e a l w ith  each o th e r  
in  l i g h t  o f  r a p id ly  changing r e a l i t i e s .
I
A n g lo -In d ia n  r e la t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  a f f a i r s  in  th e  w est, had lo n g  
been h e ld  to g e th e r  and r a t io n a l iz e d  by a  number o f  in t e r - c u l t u r a l  a l ­
l ia n c e s .  The o ld e s t  and b es t known was th e  Cevenant Chain which bound 
th e  S ix  N a tio n s  Ir o q u o is  and s e v e ra l E n g lis h  c o lo n ie s  in  a s p e c ia l r e ­
la t io n s h ip .  Founded in  th e  1670s by New Y o rk 's  g overn o r Edmund Andros, 
th e  C hain— a m e ta p h o ric a l d e v ic e  s ig n if y in g  th e  s p e c ia l ,  c lo s e  f r ie n d -
112
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s h ip  "between th e  Ir o q u o is ,  t h e i r  c l i e n t s ,  and th e  E n g lis h — was d i r e c t ­
ed tow ard  r a t io n a l i z in g  In d ia n  a f f a i r s  and p re s e rv in g  peace on New 
Y o rk 's  exposed w es te rn  and n o r th e rn  f r o n t i e r .
A ccord ing  th e  F ra n c is  Jen n in g s , fo rem ost s tu d e n t o f  th e  C hain, 
t h is  a l l ia n c e  was an " in t e r - s o c ie t a l "  system " c re a te d  "by c o n tra c t f o r  
e lim in a t in g  v io le n c e  and re d u c in g  c o n f l i c t  between In d ia n s  and E n g lis h ­
men w ith in  s p e c if ie d  and bounded t e r r i t o r i e s . "  F u r th e r , from  th e  Eng­
l i s h  p o in t  o f  v ie w , th e  C hain  p ro v id e d  a  means o f  a d ju s t in g  c o lo n ia l-  
In d ia n  boundaries  and f u r t h e r in g  E n g lis h  expansion a g a in s t  th e  French  
and those n a t iv e s  n o t in c lu d e d  i n  th e  a llian ce ."*"
As o r ig i n a l l y  c o n ce ived , th e  Covenant Chain had s e v e ra l c h a ra c te r ­
i s t i c s .  On th e  E n g lis h  s id e ,  New York s tro v e  to  m a in ta in  i t s e l f  as 
th e  s o le  spokesman f o r  A ng lo -A m erican  in t e r e s t s .  The a l l ia n c e  i t s e l f  
was based on m utual needs and r e c ip r o c a l  o b l ig a t io n s . On th e  In d ia n  
s id e , th e  Ir o q u o is ,  w ith  New Y o rk 's  b a c k in g , a c te d  as th e  o f f i c i a l  
v o ic e  f o r  o th e r  In d ia n s  i n  th e  C hain . F in a l l y ,  a lth o u g h  th e  Chain was 
an E n g lis h  c o n tr iv a n c e , i t s  success and c o n t in u ity  came to  r e s t  on th e  
c o o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  Ir o q u o is  and, more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  th e  Mohawks, through
whom New York sought in f lu e n c e  w ith  th e  more d is ta n t  and le s s  w e ll
2
known Iro q u o is  com m unities.
By v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  g e o g rap h ic  p o s it io n  a s t r id e  th e  m a jo r a r t e r ie s  
o f  tra d e  and war in  th e  n o r th e a s t and lo w e r G re a t L akes , and t h e i r  
in t e r n a l  o rg a n iz a t io n — th e  "League" o r  "C o n federacy"— th e  F iv e ,  l a t e r  
S ix ,  N a tio n s  were a b le  to  e x e rc is e  in f lu e n c e  o ver n a t iv e  and i n t e r -
3
c o lo n ia l  a f f a i r s  o u t o f  p ro p o r t io n  to  t h e i r  numbers o r  a c tu a l power.
Due to  t h e i r  e a r ly  access to  Dutch f i r e a r m s , Mohawk, Seneca, and o th e r
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Ir o q u o is  w a r r io rs  were a b le  to  wage a s e r ie s  o f  s u c c e s s fu l campaigns
a g a in s t  le s s  w e ll-a rm e d  tr a d e  c o m p e tito rs , r e a l  o r p o t e n t ia l .  In
th e s e  c o -c a lle d  "B eaver Wars" th e  Ir o q u o is  d e fe a te d  o r  s c a t te re d  most
o f  th e  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  in  th e  lo w e r O n ta r io  p e n in s u la  and th e  la n d s  im -
4
m e d ia te ly  south o f  Lake E r ie .  Success was made p o s s ib le  as w e l l  by 
th e  League c o u n c il w h ich , th rough  k in s h ip  t i e s ,  d e b a te , consensual 
agreem ent, and th e  condolence ceremony to  suppress in t e r n a l  b lood  
fe u d s , served  to  l i m i t ,  b u t by no means e l im in a te ,  in te r n e c in e  con­
f l i c t s .  Thus, w h ile  Mohawks, Ononadagas, and Senecas o c c a s io n a lly  
fo u g h t each o th e r  f o r  c o n tro l o f  t ra d e  ro u te s  and th e  doin 'nant r o le
w ith in  th e  c o n fe d e ra c y , th e  image most o f te n  p ro je c te d  to  le s s  in fo rm -
5
ed o u ts id e rs  was one o f  u n i t y  and c e n t r a l iz e d  le a d e rs h ip .
Ir o q u o is  in f lu e n c e  and v i t a l i t y  was f u r t h e r  m a in ta in e d  by th e  
S ix  N a t io n s ' p o l ic ie s  tow ard  o th e r  In d ia n  g roups. I n  th e  m id -seven ­
te e n th  c e n tu ry  th e  Ir o q u o is  were a b le  to  make good lo s s e s  from  war and 
d is e a s e  by in c o rp o ra t in g  in d iv id u a l  p r is o n e rs  and w hole v i l l a g e s  in to  
t h e i r  o s c ie ty .  The a d o p tio n  o f  e n t i r e  Huron v i l la g e s  by th e  Senecas, 
f o r  exam ple, was o n ly  an e x te n s io n  o f  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  p r a c t ic e  o f  r e ­
p la c in g  th e  dead w ith  l i v e  c a p tiv e s  o r  by means o f  t h e i r  r i t u a l i s t i c  
6
e x e c u tio n . A t th e  same t im e , th e  Ir o q u o is  developed  a p o l ic y  o f  a c t ­
in g  as p ro te c to rs  f o r  th o s e  In d ia n s  who, as v ic t im s  o f  e p id em ics , w ars , 
o r d is p o s s e s s io n , were fo rc e d  to  v a c a te  t h e i r  own la n d s . The L e a g u e 's  
reasons f o r  assuming t h is  r o le  were n o t e n t i r e ly  h u m a n ita r ia n . As 
European s e tt le m e n ts  pushed up th e  n a tu r a l avenues in to  th e  i n t e r i o r ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  a lo n g  th e  D e la w a re , Susquehanna, and M0hawk r i v e r s ,  th e  I r o ­
q uo is  responded by p la n t in g  th e s e  s m a lle r  n a t iv e  groups a t  s t r a t e g ic
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points as "props" for the League's symbolic longhouse.
Each Iroquois group seems to have taken charge of that area over 
which it had special claims or interests, thus the Oneidas' and Onon- 
dagas' invlovement in affairs on the Susquehanna River and the Senecas" 
interest in the Ohio region, In the latter case, special regard for 
the Ohio country resulted also from the Senecas' special role as 
keepers of the western door of the metaphorical longhouse. The re­
sult was that in addition to the Six Nations proper, client groups—
the props— were given land and a place in the Covenant Chain in re-
8
turn for guarding the Iroquois' frontiers.
The Chain extended this clientage system into the arena of Anglo- 
Indian relations and at the same time enhanced Iroquois prestige and 
their image as a powerful force in international affairs. As the 
system evolved, the Six Nations came to serve as the sponsor of other 
Indian groups in the alliance. By the early eighteenth century these 
included the Delawares, the so-called River Indians, refugee groups 
from Maryland and the lower Susquehanna valley, and immigrant groups 
of Shawnees who moved into Pennsylvania from the Ohio and Tennessee
9
river valleys. Clientage did not mean coersion, however. The spirit 
of reciprocity, common in native relationships, extended to the Covenant 
Chain as well. In return for protection and security in their new or 
traditional homelands, Conoys, Tutelos, Delawares, and others appear 
to have accepted Iroquois domination of their external affairs. The 
clients, for their part, were expected to cooperate in maintaining 
peace and securing the lands embraced by the Chain. They could not 
be compelled to do so. Iroquois demands for military assistance in
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the seventeenth century were often met by protest or quiet refusal
suggesting that, far from being "conquerers, the Six Nations were
10
limited by traditional values and dependence on English support.
The Covenant Chain did not remain static but continued to evolve 
and expand as circumstances governing Indian-European relations changed. 
As the alliance evolved, it became more complex and took on new char­
acteristics. Power relationships within the Chain shifted as well 
until, by 1753» 'the whole system had been thrown into disarray in the 
wake of growing distrust and military conflict centering on the trans- 
Appalachian region. The later history of the Chain came to include 
many of the people who would find themselves in confrontation in the 
west after 1758•
Prior to the collapse of Anglo-Indian relations in the west, the 
Covenant Chain alliance changed in several ways. First, the role of 
the Six Nations as the dominant native group changed after 1701. Second, 
the Chain took on a coercive aspect toward some Indians as it became 
more and more a tool of Anglo-American expansion. Finally, the net­
work of relationships that made up the original alliance were alter­
ed as new English and Indian groups were brought into the Covenant and 
as new partnerships only tangentially connected to the original Chain 
were formed. By the late 17^ K)s these trends had converged in the econom­
ically and strategically important Ohio country.
By the time the Ohio valley crisis reached its peak, the influence 
of the Six Nations in the Covenant Chain had come to be based as much, 
or more, on Anglo-American support for and perceptions of the Iroquois 
than on any inherent authority or power of the League itself. Since
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Prance had been one of official, though at times aggressive, neutral­
ity which allowed interested Iroquois groups to play off or balance 
the two competing European powers to their own advantage. The basis 
for this policy had been the treaties with New France and New York, 
known collectively as the Peace of 1701. Through these agreements the 
Six Nations hoped to extricate themselves from a costly war with the 
French, re-establish their prominence in the western fur trade, and 
still maintain the Covenant Chain with New York. The results worked 
well enough in the short run. Peace and neutrality helped the Iroquois 
rebuild trade connections to the west as Great Lakes Indians took ad­
vantage of new access to the Albany market. This trade enriched the 
Iroquois as well as New York. The French, for their part, received 
Six Nations pledges of neutrality in any future inter-colonial wars. 
Finally, in order to ensure access to beaver hunting grounds north of 
the Great Lakes, the Iroquois deeded to England their own dubious claims 
to these lands by right of conquest, a claim more valid in European 
courts than in native councils. England thus found itself holding
a questionable claim to a vast territory with which to counter similar 
11French ambitions.
While the 1701 treaties gave the Six Nations the means to survive 
between and even play o f f the colonial powers, the settlement was less 
a triumph of Iroquois military power than it was an example of the 
Six Nations' diplomatic acuity. Neutrality was the price the Iroquois 
had to pay in return for peace with New France. And while trade and 
neutrality had their benefits, each to a large extent depended on Euro­
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pean perceptions of Iroquois intentions and abilities to tip the 
balance of power in favor of one side or the other. Any noticeable 
efforts by the League to support English over French interests would 
result in a French response that had the potential of wrecking the 
western trade and perhaps the Iroquois themselves. Conversely, if 
it appeared that the Six Nations, as the principal Indian partners in 
the Covenant Chain, could not help thwart French expansion into dis­
puted regions, the English could by-pass the League altogether and 
act alone or with other Indians to redress the balance of power. For 
over a decade the Iroquois were able to avoid this dilemma due in large 
part to the rapproachment that existed between France and England after 
1715.1?
Nonetheless, the Six Nations were never able to re-assert the 
territorial or military influence they had enjoyed before 1701. While 
Anglo-Americans in New York, and later in Pennsylvania and Virginia, 
continued to base their Indian and inter-colonial policies on a per­
ception of Six Nations influence and power over other Indians, the 
basis for that perception was eroding. In one sense it had never ex­
isted at all. Prior to the 1730s, the Iroquois had not voiced claims 
of conquest over Covenant Chain clients, and relations between Indian 
groups within the alliance were based on reciprocity rather than 
force.
In the first place, while the 1701 peace brought a chance to re­
build and to recoup twenty years worth of war-related losses, the New 
York Iroquois population continued to decline. This decline was in 
part due to continued invasions of diseases combined with periodic
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local shortages of food. However, the early eighteenth century wit­
nessed out-migrations that eventually alarmed both Iroquois and Anglo- 
American leaders. On the one hand, Iroquois people continued to re­
settle at French mission towns such as Gaughnawaga and Oka and, after
14
1748, at the new settlement of La Presentation at Oswegatchie. This
migration was a continuation of one begun in the l660s, when whole
families of Christian Mohawks had emigrated to La Prairie de la Mag-
delane, later known as Sault St. Louis.
To the west, increasing numbers of Iroquois, principally Senecas,
were opening up the Ohio country to settlement. This pioneering effort
developed gradually as hunters, seeking alternatives to game shortages
and crop failures at home, decided to take permanent advantage of what
amounted to the last unexploited game reserves and fresh farming regions
15east of the Mississippi. Existing population figures suggest the
magnitude of the migration. This appears to have begun in earnest in
the 1720s and increased in the 1740s as local famines drove people out
of the Genesee valley. By 1748 some 730 Iroquois men were reported
living in the Ohio country, representing a total of perhaps three
thousand people. In that year also, Conrad Weiser was told that 292
Iroquois warriors were living in the vicinity of Logstown and the Kus-
16
kuskies on the upper Ohio. A lack of population data for the Six
Nations in New York before 1763 renders comparisons difficult. In the
latter year, the Iroquois were said to have 1,930 vrarriors, including 
those living in the west. Assuming that the Ohio Iroquois population 
remained the same— and wartime conditions may well have increased the 
westward movement— then a significant number of these men and their fam-
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
120
17
i l i e s  were l i v i n g  o u ts id e  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  bounds o f  th e  co n federacy . 
D is ta n c e  from  New York a ls o  b rought independence and a new i d e n t i t y .
W h ile  c o n tin u in g  to  pay l i p - s e r v i c e  to  t h e i r  e ld e rs  in  th e  Mohawk 
re g io n , th e  Ohio Ir o q p o is  c h a rte d  t h e i r  own course i n  in t e r n a t io n a l  
a f f a i r s .  By th e  l a t e  17^K)s, t h e i r  le a d e rs  were p la y in g  a  c e n t r a l  r o le  
in  r e g io n a l a f f a i r s ,  in  d e fia n c e  o f  S ix  N a tio n s  w ishes.
A t th e  same tim e  t h a t  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  were lo s in g  peop le  to  o th e r  
la n d s , th e y  were lo s in g  th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e  a t  home. W h ile  m ain­
ta in in g  an o f f i c i a l  n e u t r a l i t y  in  th e  two decades a f t e r  1701 , con­
s t i t u e n t  e lem ents  o f  th e  co n fed eracy  pursued more l o c a l l y  advantageous  
p o l ic ie s .  D e s ir in g  to  m a in ta in  t h e i r  fa v o ra b le  t r a d in g  r e la t io n s  w ith  
both A lbany and Canadian In d ia n s , th e  Mohawks tended  to  le a n  tow ard  
th e  E n g lis h  d u r in g  th e  renewed im p e r ia l c o n f l i c t ,  known as Queen A nne 's  
War. P e rc e iv in g  t h is  su p p o rt as p o t e n t ia l ly  damaging to  h is  governm ent's  
economic and m i l i t a r y  p o s i t io n ,  G overnor V a u d re u il o f  Canada approved  
th e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  N ia g a ra  p o rta g e  in  1720 to  o f f s e t  th e  A n g lo -
A m erican t r a d in g  advantages w ith  th e  west which had come w ith  th e  
18
t r e a t ie s  o f  1 7 0 1 . Done w ith  th e  a p p ro v a l o f  lo c a l  Senecas, who 
sought to  p r o f i t  from  th e  French e s ta b lis h m e n t, t h is  a c t io n  prom pted a 
l i k e  response from  New Y o rk 's  G overnor B urnet who fo u r  y ears  l a t e r  
a u th o r iz e d  th e  b u i ld in g  o f  F o r t  Oswego a t  th e  mouth o f  th e  Oswego R iv e r ,  
w ith in  Onondaga Ir o q u o is  t e r r i t o r y .
The m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  o f  w e s te rn  New Y o rk , re p re s e n tin g  a s h i f t  in  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e  to  England and F ra n c e , r e s u lte d  in  a g r e a te r  
re lu c ta n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  to  a c t iv e ly  engage in  a f f a i r s  
r e la te d  to  in t e r - c o lo n ia l  c o m p e tit io n . A f t e r  th e  m id -1 7 2 0 s , Ir o q u o is
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n e u t r a l i t y  became more r i g i d  th a n  i t  had been in  th e  p a s t.
W h ile  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  Oswego posed a  r e a l  economic and  
c u l t u r a l  t h r e a t  to  th e  w estern  Iro q u o is , i t  was a  boon to  th o se  w est­
e rn  In d ia n s  who sought tr a d e  w ith  th e  E n g lis h . The p ro x im ity  o f  th e  
p o s t to  th e  G re a t Lakes tra d e  ro u te s  removed th e  n e c e s s ity  o f  d i r e c t  
n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  o ver t r a d in g  r ig h t s  and t r a v e l  
p r iv i le g e s .  Oswego f u r t h e r  ensured th e  co n tinuance o f  economic con­
ta c t s  between th e  A ng lo -A m ericans o f  New York and th e  G re a t Lakes I n -  
20d ia n s .
I n  la r g e  m easure, th e  re lu c ta n c e  and f a i l u r e  o f  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  
to  r e t a i n  c o n tro l o v e r a f f a i r s  in  t h e i r  own co un try  and t h e i r  co n tin u ed  
r e lu c ta n c e  to  a c t iv e ly  engage in  in t e r n a t io n a l  a f f a i r s  r e s u lte d  from  
a  la c k  o f  consensus o v e r what pa th  to  fo l lo w .  The N iagara-0sw ego  con­
tr o v e r s y  d iv id e d  th e  co n fe d e ra c y . The w estern  Senecas s tood  opposed 
to  any A n g lo - Iro q u o is  e f f o r t  to  remove th e  French from  N ia g a ra , w h ile  
th e  Onondagas and e a s te rn  Ir o q u o is  q ues tio n ed  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  a  s e t t l e ­
ment a t  th e  f a l l s  t h a t  had not been approved by th e  f u l l  co n federacy  
21
c o u n c il .  A t th e  same t im e , th e  death  o f  im p o rta n t le a d e r s ,  n o ta b ly  
th e  Onondaga d ip lo m a t T e g a n isso ren s , c re a te d  v o id s  t h a t  were d i f f i c u l t  
to  f i l l .
Even though th e  S ix  N a tio n s  exp e rie n c e d  in t e r n a l  d is u n ity ,  th e y  
were a b le  to  p r o je c t  an image o f  u n i ty  and purpose th ro u gh  th e  medium 
o f  th e  League c o u n c il.  The p ic tu r e  o f  a l l  fo r t y - n in e  co n federacy  sachems 
m eetin g  to  conduct b us iness  and d e f in e  p o l ic y  was b e t t e r  u nd erstood  by 
h ie r a r c h y -o r ie n te d  Europeans th a n  was th e  r e a l i t y  t h a t  la y  beh in d  th e  
im age. T h a t th e  Ir o q u o is  c o n c io u s ly  employed t h is  im agery  in  t h e i r
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dealings with Anglo-Americans is clear from the actions of Iroquois 
speakers in council. It became almost a standard part of Six Nations 
council rhetoric to invoke the "League" when in fact speakers often 
stood for only a particular interest or group. This in turn led to 
Anglo-American policies and actions that sometimes had confusing, cost­
ly results.
The hallmark of Anglo-American Indian policy had long been the 
assumption that the Six Nations would regulate the activities of 
client members of the Covenant Chain as well as foster English colon­
ial expansion. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Chain and 
the Iroquois' role in it had changed. This was due in part to changes 
in Anglo-American interests and in part to the acceptance of these by 
certain Iroquois individuals and groups bent on maintaining their in­
fluence both among their own people and within the alliance. The 
changes taking place in the Chain were typified by Pennsylvania's In­
dian policy between 1736 and the early 1750s.
The first change came as Pennsylvania sought to construct a re­
lationship with the Iroquois that would avoid reliance on New York.
The reasons were similar to those that had prompted the creation of 
the original Chain nearly a century earlier! the need to control and 
rationalize Indian affairs in order to facilitate the colony's expansion. 
The agreement was also similar! in return for Six Nations assistance 
the proprietary government would acknowledge the League as the sole
arbiter of Indian affairs within the colony and on Pennsylvania's 
22
western frontier. What was different was the distinctively coersive 
nature of the Penns' alliance with the League as it came to bear on
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those Indians whose lands the Proprietors coveted.
The outline of a new addition to the old Chain emerged in 1732 
when the Proprietors applied to the Six Nations for aid in preventing 
the wholesale migration of the Shawnees to the Ohio country. Concern 
that such a migration would damage the fur trade as well as cause 
security problems led to the request. Iroquois cooperation, while it 
failed to prevent the Shawnee move, led to a formal understanding in 
1736 as a new chain of friendship was forged and a new council fire,
23
quite separate from that at Albany, lit at Philadelphia. It should
be noted that, in the first place, the Six Nations failure to prevent
the Shawnee migration reflected the League's own limited control over
that group. Further, at none of the councils wherein the Iroquois and
Pennsylvania created their new alliance were the Mohawks present.
Their close commercial and historic ties to Albany and the New York
Chain gave them considerable influence in confederacy affairs, influence
that may have been jeopardized if they suddenly turned their backs on
Zk
their Anglo-Dutch backers.
The climax of the Penn-Iroquois rapproachment came in 17^2 when
the Proprietors and their agent, James Logan, called in the Six Nations
to rid the province of Delaware opposition to the Walking Purchase.
Preliminaries for what amounted to the forced eviction of the Delaware
group occupying the disputed land had been laid years earlier through
25the careful negotiations of Logan and interested Iroquois parties.
These Iroquois expressed initial concern over such a move, which vio­
lated native principles of patron-client relationships. Further, the 
Iroquois voiced no special claims to the lands in question. Several
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factors may have contributed to a change of heart on the part of the 
Onondaga leader Ganasetago and his Six Nations followers. As the cen­
tral actor in the subsequent drama, Ganasetago may have hoped to increase 
his own standing with the English and his own people. Further, in act­
ing the "heavy", the Iroquois could reinforce the Anglo-American image 
of League unity and authority that was a vital element in the Six 
Nations' strategy for the survival in the colonial world. Finally, the 
Iroquois would be well paid for their efforts. This last may not have 
been an insignificant influence on the final decision since the Iro­
quois who ultimately became involved in the 1742 eviction notice were
26
said to have been in a "starving condition."
The result, in 1?42, was the forced eviction of the Delaware band
led by Nutimus, and the reinforcement of the myth of Iroquois "conquest"
of the Delawares, by which the lands in question became Iroquois after
all. This notion of conquest was extended to all Delawares, whether
living on the Ohio or Susquehanna and became the fictitious basis for
27
later British Indian policy. The price, beyond the trade goods paid
to Ganasetago and other Iroquois participants, was the alienation of 
28
the Delawares.
In the five years after 1742 the Covenant Chain was further en-
29
larged by the inclusion of Virginia in 1744. Efforts by the colonies 
to enlist the active support of the Six Nations in King George's War 
failed as the Iroquois, with the notable exception of the Mohawks, tend­
ed to hold to a neutral course. It was the reluctance of the Six Nations 
to support Anglo-American ambitions, coupled with events in the west, 
that led to another significant departure in Anglo-Indian relations.
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The Anglo-French conflict had created a shortage of supplies at 
the western French posts which in turn provoked mounting discontent 
among France's trading and military partners. Fanned by Anglo-Irish 
traders who sensed profits from French losses, one element of the De­
troit Wyandot town attempted to organize a pan-Indian assault on the 
French throughout the west. While this effort ultimately failed, it 
did give the English the initiative in the growing commercial war in 
the west— a struggle which tended to overlap and was finally engulfed 
by the larger imperial conflict for mastery of the trans-Appalachian 
region. Another immediate result was a diplomatic initiative by the 
Indians living in the Ohio country to enlist Anglo-American aid against 
the French. Prompted by the Pennsylvania trader George Croghan, this 
invitation led to a conference at Philadelphia in the fall of 17^7 and
the first direct political contact between the western Indians and En- 
30glish colonials.
The Indians who came to Philadelphia represented the "warriors 
of Ohio" and their spokesman, the Ohio Iroquois sachem Scarouady, in­
dicated their intent to support the English against the French in spite 
of official Six Nations sanctions against such actions. Of greater 
importance was the tome of disagreement and dissatisfaction with League 
policy. Scarouady informed the Pennsylvanians that "these Indians on 
Ohio, had concluded to kindle a Fire in their Town" and to call all 
neighboring Indians to it in an alliance. In effect, the Ohio Iroquois,
the dominant group in the region, was declaring independence from Onon-
31daga, prompted by the rise of Anglo-American influence in the west.
What Pennsylvania officials had witnessed at the council was the
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manifestation of a shift of power from the New York Iroquois to those
living on the Ohio. This resulted in part from the Six Nations refusal
to take any positive actions to sanction the goals and actions of the
Indians in the region. Also, by the late 1740s, the migration to the
west from New York had resulted in the transplantation of a considerable
32
number of Iroquois warriors to the Ohio.
This shift in the locus of Iroquois power presented Pennsylvania 
with both an opportunity and a dilemma. The opportunity was the 
proffered Indian alliance and with it prospects not only of expanded 
trade but the strengthening of the Penns' claims to lands west of the 
mountains. The dilemma arose over whether to continue to support the 
Six Nations as the preeminent Indian group in colony affairs or to by­
pass the League in favor of direct relations with the Ohio Indians.
In the end, considerations of profits and practicality overcame any 
scruples about commitments to the Six Nations. Richard Peters, the 
Provincial Secretary, summed up the new realities in the west when he 
observed that "our only game to play now is with the Ohio Indians and
33Twightwees[MiamisJ."
The new alliance with the western Indians was consummated the 
following year at an important meeting at Logstown on the Ohio River.
In the fall, Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian agent, met with re­
presentatives of the several Ohio Indian communities and participated 
in the ceremonial lighting of a council fire, thus making Logstown the 
center of Anglo-Indian affairs in the west. The ceremony also marked 
the Ohio Iroquois' self-proclaimed emergence from the subordinate 
status of hunters and warriors to that of councilors and independent
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men of affairs. This move was heartily supported by Anglo-American 
trading and land interests. On behalf of these interests, and to pro­
mote the image of Anglo-American unity, Weiser gave the assembled In-
3^dians gifts valued at £1,100 on behalf of Pennsylvania and Virginia.
The men most responsible for this turn of events were two Ohio
Iroquois leaders, the Seneca Tanaghrisson and his companion, Scarouady.
Although traditionally labelled Six Nations viceregents in the Ohio
country, these men were more likely local leaders whose position as
spokesmen for other local groups, notably the Delawares and Shawnees,
grew from the latter's recognition of special Iroquois claims to the
Ohio region. Both men clearly saw their own and their followers' best
interests as being served by charting an Independent course of action
which, after 17^ 7, led to a closer association with the English of
Pennsylvania and Virginia. The influence of these men resulted in
part from the support, both political and economic, given them by
Anglo-Americans. At Logstown in 17^8, Weiser gave Tanaghrisson the
trade goods necessary to allow the sachem to have treaty wampum made
37and invitations sent to other Indians in the vicinity. Further, 
Weiser deliberately ensured the predominant role of these two leaders 
by rejecting any other meeting place than Logstown, Tanaghrisson's 
residence.^®
Even before his trip to the Ohio, Weiser was confronted by offers 
of alliance by the Miamis, the "Twightwees"referred to by Peters.
Their dissatisfaction with the volume and quality of French trade 
goods and desire to foster more— and more advantageous— trade com­
petition, led some Miamis under the leadership of La Demoiselle to
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39seek closer ties with the English colonies. Thus, in the wake of
the Logstown council, Pennsylvania and Virginia had begun to forge
a new alliance system with the Ohio Iroquois, Wyandots, Miamis and,
to a lesser degree, the Delawares and Shawnees, and alliance that by-
40
passed the Six Nations and the old Covenant Chain. Characteristically,
neither the League Iroquois nor New York looked with favor on the new
arrangement in the west, each seeing it as a threat to its own favor-
41ed diplomatic position.
The new partnership between Ohio country Indians, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia was short-lived. Within six years of the Logstown meet­
ing Anglo-American traders were being driven from the west in the face 
of a French military invasion. This invasion was the culmination of 
French efforts to re-establish their trading system and political hegem­
ony over the west in the face of the new Anglo-American initiatives. 
Further, the threat posed by the recently formed Ohio Company of Vir­
ginia demanded a prompt and vigorous response if New France was not 
to be severed from its granary and its Great Lakes communication net­
work disrupted. Military action was initiated when it was determined
just how low French prestige and influence had sunk in the face of ag-
42
gressive Anglo-American traders and political agents.
The arrival of a new Governor-General, Duquesne, resulted in a 
more aggressive policy aimed at redressing the strategic balance. Re­
tribution, when it came, was swift and effective. In 1752 a French- 
Indian war party based at Fort Michilimackinac destroyed the English- 
Miamis trading town of Pickawillany and with it La Demoiselle and the 
Anglo-American trading alliance. The following year, Duquesne sent
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forth over two thousands troops to occupy and fortify the upper Ohio
valley as the hest, perhaps only, way of keeping the English out and
4 3
the Indians cooperative. J
For their part, the Anglo-Americans continued to work at cross­
purposes with the only point of agreement "being the desire to ex­
ploit the Ohio Indian population for material gain. By 1751 Penn­
sylvania, whose Quaker-dominated Assembly refused to commit itself to 
armed intervention on the Ohio, dropped out of the contest, leaving
44
the field to the more aggressive Virginians. Virginia interests in 
the region were largely those of the Ohio Company, whose land specula­
tion schemes rested on Ohio Indian cooperation. At Logstown, in 1752E, 
Tanaghrisson and his followers, pressed now by French and English alike 
and striving to maintain their own freedom of action, agreed to permit 
the construction of an Ohio Company "storehouse" on the Ohio but, in
a neat diplomatic dodge, refused to consider settlement plans without
45referring the whole matter to the League council at Onondaga.
The Six Nations had observed events in the west from a distance.
Upset at the rapproachment between the English colonies and the Ohio
Iroquois, the League council told Weiser that "the Ohio Indians were
but Hunters and no Counsellors or Chief Men, and they had no Right to
receive Presents that was due to the Six Nations" but that "they must
receive £a sharej from the Six Nations chiefs under whom they belong"
46
and thus confirm their subordinate status. This and other verbal 
efforts to assert League claims to dominion over the Ohio Indians fell 
on deaf ears as Pennsylvania ignored Six Nations claims in the face of 
new realities. Such verbalizing represented the extent of Iroquois
Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
130
involvement in western affairs prior to the outbreak of inter-colonial
warfare in 175^ . There were several reasons for this. In large measure,
the internal divisions that limited the Iroquois' response to Anglo-
French activities in the 1720s were at work two decades later. Weiser,
after a journey to Onondaga in 1750, described what he found to Thomas
Lee. Not only were seasoned leaders such as Ganasetago dead, but some
of their successors seemed to be leaning toward the French, perhaps
in response to the vigorous persuit of western lands by the English.
Further, the confederacy was divided within itself, with the western
Senecas distinctly cool toward the Anglo-Americans and even normally
4?
reliable Mohawks were "divided in their Counsel."
The leadership and political problems were further aggravated by 
the inconsistency of Anglo-American policy toward both the Six Nations 
and the west. Divided councils and a lack of what the Iroquois saw as 
proper behavior by New York toward its allies and friends led to dis­
trust, especially when added to the growing threat to the Iroquois' 
homelands by New York land barons.
Finally, English or French expectations of an "Iroquois" response 
to events in the west were misplaced. Given both the division of re­
sponsibility between constituent groups for oversight of affairs and 
the high degree of local autonomy within the League, a unified response 
may not have been regarded by the Iroquois as necessary or appropriate.
In 1757, Six Nations leaders placed responsibility for western affairs 
in the hands of the Senecas. It was through them that all affairs con­
cerning the Ohio country had first to pass before being dealt with by 
the confederacy as a whole. In the face of a French military invasion
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and faced with internal divisions, the Senecas chose not to act de-
49
cisively in the years before 175^ .
The web of alliances between Anglo-Americans and the Six Nations 
and we-tern Indians finally collapsed in 1?53« On the Ohio, French
50troops, albeit sick and hungry, managed to fortify the Allegheny River. 
Having all but won the trade war as a result of their victory at Picka- 
willany the year before, the French consolidated their advantage by 
checking English expansionist plans as well. Meanwhile, in Albany, 
sachem Hendrick Peter of the Mohawk town of Canajoharie expressed in 
no uncertain terms Iroquois anger at their treatment by provincial 
officials and disgust with English policies. Declaring, largely for 
dramatic effect, that he spoke for all the Six Nations, Hendrick an­
nounced "the Covenant broken between you and us." The finality of his 
statement and the breadth of his support at home may be questioned in 
retrospect, but his words ultimately had the desired effect of stirr­
ing the Anglo-Americans to reconsider their Indian policies. For the 
moment, however, the Covenant Chain lay in pieces and the Pennsylvania-
51
Virginia Indian alliance on the Ohio was in a shambles.
On the Ohio, Tanaghrisson and Scarouady made a last-ditch effort
to shore up the English and their own position. While Scarouady attemp-
ed to muster colonial aid, Tanaghrisson met the advancing French near
Fort le Boeuf and issued the traditional three warnings to depart. In
each case the sachem and his wampum were ignored by Sieur de Marin, the 
52
French commander. Rebuffed by the French, Tanaghrisson was also re­
pudiated by the Six Nations, whose only action was to send a number of 
clan matrons to inquire if Marin intended any hostility against the
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Iroquois or other local Indians. Also, as Duquesne observed, the
Six Nations indicated that they would not "meddle in my affairs, and
53that they would look quietly on, from their mats."
The confrontation between Tanaghrisson and Marin also revealed 
the weakness of the Ohio Indians' commitment to the English. None 
of the local Delawares or Shawnees, whose role in the alliance was 
ambivalent at best, bothered to second Tanaghrisson's warning, even 
though he claimed to speak for "all the warriors who inhabit the
5^
Belle Riviere." Unlike Tanaghrisson, the Delawares and Shawnees 
were able to see clearly the regional shift in power that had come 
with the French. Stunned by the Pickawillany raid and the subsequent 
departure of the Anglo-American traders, the Miamis and Wyandots had 
already begun to make their peace with the French. In either case, 
policy was based far less on any "pro-French" or "Pro-English" attitude 
than it was on a clear reading of the economic and political realities 
in the west. Having engaged in an advantageous, abundant trade with 
the Pennsylvanians, the Ohio Indians were now faced with an economic 
crisis of great proportions. Resistance to the French juggernaut 
would have further endangered, rather than improved, the situation.
Rather than fight, the Delawares and their neighbors to the west attempt­
ed to retain their freedom of action by making the best of a bad sit­
uation. The French army also brought with it opportunities to offset 
those lost with the English retreat. Duquesne observed that the In­
dians in the upper Ohio valley were "assisting with their horses 
that they have brought with them, in making the [le Boeuf] Portage.
As cold weather approached and in the absence of Anglo-American traders,
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the local population found itself heavily dependent on French sources 
of supply. At a condolence ceremony for the recently deceased Marin, 
Indians from Venango reminded the French that "you have driven off the 
English, and that your Children will be in a pitiable state if they 
do not see you here. Or, should you wish to stretch out their ne­
cessities, the winter is long. Bemember your promise and remember
56
themj do not abandon them."
The decision by Ohio Indians to accommodate the French, however 
reluctantly made, was made necessary and perhaps easier by the Anglo- 
American response to the western situation. Basically, the Ohio In­
dians were caught between English promises and French actions. Having 
been presented with a fait-accompli on the Ohio, hamstrung by a re­
luctant legislature, and bereft of any support from neighboring Penn­
sylvania, Virginia's Governor Dinwiddle fell back on bluffs and stall. 
His instrument was young George Washington, whose first mission was to 
deliver what was ultimately to be a meaningless warning to the French 
to withdraw from English territory or face the consequences. The French 
accepted the message for what it was. During his journey to Fort le 
Boeuf, Washington was given aid by Tanaghrisson, who still hoped for 
some form of English support. The depths to which Tanaghrisson's 
authority had fallen was shown by the total disregard given his messages 
by the Delawares and Shawnees. When ordered to bring in all the wam-
57pum they had been given by the French, none complied.
Dinwiddle's next move was to fortify the forks of the Ohio, bas­
ing his decision on military necessity and the approval received at 
Logstown for a trading house on the Ohio. Again Washington was placed
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in command. The young colonel, through a series of deceptive state­
ments, led Tanaghrisson to believe that a real English army was en
58
route to answer the Indians' request for aid. At this point the 
majority of Ohio Indians were still unwilling to commit themselves
59
openly in the growing conflict. Washington's subsequent actions 
in the spring and summer of 175^ did much to change that. The "army" 
of which he spoke turned out to be a poorly organized and equipped 
collection of farmers as inexperienced as their leader. The humiliat­
ing surrender of Fort Necessity on July k ended colonial attempts to 
deal with the French invasion. It also clearly demonstrated French 
strengths and victorious ways to the local Indians. And it ended the 
careers of Tanaghrisson and Scarouady and the political dominance of 
the Ohio Iroquois they represented. The two sachems left the Ohio 
country with many of their people, some of whom eventually resettled 
in New York. The Senecas on the upper Ohio remained, however. Tana­
ghrisson died late in 175^ and the Delawares and Shawnees became the
principal Indian political and military force on the Ohio, but one
60
still divided over what role to play in the war just begun.
II
In the wake of Hendrick Peter's announcement that the Covenant 
Chain was no more, and the virtually uncontested French occupation of 
the Ohio country, the royal government in London moved to strengthen 
its strategic position in North America. On instructions from the 
Board of Trade, delegates from the colonies north of Virginia met at
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Albany in the summer of 1 7 5 The purpose of the meeting was two-fold. 
First, the colonies were to mend relations with the Six Nations and 
their clients. Second, the colonial officials, now hopefully support­
ed by the League, were to devise some means of inter-colonial defense 
and a coherent Indian policy. Measured against these goals the con­
ference was a distinct failure. Whole-hearted Six Nations support 
was not forthcoming and the Plan of Union, for which the Albany con­
ference is famous, was ultimately rejected by colonial and royal officals 
6l
alike.
Indeed, far from solving problems, the Albany conference created 
new ones. The meeting gave land agents from Pennsylvania and Connecti­
cut a golden opportunity to gain Indian signatures on deeds for covet­
ed lands on and west of the Susquehanna River. As it turned out, each 
colony's agent ended up buying much the same piece of real estate but 
from different groups of Iroquois. It mattered little to the Anglo- 
Americans that the Six Nations sachems who signed the papers had no 
authority to do so. It did matter, however, to the Iroquois, Dela­
wares, and Shawnees living on the lands in question, and the fraudulent
62sales added further to the declining state of Anglo-Indian relations.
In the absence of a negotiated settlement of the imperial conflict 
on the Ohio, both England and France stepped up military activity. For 
its part, England dispatched two under-strength regiments from Ireland 
to Virginia. Their leader, Major General Ed: .,.1 Braddock, was to take 
the French forts on the Ohio and, in conjunction with provincial forces 
led by Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts and William Johnson 
of New York, roll up the French forts all along the northern and west­
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63ern perimeter of the colonies. The campaign resulted in the well- 
known disaster on the M0nongahela River and virtual stalemate else­
where. In the west, the overwhelming French victory over Braddock 
and the corresponding English losses Both in manpower and prestige 
resulted in a quantum leap in the number of raids launched against 
the Anglo-American border settlements. Anglo-Indian relations were 
further thrown into disarray by the reluctance of the Iroquois to enter 
the conflict as English auxiliaries. Only the Mohawks had participat­
ed in Johnson's Lake George campaign in any numbers and their losses, 
which included the death of Hendrick Peter, made them reluctant to en­
gage in further campaigns. The ! ^ hawk lesson was not lost on the other
Iroquois, who stood behind the League declaration of neutrality made 
64
years earlier.
The task of re-establishing cooperation between the colonies and 
the Six Nations, and peace between England and the now-hostile Indians 
in the west fell to William Johnson. His commission as "Colonel of the 
Six Nations" and coordinator of crown Indian policy in the north, issued 
by Braddock in 1755> was confirmed the following year in instructions
65
from the Board of Trade. As new Superintendent for Indian Affairs 
in the northern colonies, Johnson, soon elevated to the title of baronet, 
was to coordinate and direct all matters relating to the Six Nations 
and their "dependents"— those Indians in the Ohio country currently at 
war with the colonies. Essentially, Johnson's task was three-foldj to 
re-establish the Covenant Chain; to end the growing border war plaguing 
the colonies; and to draw away Indian support from the French while at 
the same time increasing that given to the English. The inducement offered
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to achieve this last point would he guarantees of peace, economic 
cooperation, and the restoration of lands taken from Indians under 
questionable circumstances.
All three aspects were intimately interrelated both in fact and 
in Johnson's strategy for dealing with them. Through a renewal of 
the Chain, Johnson hoped to re-assert League authority over those of 
its clients who had taken up the hatchet. In addition, the Chain, 
with its prospects of inter-cultural peace and trade, could be used 
as an inducement to other western Indians to leave the war and re­
establish relations with the Anglo-Americans as they had been before 
1753< This program was to be achieved through a number of meansj 
primary of which, in Johnson's mind, was "an equitable trade establish­
ed with a plentiful & proper supply of Goods" which would be "the 
chief means by which we may expect to obtain & retain them in our 
Interest" and without which, Johnson believed, any gains would not be 
forthcoming.^
Johnson confronted a number of problems in carrying out his charge. 
Paramount of these was the lack of any coordinated program for Indian 
affairs in the colonies, a deficiency which had resulted in the dis­
possession of the Delawares in Pennsylvania, the loss of influence 
on the Ohio, and the alienation of a least a substantial part of the 
Six Nations. As Johnson and others would subsequently learn, this 
situation was directly responsible for the hostilities then plaguing 
the colonial frontiers. The source of this was the insistence by colon­
ial governments that their particular provinces be permitted to re­
tain control over internal affairs, including Indians, without inter­
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ference from above. Even with a royal commission, Johnson receiv­
ed stiff opposition from provincial leaders, particularly in Penn­
sylvania! it was not until 1758 that he was able to gain control over 
that colony's Indian affairs. Finally, Johnson's authority was ques­
tioned, and his advice often ignored, my the military commanders-in- 
chief for whom he worked. Foremost among these was Massachusetts 
Governor William Shirley, who assumed command upon Braddock's death. 
Handicapped by a lack of independent authority, and dependent on the 
army for his and his agents' salaries, Johnson was hard-pressed to
present himself as the sole voice of the English government in Indian 
6?
affairs.
Six Nations reluctance to declare openly and unanimously for the 
English continued through 1758. To Johnson and other Anglo-American 
officials this presented a frustrating problem on which much time and 
money was to be expended. Insisting that the Covenant Chain relation­
ship included a military commitment on the part of the Iroquois, John-
68son tried to convince them to take up arms against the French. By 
1757, the superintendent had been largely thwarted in his efforts and 
was by then engaged in an effort to retain as many Iroquois auxiliar­
ies as possible while trying to ensure the neutrality of the rest.
For the Iroquois' point of view, the situation was more complex 
than a matter of accepting or rejecting a military alliance with the 
English. The council minutes and reports of British agents and in­
dividual Iroquois reveal a number of issues and problems that tended 
to divide the League and create reluctance at all levels of society 
to choose sides. The war presented the Iroquois with a potentially
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serious security problem. With hostile armies facing each other 
across Six Nations territory, any action that suggested favoritism 
one way or the other could result in reprisals reminiscent of the
69
French raids which had struck the Iroquois late in the last century. 
Compounding this problem was the economic attachment and peculiar 
security needs of some Iroquois communities. Because of their long­
standing partnership with New York, the Mohawks, especially those of 
Oanajoharie, tended to support the English. This stand was taken in 
part as a result of a sense of special relationship with the colony, 
made stronger by Johnson’s personal ties with the leading families of 
the town. On the other hand, the proximity of French forces to the 
Mohawk towns made such a relationship all the more advantageous. In
return for Mohawk aid, the English were expected to fortify and garrison
70the Indians' towns and provide for the women and children.
The situation was much the same for the Senecas, especially those 
living near Fort Niagara and on the upper Allegheny. These communities 
enjoyed personal and economic relations with the French which limited
71
their options.
Another problem, not born of the war but certainly exacerbated 
by it, was the struggle between constituent members of the League and 
between factions within the towns. Those Iroquois who had early chosen 
a position of neutrality tended to distrust and feel threatened by
72
those who chose a stand that might result in disaster for everyone.
In 1755 the Mohawks received a warning from the other members of the 
confederacy not to meddle in the war since "the English and French had 
a design to kill them all." If the warning was not heeded, the other
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Iroquois would "Kick them £the Mohawks] from us and have no more to
73
say to them." Likewise, jealousies appear to have existed "between
74
the Oneidas and Onondagas which the French sought to turn to advantage.
At the local level, war increased tensions between warriors, often
supported by clan matrons, and sachems. For the former, warfare
still represented the primary avenue to status and authority. The
latter, regardless of any personal preferences, were duty-bound by
office to advise peace and forbearance. One Onondaga sachem stepped
down from office because his people would not consider his advice
75"with sufficient cordiality." Warriors countered by blaming the 
sachems for "keeping them in the dark by misrepresentations" and for 
incurring English anger by not allowing the young men to join Anglo- 
American forces.
Finally, the Iroquois showed great reluctance to engage in a con­
flict that might place Six Nations warriors in the position of having 
to kill or be killed by kinsmen living in Canada. The so-called Mission 
Iroquois of Caughnawaga, La Presentation, and Oka, while physically 
removed from the League and distinguished by their acceptance of 
French Catholicism, nonetheless felt themselves to be culturally one 
with their kinsmen to the south. Lineage affiliations still existed 
which lent additional strength to the bonds between them. Through­
out the war, parties of Six Nations and Canadian Iroquois met and re­
affirmed their cultural unity and desire to take no steps that might 
result in injury to either group. This reluctance to engage in a fratri­
cidal war of revenge doubtless had as much as anything else to do with
77Iroquois' decisions to remain neutral.
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Added to these purely Iroquois concerns and issues in dividing 
opinion on the war was the Anglo-American war effort. J0hnson repeat­
edly warned his superiors that failure on the battlefield was making
it difficult for him to bring increasingly skeptical Indians to the
78
English camp. Yet failures continued as one humiliating surrender 
or abortive campaign followed another, from Fort Oswego in 1756
through General James Abercrombie's bloody defeat at Fort Ticonderoga
79
in July 1758. To make matters worse, the methods employed by Govern­
or Shirley to enlist Iroquois warriors bordered on press-gang tactics
80
and further injured Anglo-Indian relations. Those Iroquois who did
participate in Anglo-American campaigns suffered losses greater than
their communities could sustain, both from bullets and the ever present
camp fevers and smallpox. The Mohawks were particularly fearful that
the English would "swallow all our Fighters at once" and accused English
81leaders of having "drained both our Castles of most of our young men."
Finally, the war gave rise to the belief that the fighting be­
tween England and France was merely a sham, a prelude to a European 
plot to destroy or at least dispossess all Indians by first dragging 
them into a conflict that would weaken and compromise them. Iroquois 
leaders indicted both European nations as "Common Disturbers of this 
Country" and warned their people that "the present War between the Eng­
lish and French was but a pretended one & that by & by they would make
82
Peace & unite to destroy the Six Nations." This belief was not pe­
culiar to the Iroquois, but was echoed in the west. The Delawares 
had also heard that "the English and french made an agreement to cut
Qq
them of[f] & then take their Lands in Possession." These and other
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s ta tem en ts  re v e a l a d e e p -s e a te d  d is t r u s t  o f  European m o tives  and th e  
s in c e r i t y  o f  A ng lo -F rench  assurances t h a t  th e  w ar would r e s u l t  in  th e  
p re s e rv a t io n  o f  n a t iv e  la n d s . T h is  theme o f  a  European c o n sp iracy  
to  d e s tro y  In d ia n s  would ap pear a g a in  in  th e  west as A nglo-A m ericans  
began to  occupy th e  G re a t Lakes re g io n  a t  w a r 's  end.
The Ir o q u o is  response to  th e  m yriad  in t e r n a l  and e x te r n a l problem s  
c re a te d  by th e  war was c o n tin u ed  o f f i c i a l  n e u t r a l i t y .  As i n  th e  p a s t,  
th e  League worked to  p re s e rv e  t h is  p o s it io n  w h ile ,  a t  th e  same t im e ,  
c o n s t itu e n t  groups could  pursue th a t  course o f  a c t io n  b es t s u ite d  to  
t h e i r  own needs o r in t e r e s t s .  I t  was a p o l ic y  grounded in  Ir o q u o is  
n o tio n s  o f  lo c a l is m  and in d iv id u a l  autonomy. I t  a ls o  gave th e  con­
fe d e ra c y  c o u n c il a  way o f  p re s e rv in g  Iro q u o is  freedom  o f  a c t io n .  By 
s ta n d in g  on o f f i c l a  n e u t r a l i t y ,  th e y  could  c o n v e n ie n t ly  disavow  a c tio n s
by th o se  who d id  go to  war and, a t  th e  same t im e , p re s e rv e  an  image o f  
84
u n i t y .
The same la c k  o f  u n a n im ity  and c a u tio n  th a t  c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e  
S ix  N a tio n s ' approach to  m i l i t a r y  in vo lvem ent was r e f le c t e d  in  t h e i r  
p a r t ic ip a .t io n  in  e f f o r t s  to  end F ren ch -su p p o rted  r a id s  a lo n g  th e  A n g lo -  
A m erican f r o n t i e r .  Soon a f t e r  th e s e  ra id s  began, S i r  W il lia m  Johnson 
and L ie u te n a n t G overnor R o b e rt H u n te r M o rr is  o f  P e n n s y lv a n ia  lo b b ie d  
to  g a in  Ir o q u o is  support in  ending what was, in  some re s p e c ts , an I n ­
d ia n  war a g a in s t  P e n n s y lv a n ia , s e p a ra te  from th e  la r g e r  im p e r ia l con­
f l i c t .  The r a t io n a le  f o r  seek in g  In d ia n  support was th e  s t i l l  c u rre n t  
b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  had some s p e c ia l c o n tro l o v e r th e  D elaw ares  
and Shawnees l i v i n g  on th e  O h io , and in  th e  I r o q u o is ' Covenant Chain  
r o le  as p o licem en  o f  th e  A ng lo -A m erican  f r o n t i e r .  A problem  aro se
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n ot o n ly  from  th e  I r o q u o is ' re lu c ta n c e  to  become e n ta n g le d  in  Penn­
s y lv a n ia 's  t r o u b le s , b u t an e q u a l re lu c ta n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  
" c l ie n t s "  to  p la y  a  s u b o rd in a te  r o le .
Escaped prisoners and information derived from the complex ne­
gotiations later initiated by the Ohio Indians reveal the sources of 
native, and especially Delaware, hostility. The decision to take up 
arms against the Anglo-Americans was taken reluctantly by many Ohio 
Indians and was never fully endorsed by all. From 1755 through the 
decline of hostilities in the wake of Forbes' expedition three years 
later, a clearly definable group among the Delawares kept up negotiations 
aimed at ending the war. This, and the reasons given by Indians for 
the fighting, belie the simplistic notion that native participants in 
colonial conflicts were merely pawns of European powers. While it is 
true that the economic and military circumstances in the west after 
1754 did limit Indian options, those who chose to fight or negotiate 
did so with their own best interests in mind, interests which, for a 
time, happened to coincide with those of French and English imperial 
goals.
Land and th e  is s u e s  o f  independence and s e c u r ity  were prom inent 
on th e  l i s t  o f  reasons g iv e n  by Ohio In d ia n s  f o r  waging w ar. A fo rm er  
c a p tiv e  o f  th e  D elaw are w ar le a d e r  S h in gas , C h arles  S t u a r t ,  re p o rte d  
th a t  Shingas and o th e rs  d ec id ed  to  break  w ith  th e  E n g lis h  a f t e r  be­
in g  t o ld  by G en era l Braddock t h a t  "No Savage Should In h e r i t  th e  Land" 
in  th e  wake o f  th e  a n t ic ip a te d  E n g lis h  v ic t o r y .  T h is  r e p ly  came a f t e r
Shingas sought assurances t h a t  B rad d o ck 's  army would r e s to r e  c o n tro l
86
o f  th e  Ohio co un try  to  th e  In d ia n s . A t th e  same t im e , S tu a r t  r e -
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ported. that the Indians gave as another reason for fighting "their
own Safety"! they had been threatened with the loss of needed supplies
87if they failed to support the French.
Other sources confirm Stuart's account. Susquehanna Delawares,
who became involved in the fighting alongside their Ohio kinsmen, told
the English that the Anglo-French conflict over the west had prompted
88a chain of events that left the Indians little choice but to fight.
In 1758 an Ohio Shawnee leader, Ackowanothio, issued a stinging ex­
planation of events. Expressing indignation over the constant English 
inquiries about the Indians' reasons for fighting, he enjoined Penn­
sylvania officials to "get sober and think impartially." In the message 
that followed, he listed English "land hunger" as high on the list of 
grievances. He further pointed out that many Ohio Indians had remain-
89
ed neutral even in the face of the French invasion. Sir William
Johnson also pointed to encroachment on native lands as a prime cause
r 90for war.
The litany of injuries did not, however, end with land frauds and 
dispossession. Both Indians and Englishmen blamed Anglo-American mil­
itary actions, but for different reasons. To Johnson, Braddock's de­
feat was a disaster in more ways than one since it allowed the French 
to gain support from "several of those Indians who were before in our
Interest and some who held themselves as it were neutral till they saw
91
how the event of that Expedition would turn out." This view was
supported by Ackowanothio, who also acknowledged that the defeat had
pushed some Ohio Indians, particularly the Shawnees, into the French 
92
camp. On the other hand, some Ohio Delawares appear to have been
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resentful of the English, believing the latter unnecessarily blamed 
them for Washington's surrender in 175^ and Braddock's fiasco the
93following year.
Traditional motives also played a part. While direct evidence 
is lacking, it can be assumed that Ohio warriors, like their Six Nations 
counterparts, saw the war as an opportunity for achieving status. Further 
insight into motives is gained from information supplied by the Susque­
hanna Delaware leader Teedyuscung. He informed Pennsylvania agents 
in 1757 that several hundred western Senecas had gone to war against
the frontier settlements. Their reason for so doing was the desire
9k-
to avenge the earlier murders of Senecas by settlers in Virginia.
Thus revenge, and the corresponding need to cover and replace the dead—  
both traditional motives for war— appear to have still been valid dur­
ing the Seven Years' War. The large number of prisoners taken and 
adopted into Delaware, Iroquois, and Shawnee families would lend further 
support for the centrality of these motives. For many Indians, the 
war may have offered an opportunity to carry out cultural responsibilities
95and at the same time restore populations ravaged by recent epidemics.
Finally, for at least some Delawares in the west, their prior re­
lationship with the Six Nations appears to have influenced the decision 
to take up arms. On the one hand, the Delawares expected support from 
their "uncles" on whose lands they had settled and with whom they had 
a long-standing relationship. When this aid against the French was 
not forthcoming, and given the varying response of local Iroquois to 
the invaders, the Delawares felt obliged to support, or at least tolerate, 
the new regime.
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On the other hand, the recent history of Iroquois-Delaware re­
lations must have resulted in lingering resentment on the part of the 
latter. As the war would subsequently demonstrate, the role of "women"—  
signifying people who took a subordinate, non-aggressive, role in re­
lation to their masculine patrons— hung heavily on those Delawares 
still living in the east. Many of the Delawares living on the Ohio 
undoubtedly migrated from eastern homelands at Shamokin and elsewhere 
to escape the increasingly onerous position as Iroquois clients, par­
ticularly after the shift in Covenant Chain relations in the 1730s.
In addition, as recently as 1752, the Ohio Iroquois Tanaghrisson, in
collusion with Virginians, appointed Shingas "king" of the Ohio Dela- 
97wares. The irony of this event was that while the coronation was
done chiefly to facilitate Anglo-Indian relations, the act gave the
Delawares a spokesman who was legitimate in the eyes of his people and
thus unwittingly contributed to the on-going development of a Delaware
98
identity in the west. This growing identity, coupled with the obvious 
interference in Delaware affairs and the threat posed by the Anglo-Iro- 
quois policy of subordinating as many Indians as possible to the Chain, 
must have prompted some Ohio Delawares to see the war as an opportunity
99to strike a blow for political independence.
Again, given the recent history of provincial-Indian relations, 
it is not hard to understand why Pennsylvania took the brunt of the 
frontier war which erupted. Aside from the close proximity of the 
colony's outlying settlements to French bases on the Ohio, longstand­
ing Delaware and Shawnee resentment over land policies added another 
dimension to what has usually been defined as a wholly Anglo-French
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conflict. Indeed, between 1755 and 175“ Pennsylvania, by its own 
declaration, was engaged in its own Indian war, a conflict which was 
at once distinct from, but subsumed by, the larger international con­
flict.
Shortly after its outbreak, this Indian war led to a lengthy and 
complex series of negotiations as provincial and crown officials attempt­
ed to isolate the causes of the conflict and create a settlement that 
would allow English military operations against the French to proceed 
unmolested. By late 175& this negotiating process had come to include 
various elements of the Six Nations, the Delawares, Shawnees, and other 
Indians living west of the Appalachians, the Delawares living on the 
Susquehanna River, Pennsylvania political interests, and crown Indian 
agents. The process of arriving at some sort of accommodation that 
would satisfy all parties concerned also underscored the issues and 
problems that Anglo-American policy makers would have to confront in 
the post-war period.
Ill
When war broke out, Anglo-Americans' responses were based on 
their conception of the Covenant Chain as a power relationship in 
which the hostile Delawares and Shawnees were under Iroquois control. 
This view was best summarized by Braddock's successor, Shirley, who in­
formed the Six Nations that "The Indians the Delawares & Shawanese al­
ways lived under your Direction, they looked upon you as their Master." 
His point of view was seconded by Pennsylvania's governor as well as by
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Sir William Johnson. As a result, initial efforts to end the fight­
ing were made through the League with colonial officials insisting
"strenuously on their using all means possible to check their £Dela-
103
ware and Shawnee] proceedings."
However, it fell to Johnson to move negotiations through the 
League and to rebuild the now-shattered Chain by inducing those In­
dians at war with the colonies to re-affirm their earlier friendship
with the English. The initial Iroquois response was favorable and
104
conciliatory messages were sent to the Ohio by the end of 1755•
However, the same issues which led the Six Nations to avoid involvement 
in the war also limited their enthusiasm for saving colonists from 
angry Ohio warriors. While agreeing that they had "by a series of con­
quests" attained superiority over the Ohio Indians, the Iroquois passed 
the diplomatic ball back to the English. When pressed by Johnson to 
take positive action, the Six Nations speaker, Red Head, replied "we 
always look’d upon the Delawares as the more immediate care of Onas 
£the governor of Pennsylvania], that they were within the circle of
his arms; we therefore are of opinion, that he has not taken that
105
friendly care of them as he ought to do."
The conference punctuated by Red Head’s speech marked the limit 
of Iroquois involvement in western affairs until 1758. While the Six 
Nations continued to send messages and engage in their own efforts to 
learn the causes of the war, they were careful not to become embroil­
ed in the conflict itself. Their ability to intervene was limited as 
much by traditional limits on inter-group relations as anything else. 
Added to this was a distrust of Anglo-American motives and a lack of
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confidence in their ability to defend themselves.
This assessment was based on two closely related events. Early 
in 1756 the frontier war grew as Delawares living on the upper Susque­
hanna River took up arms against Pennsylvania. Acting in response to 
a call from their Ohio kinsmen, and presented with an opportunity to
retaliate for the Walking Purchase and similar acts of dispossession,
106
Teedyuscung and other Delawares struck suddenly and hard. Respond­
ing to this and earlier attacks from the west, Pennsylvania issued 
a declaration of war on April l^i- 1756 against all Indians then in arms 
against the colony. This act caught the Iroquois and Johnson by sur­
prize and infuriated both. Johnson was of the opinion that, by act­
ing before he had learned the outcome of the Iroquois' inquiries, Gov­
ernor Morris had threatened to wreck any chance of peace as well as to 
further weaken English standing with the Six Nations. Moreover, he
wondered out loud how the Ohio Indians would respond to what could
107
easily be interpreted as English duplicity, Morris's actions 
underscored further the gulf between royal and provincial policies 
and the inherent lack of coordination in Indian affairs.
Negotiations to end the war began soon after the hostilities 
spread to the Susquehanna. The center of attention for all concern­
ed soon became the previously little-known Susquehanna Delaware and
108
sometime Moravian convert, Teedyuscung. Anxious to conclude peace, 
provincial officials were attracted to Teedyuscung, who claimed to be 
the voice of "ten nations" living on or near the Susquehanna River.
At the same time, Quaker politicians were drawn by his desire to ex­
pose fraudulent proprietary land deals which, if properly handled,
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109could be used as ammunition In the on-going Quaker-Proprietary feud.
In preliminary talks at Easton in 1756 and in a truce arranged 
the following year at the same place, proprietary leaders and Teedy­
uscung were able to agree on ending the Susquehanna phase of the war 
pending the outcome of serious talks which were to address a number 
of basic Indian grievances. At the same time, in another effort to 
promote peace at a meeting between the Six Nations and the Susque­
hanna Delawares, Johnson removed the "petticoat" from the latter group. 
This act was designed to allow the Delawares to speak for themselves 
in council on issues specific to them and so facilitate peace-making. 
Johnson had no desire to dis-establish the system whereby the Six 
Nations acted as spokesmen and negotiators for other Indians in the 
Covenant Chain. In short, his actions were based on political neces­
sity. At Easton in 1756, the Iroquois bowed to political realities 
and acknowledged the independent stand taken by the Delawares. In the 
words of the Six Nations’ speaker, "as you have thrown off the Cover 
of your modesty . . .  We now give you a little Prick and put it in
your Private Parts, and so let it grow there till you shall be a corn- 
111
pleat man." The implication was that the Iroquois made the Dela­
wares "compleat men". But an exchange earlier that year suggests a 
reluctance to withhold what the eastern Delawares had assumed as a 
matter of right. At that earlier encounter at Otsinigo, the Delawares 
declared that "we are Men & are determined not to be ruled any Longer 
by you as Women." They further warned their uncles to "say no more
to us in that head, least we cut off your private parts & make Women
112
of you as you have done to us." As a declaration of independence,
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this statement has few rivals in Indian or European history and serv­
ed to underscore the role that Delaware political aspirations played 
in both bringing on the war and opening the way to peace.
All of this diplomatic activity was watched with great care and 
interest by the Delawares, Shawnees, and others living west of the 
mountains. Contacts between these groups and Pennsylvania had con­
tinued through the summer of 1755 as the regional situation continu­
ed to deteriorate in the wake of Braddock's defeat. These contacts 
were marked by efforts of some Ohio Indians, notably the Sandusky Wy- 
andots led by Jagea, the Delawares led by Tamaq.ua and Delaware George,
and the Ohio Iroquois led by Scarouady, to maintain English and Six
113
Nations support in the face of growing French power. In this dip­
lomatic exchange, the leading role was assumed by Scarouady, who serv­
ed as messenger between the Ohio Indians, Philadelphia, and the Iro­
quois towns in New York.
During the latter part of 1755 and most of 1756, a diplomatic 
hiatus appears to have taken place during which direct contact be­
tween the west and Anglo-American officials was very limited or al­
together nonexistant. However, in light of subsequent negotiations, 
which began in the fall of 1756, some idea of conditions in the west 
can be obtained. From the opening of hostilities, it is clear that 
not all Indians in the Ohio country of Great Lakes region were com­
mitted to supporting French aims or taking revenge on the English. 
Apart from those actively engaged in fighting, there emerged another 
group which tended to initiate and direct the negotiations with the 
English. The goals of these men, representing Delawares, Iroquois,
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Wyandots, and Shawnees, were to  d e m i l i t a r iz e  th e  Ohio c o u n try , r e ­
s to re  th e  economic system o f  th e  f u r  t ra d e  v i t a l  to  co n tin u ed  w e l l -  
b e in g , and to  in s u re  n a t iv e  c o n tro l o v e r r e g io n a l a f f a i r s .  N e ith e r  
"p ro -F re n c h "  nor "p ro -E n g lis h " , t h is  group was in te r e s te d  o n ly  in  
peace and th e  fu tu r e  o f  i t s  own p e o p le . A t th e  c e n te r  o f  t h is  g roup , 
which was never fo rm a liz e d  and whose membership f lu c tu a te d  w ith  war­
tim e  c o n d it io n s , were th e  D elaw are  le a d e rs  Tamaq.ua, a ls o  known as K ing
11^B eaver, P isquetom en, D e law are  G eorge, and Netaw atw ees, o r  Newcomer.
B eaver and Pisquetom en were b ro th e rs , nephews o f  th e  D elaw are le a d e r
Alumapees and th u s  le g i t im a t e  c la im a n ts  to  D elaw are le a d e rs h ip  on th e  
115
Ohio. Pisquetomen and a third brother, Shingas, had chosen to go 
to war against the English in 1755* So successful was Shingas in this 
that Pennsylvania offered a special bounty for his scalp. Tamaqua, 
on the other hand, kept scrupulously aloof from the conflict, estab­
lishing himself as the least tainted with English blood and thus most 
qualified to talk of peace. It is unclear precisely when Tamaqua emerg­
ed as the principal Delaware spokesman. By 1758 he was being referred 
to as King Beaver and his name tended to head thp list of known Ohio 
Delaware leaders. It should be noted that not all Delawares acceded 
to Tamaqua's leadership. The notable exception was Gustaloga’s group 
living near Venango. Tamaqua's ascendancy coincided with the eclipse 
of Shingas and may perhaps be dated to after the damaging English raid
on Kittanning in 1756. Active negotiations with the English began
116soon after this event.
C o in c id in g  w ith  th e  emergence o f  what may be c a l le d  th e  "peace" 
group among th e  Ohio In d ia n s  was th e  emergence o f  th e  D elaw ares as th e
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dominant group in the region. That the two events were connected can­
not be doubted. In the absence of the moderate Ohio Iroquois group 
formerly led by Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, Tamaqua and his follow­
ers, taking advantage of the current Delaware preponderance of num­
bers and their own regional influence, worked to establish themselves 
as brokers between the Anglo-Americans and other Indian groups farther 
west. At the same time, the creation of new political relationships 
in the west serves to reveal aspects of int.ra-societal relations among 
the Delawares. Throughout the period from 1756 through 1758i the 
leaders of the Turtle and Turkey clans on the Ohio, Netawatwees and 
Tamaqua, appear to have cooperated in seeking a resolution to the fron­
tier conflict. However, the Wolf clan leader, Gustaloga, played a 
separate, but not necessarily hostile part. Physically separated from 
the other Delawares, Custalog'as people maintained a much closer re­
lationship with the Seneca towns on the Allegheny River. They had, 
in addition, established a symbiotic relationship with the French gar­
risons in the area, supplying food and labor in exchange for trade 
goods and cash, as they later attempted to do with the Anglo-Americans.
Significant contacts between the western Indians and the English
resumed late in 1756 as the result of a message sent by Sir William
Johnson's deputy, George Groghan. Groghan's message was delivered to
Gustaloga at Venango and, according to one Delaware witness, the In-
117
dians "Seem'd desirous of Peace." Characteristically, Gustaloga and 
his people, while personally interested in opening talks, deferred to 
"their Uncles, the Senecas" who warned against making a reply. The 
reason reveals the care with which the Indians were proceeding to re­
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open normal relations. According to the Seneca Garisagee, who knew
Croghan, the message belts were "not proper Belts on this Occasion."
A proper belt was to have "Men wrought in it for the several Tribes
he [^ Croghan] wants to meet with (himself taking us by the Hand), made
118
of old Council Wampum." In the absence of this, the Senecas act­
ed as if no message had been sent.
In August 1?57, in the wake of the Easton treaty that produc­
ed a cease-fire between Pennsylvania and the eastern Delawares, another 
exchange with the Ohio Indians took place. This time the initiative 
came from the west in the form of "Three Indian Men, and a Boy about 
Sixteen Years of Age" who bore a message from Menatochyand— Delaware 
George— and Netawatquelemond— Newcomer, "Two of the Principal Men of 
the Ohio Indians.
The intermediary in this case was Pennsylvania's former enemy, 
now partner in peace, Teedyuscung. Unlike Croghan's abortive and mis­
handled attempt the year before, this Ohio Delaware message was re­
ceived and elicited an official reply from Governor William Denny of 
Pennsylvania. The Ohio messengers offered a regretful apology for 
their people's part in the war and expressed interest in learning more 
about the negotiations between the colony and Teedyuscung. They further 
pledged to refrain from further warlike acts until the outcome of such 
negotiations was made known to them. Denny replied to his "Grand
Children" through Teedyuscung, who was asked to encourage his Ohio
120
kinsmen to participate in general peace talks. This message was
sent in the care of Teedyuscung's son to Delaware George "who was wait-
12.1
m g  at Venango for a reply," This exchange and others to follow
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undoubtedly increased the influence of Tamaq.ua's group and helps
account for their emergence as the dominant voice in Ohio country
affairs by the end of the following year.
The following spring, Teedyuscung returned to Denny with news
that eight western nations had chosen him as their voice and wished
to send a message to the governor. These eight nations underscored
the serious tone of their message by sending with the wampum belts a
calumet, the ceremony surrounding which had long before developed in
the west as a means of transcending inter-societal conflicts and
122
establishing peaceful relations. Teedyuscung listed the eight
nations which included Ottawas from Saginaw Bay and Lake Erie, Miamis,
123
Ojibwas, Caughnawagas, Potawatomis, Mahoov»j.s, and Nolashawanas.
Denny's reply was positive, and not a little presumptuous. The belts
and calumet he sent in return were directed to "the Indian Towns on
the Ohio, and the other Towns who have no£t] entered into our alliance.'
The message itself indicated that "His Majesty, King George, embraces
these Eight Nations and receives them with open Arms into the Union
125established between you [^ Teedyuscung] and us." Whether through 
ignorance or design, Denny was making it appear as though peace had 
now been reduced to a mere formaility— a position emphatically reject­
ed by the Ohio Indians in later negotiations. From their perspective, 
such initial contacts were strictly preliminaries, a way of "clear­
ing the path" so that meaningful exchanges could continue.
Irregardless of the apparently central role played by Teedyuscung, 
it is nonetheless clear that the western Indians regarded him only as 
a convenient messenger, someone who had Onas's ear, not a bonafide
Reproduced w ith permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
156
negotiator. Teedyuscung's current status as Pennsylvania's favorite 
Indian made him the logical choice as an intermediary. But the 
prime movers "behind western Indian peace initiatives were unquestion­
ably those Delawares associated with Tamaqua. One of the three In­
dians who delivered the message and calumet to Teedyuscung was Gela-
126
pamund, a brother of Netawatwees. In addition, the messages sent
west by Denny were apparently carried first to Netawatwees, who then
127
forwarded them to Tamaqua at his current home at the Kuskuskies. 
Information about subsequent negotiations on the Ohio also demon­
strated the central role played by Tamaqua in bringing other interest­
ed Indians into contact with the English. Finally, Delaware messengers 
who arrived in Philadelphia later in 1758 to open talks claimed not 
to have heard the messages carried by Teedyuscung and his agents. This 
suggests a rejection of his self-proclaimed status as official ne­
gotiator— only direct contacts with mutually acceptable agents would 
128
suffice.
The evident success of Ohio Delaware leaders in drawing other 
western Indians into negotiations with colonial officials was made 
easier by the changing nature of French-Indian relations throughout 
the west. As with those Indians living on the Ohio, not all Ottawas, 
Ojibwas, Potawatomis, or other Great Lakes Indians would have been 
favorably disposed toward a war with the English. This would have 
been especially true for those who had worked and risked much to estab­
lish trade relations with the Anglo-Americans that benefited Indians 
through competitive prices and a wider variety of goods. The Seven 
Years' War had the added effect of seriously limiting French aid for
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those western Indians who did take up arms and also upset normal 
social and economic patterns. The result, by 1759 > was growing In­
dian disenchantment with French policies and a corresponding interest 
by some to open contacts with the English in the hope of repairing 
at least some of the war-related damage.
Having subdued Indian and Anglo-American attempts to overthrow 
them, the French, by 1753. had reasserted their role as the west's 
chief supplier of goods and principal military force. In the face of 
Anglo-American threats to the French commercial empire and settlements 
in North America in 1755 "the Canadian Governor General, Vaudreu.'l, and
h is  f i e l d  o f f i c e r s  moved to  m u ster w estern  In d ia n  su p p o rt f o r  th e  im - 
129
pending  c o n f l i c t .  U s in g  fe a r s  o f  E n g lis h  la n d  h un g er, French ag en ts  
were a b le  to  le a d  im p re s s iv e  numbers o f  G re a t Lakes and Ohio In d ia n s  
in  th e  v ic to r io u s  campaigns o f  1756 and 1757
By the end of 1757> however, conditions were changing and the 
marriage of convenience between French and western Indians was, in 
some instances, strained to the point of divorce. Part of the problem 
was external. The British naval blockade of Canada was keeping need­
ed supplies out of the colony. The capture of Louisbourg in 1758 made
131th e  s i t u a t io n  even w orse. The degree o f  In d ia n  dependence on th e
French  was in d ic a te d  by a  c a p tu re d  p a r t is a n  o f f i c e r  who in d ic a te d  t h a t
th e  g a rr is o n s  o f  th e  Ohio f o r t s  p la n te d  corn  ju s t  f o r  th e  In d ia n s , and
132
also supplied them with clothing. The curtailment of this support, 
especially for the families of warriors in the field, led to increased 
unrest. In 1757» "Several drunken Missisaugas" threatened to destroy 
the post at Toronto. More serious was a show-down at Fort Duquesne
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between a Miamis war party and the garrison that resulted in an ex-
133change o f  g u n f ir e  and s e v e ra l M iam i d e a th s . A ls o , i t  was observed  
t h a t  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  near th e  e a s te rn  G re a t Lakes were h av in g  second 
th o ug h ts  ab ou t th e  French  d e s tru c t io n  o f  th e  E n g lis h  tr a d in g  p o s t a t
13^Oswego.
The French bore the brunt of Indian anger over war-related 
losses as well. The Kittanning raid in 1758 undoubtedly inspired 
some Delawares to reconsider their role in the war, particularly when
135th e y  r e f le c t e d  on how l i t t l e  p r o te c t io n  th e  French had g iv e n  them .
I t  appears, however, that the epidemic of 1757-1758 which swept the 
Great Lakes served as a major turning point in French-Indian relations. 
In assessing the rising discontent among western Indians, a French 
observer attributed it to "The great loss they have suffered from the 
smallpox, the bad medicine the French have thrown them." This tendency 
to blame the French for disease and death was not farfetched, since 
the illness appears to have been carried west by Indians who participat­
ed in the siege of Fort William Henry. Refusing to limit their anger
to  words, Menominees a t  La Baye b es ieg ed  th e  f o r t  th e re  f o r  s e v e ra l
136
days and k i l l e d  a  dozen French  c i v i l i a n s  l i v i n g  n e a rb y . The ap­
pearance o f  O ttaw as , O jib w as , and Potaw atom is among th e  " e ig h t  n a tio n s "  
re p re s e n te d  by Teedyuscung suggests t h a t  some, a t  l e a s t ,  o f  th e s e  peo­
p le  were a ls o  becoming d is i l lu s io n e d  w ith  th e  F ren ch . By th e  tim e  
A ng lo -A m erican  fo rc e s  a r r iv e d  on th e  O h io , o th e r  G re a t Lakes In d ia n s  
were moving to  c o n ta c t them , th ro u gh  th e  o f f ic e s  o f  Tamaqua.
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As th e  French p o s i t io n  in  th e  w est co n tin u ed  to  d e te r io r a te ,  
A nglo -A m erican  c o n ta c ts  w ith  th e  Ohio In d ia n s  to o k  an im p o rta n t tu r n  
w ith  th e  a r r i v a l  in  P h i la d e lp h ia  o f  two D elaw are m essengers, P isquetom en
13?
and Keekyuscung. Upon m eetin g  C h r is t ia n  F re d e r ic k  P o s t a t  Wyoming
th ey  in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e y  had come " to  see some o f  th e  In h a b ita n ts  o f
P e n n s y lv a n ia  w ith  whom we co u ld  speak o u rs e lv e s , f o r  we cannot b e lie v e
a l l  t h a t  we h e a r , and know n o t what i s  t r u e  and w hat is  f a l s e . "
W h ile  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  th e s e  men may have been prom pted by P e n n s y lv a n ia
messages sen t west by Teedyuscung in  response to  th e  e ig h t  n a t io n s '
139
ca lu m et, P isquetom en suggested  a n o th e r e x p la n a t io n . In  express­
in g  th e  D e law ares ' r e g r e t  a t  h av in g  gone to  w ar, he s a id  t h a t  th e y  
"w ished o f te n  to  have seen some M essengers from  th e  Government w ith  
whom th e y  co u ld  have spoken" and he "com plained  s tr o n g ly  th a t  th e y  
n ever had heard  any S a t is f a c to r y  Account o f  th e  Peace made a t  E asto n ,
n or any T r e a t ie s  t h a t  hd been h e ld , n o r re c e iv e d  any D o lts  ' t i l l  now 
140
l a t e l y . "  T h is  and o th e r  s ta te m e n ts  in d ic a te  t h a t  th o s e  Ohio D e la ­
wares b en t on n e g o t ia t in g  f e l t  i t  n ecessary  to  make d i r e c t  c o n ta c t  
w ith  P e n n s y lv a n ia  and d iv o rc e  th em se lves  from  Teedyuscung and th e  e a s t­
e rn  D elaw ares . F u r th e r , t h is  in s is te n c e  t h a t  p re v io u s  messages had n o t 
been h eard  and th e  D e la w a re s ' em phasis on c o n ta c t w ith  th e  c o lo n ia l  
governm ent may a ls o  have been a  to k e n  o f  th e  In d ia n s ' in s is te n c e  t h a t
t h e i r  in te r e s ts  be re c o g n iz e d  as s e p a ra te  and d is t i n c t  from  th o se  i n -
141
v o lv in g  I nd ia n  groups on th e  Susquehanna.
I n  v iew  o f  th e  im pending advnace o f  G e n e ra l John F o rb e s ' army t o -
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ward, th e  Ohio c o u n try , th e  a r r i v a l  o f  P isquetom en and Keekysucung
aroused  g re a t  in t e r e s t .  They o f fe r e d  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  ending
h o s t i l i t i e s  w ith  th e  Ohio In d ia n s , which would g r e a t ly  in c re a s e
F o rb e s ' chances o f  success. In  h is  r e p ly  to  th e  Ohio d e le g a te s ,
G overnor Denny o u t l in e d  p re v io u s  peace n e g o tia t io n s  and emphasized
t h a t  "We do a ssu re  th e  A lle g h e n y  In d ia n s , and a l l  o th e rs  who h o ld  on
th e  Peace B e l t ,  th a t  th e y  a r e ,  and s h a l l  be in c lu d e d  in  t h is  im p o rta n t
m a t te r ,  and t h a t  every  O ffen se  th a t  has been passed s h a l l  be fo rg o t  
IkZ
f o r e v e r . "
Both Denny and Forbes were an x io u s  to  have P isquetom en and h is  
companions r e tu r n  to  th e  O h io . Not o n ly  were th e y  to  c e r t i f y  th e  Eng­
l i s h  in t e n t  to  n e g o t ia te  but were asked  to  keep p r o v in c ia l  and army 
o f f ic e r s  in fo rm ed  about French p lan s  and o p e ra tio n s . To f u r t h e r  i n ­
su re  th e  v e r a c i ty  o f  P e n n s y lv a n ia 's  message and to  convey v i t a l  i n t e l ­
l ig e n c e  to  F o rb es , Denny asked C h r is t ia n  F re d e r ic k  P o s t to  accompany 
I k J
th e  D elaw ares .
P o s t 's  account o f  th e  jo u rn ey  to  th e  Ohio in  J u ly  and August and 
th e  re c e p t io n  D enny's message was g iv e n  t e l l s  much ab ou t how th e  w est­
e rn  D elaw ares and t h e i r  ne ighbors  view ed  th e  A ng lo -A m erican  peace  
p ro p o s a ls . In  a d d it io n ,  P o s t w itn essed  th e  s t i l l - d i v i d e d  n a tu re  o f  
th e  Ohio In d ia n  community, due both to  th e  is s u e  o f  peace and to  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  th e  p o p u la t io n  a lo n g  th e  Ohio was in  a  s ta t e  o f  f l u x  as 
groups tended  to  move f a r t h e r  west and south to  a v o id  th e  w ar. The 
pospects  o f  opening  ta lk s  c le a r ly  ap p e a le d  to  Tamaqua and h is  fo llo w e r s .  
A ccord ing  to  P o s t , D elaw are George, Tam aqua's a s s o c ia te , " s a id  he had 
n o t s le p t  a l l  n ig h t ,  so much had he been engaged on account o f  my com­
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144in g ."  T hat Tam aqua's a s s o c ia te s  were re s p o n s ib le  f o r  a r r iv in g  a t
a s u ita b le  r e p ly  to  D enny 's  message is  c le a r  from  P o s t ’ s jo u r n a l.
P o s t spent most o f  h is  t im e  a t  Tamaqua’ s town a t  th e  K u sku sk ies , and
both  Tamaqua and D elaw are  George served  as h is  hosts  and p ro te c to rs .
W h ile  eag er to  exchange v iew s w ith  th e  A ng lo -A m erican s , th e  Ohio
D elaw ares made a p o in t  o f  em phasizing  t h a t  such p ro ceed in gs  were o n ly
p r e l im in a r ie s .  A s ta t e  o f  war s t i l l  e x is te d  and many D elaw are w a r r io rs
145were even th e n  i n  th e  f i e l d .  F u r th e r , P o s t was made to  u nd ers tand  
th a t  as " a l l  th e  In d ia n s , from  th e  s u n r is e  to  th e  su n s e t, a re  u n ite d  
in  a  body, i t  i s  n ecessary  t h a t  th e  whole sh ou ld  jo in  in  th e  peace, 
o r i t  can be no p e a c e ,"  and t h a t ,  th e r e f o r e ,  th e  E n g lis h  shou ld  not
14(
expect th e  w estern  D elaw ares  to  speak f o r  a l l  o r  to  make peace a lo n e .
I t  was t h is  v ie w  t h a t  peace co u ld  n o t be a c h ie v e d  u n t i l  a l l  p a r t ie s  
were in c lu d e d  t h a t  prom pted Tam aqua's l a t e r  a c t i v i t i e s  as  an i n t e r ­
m ed iary  between In d ia n s  to  th e  west and th e  A ng lo -A m erican s . E n g lis h  
n o tio n s  o f  d ip lom acy a s id e ,  f o r  th e  In d ia n s  in v o lv e d  peace meant th e  
in c lu s io n  o f  a l l i e s ,  t r a d in g  p a r tn e r s , and kinsm en.
Some in s ig h t  in to  th e  problem  c o n fro n t in g  Tamaqua and o th e rs  i n  
a c h ie v in g  a  consensus on th e  is s u e  o f  peace was a ls o  re v e a le d  to  P o s t.
In  c o n tra s t w ith  h is  c o r d ia l  re c e p t io n  a t  th e  K uskuskies  due to  th e  
in f lu e n c e  o f  Tamaqua, P isquetom en, and D elaw are G eorge, was P o s t 's  
tre a tm e n t a t  Saucunk, sometime re s id e n c e  o f  b o th  Shingas and N etaw at­
wees, a t  th e  mouth o f  th e  B eaver R iv e r .  P o s t observed  t h a t  "The peop le  
o f  th e  town were much d is tu rb e d  a t  my coming" and t h a t  " t h e i r  fa c e s  
were w u ite  d is to r t e d  w ith  r a g e ."  O n ly  P o s t 's  t im e ly  re c o g n it io n  o f  
an In d ia n  acq u a in ta n c e  i n  th e  town l i m i t e d ,  and to  some e x te n t ,  reduced
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th e  exp re s s io n s  o f  h o s t i l i t y .  Perhaps th e  b es t e x p re s s io n  o f  th e  
a b id in g  b it te r n e s s  and d is t r u s t  tow ard  th e  E n g lis h  h e ld  by many D e la ­
wares was t h a t  o f  th e  w a r r io r  Shamokin D a n ie l.  H aving  h eard  P o s t 
a ssu re  Shingas t h a t  P e n n s y lv a n ia  would re s c in d  th e  bounty i t  had p u t 
on h is  head, D a n ie l in te r r u p t e d ,  t e l l i n g  Shingas "Do n o t b e l ie v e  him , 
he t e l l s  n o th in g  b u t i d l e  ly in g  s t o r ie s ."  I n  th e  fa c e  o f  P o s t 's  
s tro n g  p r o te s ta t io n s  to  th e  c o n tra ry , D a n ie l 's  anger b u rs t f o r t h .
He la s h e d  back by t e l l i n g  P ost "D— n you, why do not you and th e  
French  f i g h t  on th e  sea? You come h e re  o n ly  to  cheat th e  poor I n ­
d ia n s , and ta k e  t h e i r  la n d  from  th e m ."  W h ile  Shingas and o th e r  le a d ­
e rs  l a t e r  a p o lo g iz e d  f o r  D a n ie l 's  o u tb u rs t , h is  words cu t to  th e  h e a r t  
o f  th e  m a t te r .  What th e  Ohio In d ia n s  wanted was a g u aran tee  n o t o n ly
l i f - 8
o f  peace b u t o f  fu tu r e  n o n - in te r fe r e n c e  in  t h e i r  a f f a i r s  by Europeans.
F a r  from  b e in g  th e  ra v in g s  o f  a  man a c t in g  "as i f  he was d ru n k " ,
D a n ie l 's  e x p re s s io n  o f  d is t r u s t  o f  A ng lo -A m erican  m o tives  in  sending
1^9
peace b e l ts  was shared  by o th e rs , in c lu d in g  Tamaqua and o th e r  n e g o t ia to r s .
The reaso n  f o r  t h is  was th e  a p p a re n t gap between E n g lis h  p r o te s ta t io n s  
o f  peace and th e  c o n tin u in g  advance o f  th e  A ng lo -A m erican  arm y. G overnor 
D enny 's  message, r e i t e r a t e d  in  c o u n c il by P o s t , spoke o f  f r ie n d s h ip  
and a l l i a n c e .  The war h a tc h e t was to  be b u r ie d  "on both  s id e s "  and 
th e  same peace t h a t  had been made in  th e  e a s t in  1?57 was to  be ex­
ten d ed  to  th e  O h io . P o s t opened a  ro a d  from  th e  D elaw are towns to  
P h i la d e lp h ia  and ass u re d  th e  assem bled In d ia n s  t h a t  F o rb e s ' army was 
d ir e c te d  o n ly  a t  th e  F ren ch .
I t  was t h is  l a s t  p o in t ,  among o th e r  is s u e s , t h a t  prom pted c o n tin u e d  
concern among th e  In d ia n s . By m id -A u g ust, as  th e  In d ia n s  were m ee tin g
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to consider Denny's message, the advance elements of Forbes' army were 
already approaching Loyal Hanna Greek, soon to build Fort Ligonier.
The advance of an English army on one side and the French garrisons 
on the other reinforced the belief that "you and the French contriv­
ed the war to waste the Indians between you." The Delaware leaders
continued by suggesting that Post had knowledge of this, but was order-
151
ed by Denny to remain silent. Of equal concern was the presence
in the army of several hundred Catawba and Cherokee warriors. These
Indians had long been enemies of those living north of the Ohio and
152
their appearance as English allies further suggested treachery.
Tamaqua, Pisquetomen, and others made a point of exposing what, at the
very least, was bad English planning and timing when they observed
"if you had brought the news of peace before your army had begun to
153march it would have caused a great deal more good."
Aside from the apprehension and divisiveness caused by the dif­
ference between Anglo-American words and deeds, the peace proposals 
themselves led to some debate and resistance. In the first place, 
it is clear that Indians on the Ohio did not feel themselves included 
in, or wish to be embraced by, the treaty of 175?. While this treaty 
did end fighting in the east, it failed to address fundamental issues, 
particularly land. To Tamaqua and his followers, the current negotia­
tions were only a first step toward peace. Such was not, however, go­
ing to emerge from a flat acceptance of English promises and requests. 
Rather, the Ohio Indians took advantage of Pisquetomen's mission to 
send signals of their own.
On the fundamentally important issue of land, the assembled lead-
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ers' stand was clear. Emphasizing that "the land is ours, and not
theirs [the English^", the Indians asserted that they would insure
the removal of the French if "you will he at peace with us" and if
15^
the English dropped any plans for expanding into the west. The
repatriation of English captives was also a matter for concern. This
issue struck at the heart of native society and, like the other points,
would become a major issue in Anglo-Indian relations over the next
several years. The principal objection, as Post observed, was that
"it appears very odd and unreasonable that we should demand prisoners
before there is an established peace; since an unreasonable demand
155makes us appear as if we wanted brains." Further, as Post had
earlier indicated, repatriation of prisoners, many of whom had been
adopted, was no easy task since redemption meant weakening native kin 
156
groups. Also, no mechanism, coersive or otherwise, existed by
157
which Indian leaders could guarantee repatriation. Thus, Anglo- 
American demands that peace be linked to prisoner returns served to 
increase tension within the Indian community on the Ohio and made a 
consensus on peace harder to ahcieve.
After having expressed their positions on these matters to Post, 
the assembled native leaders issued a formal reply to Denny. The 
message, carried back east by Pisquetomen and the Delaware warrior 
Thomas Hickman, reveals both the extent to which Tamaqua and his follow­
ers had created a rough consensus among the Delawares and how tenuous 
this consensus was. The list of Delawares who issued the message was 
headed by Tamaqua. Significantly, the second name on the list was 
Shingas'. His agreement to the proceedings, as well as that of other
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Delaware war leaders such as Kill Buck and Captain Peter, may have 
been intended as a further signal to the Anglo-Americans of the Dela­
wares 1 willingness to consider reasonable proposals. The men whose 
names were appended to the message represented all three Delaware 
clans on the Ohio, though Custaloga's and Netawatwees's names were 
not included. One additional measure of a new-found agreement is found 
in Post's comment on the initial hostility shown him at Saucunk. He 
had particularly wingled out Whiteyes and Kill Buck on this occasion,
but later noted that their attitudes had changed. B0th mens' names 
158
appear on the list. On the other hand, the fragility of the consensus
is expressed in the Delawares' request that the English "make haste,
159
and let us soon hear of you again." Tamaqua and his followers seem
to have needed additional signs of Anglo-American good will, especially
since Forbes' army was cintinuing its advance against Fort Duquesne.
The Delawares' message made no mention of peace being accepted,
only an interest in peace. In addition, even as Pisquetomen and his
party traveled to Pennsylvania, Delaware warriors participated in the
near annihilation of an Anglo-American detachment and engaged in an
160
abortive French attack on Forbes' advance base at Fort Ligonier.
Such activity reflected the assumption that, until formal peace was 
made directly with the English to the satisfaction of all the Delaware 
interests involved, a state of war existed and that not all Delawares 
may have accepted the idea of negotiating at all. Significantly, the 
English were asked to inform the Ohio Indians when a formal peace had 
been concluded in the east. The implication that the western Indians 
would deal separately with such an event was reinforced by the suggest-
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ion that the Ohio Indians would send any news of such a peace agree-
161
ment to the western Indians themselves.
Pisquetomen's party arrived at Philadelphia and then went to
Easton where it arrived in mid-October in the midst of the general
peace conference being held between the crown, Pennsylvania, the east-
162
ern Delawares, and Six Nations. The conference had been called to 
settle outstanding problems between the Indians and the colony and to 
complete the process begun a year earlier with Teedyuscung. While 
Anglo-American officials hoped that the results of the treaty would 
induce western Indians to stop fighting, the conference was not called 
specifically for that end. Indeed, until Pisquetomen's arrival, affairs 
on the Ohio had hardly been mentioned during the proceedings.
The background to, and proceedings of, the 1758 Easton Treaty 
have been amply dealt with elsewhere and need not be repeated here.
The conference did play an important role in future relations between 
western Indians and Anglo-Americans. As recent scholarship on the 
Treaty has made clear, there emerged from Easton a new foundation for 
Anglo-Indian relations, one on which royal officials over the next de­
cade and a half would attempt to construct a realistic, coherent, and
manageable policy. The Treaty's most immediate result was to confirm
163
peace with the Susquehanna Delawares. Out of this emerged a number 
of important points. First, the treaty marked the emergence of Sir 
William Johnson as master of Indian affairs in Pennsylvania. Although 
Johnson did not attend the meetings, it was through his solicitations 
to the Board of Trade that the conference was held, and his deputy, 
George Groghan, was present to monitor the proceedings and represent
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Johnson's interests. In this, Croghan was supported by the Six Nations
delegation. Not only were the Iroquois present, but they managed the
Indian side of the negotiations from the outset. In addition, the
Susquehanna Indians agreed to acknowledge the leadership of the League
164
in international affairs once again. Thus, Johnson was able not 
only to put his own stamp on the proceedings but to begin the task 
of rebuilding the Covenant Chain as well. To be sure, the new Chain 
that eventually emerged bore little resemblance to its pre-1754 pre­
decessor, but in 1758 none of this was yet evident.
In return for acknowledging Iroquois leadership, the Susquehanna 
Indians obtained support from the League in settling the still sen­
sitive issue of lands which, by Delaware and Iroquois admission, was 
at the bottom of the Indians' alienation during the war. Aside from 
settling specific Delaware claims to lands along the Susquehanna River, 
the conference witnessed the retrocession of the 175^ Albany purchase 
to the Six Nations, with a promise that settlement west of the moun­
tains would be stopped until Indian and crown leaders could meet and
165
agree on reasonable cessions. Coupled with this was a pledge to
open a regulated trade under provincial supervision at selected locations,
166
one of which was later to be at Fort Pitt.
What the Anglo-Americans asked in return for thus opening a road 
to peace was an assurance that hostilities would end. In addition, 
all prisoners taken during the war were to be returned as soon as possible. 
While the Six Nations' sachems agreed in principle to both requests and 
urged their clients to do likewise, actual compliance was another matter. 
For the Indians involved, achieving peace was a continuing process
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based on achieving and maintaining a consensus on the issues at hand. 
Unlike their Anglo-American counterparts, no native leader could rat­
ify a treaty and suddenly declare peace. This was due in part to the 
local, consensual nature of Indian society and the limited authority 
enjoyed by leaders. Of greater importance was a value system that de­
fined relations with outsiders as potentially hostile rather than peace­
ful. Peace was considered fragile and had to constantly be renewed,
168
rather than merely declared.
This fundamental difference in outlook between the Indians at 
Easton and their Anglo-American adversaries carried profound meaning 
for this and future encounters. To the Six Nations, the eastern Dela­
wares, and Pisquetomen's delegation observing from the galleries, Easton 
was one more step toward normalization of relations, the finality of 
which would depend on how sincere the English appeared to be about 
maintaining peace and keeping their promises.
It was with this outlook that Pisquetomen and Thomas Hickman de­
parted for the Ohio with news of the Easton Treaty and Governor Denny's
message. Significantly, the Delawares were accompanied on their re-
169
turn by two Cayuga sachems. The presence of these men among the 
western Delawares, the English hoped, would lend weight to the news 
of the treaty proceedings and underscore the Six Nations' renewed role 
as leaders of regional affairs. Denny's message reiterated the Anglo- 
American desire for peace and called on the Ohio Indians to re-enter 
the Covenant Chain alliance. He also promised to open a road— to 
normalize relations with them— in return for an end to hostilities.
The road, however, was to lead to the council fire at Philadelphia,
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with no mention of a similar meeting place on the Ohio.
The reception given the news from Easton "by Ohio Indians is re­
vealed in the journal of Christian Frederick Post's second trip to 
the Ohio country in November 1?58. Post was not involved in any way 
with carrying messages to the west and did not accompany Pisquetomen
from Easton. Rather, his mission was to gather and report intelligence
1?1
on Indian and French activity for the British army. He did, how­
ever, engage in talks with Indian leaders at the Kuskuskies, but by 
no means directed negoiations.
Post's observations reveal the extent to which the Delawares re­
mained divided on the subject of negotiating with.the English. In ad­
dition, the specific issues that had been the source of debate in July 
were still pressing matters that fall. Perhaps even more so, given 
the continued movement of Forbes' army and the steadily weakening 
French resistance.
It took little time for these concerns to surface. En route to 
the Ohio, Pisquetomen argued with the officers of Post's escort, Cap­
tain Bull and Lieutenant Hays, over the issue of land and the continued 
presence of Anglo-American forces in the west. Insisting that the In­
dians be allowed to deal with the French in their own way, Pisquetomen 
emphasized a sore point when he told the officers "We are jealous the 
English will take the land from us." This seemed not an unreasonable 
conclusion, given the road the army was cutting through to the Ohio,
172a road wide enough to carry settlers' wagons as well as gun carriages. 
Pisquetomen's agitation was not lost on Post, who cautioned his com­
panions "to be careful how they argued with the Indians; and be sure
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170
to  say n o th in g  t h a t  m igh t a f f r o n t  them" l e s t  th e  Englishm en be con-
173f r o n te d  by what P o s t had fa c e d  a t  Saucunk th e  p re v io u s  summer.
P isq u eto m en 's  words o n ly  h in te d  a t  th e  in te n s e  concern la n d  had
become among th e  w estern  D e law ares . Upon re a c h in g  th e  K uskuskies ,
P o s t noted  th a t  th e  In d ia n s  "were a f r a id  th e  E n g lis h  would come over
th e  r i v e r  O hio" and t h a t  " th e y  concern them selves  v e ry  much about th e
a f f a i r  o f  la n d ; . . . and a re  c o n t in u a lly  . . . a f r a i d  th e  E n g lis h
174
w i l l  ta k e  t h e i r  la n d ." In d ia n  a n x ie ty  o ver la n d  was ro o te d  in  f a r  
more th a n  economics. The D elaw ares on th e  upper Ohio had m ig ra te d  
once a lre a d y  in  th e  fa c e  o f  w h ite  la n d  hunger and had seen t h e i r  Ohio  
homes invaded  by th e  F re n c h , and in v a s io n  t h a t  b rought economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  d is ru p t io n  and w ar. Now, as w in te r  approached, a  second in ­
v a s io n  seemed im m inent. H av in g  been d e p r iv e d  o f  m astery  o f  t h e i r  own 
a f f a i r s  in  th e  p a s t , th e  D elaw ares  were n o t w i l l in g  t h a t  th e  same th in g  
happen a g a in . What made m a tte rs  worse was th e  r a p id ly  d e te r io r a t in g  
s i t u a t io n  on th e  Ohio and th e  c o n tin u in g  c o n tra d ic to ry  s ig n a ls  being  
s e n t by th e  A ng lo -A m erican s. On th e  one hand, as th e  French p rep ared  
to  abandon F o r t  Duquesne, most Shawnees and many D elaw ares  a ls o  began 
m oving away from  th e  fo rk s  o f  the O h io . On th e  o th e r , th e  D elaw ares  
began re c e iv in g  messages o f  peace from  both  Forbes and Denny as th e  
A ng lo -A m erican  army p re p ared  f o r  i t s  f i n a l  push a g a in s t  th e  French— a  
push w hich, c o r r e c t ly  o r  n o t , th e  D elaw ares  b e lie v e d  was aim ed a t  them 
as w e l l .  The fe e l in g  t h a t  th e  E n g lis h  were not s in c e re  about peace 
seemed to  be co nfirm ed  when P ost a r r iv e d  a t  th e  K uskuskies  accompanied  
by an armed e s c o r t , h a rd ly  th e  a c tio n s  o f  an em issary  o f  peace. I n ­
deed, so u p se t were th e  D elaw ares by t h is  th a t  th e y  c a u tio n e d  P o s t not
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to  c a l l  B u l l  by h is  m i l i t a r y  t i t l e  s in c e  " t h e i r  young men would be
176
mad t h a t  we b rought a  w a r r io r  t h e r e ."  P ost a ls o  found t h a t  th e  
a i r  o f  c o r d ia l i t y  and consensus t h a t  had e x is te d  when he l e f t  th e  
p re v io u s  summer had la r g e ly  d is a p p e a re d . The sachems were a ls o  
s e n s it iv e  about t h is  and e n jo in e d  him not to  " re g a rd  what th e  common 
p eop le  would say , b u t o n ly  hearken  to  th e  c h ie fs ."  He was a ls o  ex ­
p re s s ly  fo rb id d e n  to  speak to  any o f  th e  E n g lis h  c a p tiv e s  h e ld  in  th e
177town and were fu r io u s  when P o s t 's  companions proceeded to  do so.
The reasons appear to  have been a  concern th a t  th e  p r is o n e rs  would 
spread f a ls e  r e p o r ts  ab ou t t h e i r  t re a tm e n t, which co u ld  damage ne­
g o t ia t io n s ,  and a ls o  g iv e  in t e l l ig e n c e  ab ou t th e  s ta te  o f  lo c a l  a f f a i r s .  
In  a d d it io n ,  th e  D elaw are  w a r r io rs  were p a r t i c u la r ly  i r r i t a t e d  both a t  
P o s t 's  presence among them and th e  nearness o f  F o rb e s ' arm y. T h e ir  
a t t i t u d e  in  t h is  re g a rd  was founded in  t r a d i t io n a l  v a lu e s  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  w a r fa re . P o s t a s c r ib e d  t h e i r  beha,yior to  a  "m urdering  s p i r i t "  
born o f  h av in g  been re p u ls e d  in  an a t ta c k  near F o r t  L ig o n ie r .  What he 
w itn essed , how ever, was g r i e f  o ver lo s s e s  and th e  u rg e  to  revenge th e  
dead and so appease t h e i r  s p i r i t s .  An a tte m p t by French agents  to  i n ­
c i t e  th e  D elaw ares a ls o  added to  t h is  u n r e s t .  The French produced
l e t t e r s  supposedly ta k e n  from  E n g lis h  tro o p s  c o n firm in g  A nglo-A m erican
178
d e te rm in a tio n  to  ta k e  and keep  th e  Ohio la n d s .
What appears to  have tem pered  t h is  an ger and g e n e ra l u n re s t was
th e  a r r i v a l  o f  Tamaqua, S h in g as , and th e  two Cayuga sachems a t  th e
179
K uskuskies s e v e ra l days a f t e r  P isquetom en and P o s t. Is a a c  S t i l l ,  a 
D elaw are le a d e r , to o k  advan tage  o f  th e  Cayugas' a r r i v a l  to  s ile n c e  th e  
w a r r io rs . T e l l in g  them o f  th e  p ro ceed in gs  a t  Ea sto n  and o f  th e  I r o ­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
q u o is ' p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  them , he c h a lle n g e d  th e  young men to  "go 
t e l l  them £ th e  Ir o q u o is ]  t h a t  th e y  a re  fo o ls .  Go and t e l l  th e  
Cayuga c h ie fs  so , and you w i l l  become g re a t  m en." W h ile  d is s e n t  con­
t in u e d , S t i l l ’ s to n g u e -la s h in g  appeared  to  end th e  most b e l l ic o s e  o u t -  
180
b u r s ts .
Tam aqua's a r r i v a l  m arked th e  b e g in n in g  o f  fo rm a l c o n s id e ra tio n  
o f  th e  A ng lo -A m erican  m essages. W ith  him were Keekyuscung, S h ingas, 
'P isquetom en, and D elaw are G eorge, th e  core  o f  th e  group which had le d  
n e g o tia t io n s  t h a t  summer. Ha v in g  l is te n e d  to  D enny's messages, th e  
assem bled c h ie fs  and w a r r io rs  a ls o  a tte n d e d  to  a d v ic e  o f fe r e d  by th e  
Cayugas. Speaking f o r  th e  S ix  N a tio n s , th e y  t o ld  th e  D elaw ares t h a t  
th e  w ar h a tc h e t belonged to  th e  w h ite  p e o p le , " l e t  them use i t  among 
th em se lves , i t  i s  t h e i r s ,  and th e y  a re  o f  one c o lo u r; l e t  them f i g h t  
w ith  one a n o th e r ."  They p u n c tu a ted  th e s e  rem arks by a d v is in g  th e  D e la ­
wares to  "be s t i l l  and q u ie t  a t  K ush ku shk in g ," away from  th e  E n g lis h  
and F rench  a rm ie s . I t  was a n t ic ip a te d  by P e n n s y lv a n ia  and crown o f f i c i a l s  
t h a t  th e  D elaw ares would heed such a d v ic e  and once a g a in  come u nder th e  
d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  League. P o s t had h in te d  a t  such when he e a r l i e r  r e ­
minded th e  D elaw ares  t h a t  th e  Iro q u o is  "a re  th e  c h ie f  owners o f  th e
181
la n d "  and t h a t  " th e y  w i l l  s e t t l e  th e  a f f a i r . "  In  v ie w  o f  p a s t I r o ­
qu o is  perform ances w ith  re g a rd  to  a f f a i r s  in  th e  w est, i t  i s  d o u b tfu l  
t h a t  a l l  P o s t 's  l i s t e n e r s  were im pressed o r  convinced.
H aving  ta k e n  account o f  th e  s e v e ra l speeches and a d m o n itio n s , th e  
D elaw ares spent th e  n ex t day in  p r iv a t e  m eetings  d is c u s s in g  th e  is s u e s  
and p re p a r in g  a r e p ly .  Tamaqua e x p la in e d  what to  P o s t must have seem­
ed a  d e la y  in  th e  p ro ceed in gs  by t e l l i n g  him t h a t  " I t  i s  a g re a t  m a t te r ,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
and wants much consideration," and that each of the three Delaware
clans had to discuss and arrive at some agreement on each proposal
182before all three could act together. On November 28, Tamaqua,
again speaking for the assembly, expressed general agreement with what
they had heard. They agreed to remain uninvolved in the military
operations and expressed satisfaction with the tone and substance of
Denny's message. Tamaqua also agreed to carry word of the Easton
Treaty to the Indians living beyond the Ohio, in hopes of including
them in future negotiations. He did, however, persist in asking that
183
the English "after having drive away the French, not settle there."
His request was reinforced by Ketiushund, "one of the chief counsellors."
This man warned Post, as the latter prepared to depart, that "all the
nations Rolans]] had jointly agreed to defend their hunting place at
Allegheny, and suffer nobody to settle there." He further observed
that, as many of the local Indians were now "very much inclined to
the English interest" that the latter would do nothing to wreck the 
184-
rapproachment. Post's reply was to direct the Indians to Forbes,
who alone could make any determination on whether Englishmen would re-
185
main west of the mountains.
Even as Tamaqua and his companions deliberated over the messages 
from the English and Six Nations, Forbes' army had completed its mission. 
Unable to slow or stop the English advance, the French blew up Fort Du- 
quesne and evacuated the forks of the Ohio, which was occupied by 
Forbes' tired and threadbare troops on November 25. The imminent 
arrival of the Anglo-American forces undoubtedly played a role in de­
termining the outcome of the talks at the Kuskuskies. The Delawares
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had received periodic situation reports throughout the council and
were well aware of French plans. The Indians had earlier rejected
French requests for aid, largely due to the obvious weakness of the 
186
latter's situation. While Post recalled that the Indians "danced
round the fire till midnight" on November 22, celebrating the arrival
of the British army, it is doubtful that many rejoiced at the thought
of bidding farewell to one invader only to greet another. Shingas'
reply to Denny's message was more cautious. He told Post that he and
the warriors were "pleased" with the governor's speech, but went no 
187
further than that.
V
It has been part of the lore surrounding the Easton Treaty and 
the English occupation of the Ohio country that the treaty somehow 
guaranteed Anglo-American military success by preventing the west­
ern Indians from striking Forbes' army, and that the English force 
so overawed the Indians that they had no choice but to settle for the 
best terms available. Contemporaries believed this to be true and 
later historians have concurred, citing Colonel Henry Bouquet's ob­
servation to William Allen that the peace made at Easton had "knocked
188
the French in the head." Echoing this, Nicholas Wainwright summar­
ized the Anglo-American occupation of ruined Fort Duquesne by observ­
ing that while "some Ohio Delawares had approached Forbes after his 
victory, most of them were terrified of his vengeance and sought safety
189
in flight."
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To th e  e x te n t t h a t  some D elaw are le a d e rs  chose to  d e l ib e r a te  o ver  
th e  news from  Easton and a tte m p te d  to  keep t h e i r  w a r r io rs  home d u rin g  
th o se  d e l ib e r a t io n s ,  th e  t r e a t y  may have had a m inor in f lu e n c e  on even ts  
a t  th e  fo r k s .  H ow ever, Tamaqua and o th e r  D elaw ares  a t  th e  K uskuskies  
d id  n o t make peace, a c c e p t th e  t r e a t y  as e x p la in e d  to  them, o r  in  any 
way suddenly change co u rs e . C e r ta in ly  th e re  is  l i t t l e  ev idence  o f  
" t e r r i f i e d "  In d ia n s  f l e e in g  th e  vengeance o f  th e  E n g lis h  h o s ts . Some­
th in g  o f  t h is  s o r t  may be a t t r ib u t e d  to  th e  Shawnees who had l i v e d  a t  
Logstow n. They d id  p r e c ip i to u s ly  abandon t h e i r  town and moved down 
th e  Ohio to w ard  th e  S c io to  R iv e r  in  o rd e r  to  a v o id  F o rb e s ' arm y, b u t 
a ls o  to  m a in ta in  t h e i r  c o n ta c ts  w ith  th e  F ren ch , c o n ta c ts  t h a t  had be­
come e s s e n t ia l  to  t h e i r  economic w e l l -b e in g . Some o f  th e  D elaw ares  
a ls o  l e f t ,  abandoning Saucunk, t h e i r  town c lo s e s t to  F o r t  Duquesne.
H oever, t h is  re p re s e n te d  a  tre n d  in  p o p u la t io n  movement t h a t  had begun 
e a r l i e r ,  i n i t i a t e d  in  th e  wake o f  th e  K it ta n n in g  r a i d  two y e a rs  be­
fo r e .  A s u b s ta n t ia l  number o f  D elaw ares co n tin u ed  to  l i v e  a t  th e  Kus­
k u s k ie s  as w e l l  as in  towns f a r t h e r  n o r th , enough to  g iv e  A ng lo -A m erican  
commanders cause f o r  concern  f o r  months to  come. F in a l l y ,  th e  In d ia n  
messages s en t to  Forbes and Bouquet u rg in g  them in  th e  s tro n g e s t term s
to  "go back o ver th e  m o u nta in s , and s ta y  th e re "  do n o t r e f l e c t  th e  a c t io n s
190
o f  a  b e a te n , f r ig h te n e d  p e o p le .
R a th e r , th e  D elaw ares  based t h e i r  a c t io n s  on a c le a r  u n d ers tan d ­
in g  o f  th e  p o s s ib le  as w e l l  as on t h e i r  own c o n tin u e d  d e s ire  to  see a l l  
o f  ohe Ohio c o u n try  d e - m i l i t a r i z e d  and l e f t  f o r  th e  use and management 
o f  i t s  n a t iv e  in h a b ita n ts .  In  t h is  re g a rd , W illia m  H u n te r 's  obser­
v a t io n  th a t  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  Forbes" army made peace more a t t r a c t i v e  is
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191somewhat c lo s e r  to  th e  m ark. S ta n d in g  a lo n e , th e  D elaw ares found  
t h e i r  o p tio n s  r e s t r ic t e d  th a t  w in te r .  The French r e t r e a t ,  and w ith  
i t  th e  d isappearance o f  needed s u p p lie s  o r  hardw are and fo o d , t h r e a t ­
ened to  f u r t h e r  d is ru p t  th e  lo c a l  economy. The Ir o q u o is ' a d v ic e  th a t  
th e  D elaw ares rem ain  q u ie t  in  t h e i r  towns suggested  t h a t  l i t t l e  support 
co u ld  be counted on from  t h a t  q u a r te r .  F i n a l l y ,  th e  s t i l l - d i v i d e d  
s ta t e  o f  th e  D elaw are community p re c lu d e d  uoth a  h a s ty  peace and con­
t in u e d , c o n c e rte d , r e s is ta n c e .
Faced w ith  a  sudden and s ig n i f ic a n t  change in  th e  r e g io n a l balance  
o f  pow er, th e  D elaw ares sought to  f o l lo w  a m id d le  course o f  c o n tin u in g  
n e g o t ia t io n s  w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e  s t r iv in g  w ith in  c u rre n t l i m i t s  to  
o b s tru c t f u r t h e r  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra tio n s  in  t h e i r  la n d . The g o a l was n e a t­
l y  s ta te d  in  response to  a  French c a l l  f o r  D e law are  a id  in  d r iv in g  th e
s m a ll E n g lis h  g a rr is o n  from  th e  fo r k s .  I n  r e p ly ,  th e  K uskuskies  corn-
192m u n ity  re fu s e d , say in g  " th e y  would have no war in  t h e i r  c o u n try ."
As i t  tu rn e d  o u t , f ig h t in g  in  th e  re g io n  d id  d e c l in e ,  b u t th e  D elaw ares
co u ld  n o t s top  C o lon e l Bouquet from  le a v in g  tro o p s  in  th e  ru in e d  French
f o r t ,  though th e y  warned him o f  th e  p o s s ib le  i l l  consequences o f  such 
193
a c t io n s . The p o s tin g  o f  A ng lo -A m erican  tro o p s  on th e  O h io , however 
fe w , in a u g u ra te d  a new phase in  A n g lo - In d ia n  r e la t io n s ,  one to  which 
both  In d ia n s  and A ng lo -A m ericans would have to  a d ju s t .
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CHAPTER IV 
The Search for Securityi 
The Anglo-American Occupation of the West,
1758-1762
As Anglo-American forces gradually nibbled away at New France, 
the American commander-in-chief and his senior subordinates were con­
fronted with problems of imperial management born of conquest. The 
tenuous occupation of the Ohio country, the capture of Fort Niagara, 
and the fall of Canada in 1760 necessitated the occupation of a vast 
and ill-defined territory and the imposition of order and English 
rule on those who lived there. This difficult task was complicat­
ed by London's failure to anticipate the need to administer the west. 
Unlike the heartland of New France, where the French administration 
system aided the transfer of power, in the pays d'en haut the English 
succeeded only in gradually occupying isolated posts and settlements. 
English control, political and economic, remained incomplete in the 
region through the outbreak of war in 1763. Instead of a swift and 
complete transfer of control from conquered to conquerer, the west 
witnessed what Louise Kellogg has aptly termed an interregnum."*'
From the point of view of the resident Indians, however, even this 
term would not accurately describe the situation. As sovereign peo­
ple in their own land, they only witnessed the removal of one colon­
ial force and its attempted replacement by another.
The western Indians, many of whom persisted in their economic
189
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and political relations with the French, presented Sir Jeffrey 
Amherst and Sir William Johnson with a major, but by no means 
their only, challenge. In addition, the west had to be occupied 
and a reliable logistical system created to sustain local garrisons 
and government. Further, the French population in the Great Lakes 
region, though small and scattered, had to be closely watched and 
properly administered. It was Indian affairs, however, that held 
the attention of Anglo-American officials and demanded the greatest 
care and supervision. Johnson made it clear that not only the oc­
cupation of the west but the continued security of the older colon­
ies depended on "the Improvement and Extension of His Majesty’s 
3
Indian Interest."
While this statement may have appeared obvious to royal officers 
who had attempted to direct and pay for the recent war and to those 
colonists who had been terrorized by Indian warfare, it was decep­
tively simple. It was clear that "His Majesty's Indian Interest" 
was best served by establishing a firm peace with the western In­
dians and soliciting their cooperation in Anglo-American plans to 
occupy and exploit the west. The central problem was how that in­
terest was to be achieved. And, inevitably tied to this was the 
question of the role that Indians should play in the new regional 
order. True, certain guidelines had been made explicit. Anglo- 
American officials left the 1758 Easton Treaty committed to ful­
filling certain specific promises made to the Six Nations and their
"dependents" and which were extended to other native groups as these
3
re-opened diplomatic and trade relations with crown and colonies.
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These obligations were later given recognition as policy by officials
k
in London. Beyond this, however, the crown left the determination 
of short-term policy to the commander-in-chief. The result was a 
series of de facto measures designed to bring western Indian affairs 
under control. Some of these were later included in the Proclamation 
of 1763. Until then, Indian affairs in the west were confronted by 
officials in America who attempted, in the face of real and immediate 
problems, to create a workable program that would secure and extend 
royal interests.
In attempting to do so, however, the officials themselves some­
times collided over the best means to obtain desired ends. They 
also found themselves opposed by private interests which did not 
share the official concern that exploitation of the west should be 
well ordered and care taken to secure the good will of the Indians. 
Finally, the efforts made to bring order to the west, and particular­
ly to Indian affairs after 1758, reveal the gap between intention 
and implementation. Between New York City or Johnson Hall and the 
tiny western garrisons was a vast gulf of understanding as well as 
of space and time.
I
Anglo-American efforts to rationalize Indian affairs before 
1763 fell into four broad catagoriesi trade, settlement, diplomacy, 
and military. Agreement between the leading policy makers on any 
given issue tended to vary for a number of reasons. However, both
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Amherst and Johnson did agree on certain fundamentals upon which all 
future policy decisions would be based. The first of these was the 
view that Indians, irregardless of questions of local sovereignty, 
had been clearly reduced to subordinate status as a result of the 
French defeat. English leaders recognized from the outset that 
the Conquest had shattered the old survival strategy whereby various 
native groups could play-off English and French interests for their 
own benefit. Thus, Amherst's observation in 1762 that the English 
"are the only People who can Protect them."^ Both he and Johnson 
spoke of "managing Indians" and of "keeping them in Subjection" to 
royal authority.^ While in more heated moments Amherst was even 
disposed to lumping Indians with other English "subjects", their 
comments reflect an attitude more closely akin with directing a con-
7
quered people. Not only did such assumptions underly much subsequent 
decision-making, it was voiced in unmistakable terms to the Indians.
A t a m eeting  w ith  a number o f  w estern  groups a t  F o r t  P i t t ,  George  
Croghan rem inded h is  a u d ien ce  t h a t  "you must now be S e n s ib le  Your
8
B re th re n  th e  E n g lis h  i s  th e  most p o w e r fu l l P eop le  in  th e  C o u n try ."
Concommitant w ith  t h is  assum ption o f  A ng lo -A m erican  s u p e r io r i ty  
and n a t iv e  dependence— an assum ption  r e in fo r c e d  by A ng lo -A m erican  
m i l i t a r y  successes a g a in s t th e  F rench— was a n o th e r g iv e n . N e ith e r  
Am herst nor Johnson, n o t any o th e r  o f f i c i a l s  in v o lv e d  in  In d ia n  and 
w estern  a f f a i r s ,  q u es tio n ed  th e  f a c t  t h a t  In d ia n  p o l ic y  u l t im a te ly  
e x is te d  to  s e rve  A ng lo -A m erican , n o t In d ia n , needs. R epeated  r e ­
fe re n c e s  to  "our in t e r e s t "  o r  "H is  M a je s ty 's  In t e r e s t "  when speak­
in g  o f  In d ia n  a f f a i r s  le a v e  no room f o r  doubt t h a t  p o l ic y  d e c is io n s
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were a means to a greater end. The object was always the neutral­
ization of Indians as a potential military threat so that, eventually, 
Anglo-Americans could reap the benefits brought by the conquest of 
Canada.
Beyond these points, however, Amherst and Johnson parted com­
pany in their views on Indians and Indian affairs. As a professional 
soldier and one who had little contact with Indians outside the battle
field, Amherst's understanding of the natives and the complexities
9
of western affairs was servely limited. In addition, the commander- 
in-chief brought to his office an imperialist's view of native peo­
ple better suited to the Northwest Frontier of India in I860 than 
North America in 1760. His opinion of Indians was clearly not a 
flattering one and deteriorated as he wrestled with the problems of 
Indian affairs. He had little respect for their culture, capabilities 
or sensibilities. As late as May 1763, just weeks before confirm­
ation arrived of warfare on the Lakes, Amherst could tell a sub-
10
ordinate that "I have a very Contemptible Opinion of the Savages."
This attitude of thinly veiled contempt was conveyed to military
commanders in the west who were reminded that they had little to
11
fear from the Indians as long as precautions were taken. To what 
extent Amherst's field officers, many of whom experienced day-to-day 
contact with western Indians, accepted their chief's views is prob­
lematic. One, Lieutenant-Colonel William Eyre, denigrated intelli­
gence given his garrison by local Senecas as of little value, given
12
the unreliable source. This disregard for Indians appeared re­
peatedly in Amherst's dealings with them, as when he rejected out
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of hand protests against a new fort at Sandusky, an establishment
that lay astride the natives' east-west diplomatic road linking
13the Ohio country and the Great Lakes.
Mixed with Amherst's lack of regard for Indians as people and 
his view of them as a subordinate people was a confirmed distrust 
for the natives. In this regard his feelings seem to have grown 
from personal experiences during the campaign of 1760. At that 
time several hundred Six Nations warriors had joined the army ad­
vancing on Montreal. Denied, by Amherst's orders, a chance for 
scalps and plunder after the capture of a French outpost, the frus­
trated warriors left en masse, leaving an infuriated general seeth-
14
ing with resentment at "treacherous" Indians. This incident seems 
to have reinforced a predilection to view Indians as savage and 
therefore sinister. Amherst's observations on Indian affairs are 
full of references to Indian "treachery" and "villany" and orders
15to frontier commanders to guard against Indian "mischief". In­
deed, during the period from 1758 to 1763, there is evidence of a 
growing concern for, and even expectation of, a conflict with the 
western Indians, reinforced by the very real attempts made by the 
Senecas in 1761 to generate resistance to Anglo-American expansion.
Standing somewhat opposed to Amherst was Sir William Johnson. 
Unlike his superior, Johnson had spent some twenty years in close 
association with the Mohawks and, through them, with other Six 
Nations and Algonkian Indians. Johnson suffered from no illusions
of noble savagery and was quick to point out the necessity of "civil-
17
izing" the Indians through a variety of means. On the other hand,
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c lo s e  o b s e rv a tio n  and a conscious e f f o r t  to  le a r n  about h is  n a t iv e  
t r a d in g  p a rtn e rs  enabled  Johnson, as w e l l  as h is  a g e n ts , to  u nd er­
s tan d  In d ia n  v iew s on A ng lo -A m erican  p o l ic ie s  and a c t io n s . He was 
a ls o  aw are, as Amherst n ever was, o f  th e  v a lu e  th e  In d ia n s  p laced  
on t r a d i t io n a l  p ra c t ic e s  and th e  c u l t u r a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  a c t i v i t i e s  such as t r a d e , g i f t  g iv in g , and t r e a t y  m aking.
Thus, where Amherst demanded c o s t -e f fe c t iv e n e s s  and a  s w i f t  t r a n s ­
i t i o n  to  E n g lis h  c o n tro l o ver th e  w es t, Johnson c o u n s e lle d  g ra d u a l­
ism d u rin g  which custom ary p ra c t ic e s  would be m a in ta in e d  as a s ig n
18
o f  f r ie n d s h ip  and good f a i t h  tow ard  th e  w estern  In d ia n s .
W h ile  much o f  what u l t im a t e ly  s e p a ra te d  th e s e  two men on p o lic y
is s u e s  was ro o te d  in  p e r s o n a l i t ie s  and e x p e r ie n c e , th e  r o le  th a t  each
p la y e d  cannot be o v e rlo o k e d . I n  th e  f i n a l  a n a ly s is ,  each man served
d i f f e r e n t  in t e r e s t s .  Both were r o y a l ag en ts  charged w ith  e n la rg in g
and s e c u rin g  E n g la n d 's  o verseas  t e r r i t o r i e s  and to  t h a t  e x te n t were
re s p o n s ib le  to  crown o f f i c i a l s  and o b lig a te d  by r o y a l in t e r e s ts  f o r
t h e i r  ra n k  and o f f ic e s .  T h is  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  o f  A m herst, whose
fo r tu n e s  and co ntin u ed  enjoym ent o f  o f f i c e  were l in k e d  to  a le s s -
19th a n -s ta b le  governm ent i n  London. I n  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  h is  e q u a l-  
ib r iu m  and la c k in g  any c o n s titu e n c y  in  A m erica, th e  com m ander-in- 
c h ie f  wras com pelled to  a c t  in  ways c a lc u la te d  to  im press m e tro p o lita n  
p o l i t ic ia n s  and th u s  ensure is  own p e rs o n a l and p ro fe s s io n a l advance­
m ent. One way f o r  Amherst to  dem onstra te  h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and con­
cern  f o r  th e  crown was to  economize as  much as p o s s ib le , e s p e c ia l ly
in  th e  a re a  o f  e x tr a o r d in a r y  expenses f o r  both m i l i t a r y  and In d ia n  
20
a f f a i r s .  A nother way was to  occupy th e  west q u ic k ly  and e f f i c i e n t l y
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by v ig o ro u s ly  e n fo rc in g  p o l ic ie s  designed  to  answer In d ia n  com-
21
p la in t s  abou t la n d  and t r a d e ,  as w e ll  as  o th e r  abuses.
To some e x te n t  Johnson found h im s e lf  in  s im i la r  c ircum stan ces .
As a r o y a l o f f i c e r  h e , l i k e  Am herst, was re s p o n s ib le  to  s u p e r io rs
in  London, in  t h is  case th e  Board o f  T ra d e . F u r th e r , Johnson and
Amherst were l in k e d  to g e th e r  due to  th e  l a t t e r ' s  f i n a l  a u th o r i ty
22
o v e r th e  a c t i v i t i e s  and expenses o f  Johnson 's d epartm en t. How­
e v e r, Johnson, u n l ik e  h is  s u p e r io r , had in te r e s ts  d e e p ly  ro o te d  in  
th e  p o l i t i c s  and economy o f  th e  c o lo n ie s . Johnson, as  a m i l i t i a  
o f f i c e r ,  In d ia n  Com missioner and J u s t ic e  o f  th e  Peace f o r  A lbany  
County and th e  p ro v in c e  o f  New Y ork , was c lo s e ly  a l l i e d  w ith  lo c a l  
e l i t e s .  F u r th e r ,  h is  lo n g -s ta n d in g  in vo lvem en t in  th e  f u r  tra d e  
and la n d  s p e c u la t io n  s tre n g th e n e d  h is  t i e s  to  lo c a l  in t e r e s t s .  Even 
w ith o u t h is  r o y a l com m ission, J0hnson would have rem ained  a  power­
f u l  and w e a lth y  man by c i r t u e  o f  h is  in v e s tm e n ts , la n d h o ld in g s , and 
a l l ia n c e s  w ith  New Y o rk 's  r u l in g  e l i t e .  Thus, in  h is  h a n d lin g  o f  
In d ia n  a f f a i r s ,  Johnson was in f lu e n c e d  n o t o n ly  by r o y a l in te r e s ts  
but by th o se  o f  h is  f r ie n d s  and ne ig h bo rs  as w e l l .  As h is  l a t e r
c a re e r  in d ic a t e s ,  he was n o t above s a c r i f ic in g  r o y a l in t e r e s t s  when
23
th e  o p p o rtu n ity  a ro s e .
G iven  th e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s , Amherst and Johnson o f te n  found them­
s e lv e s  on o p p o s ite  s id e s  o f  s p e c if ic  io s u e s . T h is  was p a r t i c u la r ly  
t r u e  in  m a tte rs  co ncern in g  d ip lom acy and s e tt le m e n ts . On one sub­
j e c t ,  how ever, th e y  were i n  t o t a l  ag reem ent. B0th  b e lie v e d  th a t  
E n g la n d 's  en joym ent o f  i t s  w estern  domain depended la r g e ly  on a r e ­
g u la te d  f u r  t r a d e .
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Johnson had c o n tin u o u s ly  rem inded h is  s u p e r io rs  a t  home and
in  London t h a t  "an e x te n s iv e  In d ia n  tra d e  & In t e r e s t  a re  in s e p a r -  
24
a b le ."  I n  so d o in g , he was r e f e r r in g  to  th e  r o le  which t h is  
system o f  b i - c u l t u r a l  economic exchange had come to  p la y  in  th e  
grow ing im p e r ia l a m b itio n s  o f  European pow ers. By th e  e ig h te e n th  
c e n tu ry  th e  f u r  t r a d e  had become th e  c h ie f  means by which England
25
and Prance sought to  in f lu e n c e  o r c o n tro l n a t iv e  g ro up s . Both  
In d ia n s  and Europeans re c o g n ize d  t h is .  In d ia n s , e n jo y in g  th e  
p r o f i t s  to  be had from  b e lin g  s o l ic i t e d  by both fo r e ig n  pow ers, 
d e f t l y  p la y e d  each a g a in s t  th e  o th e r  and, in  so d o in g , a c q u ire d  
more and b a t t e r  goods and c o n tin u e d  freedom  o f  a c t io n .  F o r t h e i r  
p a r t ,  both  England and France  understood  th e  m a t e r ia l  term s on 
which In d ia n  support would be fo rth c o m in g . As a  r e s u l t ,  as th e  im­
p e r ia l  c o n f l i c t  in t e n s i f ie d ,  th e  French in c r e a s in g ly  su pp o rted  and  
re g u la te d  th e  f u r  t r a d e  as a weapon in  th e  c o n f l i c t  w ith  E ng land . 
W h ile  some A nglo -A m erican  o f f i c i a l s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  New Y ork and Penn­
s y lv a n ia , a ls o  re c o g n ize d  th e  p la c e  o f  t ra d e  in  th e  c o n f l i c t ,  th e  
in h e r e n t ly  d e -c e n t r a l iz e d  n a tu re  o f  E n g lis h  c o lo n ia l  a d m in is tr a t io n  
b e fo re  1760 p re c lu d e d  th e  e f f e c t iv e  use o f  t r a d e  as a p o l i t i c a l  wea­
pon. F u r th e r ,  th e  u n re g u la te d , p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c  n a tu re  o f  th e  A n g lo - 
A m erican tr a d e  le d  to  in t e r - c o lo n ia l  c o n f l ic t s  and, w orse , p r ic e -  
gouging , c h e a tin g , and v io le n c e  t h a t  th re a te n e d  to  d r iv e  e s ta b lis h ­
ed and p o t e n t ia l  In d ia n  custom ers away. I t  was to  t h is  l a s t  problem  
t h a t  Johnson spoke and which both he and Amherst s tro v e  to  c o r re c t .
Johnson 's  proposed remedy was to  "open an advantageous T rade  
f o r  th e  In d ia n s  and to  have i t  p u t under such a u t h o r i t iv e  r e g u la -
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t io n s  as may convince th e  In d ia n s  how much i t  i s  f o r  t h e i r  i n -
27
t e r e s t  to  m a in ta in  Peace & F r ie n d s h ip  f o r  th e  E n g l is h ."  Ad­
vantageous tr a d e  meant "s u p p ly in g  them a t  as  re a s o n a b le  a  r a t e  as
th e  t r a d e r s  can a f f o r d , "  as w e l l  as s u p p ly in g  a  w ide v a r ie t y  o f
28
needed and s o u g h t -a f te r  goods. On th e  more im p o rta n t p o in t  o f  
" a u th o r i t iv e  r e g u la t io n ,"  J0hnson p lan n ed  f o r ,  and Am herst su pp o rt­
ed, a  t r a d e  open to  a l l  A ng lo -A m ericans  on a l ic e n s e  b a s is , but 
l im i t e d  to  c e r t a in  p o s ts  where m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  c o u ld  oversee
tr a d e  and e n fo rc e  p ro p e r e t iq u e t t e , as w e l l  as  an o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  
29
sch ed u le . I n  a l l  o f  t h i s ,  Johnson and Am herst had th e  support
o f  th e  home governm ent. S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Egremont u rg ed  Amherst
to  c le a n  up th e  t r a d e  and em phasized th e  k in g 's  in t e n t io n  o f  d e a l-
30
in g  hum anely and f a i r l y  w ith  th e  In d ia n s .
The need to  a c t  q u ic k ly  and d e c is iv e ly  was made more im p e ra tiv e  
f o r  two reaso n s . F i r s t ,  a t  Easton and subsequent m e e tin g s , t r a n s -  
A p p a lach ian  In d ia n s  had been prom ised t h a t  t r a d e  would be re -op en ed
31
a t  th e  e a r l ie s t  p o s s ib le  momenc. The In d ia n s  re p e a te d ly  c a l le d
f o r  t h i s ,  as  th e y  a tte m p te d  to  r e -o r d e r  t h e i r  l i v e s  and economies
in  th e  wake o f  th e  Seven Y e a rs ' War. R esponding to  t h is  c a l l ,  and
sensing  th e  p r o f i t s  to  be made w ith o u t French  c o m p e tit io n , A ng lo -
A m erican t r a d e r s  moved west w ith  such r a p id i t y  t h a t  th e y  were o fte n
32
ahead o f  th e  tro o p s  d is p a tc h e d  to  p r o te c t  and c o n tro l them . George
Groghan a p t ly  summed up th e  fe e l in g s  i n  P e n n s y lv a n ia  in  th e  wake o f
F o rb e s ' success when he t o ld  Johnson " th e  P eop le  o f  t h is  P ro v in c e
33a re  a l l  ru n n in g  w i ld  a f t e r  th e  In d ia n  T ra d e ."
The program t h a t  e v o lv e d  to  ensure a  f a i r  and re g u la te d  tra d e
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was grounded i n  e x e c u tiv e  o rd e rs  is s u e d  by Amherst o r Johnson w ith
th e  g e n e r a l 's  a p p ro v a l. No law s were passed a t  th e  r o y a l le v e l
g overn in g  t r a d e ,  a lth o u g h  P e n n s y lv a n ia  and New York had enacted  
3k
codes o f  t h e i r  own. Each t r a d e r  was to  purchase a l ic e n s e  issu ed  
e i t h e r  by A m herst, Johnson, o r a  d e s ig n a te d  s u b o rd in a te , o r th e  
m i l i t a r y  g overno rs  in  Canada. Once lic e n s e d  f o r  a s in g le  season, 
th e  t r a d e r  c o u ld  t r a n s p o r t  goods to  one o f  seven p o s ts  a t  which
35t r a d e  co u ld  l e g a l l y  be conducted . Passes and s h ip p in g  m a n ife s ts  
were to  be g iv e n  to  th e  p o s t commander who, a lo n g  w ith  th e  re s id e n t
36
In d ia n  a g e n t, would o v ersee  t r a d in g  a c t i v i t i e s .  T h is  c lo se  super­
v is io n  w ould, i t  was hoped, ensure f a i r  t r a d in g  and s a t is f ie d  In d ia n  
custom ers. E q u a lly  im p o rta n t , i t  would p re v e n t th e  s a le  to  In d ia n s  
o f  c e r ta in  p ro s c r ib e d  ite m s  such as l iq u o r  and am m unition.
The use o f  l iq u o r  as  an ite m  o f  tra d e  and i t s  consumption by 
In d ia n s  had lo n g  been re c o g n iz e d  as s e rio u s  problem s by In d ia n s  and  
c o lo n ia l o f f i c i a l s  a l i k e ,  f o r  p r a c t ic a l  as w e ll  as m oral reasons.
Rum t r a d e r s ,  lo o k in g  f o r  q u ic k , easy p r o f i t s ,  would o f te n  in to x ic a te  
t h e i r  custom ers b e fo re  engaging in  b a r te r .  Thus, Iro q u o is  com­
p la in e d  to  J0hnson t h a t  "when o u r H u n te rs  come o u t o f  ye  Woods w ith  
F i r s ,  S k in s , M eat & th e  l i k e ,  th e r e  a re  a lw ays Some o f  y r  Peop le  
read y  w ith  l iq u o r  to  in t o x ic a t e  them & th e re b y  d e p r iv e  them o f  wt 
th e y  w ith  la b o u t  & lo s s  o f  tim e  p ro cured  f o r  th e  Sustenance o f  t h e i r  
Fam ily s ."  They f u r t h e r  em phasized t h a t  such tr a d e r s  t r e a te d  t h e i r
custom ers v e ry  b a d ly  and " o b lig e d  [[them ] to  go o f f  w ith o u t any S a t-  
37
is f a c t io n ."  I t  was t h i s  l a s t  t h a t  A ng lo -A m erican  o f f i c i a l s  and 
more scru p u lo us  t r a d e r s  wanted most to  a v o id , s in c e  such b e h av io r
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o Q
co u ld  r u in  th e  tra d e  and le a d  to  p o s s ib ly  f a t a l  r e p r is a ls .
On a n o th e r l e v e l ,  from  th e  p o in t o f  v iew  o f  th e  army and In d ia n  
s e r v ic e , In d ia n s  under th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  rum were more d i f f i c u l t  to  
d e a l w ith  and c o n t r o l.  Drunkenness postponed c o u n c ils , made I n ­
d ia n  a u x i l i a r i e s  le s s  v a lu a b le , and le d  to  v io le n t  c o n fro n ta tio n s  
t h a t ,  on a t  le a s t  one o ccas io n , r e s u lte d  in  th e  d ea th  o f  a c o lo n -
39i a l  s o ld ie r .  F in a l l y ,  In d ia n s  who, w h ile  d runk, gave away o r  
l o s t  t h e i r  means o f  p urchas in g  s u p p lie s , became a p u b lic  charge
ko
on lo c a l  g a r r is o n s , som ething Amherst w ished to  a v o id . To remedy 
th e s e  problem s and to  p u t tra d e  and In d ia n  r e la t io n s  on th e  best 
p o s s ib le  fo o t in g ,  Amherst and Johnson a c te d  to  p r o h ib i t  th e  tr a n s ­
p o r ta t io n  o r  s a le  o f  l iq u o r  i n  th e  w est. P ost commanders were
s t r i c t l y  e n jo in e d  "not to  p e rm it any o f  th e s e  p e rn ic io u s  A r t ic le s  
41
to  P a s s ."
A long w ith  l iq u o r ,  Amherst a ls o  p lanned  to  r e s t r i c t  th e  supply
42o f  weapons and am m unition a v a i la b le  to  th e  In d ia n s . Hw was qu ick
to  p o in t  o u t t h a t  " th e  le s s  am m unition th e y  h ave , th e  More r e g u la r  
43
th e y  w i l l  b e ."  From a  p u re ly  m i l i t a r y  s ta n d p o in t , and g iv e n  
A m h ers t's  tendency to  assume In d ia n  h o s t i l i t y ,  such a  p o l ic y  made 
sense. From a p r a c t ic a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p e rs p e c t iv e , how ever, i t  
p roved  tro u b leso m e. T h is  was e s p e c ia l ly  t r u e  when th e  g e n e ra l ex­
panded th e  l i s t  o f  p o t e n t ia l ly  dangerous, and th e r e f o r e  p ro s c r ib e d ,
ite m s  to  in c lu d e  "S c a lp in g  & C lasp K n iv e s , R azo rs , Tomahawks, . . .
44
F o w lin g  p ie c e s  . . . "  I n  response, Johnson warned t h a t  th e  cur­
ta i lm e n t  o f  such a necessary  item  as gunpowder would c re a te  a r e a l  
h a rd s h ip  f o r  w estern  In d ia n s  who depended upon f ire a rm s  f o r  both th e
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procurem ent o f  food  and p e lts  f o r  t r a d e .  The problem  was a p p a re n t­
l y  compounded by th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t r a d e r s  to  o b ta in  gunpowder in  
s u f f i c ie n t  q u a n t i t ie s  to  meet n a t iv e  demands. W ith o u t s u b s id ie s  
from  th e  army o r  In d ia n  a g e n ts , lo c a l  commanders f e l t  t h a t  " i t
45
would be im p o s s ib le  to  keep them i n  te m p e r ."  F i n a l l y ,  th e  
e lim in a t io n  o f  c e r ta in  tr a d e  goods, e s p e c ia l ly  am m unition , sen t 
th e  wrong message to  th e  w estern  In d ia n s .
Coupled w ith  e f f o r t s  to  r e s t r i c t  l iq u o r  and am m unition was 
A m h ers t's  in s is te n c e  t h a t  th e  custom o f  t r e a t y  s u b s id ie s  and p e r io d ­
i c  g i f t  exchanges w ith  th e  In d ia n s  be c u r t a i le d .  The g e n e r a l 's  de­
c is io n  to  red u ce  g i f t s  was based on f in a n c ia l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  as 
w e ll  as h is  p e rc e p tio n  o f  In d ia n s . As re c e n t  w a r -t im e  exp e rie n c e  
had p roven , s u b s id iz in g  In d ia n s  co u ld  p la c e  an enormous burden on 
th e  a rm y 's  b ud g et. Once th e  need o f  such expenses had passed, Am-
46
h e r s t  was eag er to  red u ce  th e  c o s t o f  g i f t  g iv in g  to  a  b a re  minimum. 
H is  f irm  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h is  shou ld , and c o u ld , be done was grounded  
in  h is  l im i t e d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f ,  and p re ju d ic e s  a b o u t, In d ia n s .  
Convinced o f  th e  in h e re n t  savage and h o s t i le  n a tu re  o f  th e  n a t iv e s ,
th e  g e n e ra l was c e r ta in  t h a t  g i f t s  " o n ly  serve  to  Encourage them in
47
Id le n e s s ."  These id l e  peop le  w ou ld , he b e lie v e d , "n e v e r th in g  o f  
p ro v id in g  f o r  t h e i r  F a m ilie s  by h u n tin g , i f  th e y  can S upport them
by begging P ro v is io n s  from  u s ,"  a  p r a c t ic e  w h ich , once begun, would
48
n e v e r end. F in a l l y ,  ig n o r in g  th e  sym bolic  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  g i f t
exchange, Amherst equated  i t  w ith  b r ib e r y ,  som ething to  which he
49
would n o t c o n tr ib u te .
Taken to g e th e r , th e  tra d e  r e g u la t io n s  and A m h e rs t's  in s is te n c e
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t h a t  g i f t  g iv in g , and p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  g iv in g  o f  am m unition , be 
s e v e re ly  r e s t r ic t e d ,  p o in te d  tow ard  a new d e f in i t io n  o f  A n g lo - 
In d ia n  r e la t io n s .  By b lo c k in g  o th e r  o u t le ts  to  needed s u p p lie s  
w hich, Amherst b e lie v e d , encouraged th e  In d ia n s  in  id le n e s s  and  
a  f a ls e  sense o f  im p o rta n c e , th e  g e n e ra l appears  to  have sought 
to  reduce th e  n a t iv e s  to  th e  l e v e l  o f  a  p e a s a n try , managed and con­
t r o l l e d  by a g en ts  o f  th e  r o y a l governm ent. I n  a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  
new tr a d e  p o l ic y ,  Amherst in d ic a te d  to  Johnson t h a t  " I  th in k  i t  
much b e t t e r  to  a v o id  a l l  p re s e n ts  in  fu tu r e ,  s in c e  t h a t  w i l l  o b lig e  
them to  supp ly  them selves  by b a r te r  & o f  course keep them more Con­
s ta n t ly  Employed by means o f  which th e y  w i l l  have le s s  tim e  to  con­
c e r t ,  o r C a rry  in to  E x e c u tio n  any Schemes p r e ju d ic ia l  to  H is  M a je s ty 's  
I n t e r e s t s ."  B a s ic  to  t h i s  scheme was th e  r e s t r ic t io n  o f  am m unition
"s in c e  n o th in g  can be so im p o l i t ic k  as to  fu rn is h  them w ith  th e
50
means o f  a c c o m p lis h in g  th e  E v i l  which i s  so much D read ed ."  On 
a n o th e r l e v e l ,  hungry In d ia n s , le s s  sure  o f  handouts in  tim es  o f  
s c a r c i ty ,  would be le s s  a p t  to  d r in k  away t h e i r  la b o r s ,  thus r e -
51
moving a n o th e r source  o f  expense and cause f o r  a la rm .
On t h i s  l a t t e r  p o in t ,  Am herst may have been on to  som ething.
The problem  w ith  t h is  p la n , and one th a t  caused In d ia n  resen tm en t 
to  mount, was th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  In d ia n s 'p o s t-w a r  econom ies. As 
Johnson and o th e rs  re p e a te d ly  o bserved , th e  d is ru p t io n  o f  French  
tr a d e  and sources o f  supp ly  had l e f t  w estern  In d ia n s  s e r io u s ly  
s h o rt o f  a number o f  e s s e n t ia l  ite m s , e s p e c ia l ly  gunpowder. W ith ­
out th e  use o f  m uskets, which had become th e  common h u n tin g  t o o l ,  
p e lts  and s k in s  co u ld  n o t be c o lle c te d  in  s u f f i c ie n t  q u a n t i t ie s  f o r
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t r a d e .  F u r th e r ,  as Johnson p o in te d  o u t , u n t i l  th e  new tr a d e  was
s e t in  m o tio n , th e  o n ly  source o f  c lo th ,  emergency r a t io n s ,  gun-
52
pow der, and to o ls  were th e  g a rr is o n s  and In d ia n  a g e n ts . Thus, 
to  th e  degree t h a t  A m h ers t's  w ishes were t r a n s la te d  in to  a c tio n s  
a t  in d iv id u a l  p o s ts , w e s te rn  In d ia n s  found th em se lves  in  a c u rio u s  
and f r u s t r a t i n g  s i t u a t io n .  Needing tr a d e  to  r e - h u i l d  t h e i r  own 
d is ru p te d  economies and to  re -s to c k  s u p p lie s  o f  e s s e n t ia l  goods, 
th e y  were a t  th e  same tim e  p re v e n te d  from  o b ta in in g  th e  i n i t i a l  
c a p i t a l  o u t la y  needed to  o b ta in  p e l ts  f o r  t r a d e  w ith o u t w h ich , 
g iv e n  A m h e rs t's  p o l ic y ,  th e y  co u ld  n o t o b ta in  th e  p urchas in g  power
53to  buy s u p p lie s .
I I
A m h e rs t's  in s is te n c e  t h a t  g i f t  g iv in g  be c u r t a i le d  a ls o  had  
p o t e n t ia l ly  s e r io u s  non-econom ic im p lic a t io n s  f o r  A n g lo -In d ia n  r e ­
la t io n s .  G i f t  exchange, as  a means o f  s o c ia l in t e g r a t io n  and o f  
e s ta b lis h in g  p e a c e fu l r e la t io n s  w ith  o u ts id e rs , h e ld  much s i g n i f i ­
cance f o r  w estern  In d ia n s . W ith in  com m unities, g i f t s  were exchang­
ed between lin e a g e s  in  o rd e r  to  "co ver th e  d ead", to  compose group
c o n f l i c t s ,  and as p a r t  o f  th e  cerem onies t h a t  accom panies th e  i n -
5^
v e s t i t u r e  o f  new le a d e r s . The In d ia n s  o f  e a s te rn  N o rth  A m erica  
had endowed g i f t - g i v i n g  w ith  sym bo lic  meanings w hich p re -d a te d  con­
t a c t  w ith  Europeans. Thus, th e  g i f t  served  as an e x te n s io n  o f  th e
55
s e l f ,  and was endowed w ith  s p i r i t u a l  v a lu e . G i f t s  a ls o  served  
to  an im ate  and c o n firm  th e  im portance  o f  messages exchanged b e -
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tw een groups.
The a c t  o f  g i f t  exchange was a ls o  surrounded, w ith  s p i r i t u a l
and sym bolic  m eaning. As M a rc e l Mauss p o in te d  o u t , th e  a c t o f
g i f t  exchange c re a te s  a s p i r i t u a l  bond t h a t  tra n s c e n d s  any l i n g e r -  
56
in g  a n im o s ity . F u r th e r , g i f t  exchange i s  n o t a w h o lly  v o lu n ta ry  
t h in g .  The r e c ip ie n t  o f  a  g i f t ,  g iv e n  f o r  w h atever re a s o n , is
57p la c e d  under a m ora l o b l ig a t io n  to  respond  in  k in d . F in a l ly ,
g i f t - g i v i n g  a ls o  served  to  r e - d i s t r i b u t e  w e a lth  w i th in  and between
g ro up s , a lth o u g h  t h is  fu n c t io n  was, t r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  secondary to  th e
58
s o c ia l  and s p i r i t u a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  a c t .
G i f t  exchange a ls o  c a r r ie d  im p o rta n t sym bolic  m eaning in  in ­
t e r n a t io n a l  r e la t io n s .  G i f t - g i v in g  s e rved  to  compose d if fe re n c e s  
betw een p o l i t i c a l l y  autonomous groups ju s t  as i t  d id  w ith in  lo c a l  
com m unities. In  a d d i t io n ,  o u t groups who w ished to  cro ss  t e r r i t o r y  
c la im e d  by a n o th e r , o r  use tr a d e  ro u te s  p io n e e re d  by o th e r  in d iv id u a ls  
o r  groups had to  purchase th e  r ig h t  to  do so . Thus g i f t  exchange 
a c te d  as an acknowledgem ent o f  group r ig h t s  w h ile  s e rv in g  as a
c o n tra c t  under which autonomous groups c o u ld  co o p era te  f o r  m utual 
59
b e n e f i t .
O f even g r e a te r  im p o rtan ce , g i f t  exchange between s o vere ig n  
groups c o n s t itu te d  a bond o f  peace , a  p le d g e  o f  c o o p e ra tio n . In  
th e  absence o f  any in t e r n a t io n a l  a u th o r i ty  t h a t  co u ld  impose o r  
m a in ta in  peace, g i f t - g i v i n g ,  on a r e g u la r  b a s is , s e rv e d  to  b rid g e  
d if fe r e n c e s  and m a in ta in  p eace . I n  a d d i t io n ,  fo l lo w in g  p re -d e te rm in -  
ed fo rm u la s , i t  co u ld  p re v e n t a revenge w ar from  e ru p t in g  o ver a 
s in g le  in c id e n t  in v o lv in g  death  o r  in j u r y .  How ever, i n  th e  absence
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o f r e c ip r o c a l  g i f t - g i v i n g ,  o r  i f  one p a r ty  re fu s e d  to  honor th e
s p i r i t  o f  r e c ip r o c i t y ,  a  s ta t e  o f  h o s t i l i t y  would be im p lie d  and 
60
assumed.
Europeans were a ls o  in te g r a te d  in to  t h is  system . I n  th e  f u r
t r a d e , g i f t  exchange became necessary  in  o rd e r  to  c re a te  a s o c ia l
and s p i r i t u a l  c lim a te  s u ita b le  f o r  economic exchange. T rade could
o n ly  ta k e  p la c e  once f r ie n d s h ip  and a l l ia n c e s  had been s y m b o lic a lly  
6l
renewed.
How ever, i t  was i n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  rea lm  o f  In d ia n -E u ro p e a n  r e ­
la t io n s  th a t  g i f t - g i v i n g  to o k  on s p e c ia l im p o rtan ce . In d ia n  owners 
o f  la n d  and tr a d e  ro u te s  and p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs  co n tin u ed  to  in s is t  
t h a t  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  p ro to c o l be observed b e fo re  b usiness  w ith  
European ag en ts  c o u ld  be a m icab ly  conducted . U nab le  to  fo rc e  n a tiv e s  
to  conform to  th e  b u r e a u c r a t ic  p ra c t ic e s  o f  Europe, Englishm en, 
Frenchm en, and o th e rs  had no c h o ic e , s h o rt o f  w ar, b u t to  d e a l on 
n a t iv e  te rm s . Thus, c o lo n is ts  and r o y a l governm ents found  them­
s e lv e s  fo llo w in g  n a t iv e  p r a c t ic e s  o f  p e r io d ic a l ly  exchanging g i f t s
62
to  " b r ig h te n  th e  c h a in  o f  f r ie n d s h ip ."  T h is  p e r io d ic  exchange 
a ls o  served  an economic fu n c t io n ;  i t  supplem ented th e  in c re a s in g  
f lo w  o f  European goods to  In d ia n  p e o p le s .
W h ile  Europeans a c c e p te d , more o r  le s s  g r a c e f u l ly ,  th e  a c t o f  
r e c ip r o c a l g i f t - g i v i n g ,  th e y  seldom comprehended th e  f u l l  meaning 
o f  th e  a c t  as d e f in e d  by n a t iv e  p a r t ic ip a n t s .  R a th e r , g i f t - g iv i n g  
came to  be d e fin e d  as an  economic a c t  and as p a r t  o f  a  p o l i t i c a l
63p ro cess . The m eaning o f  g i f t  exchanges was a ls o  a l t e r e d  to  some 
e x te n t by In d ia n s  as w e l l .  The E uropeans' w il l in g n e s s  to  bestow
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
206
their largess on cooperative Indians was capitalized on by native 
leaders, or would-be leaders, who wished to strengthen their political 
base at home. A full coffer of sought-after European goods that the 
recipient could re-distribute among his own people heightened his 
own prestige and, thus, his ability to influence the group for
6k
his own or his sponsor's purposes. A good example of this arrange­
ment was that between Tanaghrisson and the Pennsylvania and Virginia
interests that hoped to control the Ohio country between 17^8 and 
65
175^ . However, as much as the act of gift exchange may have been 
used for pragmatic purposes, Indians still invested it with symbolic 
importance and any violation of this essential ingredient of inter- 
societal relations tended to increase tension between natives and 
Europeans.
This is precisely what happened in the wake of Amherst's di­
rectives aimed at reducing gifts to Indians. To the extent that 
the general's commands took effect, they stood in stark contrast to
the generosity that had marked English subsidies to Indian allies
66
during the Seven Years' War. Indian service agents attempted to
warn their superior of the consequences of what Johnson called "an
Ill-timed Parsimony". Not only would it be difficult to conduct
normal diplomatic relations without adequate gifts for treaty councils,
but the interpretation placed on the new policy by native observers
67
boded ill for Anglo-American interests in the west. Amherst ignored 
the warnings and proceeded, through ignorance and a soldier's desire 
to control and rationalize, to revolutionize Anglo-Indian relations. 
Attempts to alter patterns of trade and the reciprocal nature
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of Anglo-Indian relations ultimately aimed at re-defining the
whole of those relations. Aware that the conquest of Canada had
fundamentally altered the balance of power in the west, Amherst
and Johnson sought to bring Indian affairs in line with new political 
68
realities. Simply put, the older relationship based on coopera­
tion between sovereign peoples was to be replaced by one based on 
English superiority and Indian subordination. A regulated trade 
and the restrictions on firearms and other potentially dangerous 
objects would go a long way toward the realization of this goal.
The termination, or at least reduction, of gift-giving also point­
ed toward a new relationship! gift exchange was unnecessary in 
dealing with a subordinate, dependent people. This effort to 
guarantee western Indian subordination and cooperation also led to 
a fundamental re-definition of the Covenant Chain and to a more 
complex Indian diplomacy that found the Anglo-Americans striving 
to "play-off" various Indian groups.
Since the Easton Treaty of 1758, Sir William Johnson had worked 
to assert Six Nat.ions authority over groups which, by English de­
finition, were subordinate to the League. This was particularly 
true in the case of those Indians living in the Ohio country. By 
placing this strategic region and its people under Iroquois con­
trol, and by once again employing the League as a proxy in western 
affairs, royal officials could simplify Indian relations and weaken
69the local Indians' bid for independence. While the Six Nations 
supported such a plan as part of their own survivial strategy, 
the Delawares, Iroquois, and others living on the Ohio were less
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th an  e n th u s ia s t ic ,  g iv e n  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  w ith  which th ese  groups
had a s s e r te d  t h e i r  independence in  th e  p re v io u s  decade.
The f u l l  e x te n t  o f  th e  new, more c o e rs iv e , Chain was made
known in  a n o th e r re a lm  o f  A n g lo -In d ia n  r e la t io n s  and t h is  tim e
s tru c k  d i r e c t ly  a t  E n g la n d 's  most p r iv i le g e d  a l l i e s ,  th e  Ir o q u o is .
Faced w ith  re p e a te d  in s ta n c e s  o f  In d ia n  a s s a u lts  on A ng lo -A m ericans ,
Am herst a tte m p te d  to  end such a c t io n s  by e x ten d in g  E n g lis h  la w  and
punishm ent o v e r In d ia n s  as w e l l  as Europeans l i v i n g  west o f  th e
mountains. In 1?60 he had ordered the court-martial at Fort
N ia g a ra  to  t r y  s e v e ra l w e s te rn  In d ia n s  accused o f  a t ta c k in g  a w ork-
70
in g  p a r ty  from  th e  f o r t .  Then, in  l a t e  1762 , S i r  W illia m  Johnson
le a rn e d  th a t  Senecas l i v i n g  on th e  u pp er A lleg h en y  R iv e r  had k i l l e d
71
W illia m  N e w k irk , a  t r a d e r ,  and one o th e r  Englishm an. Am herst, 
upon le a r n in g  o f  th e  in c id e n t ,  o rd e re d  Johnson to  demand th a t  th e  
g u i l t y  be tu rn e d  o v e r  to  th e  New York a u t h o r i t ie s  f o r  t r i a l  in  A lb any . 
When asked by Seneca sachems to  a c c e p t th e  custom ary payment in  wam­
pum to  cover th e  two dead E ng lishm en, an a c t io n  which accorded both
w ith  Ir o q u o is  custom and p re v io u s  A n g lo -Iro q u o is  u sage, Johnson r e -  
72
fu s e d . A m h e rs t's  in tr a n s ig e n c e , expressed  th rough  th e  In d ia n  super­
in te n d e n t , p re s e n te d  th e  Senecas w ith  a  s e r io u s  problem . I n  o rd e r  
to  comply w ith  th e  demand, th e y  would have to  v io la t e  p r in c ip le s  o f  
lo c a l  autonomy and in d iv id u a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  t h a t  la y  a t  th e  h e a r t  
o f  t h e i r  s o c ia l  o rd e r . N ot to  com ply, how ever, l e f t  th e  is s u e  un­
re s o lv e d  and l e f t  open th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  E n g lis h  revenge f o r  th e  
two men. E q u a lly  im p o r ta n t , th e  in c id e n t ,  which was n ev e r f u l l y  r e ­
s o lv e d  to  A m h e rs t's  o r  Johnson 's  s a t is f a c t io n ,  re p re s e n te d  a r a d ic a l
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d e p a r tu re  in  Covenant Chain r e la t io n s .  A m herst’ s demand p o in t ­
ed tow ard  a  re d u c t io n  o f  Ir o q u o is  autonomy. I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  th e
g e n e ra l had p re v io u s ly  assu red  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  and o th e r  In d ia n s
73o f  equal ju s t ic e  u nd er E n g lis h  la w . The problem  was t h a t  ju s t ic e
had now to  come from  th e  E n g lis h  a lo n e ; th e  o ld e r  system by which
each s o c ie ty  appeased th e  o th e r  th rough  a c ts  o f  condolence— a c ts
which r e in fo r c e d  and ensured  th e  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  each p a r ty — would
no lo n g e r  s u f f ic e .  I t  was t h is  l a s t  p o in t  t h a t  concerned League
sachems when th e y  wondered about w hether Amherst had som ething more
7^
in  mind th a n  s im p le  ju s t ic e .
To f u r t h e r  secure  th e  f r o n t i e r ,  J0hnson embarked on a  p o l ic y  
o f  d iv id e  and r u l e .  I n  e f f e c t ,  i t  would now be E ngland t h a t  would  
have to  d e v is e  a  p la y - o f f  system in  o rd e r to  p re v e n t what m i l i t a r y  
le a d e rs  exp ected  and most fe a r e d j a  p a n - In d ia n  a l l ia n c e  a g a in s t  
A n g lo -A m erica . W h ile  c u l t u r a l  d if fe r e n c e s  and p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
d if fe r e n c e s  made t h is  u n l ik e ly ,  Johnson proceeded to  a c t on th e  op­
p o s ite  assum ption , n o t in g  t h a t  " I f  e v e r a S tro n g  f r ie n d s h ip  sub­
s is t s  between o ur N e ig hb o rs  Qthe Iro q u o is J  & th e  W estern In d ia n s ,  
th e  fo rm e r on b e in g  a tta c k e d  o r  th re a te n e d  w i l l  f in d  an assylum
75
amongst th e  l a t t e r ,  & both  in  C o n ju n c tio n  Ravage our F r o n t ie r s ."  
Through th e  use o f  d ip lom acy and by ta k in g  advantage o f  e x is t in g  
A n g lo - In d ia n  r e la t io n s  and in te r -g r o u p  a n im o s it ie s , Johnson hoped 
to  f o r e s t a l l  t h is  " c o n ju n c t io n " .
D ip lo m a t ic a l ly ,  Johnson sought to  keep a l i v e  s u s p ic io n s  and  
d is t r u s t  between th e  Ir o q u o is  and th e  w estern  A lg o n k ia n s , but s t i l l  
p re v e n t open w a r fa re  between them. The c lim a x  o f  t h is  p o l ic y  came
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a t  D e t r o i t  in  th e  f a l l  o f  1761. Johnson went th e re  to  make peace 
w ith  th e  lo c a l  In d ia n s  and to  le n d  su pp o rt to  th e  s o -c a l le d  "O ttaw a  
co n federacy" which embraced th e  I nd ian s  l i v i n g  a lo n g  th e  D e t r o i t  
R iv e r  and f o r  whom th e  lo c a l  Wyandots a c te d  as spokesmen. By 
l i g h t in g  a  s e p a ra te  c o u n c il f i r e  a t  D e t r o i t ,  Johnson hoped to  c re a te  
a c o u n te rp o is e  to  Ir o q u o is  power in  th e  e a s t .  As he l a t e r  e x p la in ­
ed , " I  d id  a l l  in  my power in  p r iv a t e  co n feren ces  to  c re a te  a  m is­
u n d e rs ta n d in g  between th e  6 N a tio n s , & w e s te rn  In d ia n s , as a ls o  be­
tw een th e  l a t t e r  and th o se  o f  O h io , so as to  re n d e r them Jea lo u s  o f
each other . . . for could they arrive at a perfect union, they must
76prove v e ry  dangerous N e ig h b o rs ."
Conflicts between native groups as well as colonial-Indian 
wars also gave Johnson the opportunity to drive wedges between native 
groups and to re-direct Indian affairs. Since 1759 South Carolina 
had been engaged in a war with the neighboring Cherokees. Point­
ing to the colony's obvious need for help and knowing the tradition­
al animosity that existed between the Cherokees and northern Indians, 
Johnson and his agents called on the Six Nations, Delawares, and Great 
Lakes Indians to aid the English in punishing the Cherokees. Under 
these circumstances any scruples about arming Indians were laid 
aside as war parties stopped at Fort Pitt and other outposts for 
supplies of food and ammunition before taking the Warrior's Path to 
the Carolinas. In addition, Johnson and his subordinates encouraged 
revenge raids launched by northern Indians against other traditional 
enemies1 Catawbas and Chickasaws, as well as Cherokees. In all of 
this, the Anglo-Americans were not promoting something new, but
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r a t h e r  used t r a d i t io n a l  n a t iv e  v a lu e s  and a c t i v i t i e s  to  im p e r ia l  
ad van tag e . I n  so d o in g , how ever, crown o f f i c i a l s  g e n e ra te d  te n s io n s  
and c o n f l ic t s  w ith in  n a t iv e  com m unities t h a t  ten d ed  to  negate  what­
e v e r p o s i t iv e  r e s u lt s  such p o l ic ie s  produced.
F in a l l y ,  ju s t  as Amherst and h is  s u b o rd in a te s  w ere a tte m p t­
in g  to  im plem ent programs designed to  reduce In d ia n s  to  p ro p e r sub­
o r d in a t io n , th e  co m m an d er-in -ch ie f to o k  s tep s  to  d is m a n tle  th e  agency  
most re s p o n s ib le  and b es t equipped to  d e a l w ith  In d ia n  a f f a i r s .  
A m h ers t's  move to  t r im  In d ia n  expenses by tr im m in g  th e  In d ia n  s e r­
v ic e  was based both on a p e rc e iv e d  need to  economize and on th e
n o t io n  t h a t ,  w ith  th e  French war o v e r , a  la r g e  In d ia n  departm ent was 
77no lo n g e r  n ecessary . H is  d e s ire  to  c u t In d ia n  s e rv ic e  p erso nn e l
and co s ts  a ls o  appears to  have been m o tiv a te d  by a d e s ir e  to  curb
.what were seen as excesses w ith in  th e  agency. The s e r v ic e 's  agents
had earned an unsavory r e p u ta t io n  f o r  both com bining p u b lic  s e rv ic e
w ith  p r iv a t e  g a in  and f o r  spending o th e r  p e o p le s ' money w ith  abandon.
C o lo n e l H enry Bouquet com plained about h av in g  "more Managers th a n
In d ia n s "  and re p re s e n te d  th e  In d ia n  ag en ts  a t  h is  p o s t as  a  "Load
78
Stone" f o r  id l e  In d ia n s  e x p e c tin g  h a n d -o u ts .
Johnson and h is  ag en ts  responded in  two ways. F o r h is  p a r t ,  
th e  s u p e r in te n d e n t warned Amherst th a t  any sudden re d u c t io n  in  p e r­
sonnel cou ld  have s e rio u s  re p e rc u s s io n s , e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  h is  agents
were ad ep t a t  c o l le c t in g  in t e l l ig e n c e  and p a tc h in g  up th e  in e v i t a b le
79
d if fe r e n c e s  between In d ia n s , s o ld ie r s ,  and t r a d e r s .  A t  th e  same 
t im e , how ever, J 0hnson warned h is  ag en ts  to  e x e rc is e  c a re  and f r u -
80
g a l i t y  in  ru n n in g  t h e i r  a g e n c ie s , g iv e n  A m h ers t's  l a t e n t  h o s t i l i t y .
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On the other hand., the local agents continued to conduct business 
as usual, both because of the necessity of doing so and because 
they had received no clear orders to the contrary. The best ex­
ample is George Croghan, whose personal reputation did much to 
tarnish the department he served. Even while Amherst was demanding, 
and Johnson was promising, greater economy, Croghan continued to
hire agents and other support personnel for his operations at Fort 
81Pitt. While the Indian service survived, indeed prospered, dur­
ing the 1760s, Amherst's attempt to limit its size, scope of operations, 
and budget suggest the role he thought it, and Indian affairs, should 
play in the post-war era.
Amherst also had to face the ever-present problem of land and 
colonial expansion into territories claimed or held by native groups.
Of all the issues that soured relations between Indians and colonists 
throughout the eighteenth century land was the most aggravating.
And, in the wake of the Seven Years' War, it became apparent that 
peace with the western Indians would in large measure depend on how 
successfully royal officials guaranteed Indian rights to western lands.
London's commitment to finding a way of limiting the uncontroll­
ed invasion of Indian lands was reflected in the royal approval given
to the Easton Treaty and the order-in-council halting land purchases
82
from Indians in New York. During and after the Seven Years' War 
Sir William Johnson continued to press the Board of Trade to give
83
the matter of land speculation and settlement serious study.
The need for control over western expansion, both to preserve 
peace with the Indians and as a means of imposing order on an ex-
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panding empire, was reflected in 1763 in provisions of the royal 
Proclamation of that year which forbad settlement beyond the Ap­
palachians until proper purchases had been made by the crown, not 
individual colonies. In the meantime, however, royal officials in 
America were left to their own devices in order to control western 
settlement and preserve native lands. Guidance was provided by the 
Easton Treaty and the limited steps already taken by the home govern­
ment on such matters. Between 1759 and 1763 officials both in the 
colonies and London reiterated the Easton Treaty's guarantee to pro­
tect Indian lands. In his first message to the Ohio Indians, Amherst 
told the natives that, aside from guaranteeing their rights, "I mean 
not to take any of your lands." His words were supported by pro­
vincial and Indian service officials who assured the western Indians 
that Anglo-American troops had been sent west "without any design of 
settling those lands themselves" and spoke of the establishment of
84
a boundary line between Indians and settlers to further ensure peace.
While subsequent actions demonstrated the sincerity of the crown's
intent to meet its treaty obligations, Amherst made it equally clear
that promises to honor Indian land claims would be conditional. In
the first place the general let it be known that any promises or
commitments made by the crown would be honored only as long as the
Indians "behaved like good and faithful allies." He also made it
clear that, in the absence of such friendly behavior, he would be
forced to "treat you as enemies," which included the invasion and
85appropriation of native lands.
In the next place, Amherst, ever mindful of the need to secure
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the territory in his charge, made one significant exception to the 
guarantees that he and others made. As he informed Governor Hamilton 
of Pennsylvania, "I mean not to take any of their Lands, except in 
such Causes, where the necessity of His Majesty's Service obliges 
me to take Post where I must and will build Forts." He did con­
cede, however, that "the Lands adjoining [[the fortsj will Continue 
86
their own." Notwithstanding, as early as 1760, a memorandum ap­
peared suggesting the advantage of settling farmers at military posts
O r y
along the communication route from Pennsylvania to Fort Pitt.
Amherst's scheme for "taking Post" included more than forts 
and garrisons, although these alone were to cause serious conflicts 
with local Indians. As the 1760 memorandum suggests, farmers and 
tradesmen were to be settled at the more strategic posts to help pro­
vide food and services for the army. On military grounds this may 
have been reasonable. But the presence of civilians at Fort Pitt, 
Fort Ligonier, or the Niagara portage, in additional to Amherst's 
insistence on occupying all forts formerly held by the French as 
well as several new ones, resulted in conflicting signals reaching 
Indian observers and provided another source of misunderstanding and 
resentment.
Ill
In the absence of any civil authority, provincial or royal, in 
the trans-Appalachian region, Amherst relied on martial law and the 
British regular army to enforce trade regulations and Indian affairs.
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This decision meant that Indian affairs would invariably take place
in the shadow of garrisoned posts whose commanders became, in effect,
extensions of the Indian service. In addition, the commander-in-
chief s insistence that the west be securely occupied and patrolled
meant that the army would become one of the most visible features
of the new Anglo-American Indian policy. While use of the army made
a great deal of sense from a strictly military point of view, the
88
nature and capability of this force needs to be examined.
Although in the fall of 1760 some twenty thousand regular and 
provincial troops were in the field, that number diminished rapidly 
after the surrender of Montreal. Provincial forces were quickly de­
mobilized both as an economy measure and because these men could not 
be kept in the field beyond a single campaign due to provincial ob­
jections and the soldiers' own sense of fairness. While several 
thousand men, largely from New England and New York, were raised on 
a year-to-year basis from 176l to 17&31 they were employed largely 
in what would now be called "rear-echelon" dutiesj constructing
89
roads, repairing forts, and hauling supplies for the regular forces.
The increased military activity in the West Indies, resulting from
Spain's entry into the Seven Years' War, drew away many of Amherst's
veteran troops. During the summers of 1761 and 1762, regiments marched
from Canada to embarkation points on Staten Island and New York City,
90
bound for Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Havana.
Also, between 1761 and the outbreak of the Indian war in the 
west, the size of the army was twice reduced, again for reasons of 
economy. This reduction in the establishment meant that a regiment
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whose strength had been one thousand men in 1760 would have been
, 91reduced to five hundred by the summer of 1763• Finally, the
rigors of campaigning, the reluctance of colonists to enlist for
long terms, coupled with provincial enlistment bounties the regulars
could not match, meant that the average infantry regiment was often
below strength or, if full, composed of men who had enlisted for
92
short terms or the duration of the Seven Years' Wart
All of this meant that the army in America in the years preced­
ing the Indian war was not large. Making matters worse was the 
territory this limited force had to occupy and control. For example, 
a general field return of December 1762 showed a total of 7» 76^ men 
in North America, exclusive of several disease-ridden battalions 
recently arrived from the West Indies. Of that number some 6,500
were assigned garrison duties in what had been New France, occupy-
93mg towns and forts from St, John's, Newfoundland to Montreal. 
Discounting a further four hundred men stationed in South Carolina 
and Georgia, that left fewer than one thousand men to occupy the 
Trans-Appalachian region and lend the force of arms to royal policies.
For the most part, the few hundred men who could be spared for 
duty in the west were drawn from a single unit, the first battalion 
of the 60th Foot, the Royal American Regiment. Its commanding 
officer in the field during the early 1760s was Lieutenant-Colonel 
Henry Bouquet. A Swiss, Bouquet, like many of the officers who served 
under him, was a mercenary. The presence of such men in the Royal 
Americans made the regiment markedly different from its sister units. 
Raised in 1756, the regiment was organized specifically for service
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in America. Its commissioned ranks were opened to the large num­
ber of foreign professionals seeking service and, for most of its 
American career, the regiment drew its enlisted men from the colon­
ies, although some appear to have been raised in Germany. Thus, 
the 60th took on an unusually cosmopolitan character and contained 
easily as much, or more, military talent as any other part of the 
army. Many of the western forts, such as Fort Pitt, Fort Ontario, 
and Fort Ligonier, were designed and built by officers and men from 
Bouquet's battalion. Aside from the number of Swiss and German 
officers such as Bouquet, Joseph Schlosser, and Simeon Ecuyer, the 
battalion also had a large number of Scots and two junior officers,
Lieutenant James Gorrell and Ensign Thomas Hutchins, who were natives 
95o f the colonies.
Although Bouquet was the field commander of the battalion, in 
actuality his control was largely administrative for those detach­
ments stationed beyond the Ohio River. Indeed, the chain of command 
for the western posts reflected the de facto, patchwork nature of 
England's occupation of the west. Commanders at the major posts, 
Detroit and Niagara, could and did communicate directly with Amherst 
and J0hnson. In addition, Brigadier General Thomas Gage, governor 
of Montreal, exercised some authority over the troops along the Nia­
gara River. Basically, the outposts in the Ohio country relied for 
command and support on Fort Pitt and its commanding officer. The 
small posts on the upper Great Lakes were dependent on Detroit which, 
in turn, was administratively responsible to Bouquet's subordinate 
at Fort Niagara. Orders of all but a strictly regimental nature came
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directly from the commander-in-chief through Bouquet.
Part of the command and supply problems, never wholly resolved 
before 1?63, stemmed from the perceived necessity of occupying all 
of the former French posts in the west as well as several new forts 
deemed necessary to secure communications. Between 1759 and 1762 
Bouquet's troops built or occupied fourteen forts west of the Ap­
palachians. Of these, four (Forts Pitt, Ligonier, Bedford, and 
Sandusky) were built by regular forces. The others were formerly 
French, modified and occupied to suit English needs.
The occupation of the west began in the summer of 1760. Bouquet's 
forces, including Pennsylvania and Virginia provincials, took over 
the recently abandoned French forts along the upper Ohio and re­
opened communications with the lower Great Lakes. Four hundred men 
of the Royal Americans were then sent to Fort Niagara. In the mean-
96
time work was begun on Fort Pitt.
The surrender of Montreal in September 1760 resulted in an ad­
ditional one hundred men being sent from the Ohio to occupy the French
97
forts on the upper Great Lakes. Bad weather and insufficient man­
power prevented this force, led by Major Robert Rogers, from complet­
ing its mission, though Detroit and Fort Miami were occupied. Dur­
ing the next two years, especially in the summer of 1761, the upper 
Lakes were alive with military activity as reinforcements, drawn
largely from Fort Niagara, and supply convoys pushed west to complete 
98
the occupation.
By the fall of 1762, the Royal Americans were scattered In posts 
from Bedford to La Baye and from Niagara to the Wabash valley. With
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only some seven hundred men available for duty, the blanket of
99
English authority and protection was terribly thin. At the six
posts covering the upper Great Lakes were 26k men of the 60th plus
a handful of rangers and men of the Royal Artillery. Fort Niagara
was held by just over 120 men, to which was added a company of the
80th Regiment from the Montreal area. The remaining men of Bouquet's
battalion were tied down at Sandusky and a half-dozen forts in the
100
Ohio country, with over two hundred men at Fort Pitt. While 
major posts, such as Fort Pitt or Detroit, hed respectable garrisons—  
far more than the French had maintained before 17^0— the smaller out­
posts were often held by fewer than twenty men and in some cases 
101
barely a dozen. B0uquet summarized his troops' situation when
he observed that "We have detached officers more than 600 miles from
here £Port PittJ and this poor battalion is divided and scattered
102
throughout our immense conquests to the west." What particularly 
worried Bouquet was the effect such duty was having on his men and 
their ability and willingness to perform their assigned duties.
Part of the sense of isolation and many of the health and dis­
cipline problems that confronted the battalion's officers stemmed 
from the nature of the forts themselves. As the garrisons varied 
greatly in size so too did the forts vary in composition and com­
plexity of design. Descriptions, some in great detail, and engineers' 
plans exist for the larger and more elaborate of these posts. Others,
particularly the older French trading stations on the Great Lakes are 
103
less well known. By far the largest of the western posts was 
Fort Pitt. Construction began in 1759 and proceeded through 1762. A
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pentagonal earthwork with projecting bastions, it was built to
hold nearly one thousand men and its landward ramparts were faced
with locally produced brick. Its troops also fared somewhat better
than others in terms of accommodations; the barracks appear to have
been well constructed and included brick fireplaces. The fort's
sheer size, however, and location at the confluence of the Allegheny
and Monongahela rivers, posed several problems for its defenders.
The nearly 6/10 of a mile circuit of the ramparts made adequate
defense by its small garrison all but impossible. Worse, spring
rains and thaws twice led to flooding which so damaged the fort that
its riverside walls were all but ruined, along with precious stores
10^
of food and ammunition,
None of the other forts rivalled Fort Pitt in size. Fort Nia­
gara, at the mouth of the Niagara River, was the next largest and 
boasted earthen ramparts, a dry moat, and several batteries of cannon. 
Both Detroit and Fort Michilimackinac were little more than stockades 
surrounding small communities of habitants, traders, and priests, and 
with a minimum of defensive works and artillery.The smaller out­
posts consisted of little more than a square stockade enclosing a 
blockhouse, or several buildings used as barracks, storehouses, and 
Indian council house. Of these posts, only Fort Ligonier, securing 
the communications from the Ohio to Pennsylvania, was more elaborate,
largely due to its role as a base for military convoys bound for the 
10?
west.
Regardless of their size or configuration, all of these forts 
had several things in common. They were all built of locally avail-
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able materials, particularly earth and timber, and were in a con-
108
stant state of disrepair. Ice, thaws, rain, and the effects
of wind and rot threatened to undermine the ramparts and caused
109
storerooms, barracks, and magazines to leak. Barrack space
was limited with perhaps as many as a dozen men sharing a room
110
eighteen feet square. Added to this was the constant filth 
that resulted from a general lack of sanitation, mud, and dust. 
Finally, these forts were often separated from one another by several 
hundred miles of forest and water. In the Ohio country the Venango 
Path, which linked the upper Ohio posts with Fort Pitt and Forbes' 
Road, considerably lessened feelings of isolation and problems of 
supply and communications. Farther west, however, the only avenues 
were the Great Lakes and the rivers feeding them. Seasonal storms, 
particularly on Lake Erie, made travel dangerous, and portages at 
Niagara and between the Miamis and Wabash rivers could add days to 
a re-supply or reinforcement timetable. The flat-bottomed batteau 
was the principal craft used for transporting men and supplies and, 
in all seasons, most of a garrison's time and energy were consumed 
by the seemingly endless task of moving needed supplies and keeping 
communications open.
Judging from the amount of correspondence devoted to them, the 
major concerns of the various post commanders were the health and 
discipline of their commands. Only the constant logistical problem 
occupied more of their time. As might be expected, given the vagaries 
of supplies and the less than sanitary living conditions, the health 
of soldiers in the west left much to be desired. However, it would be
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a mistake to portray these men as altogether decrepit and debilitat­
ed. Reports from the various forts suggest that the incidence of 
sickness, injury and death varied widely and also tended to be 
seasonal, with the worst time being from mid-fall to early spring. 
Lieutenant Elias Meyer, busy building Fort Sandusky, reported five 
of his thirty men sick in mid-October 1761. By early November half
his men were down with various ailments, including frostbite. By
the middle of the month, however, the sick list had been reduced
to three men, due largely to Meyer's determination to get his post
111
finished and his men under cover. At the same time, Captain 
Gavin Cochrane's command at Fort Presqu'ile had twelve men sick, 
a rate double that of the previous August, and the Detroit garrison 
had an equal number of men on the sick list, out of a total of some
U J J 112one hundred men.
Officers were no more immune to illness than the men they led;
duties in isolated posts and unusual fatigue duties seem to have
offset the advantages of additional food, liquor, and better clothes
that officers enjoyed. Ensign Robert Holmes, who later commanded
Fort Miami, was said to have "been at the gates of Death" at Detroit
in I76I. Captain Richard Mather reported from Fort Venango that he
was "now reduced so Low as scarce to be able to Crawl the Length of 
113
my Room." Although he recovered from his bout of illness, Mather
finally succumbed to other ailments in March 1762 and was buried at 
114
Fort Pitt.
Not all the posts fared as badly as Sandusky or Detroit. Lieu­
tenant Christie at Fort Presqu'ile proudly reported in April 1761 that
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"There has heen None of this Garrison Sick this Winter," and the
115same was reported from Niagara. J Fort Niagara, in fact, appears 
to have been something of a paradise in terms of health. Much of 
the good health its garrison enjoyed can be attributed to the con­
scientiousness of its officers, especially the fort's surgeon, Dr. 
Stevenson. By keeping the men busy and encouraging them to supple­
ment their diet with fresh fish, and by providing liberal quantities 
of the anti-scorbutic spruce beer, Stevenson could write that "We
have not lost by sickness any men for upwards of fourteen or fifteen
, 116
months" prior to December 1762. This record contrasted favorably
with that of the fort's previous occupants, the 44th Regiment, who
in 1759 and 1?60 turned the post into a pest hole and died in con-
117siderable numbers in their own filth.
Ill ness ca....„ in many forms. Among the ailments most common­
ly mentioned were scurvy, the pox, fevers, colds, and the bloody
118
flux. In addition, at least one man suffered from epilepsy. In
addition to appearances of these diseases, the western posts seem
generally to have been attacked by an infectious fever in the summer
and fall of 1762. The outposts north of Fort Pitt were infected, as
well as Sandusky. Less is known about its presence in other posts
farther- west, or the source and identity of the disease, but it is
noteworthy that a similar contagion was sweeping through the Indian
communities throughout the Ohio-lower Great Lakes drainage at the 
119
same time.
Officers and men also succumbed to a variety of accidents and
120
non-disease related health problems. Among the latter, frostbite
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was the most common. Without anything resembling winter uniforms, 
couriers, men working on supply convoys, and those detailed for 
hunting or woodcutting duties rosked over-exposure in severe weather. 
The only men to die at Fort Niagara between 1760 and the spring 
of 1762 did so from exposure and complications from frostbite. Vir­
ginia militiamen marching home from Fort le Boeuf in February 1761
suffered terribly due to inadequate footwear, a problem that also
121
plagued working parties sent out from Fort Pitt.
Injuries related to construction work or portaging were also
quite common, understandable given the fact that these tasks, more
than anything else, occupied a soldier's time. Lieutenant Stair
Campbell Garre sent a man down to Fort Pitt from Venango with a
dislocated collarbone, and a soldier at Fort le Boeuf was in need
122
of care for an infected finger, injured during fatigue duties.
While such injuries were relatively minor and did not affect operations
greatly, other accidents cost the army dearly, as in the case of a
supply convoy swamped on Lake Huron with the loss of six men and most 
123
of the cargo. Major William Walters at Fort Niagara undoubtedly 
faced the worst manpower shortage due to injuries. By June 1761 he 
was forced to discharge eleven men, ten of whom were "very Infirm & 
Render'd unfit for Service." The nature of their debility is reveal­
ed in a letter from Amherst on the matter. It appears that some, if 
not all, suffered from ruptures. However, Amherst, hard pressed to 
keep the ranks full now that the French war was over, ordered that 
the injured men be kept in service, observing that "Men who are 
Ruptured are not deemed Incapable of Service in England much less
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must We th in k  them so h e re , where th e  D i f f i c u l t i e s  a re  so g re a t  in
12^
R e c r u it in g  any to  R ep lace  th em ." The a t t i t u d e  expressed  was not
uncommon. G iv e n  th e  need to  keep men in  th e  army f o r  fu n d in g  p u r­
poses as w e l l  as  th e  s im p le  need f o r  manpower, s u b o rd in a te  o f f i c e r s
125
d o u b tless  r e t a in e d  many men who c o u ld  have been o f  no use to  th e  arm y. 
A m h ers t's  s t r ic t u r e s  made i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  number o f  such men ac ­
t u a l l y  in c re a s e d  down to  1763» when a g e n e ra l re o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  th e  
army a llo w e d  commanders to  f i n a l l y  d is c h a rg e  th e  h a l t  and th e  lam e.
T here was l i t t l e  t h a t  in d iv id u a l  o f f i c e r s  co u ld  do to  p re v e n t  
th e  d isease  and a c c id e n ts  t h a t  o f te n  reduced  t h e i r  commands to  l i t t l e  
more th a n  bands o f  c o n v a le s c e n ts . W fth o n ly  one surgeon and a  s u r­
g e o n 's  mate to  c a re  f o r  th e  e n t i r e  b a t t a l io n ,  o u tp o s t commanders had 
to  make d o .w ith  what l i t t l e  m e d ic a l know ledge and few  m ed ic in es  th ey  
possessed. More im p o r ta n t , th e  two th in g s  t h a t  co u ld  have a m e lio ra t ­
ed h e a lth  c o n d it io n s — adequate  c lo th in g  and fo o d — were a lw ays  in  s h o rt  
supp ly  s in c e  re g im e n ta l and army q u a rte rm a s te rs  were a t  th e  mercy o f
la k e s , p o r ta g e s , w e a th e r, and th e  poor q u a l i t y  and g e n e ra l shortag e  
126
o f  b o a ts .
The s o ld ie r 's  r a t io n  was u n ifo rm ly  b la n d  and s p a rs e , c o n s is t­
in g  la r g e ly  o f  s a l t  m eat and b re a d , o f  which each man re c e iv e d  e ig h t
127
pounds o f  th e  fo rm e r and n in e  o f  th e  l a t t e r  p e r  week. As surgeon
Stevenson d em o nstra ted , t h is  onotonous and somewhat u n h e a lth y  d ie t
co u ld  be f le s h e d  o u t by re c o u rs e  to  lo c a l l y  a v a i la b le  f i s h  and game.
In  th e  Ohio c o u n try , a t  l e a s t ,  th e  o u tp o s ts  consumed la r g e  q u a n t i t ie s
128
o f  ven ison  purchased  from  lo c a l  D e law ares . O f f ic e r s  a ls o  encourag­
ed t h e i r  men to  p la n t  gardens and s e t  th e  example by o rd e r in g  q u a n t i t ie s
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o f  seeds and p la n t  s e ts . Judging from th e  v a r ie t y  o f  v e g e ta b le s
m entioned  and re p o r ts  on crop y ie ld s ,  many o f  th e s e  gardens were
q u i te  la r g e  and were u nd o u bted ly  a  m a jo r reason  why scurvy  and
o th e r  form s o f  v ita m in  d e f ic ie n c y  do n o t appear to  have  reached
129
ep idem ic  p ro p o r t io n s .
F in a l l y ,  in  o rd e r to  supplem ent a poor d ie t  and to  boost m ora le
i n  th e  fa c e  o f  c h ro n ic  s h o rta g e s , o f f i c e r s  r e s o r te d  to  r e g u la r  r a t io n s
o f  rum , b e e r, and o th e r  s p i r i t s .  Taken in  excess, th o ug h , a lc o h o l
130
c re a te d  as many problem s as i t  s o lv e d . M a jo r W ilk in s  a t  F o r t  
N ia g a ra  seems to  have overcome t h is  problem  by b u i ld in g  a  b rew ery  
f o r  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  spruce b e e r. I t s  m ild  a lc o h o l ic  c o n te n t and  
a n t i - s c o r b u t ic  q u a l i t ie s  made i t  an id e a l  b everage , even though i t s  
t a s t e  ra n  more to w ard  tu rp e n t in e  th an  a le .  W ilk in s ' p r o je c t  was 
encouraged by A m herst, who a ls o  b e lie v e d  th e  b e e r to  be a good
131s u b s t i tu te  f o r  th e  l iq u o r  th en  f a l l i n g  in to  th e  hands o f  th e  In d ia n s .
Even i f  a d e q u a te ly  fe d ,  s o ld ie r s  would succumb t o  i l ln e s s  and  
exposure i f  in a d e q u a te ly  c lo th e d , and no amount o f  h a rd  work o r in ­
v e n tiv e n e s s  co u ld  make up f o r  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  y e a r 's  supp ly  o f  
c lo th in g  to  a r r i v e .  C h a r a c t e r is t ic a l ly ,  an E n g lis h  s o ld ie r  r e c e iv ­
ed a new re g im e n ta l c o a t— h is  m ain item  o f  c lo th in g — o n ly  once every  
two y e a rs . The o ld  co at would be made in to  a s le a v e d  w a is tc o a t and  
th e  o ld  w a is tc o a t in to  b reech es . In  th e o ry , a  new com plete s e t o f  
c lo th in g  would be is s u e d  to  each man every  th re e  y e a rs . I n  p r a c t ic e ,  
how ever, as th e  c o m p la in ts  and re q u e s ts  from  f r o n t i e r  commanders 
a t t e s t ,  E n g la n d ’ s le g io n s  in  th e  west were seldom p ro p e r ly  a t t i r e d  
and cu t much le s s  th e  f ig u r e  o f  w e ll-h e e le d  Guardsmen a t  S t .  James
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than of "clowns"— as Bouquet once described his troops. Cap­
tain Cochrane at Fort Presqu'ile summed up the general situation 
when he observed that "we have Scarce Shirt, Shoe, or Stockings", 
and he worried about the possibility of Amherst ever seeing his men
133
"so ill clothed." A year after Cochrane's report, the garrison
at Fort Venango was so badly off that "Sume of them has nothing
left but the neck and wristbands of their Shirts" and their com-
13k
mander reported that "they Cut a very odJ_d_] figure on Sentry."
The unreliability of the army's supply system and transportation 
were largely responsibly for the clothing shortages. But the un­
usual demands of frontier service placed both men and equipment 
under stresses that quickly wore down both. What was expected to 
last a year or more in Europe lasted only a few weeks or months on
135
the frontier. This was especially true of footwear. Standard
issue shoes could not stand up to the rigors of portaging and the
extremes of climate under which the troops operated. As a result,
many men were barefoot and in some cases officers were forced to
buy shoes out of their own pockets in order to keep their men on 
136
duty. When the shoes did arrive, they and other supplies were 
often of poor quality or damaged. Major Walters, at Niagara, re­
ceived 26k pairs of shoes for his and the western garrisons. Upon 
inspection, however, most were found to be poorly made and rotten.
Blankets were also found to be of poor quality and sometimes previous-
, 137 ly used.
Given the conditions under which Bouquet's troops served, it is 
not surprizing that the post commanders regularly reported morale
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discipline problems. Reports of "great Ferment" among the troops 
and "a Spirit of discontent & desertion" were accompanied by officers' 
references to their "banishment" at the outposts and at least one
1 oQ
request for indefinite leave of absence.
The letters that contained these warnings of unrest and pleas 
for rescue from oblivion also shed light on the causes for such 
feelings. Foremost among these was the keen sense of isolation 
and cabin fever felt by officers and other ranks alike. The bore­
dom and anxiety attached to being part of a seventeen-man garrison 
in the midst of alien and possibly hostile people can easily be 
imagined. Even at the larger forts life could be Less than grand. 
While admitting that Detroit was "the best frontier Garrison", its 
commander, Captain Donald Campbell, complained that "I begin to know
the People too well, I doe not think they improve on a long acquain- 
139
tance." Even Bouquet, presiding over the largest and best equipped 
post in the midst of a substantial Anglo-American community, complain­
ed of the endless fatigues undergone by his men, unrelieved except 
IkO
on Sundays. Further, the combination of fur traders turned sutlers
and the unreliability of the paymaster meant that the troops often
1^ -1
went months without pay.
Finally, for those who cared or needed to keep abreast of affairs 
outside the west, frontier duty could be particularly oppressive.
News of any kind was slow to arrive and often fragmentary. Captain 
Campbell, for example, complained that "There is now five M0nths,
Since we Know any Thing of the World," and other officers frequently 
appended requests for newspapers to their dispatches.
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The co m p la in ts  v o ic e d  by f o r t  commanders concern ing  th e  con­
d it io n s  under which th e y  and t h e i r  men l i v e d  shou ld  n o t be a llo w e d  
to  overshadow th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  f o r  th e  p r iv i le g e d  and fo r tu n a te ,  l i f e  
on th e  f r o n t i e r  could  be made t o le r a b le .  F o r o f f i c e r s  accustomed  
to  European g a rr is o n s  and fre q u e n t v i s i t s  to  c i t i e s  and e s ta te s ,
F o r t  P i t t  o r D e t r o i t  t r u l y  must have seemed a t  th e  ends o f  th e  e a r th .  
However, th e  gentlem en in  th e s e  same g a rr is o n s  co u ld  pass th e  tim e  
r a t h e r  w e l l .  C a p ta in  C am pbell, a lw ays w ith  an eye f o r  th e  f i n e r  
th in g s  in  l i f e ,  was o v e rjo y e d  to  f i n d  t h a t  "The Women [[o f D e tr o itJ
Surpasses our e x p e c ta t io n  l i k e  th e  r e s t  o f  A m erica" a lth o u g h  he judged
lk 3
th e  men "v e ry  i n d i f f e r e n t . "  A t F o r t  P i t t  as  w e l l ,  th e  presence
o f  a s iz e a b le  c i v i l i a n  p o p u la t io n  gave o p p o r tu n it ie s  f o r  a v a r ie t y
o f  d iv e rs io n s , most o f  which ap pear to  have had as t h e i r  o b je c t th e
m eetin g  and s e d u c tio n  o f  th e  p o s t 's  e l i g i b l e  women.
A t F o r t  P i t t  C a p ta in  Simeon Ecuyer seems to  have i n i t i a t e d  o r
a t  le a s t  s u s ta in e d  an a c t iv e  s o c ia l c a le n d e r . He m entioned a c lu b
which met on Mondays and "a b a l l  e v e ry  S atu rd ay  even in g , made up o f
th e  p r e t t i e s t  la d ie s  o f  th e  g a r r is o n ."  H in t in g  a t  what must have been
th e  m ajo r purpose o f  h is  s o ire e s , th e  C a p ta in  w rote  f u r t h e r  th a t  "We
re g a le  them w ith  punch, and i f  i t  i s  n o t s tro n g  enough, th e  whiskey
i s  a t  t h e i r  d is p o s a l. You may be sure  t h a t  we s h a l l  n o t be com plete­
l y
l y  c h e a te d ." Campbell bragged o f  w eekly  p a r t ie s  in v o lv in g  about
tw en ty  couples h e ld  a t  h is  own re s id e n c e . The ted ium  a t  D e t r o i t  was
a ls o  r e l ie v e d  by card  p a r t ie s  and th e  a r r i v a l  o f  new o f f i c e r s  and
lk 5
v is i t e r s  from  England,
By c o n tra s t , D r. S tevenson a t  F o r t  N ia g a ra  com plained th a t  " th e
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want of Society & being obliged to pass our time, so miserably 
uniform, hurts us every way." His only diversion, aside from keep­
ing the garrison healthy, were trips to Niagara Falls. He told 
Bouguet that it "would give me great pleasure, to have an opportunity
of attending you at the Falls." But the opportunity never arose and
146
Stevenson pressed for a change of station or discharge. His 
plight was undoubtedly shared by officers at the smaller posts who, 
aside from visits by traders or messengers, or liaisons with local 
Indian women, had little to divert them from the tedium of garrison 
life.
What officers provided for themselves as a matter of privilege 
they strove to deny those under them on grounds of order and discipline. 
In an effort to eliminate as many causes of insubordination as possible, 
Bouguet and his subordinates issued a number of orders directed at 
ridding the forts of two principal sources of vice and disordert 
liguor and women. By the end of 1760, Bouguet felt compelled to ban
the sale of liguor at Fort Pitt by all but licensed sutlers. All
147
offenders would suffer summary justice by court-martial. His
efforts seem not to have been very successful, for the following
spring he went so far as to suggest that a stockade wall be built
around the then sprawling town of Pittsboro, with one gate by which
148
his fort guards could more carefully screen the citizens.
The problem of on and off-duty drinking also spread to the small
post of Venango whose commander had to discipline the fort commissary
149
for being habitually drunk. In an interesting attempt to meet the 
reguirements of the regulations and still profit from the forts,
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s u t le r s  and tr a d e r s  a tte m p te d  to  s e l l  d i lu t e d  rum, b u t were s t i l l
150fo rc e d  to  g e t r i d  o f  t h e i r  s to c k .
Women and l iq u o r  o f te n  went to g e th e r . S e v e ra l o f  th e  dram 
shops a t  P it ts b o r o  th a t  Bouquet sought to  c lo se  were o p e ra te d  by- 
women b e lo n g in g  to  th e  g a r r is o n . These women, o f f i c i a l l y  l i s t e d  
as la u n d re s s e s , were common i n  th e  arm y, which p e rm itte d  a f ix e d  
number p e r  company w h ile  i n  g a r r is o n . Most were w ives o f  e n l is te d  
men and t h e i r  wages came from  a  common fund  managed by company o f ­
f i c e r s .  L i t t l e  rem ains to  suggest how many women were a t  th e  v a r io u s  
f o r t s  b u t t h e i r  number must have been more th a n  Bouquet f e l t  n e cessary . 
I n  1762 he is s u e d  o rd e rs  a llo w in g  o u tp o s t commanders in  th e  Ohio
151c o u n try  to  p ro v id e  r a t io n s  and s u p p o rt f o r  o n ly  one woman p e r f o r t .
The p r in c ip a l  reaso n  f o r  r e s t r ic t io n s  on th e  number and a c t i v i t i e s
a t  th e  f o r t s  was t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  as  p r o s t i t u t e s  o r as accom plices
to  d e s e r te rs . These a c t i v i t i e s  seem to  have gone h a n d -in -g lo v e  a t
F o r t  P i t t  where a  M rs . M c In tosh  n o t o n ly  k e p t a d is o r d e r ly  house b u t
was accused o f  hav in g  h id d e n  two d e s e r te rs  soon a f t e r  t h e i r  a tte m p te d
f l i g h t .  She and s e v e ra l o th e r  women c o n s t itu te d  what Bouquet r e f e r r e d
to  as "a Colony sprung from  H e l l "  and were p a r t i c u la r  ta r g e ts  o f  h is  
152
w ra th . Added to  th e  problem  was th e  c o n tin u a l f lo w  o f  p eop le  in ­
to  and out o f  th e  Ohio re g io n , a movement which in c lu d e d  "a number 
o f  In h a b ita n ts  th e  scum o f  th e  N e ig h b o rin g  P ro v in c e s , who have no
v is i b le  means to  l i v e "  and who, i t  was b e lie v e d , would seduce th e  *
153g a rr is o n s  from  good o rd e r and d is c ip l in e .
W h ile  th e  g e n e ra l c o n d it io n s  u nd er which th e  e n l is te d  men l iv e d  
and worked, and th e  l im i t e d  d iv e rs io n s  a llo w e d  them , c o n tr ib u te d  to
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the unrest that led to insubordination, these tended to pale against
another, more important, issuej the inability of men to leave the
ranks once their time was up. As Amherst's orders to Major Walters
indicated, the army could ill afford to lose any more men that it
already had. The lack of recruits and the need to keep western
battalions as full as possible left the commander-in-chief little
15k
choice but to freeze enlistments. Although Amherst seems to have 
agreed in 1761 to release all men whose time had by then expired, 
his usual directive was that such men "shall have their Discharge 
as soon as the Service will permit"— an order suitably vague to
155
caver all complaints and contingencies.
For the enlisted men who held terms for a specific number of
years, vague promises and fair words did nothing to relieve anxiety
and a sense of being held captive in remote posts at their officers'
discretion. Their frustration was made worse by knowledge that other
battalions, especially those bound for the West Indies or home service,
were discharging large numbers of men. The officers of the Royal
American Regiment filed numerous reports on the quarrelsome, seditious
nature of men who knew they had a right to an immediate separation
but were being kept nonetheless. Fear of mass desertion, mutiny, or
worse prompted garrison commanders to request exemptions to Amherst's
157
orders and to submit lists of men entitled to discharges. Indeed, 
such fears appear not to have been groundless. Bouquet discovered 
"some Insolent letters" at Fort Pitt addressed to the troops there 
from those in the upper Ohio posts. The latter, Bouquet observed,
1 58
"have increased the discontent of ours, in regard to their discharges." '
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Eligible men were also careful not to accept bounty money offered 
them to stay on another year. Even though the prospect of hard 
cash was tempting, acceptance constituted re-enlistment, something
159that most men sought to avoid. Finally, for those few men who 
could write or obtain help from those who could, petitioning offer­
ed another way of expressing discontent. One such petition, ad­
dressed to Bouquet from Private William Harris in 1762 sums up what 
must have been felt privately by many. Harris complained about the 
officers making "a hundred fair promises Without the least intention 
of Ever performing one of them." He told his colonel that "I have 
been abused with the false promises of Officers from the Beginning 
of July in the year 1760" and referred to the "hardships, and fatigue 
a soldier is obliged to go through" and the 111 treatment they re­
ceive from their officers," which "is sufficient to make them hate 
the Service." He ended his letter by telling Bouquet that he would 
have attempted desertion long ago "had I not always Expected the 
performance of your promise." Without some sign that he would be
discharged the following spring, "Captain Campbell with all his
160
Retorick shall not be sufficient to Detain me any Longer."
The act of desertion that Private Harris referred to constituted
a common form of protest against bad treatment and a remedy for gen-
, mar 
162
161
eral discontent with the army. As Harris' letter suggests, ny
left illegally to protest being kept beyond their enlistments.' 
Others fled the army to escape punishment for breaches of discipline 
or crimes. John Geddis deserted while en route to Fort Presqu'ile 
from Niagara because, while drunk, he lost money belonging to his
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comrades. The money had been e n tru s te d  to  him so t h a t  th e  P r e s q u 'i le
g a r r is o n  m igh t have th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  buy p e rs o n a l item s  a t  th e
163
b e tte r -s to c k e d  N ia g a ra  p o s t . I n  some cases th e  d e s ire  to  g e t  
o u t o f  th e  army le d  men to  re p e a te d  a tte m p ts  to  d e s e r t , sometimes 
w h ile  in c a p a c ita te d  due to  punishm ent i n f l i c t e d  f o r  p re v io u s  a t ­
tem p ts . One o f  th e  most n o to r io u s  d e s e r te rs  was John S h e rlo c k  ( S h i r -
l o c k ) , who ra n  away a t  le a s t  th re e  tim e s  from  F o r t  N ia g a ra ~ a n d  was
16^
apprehended each t im e . L ie u te n a n t A rc h ib a ld  B lane  re p o r te d  t h a t  
one D u n fin  "who I  th o ug h t uncapab le  to  move" had a g a in  d e s e rte d  
from  F o r t  L ig o n ie r .  The re p o r t  im p lie s  th a t  D u n f in 's  in c a p a c ity  
r e s u lte d  from  punishm ent i n f l i c t e d  f o r  a p re v io u s  a tte m p t to  ru n
165away.
W hile  o f f i c e r s  sometimes expressed s a t is f a c t io n  t h a t  c e r ta in  un­
d e s ira b le  e lem ents had chosen to  d e s e r t , th e  problem  was such th a t
i t  posed a  s e r io u s  t h r e a t  not o n ly  to  d is c ip l in e  b u t to  th e  a lre a d y
166
reduced  s tre n g th  o f  th e  w estern  p o s ts . D e s e r t io n  was a u n iv e rs a l
problem , s t r ik in g  a l l  th e  w estern  f o r t s .  In c o m p le te  re p o r ts  and
vague re fe re n c e s  to  in d iv id u a ls ,  coupled  w ith  fra g m e n ta ry  in fo rm a tio n
on how many d e s e r te rs  were caught o r  re tu rn e d  make a c c u ra te  e s tim a te s
o f  numbers d i f f i c u l t .  O f f ic e r s  c o u ld  do l i t t l e  to  stem th e  t i d e .  An
exasp era ted  Bouguet re p o r te d  th a t  i f  men chose to  le a v e  a t  th e  end
167
o f  t h e i r  e n lis tm e n ts  " i t  would n o t be i n  my power to  p re v e n t i t . "
The re a s o n , as Bouguet e x p la in e d  i t ,  was " t h e i r  lo n g  s ta y  in  t h is  De­
p artm en t"  which "had made them a c g u a in te d  w ith  th e  woods & I  can no
168
more have them ta k e n  up as fo r m e r ly ."
The e x te n t to  which B ou g uet's  men had ad apted  them selves to  t h e i r
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new environm ent i s  r e f le c t e d  n o t o n ly  in  th e  numbers who f e l t  th e y  
co u ld  s u rv iv e  a lo n e  in  th e  woods w h ile  f le e in g  but a ls o  in  th e  num­
b e r who l e f t  t h e i r  p o s ts  in  fa v o r  o f  n e ig h b o rin g  In d ia n  com m unities. 
The la r g e s t  s in g le  example o f  t h is  appears to  have been a t  F o r t  N ia ­
g a ra  where an In d ia n  s e rv ic e  ag en t encountered  n in e  men from  th e
169
f o r t  on t h e i r  way to  th e  w e s te rn  Seneca tow ns. H ow ever, o f f i c e r s
f a r t h e r  south and west fa c e d  s im ila r  s i t u a t io n s .  Two men from  th e
Sandusky g a r r is o n  "d e s e rte d  to  th e  Savages" as d id  L ew is  T r o f ie ld
from  D e t r o i t ,  who was suspected  o f  h av in g  "gone to w ard  th e  I l l i n o i s  
1?0
w ith  some In d ia n s ."  How many o th e rs  fo llo w e d  t h e i r  example i s  
u n c e r ta in ,  b u t enough d id  to  cause commanders l i k e  Bouquet a d d i t io n ­
a l  w o rry  as  th e y  a tte m p te d  to  lo c a te  th ese  men and n e g o t ia te ,  w ith
1?1
m ixed success, f o r  t h e i r  r e t u r n .
The f a c t  t h a t  some E n g lis h  s o ld ie r s  d e l ib e r a t e ly  sought re fu g e  
i n  In d ia n  towns suggests  t h a t  assum ptions o f  u n iv e r s a l In d ia n  h o s t i l i t y  
to w ard  A ng lo -A m ericans d u r in g  t h is  tim e  may be in c o r r e c t .  In d ia n  
m o tiv e s  f o r  h a rb o r in g  d e s e r te rs , o fte n  in  th e  fa c e  o f  t h in l y  v e i le d  
th r e a t s  from  o f f i c e r s  o r  prom ises o f  rew ard s , rem ains u n c le a r . C er­
t a i n l y  d e s e r te rs  brought w ith  them arm s, am m unition , and o th e r  e q u ip -
172
m ent, ta k e n  in  f l i g h t .  More im p o rta n t , how ever, may have been th e  
men th em se lves . Faced w ith  u n c e r ta in ty  about E n g lis h  s tr e n g th , weak­
nesses and a m b it io n s , and w ith  reduced l in e s  o f  com m unication, d e s e r t ­
e rs  may have been lo o k e d  upon by In d ia n s  as  v a lu a b le  sources o f  in ­
fo rm a tio n , g e n e ra l as w e l l  as  te c h n ic a l .  I n  s h o r t , d e s e r te rs  may, un­
w i t t i n g l y ,  have become a  new b reed  o f  c u l t u r a l  b ro k e r a t  a  c r i t i c a l  
t im e  f o r  w e s te rn  In d ia n s . F in a l l y ,  th e  r o le  o f  d e s e r te rs  as hostages
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cannot be o v e rlo o k e d . As w ith  p r is o n e rs  ta k e n  d u r in g  th e  Seven 
Y e a rs ' War, w estern  In d ia n s  may have h e ld  on to  d e s e r te rs  as a  
form  o f  in s u ra n c e  a g a in s t a t ta c k  by A ng lo -A m erican s . F o r w hatever  
re a s o n s , though, some In d ia n s  h arb o red  d e s e r te rs , an a c t  which cou ld
173
g iv e  l i t t l e  peace o f  m ind to  s e c u r ity  conscious E n g lis h  o f f i c e r s .
C onfron ted  w ith  r i s in g  d e s e r t io n  and t h e i r  t r o o p s ' f a m i l i a r i t y  
w ith  th e  la n d  and i t s  p e o p le , Bouquet and h is  s u b o rd in a te s  a tte m p t­
ed to  f i g h t  f i r e  w ith  f i r e  by em ploying  In d ia n s  to  h u n t down and .re - 
174
t r i e v e  runaw ays. W h ile  t h is  method appears to  have en joyed  some 
success, S i r  W illia m  Johnson observed  t h a t ,  among th e  S ix  N a tio n s ,
" i t  i s  a th in g  th e y  a re  n o t fo n d  o f  do ing  ( i n  g e n e r a l ) . "  T h is  was 
due " in  g re a t  measure to  t h e i r  h a v e in g  been o f te n  prom ised payment 
and o f te n  d is a p o in te d ." He f u r t h e r  noted  th a t  i f  lo c a l  commanders 
would be more s e n s it iv e  to  t h is  is s u e  "no D e s e rte r  c o u ld  make h is
175E scape ."  W h ile  th e re  i s  l i t t l e  to  suggest t h a t  w es te rn  o f f i c e r s  
heeded J 0h n so n 's  a d v ic e , th e y  d id  c o n tin u e  to  employ In d ia n s  to  tra c k  
d e s e r te rs . T h a t th e  army was a b le  to  do t h is  says le s s  about th e  
m i l i t a r y 's  s k i l l s  in  In d ia n  d ip lom acy th a n  i t  does ab o u t th e  In d ia n s  
th em se lves . Some w estern  n a t iv e s  f o r  reasons o f  t h e i r  own cooperated  
w ith  th e  arm y. I n  so d o ing  th e y  dem onstra ted  a f l e x i b l e  response to  
A ng lo -A m erican  expansion and a tte m p te d , as  in  o th e r  a re a s , to  c re a te  
a m u tu a lly  b e n e f ic ia l  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  new in v a d e rs .
In  d is s e c t in g  th e  co m p os ition  and c o n d it io n  o f  th e  B r i t is h  army 
in  th e  w es t, i t  i s  easy to  d w e ll on th e  most obvious and more pub­
l i c i z e d  e lem ents: th e  g a rr is o n s  th e m s e lv e s , t h e i r  e n l is te d  in m ates ,
and th e  problem s th e y  c o n fro n te d . H ow ever, to  u n d ers tan d  th e  r o le
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and q u a l i t y  o f  th e  f r o n t i e r  g a rr is o n s  i t  i s  u s e fu l to  n o te  i n  pass­
in g  th e  c o n d it io n  o f  i t s  o f f i c e r  corps. In  so d o in g , i t  becomes 
a p p a re n t t h a t  e n l is t e d  men o f te n  had models f o r  o b je c t io n a b le  be­
h a v io r  in  t h e i r  own le a d e r s .  W h ile  o f  an a lto g e th e r  d i f f e r e n t  
s o c ia l c la s s , and o f te n  e t h n ic a l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  men th e y  le d ,  
th e  ju n io r -g r a d e  o f f i c e r s — lie u te n a n ts  and en s ig n s— e x h ib ite d  s im i la r  
b e h a v io r ro o te d  i n  boredom and f r u s t r a t io n .
L e a rn in g  th e  ages o f  th e  o f f i c e r s  in  th e  w estern  f o r t s  i s  no 
le s s  d i f f i c u l t  th a n  c o m p ilin g  p e rs o n a l d a ta  on th e  men in  th e  ra n k s .
Is  shou ld  n o t be assumed t h a t  men l i s t e d  as "ens ign" o r  " l ie u te n a n t"  
were n e c e s s a r ily  young. P rom otions o ccu rred  w ith in  re g im e n ts  o r  th e  
army o n ly  as  v a c a n c ie s  and th e  money necessary  f o r  p urchas in g  ra n k  
became a v a i la b le .  F o r a  man to  rem ain  a  ju n io r  o f f i c e r  f o r  te n  y e a rs  
o r more was n o t uncommon and Simeon E cuyer, promoted to  c a p ta in  l a t e  
i n  1762 , c la im e d  to  have seen some tw en ty  y e a rs ' s e rv ic e  as a  ju n io r  
o f f i c e r  in  Europe.
O f f ic e r s  as w e ll  as e n l is te d  men had a lo w  re g a rd  f o r  t h e i r
c u rre n t d u t ie s .  C a p ta in  C a m p b e ll's  comments about D e t r o i t ,  and th o se
o f  D r. S tevenson on F o r t  N ia g a ra  have a lre a d y  been n o te d . E nsign
James Dow p ro te s te d  o rd e rs  t r a n s f e r r in g  him from tem po rary  d u ty  a t
P r e s q u 'i le  back to  F o r t  N ia g a ra  and wondered i f  he was b e in g  p un ished .
H is  f a t h e r ,  a  l ie u te n a n t  i n  th e  same b a t t a l io n ,  a c t iv e ly  sought h is
177
so n 's  t r a n s f e r  to  F o r t  P i t t .  When in fo rm ed  t h a t  th e  R o y a l A m ericans  
would spend y e t  a n o th e r y e a r  s c a t te re d  acro ss  th e  w e s t, L ie u te n a n t  
A rc h ib a ld  B lane  a t  F0r t  L ig o n ie r  was c r e s t f a l l e n ,  " f o r  t i l l  now I  a l ­
lw ays had some hopes o f  o u r b e in g  employed in  some o th e r  C orner o f
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178the World." '
Officers, like enlisted men, not infrequently succumbed to the 
rigors of their duties though their furstrations, fears, and bore­
dom were often vented in different, sometimes violent, ways. Un­
able by ethical code or position to desert, and often unable to ob­
tain home leave or transfers, Bouquet's officers directed their 
negative energies elsewhere. Quarrels with superiors were not un­
common, as Major William Walters found at Fort Niagara, where con­
flicts between the major and his subordinates became something of 
an institution. The most serious case involved charges and counter­
charges between Walters and Ensign William Hay stemming from Hay's 
refusal to do more additional duties. The case went to court-martial 
and the appeals dragged on for two years, ultimately involving Bou­
quet and Amherst. Hay mercifully died at Niagara early in 1763, be-
179fore final disposition of his case in London.
While Hay's case was pending, Walters was confronted with a 
more widespread case of insubordination. On this occasion all the 
lieutenants then in garrison wrote a letter of protest concerning the 
burden of their duties as well as Walters' apparent habit of appropri­
ating tie best food and liquor for himself, leaving his junior officers 
to survive on salt provisions and whatever they could buy from local 
Indians. This letter went to Bouquet and was quickly followed by one 
from Walters, who apologized for the "Spirit of Disobedience" among 
his officers. Bouquet upheld the major, as might be expected, but 
cautioned him to show more regard for his men in the future. Of 
the three officers who signed the original letter, all ended up being
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detached  to  o u tp o s t d u t ie s  in  th e  Wabash v a l le y ,  D e t r o i t ,  and 
180
th e  Ohio c o u n try .
Lieutenant George Demler and Ensign Francis Schlosser were of 
a more violent turn of mind. According to Major Walters, on October 
13 I76O "a Dispute had Happened between them occasioned by some pro­
voking words that passed between ihem which came to Blows & some 
kicks" which Walters expected would have ended in a duel had not 
both men been arrested and confined. Finally, bowing to the de­
mands of honor, Walters allowed the duel. He was silent as to the
181
manner o f  combat b u t d id  no te  th a t  n e i th e r  man was in ju r e d .
S c h lo s s e r, whose f a t h e r  was a c a p ta in  and a ls o  s ta t io n e d  a t  F o r t
N ia g a ra , seems to  have had a penchant f o r  heavy-handed b e h a v io r .
L a t e r ,  as commander o f  th e  o ld  French p o s t a t  S t .  Joseph, he so
a lie n a te d  th e  h a b ita n ts  w ith  h is  b u l ly in g  t h a t  he was th re a te n e d
2.82with dismissal, despite his father's intercessions.
Both M a jo r W a lte rs  and L ie u te n a n t B lane  o f fe r e d  e x p la n a tio n s  
f o r  t h e i r  fe l lo w  o f f i c e r s '  b e h a v io r . W a lte rs  was convinced  th a t  
much o f  i t  had to  do w ith  "be ing  s e t down in  a w ild e rn e s s  Detached  
from  th e  w orld" which o f  n e c e s s ity  would "make g r e a t  a l t e r a t io n s  in  
p eop les  te m p e rs ."  B lane  p o in te d  to  th e  human d im ension  when he com­
mented th a t  th e  tu rn o v e r  i n  o f f i c e r s  in  h is  b a t t a l io n  due to  deaths
o r  re s ig n a t io n s  meant t h a t  " th e  one h a l f  o f  us w i l l  be S tra n g e rs  to  
183
th e  o th e r ."  In d e e d , he c o u ld  w e ll  have been speaking  as  w e l l  f o r  
th e  e n l is te d  ran ks  where lo s s  o f  t r u s te d  comrades and an in f l u x  o f  
s tra n g e rs  le d  to  le s s  e s p r i t  and t r u s t  and more tow ard  a  sense o f  
s e l f  p re s e rv a tio n  and w a rin e s s . W hatever th e  p a r t i c u la r  case , W a lte rs
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and Blane adequately summarized the plight of England's trans- 
Appalachian garrisons.
IV
Given the condition of these troops and their scattered, often 
isolated state, it is not hard to imagine them as less than effective 
in the performance of their duties and as something less than ideal 
ambassadors to foreign lands and people. In fact, confronted as they 
were by the stark realities of western duties, they could readily 
see the chasm that lay between their government's and commander-in- 
chief s pretensions and the limits of Anglo-American power. Know­
ing this, fort commanders often took it upon thesmelves to alter 
policy to conform to reality. In other cases they faithfully attempt­
ed to do what was a seemingly impossible task. If post commanders 
appeared lax in the enforcement of regulations or cast a blind eye 
on clearly illegal practices, they did so knowing that at the very 
least, their efforts mattered very little and, at the worst, their 
troops' lives depended on selective enforcement.
In carrying out their duties, post commanders complained about 
being left to their own devices when it came to Indian affairs. While 
Amherst and Johnson were debating issues such as gift-giving, the 
liquor trade, and general trade policy, military officers appear to 
have operated without coherent orders or guidelines, at least through 
the fall of 176l. Captain Donald Campbell, at Detroit, reported 
that he did not know "How to behave in Indian affairs, as I have noe
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orders on that head" and trusted to common sense and "good luck,"
184
which seem to have kept everyone at least reasonably happy.
Lieutenant James Gorrell, who commanded the remote post at La Baye, 
also voiced his concern about a lack of instructions, particularly 
on matters relating to Indian diplomacy. Less is heard on the matter 
from the Ohio country, due in large measure to the presence of veteran 
Indian agents such as George Groghan and Alexander McKee. In the 
absence of such men on the Lakes, what may have saved Campbell and 
Gorrell was the presence at many western posts of experienced Anglo- 
American and French traders who could serve as interpreters and in­
termediaries until formal orders were received.
Those orders began to arrive late in 176l. As part of his 
trip to Detroit, Sir William Johnson was expected to announce recent 
decisions governing Indian affairs and trade. Aside from fixing 
trade prices at the western posts, Johnson issued a minimum of di­
rections to fort commanders on the conduct of Indian relations.
Among other things, the officers were enjoined to be indulgent of 
Indian requests for blacksmiths and armory work, to ensure strict
compliance with trade regulations, and to generally maintain good
185
relations with the natives.
While Johnson's directions may have helped relieve uncertainty
in the minds of western officers as to their duties and how best to
carry out their orders, subsequent commands from army headquarters
had only the opposite effect. By late spring 1762 Amherst's directives
governing the restricted use of gifts and orders curtailing the giv-
186
ing of food and ammunition to Indians reached the Great Lakes.
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The im pact was im m ediate and n e g a t iv e . Through th e  re m a in d er o f  
th e  y e a r w estern  commanders bombarded Bouquet and Johnson w ith  p ro ­
te s t s  o f  th e  new f r u g a l i t y .
A lo ne , w ith o u t in s t r u c t io n s ,  and fo rc e d  to  g e t  on as b e s t th ey  
c o u ld , lo c a l  commanders q u ic k ly  le a rn e d  th e  p r e v a i l in g  customs and 
p ro to c o ls  o f  In d ia n -w h ite  r e la t io n s  and fo llo w e d  s u i t .  As M a jo r  
W a lte rs  e x p la in e d  to  A m herst, he had g iv e n  p ro v is io n s  to  s e v e ra l I n ­
d ia n s  who had come in to  th e  f o r t  to  t a l k  s in c e  such a  g e s tu re  "has
1
been a llw a y s  a  custom ." O ther o f f i c e r s  found much th e  same th in g
p r e v a i l in g  in  t h e i r  a re a s  and, w h ile  th e y  m ig h t, as  d id  L ie u te n a n t
M eyer, f e e l  p u t upon by demanding In d ia n s , th e  o f f i c e r s  com plied  as  
188
a m a tte r  o f  course. C a p ta in  Cam pbell o f fe r e d  th e  b e s t e x p la n a tio n
f o r  c o n tin u in g  accep ted  p ra c t ic e s  when he re p o r te d  t h a t  s in c e  g i f t -
g iv in g  "was th e  Custom I t  would n o t be p ru d e n t in  me to  d e v ia te  from
189
i t  in  my P re s e n t S i t u a t io n ."  H is  p re s e n t s i t u a t io n  was re v e a le d
when he f u r t h e r  n o ted  " I  had n o t Men enough to  doe th e  d uty  in  th is
190
la r g e  F o r t ,  and a g r e a t  many In d ia n s  assem bled a t  t h a t  t im e ."  
C a m p b e ll's  p o s t was r e l a t i v e l y  w e ll  b u i l t  and h is  g a r r is o n  la r g e r  
th a n  m ost. Those in  s m a lle r ,  le s s  s u b s ta n t ia l  o u tp o s ts  had even more 
cause f o r  c a u tio n . L ie u te n a n t  G o r r e l l 's  o n ly  comment upon le a r n in g  
o f  th e  new p o lic y  g o vern in g  In d ia n  a f f a i r s  was to  express  h is  p e r­
so na l uneas iness  and v o ic e  concern o v e r keep ing  la r g e  numbers o f  I n -
191d ia n s  c o o p e ra tiv e  w ith  b a re ly  tw en ty  armed men.
Faced w ith  a  ch o ice  between fo llo w in g  o rd e rs  and s e lf -p r e s e r v a ­
t i o n ,  th e  G re a t Lakes o f f i c e r s  seem to  have chosen th e  l a t t e r  w ith  
few  r e s e r v a t io n s . Cam pbell a t  D e t r o i t  in fo rm ed  Johnson t h a t  " I  s t i l l
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continue to give them some Tobacco and other Trifles, and have
allowed the officers commanding at the other Posts to do the same."
He further emphasized in this and other reports how necessary it
was to continue gift-giving, both as a diplomatic measure and as a
way of encouraging Indian hunters and farmers to establish business
relations with the perpetually hungry troops. While Johnson may
have been sympathetic, Amherst clearly was not. He continued to
192press Campbell and presumably others to cut expenses. Lieu­
tenant Gorrell at La Baye needed no signal from Campbell to continue 
gift-giving "consistent with frugality." In just the first half of
1763 alone he ran up nearly £1,100 of expenses with five trading
193
firms for items related to Indian diplomacy.
Campbell's reasons for re-interpreting his orders in light of 
local conditions are revealed in a number of letters. While others 
were less inclined to express their motives, there is every reason 
to believe that Campbell's sentiments were shared by many of his 
fellow officers. While he was against "Great Treatys and large 
Presents," he was realistic enough to recognize the need for accept­
ing native protocol and suggested that relenting on the subject of 
ammunition would actually be constructive and would prevent unrest. 
This last matter weighed heavily with Campbell, who was afraid that 
if the western Indians ever "had the least hint that we intended to 
prevent them frome the use of Ammunition, it would be impossible to 
keep them Quiet." Given his apprehension, he was willing to risk
Amherst's and the Treasury's wrath rather than a war his weak garrison
194could not hope to win.
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Circumstances were different in the Ohio country. Unlike the 
upper Lakes, where orders arrived slowly and isolation led to a 
great deal of local discretion, officers on the Ohio appear to have 
conformed more to the spirit and letter of Amherst's directives.
The less isolated nature of the Ohio forts, the presence of a large 
garrison at Fort Pitt, and adequate, if not altogether reliable, 
communications undoubtedly led to a greater feeling of security and 
allowed army headquarters in New York to intervene more easily in 
regional affairs. However, Colonel Bouquet's continued presence on 
the Ohio through the winter of 1762 was certainly decisive in giv­
ing a different color to Indian affairs east of Detroit. A sampling 
of the correspondence of Bouquet and George Croghan indicates that 
by early spring 1762 a more restrictive policy governing generosity 
toward Indians had taken hold on the Ohio. As early as February, 
Bouquet was instructing Fort Pitt's new commandant, Simeon Ecuyer, 
that "The General will not allow of any Presents to Indians, there­
fore you will not give them Powder or Lead, or any Present whatever
without orders for that Purpose." The only exception would be for
195
"such as appear to be objects of charity." While the latter 
caveat could be used as a convenient loophole, available as circum­
stances warranted, a very frustrated George Croghan's experiences 
attest otherwise. His efforts to extract supplies for Indian leaders 
and war parties headed south were met with mixed success. On one 
occasion he managed to convince Bouquet to supply an Ohio Seneca war 
party, but when similar groups returned from the Carolinas and asked 
for supplies and ammunition, Bouquet's reply was that "it was not in
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his power to give any Warriors either Powder, or Lead, much less
196
Presents, without further Orders from General Amherst." The 
generally tight-fisted enforcement of policy by Bouquet tended to 
generate those feelings among local Indians that Campbell hope to 
avoid by tempering his superiors' orders with a large measure of 
practicality.
V
On the subject of native-held lands, Amherst’s caveat that he
meant to take no Indian lands "except in such Causes, where the
necessity of His Majesty's Service obliges me to take Posts" led
to a selective enforcement of treaty promises to exclude Anglo-
19?American farmers and hunters from the west. 71 Problems arising 
from Indian demands that western lands be left exclusively to them 
centered in the Ohio country. There, farmers and speculators who 
had been driven out of the west in the l?50s returned to press public 
and private claims to the land. Conversely, pressures from Anglo- 
American settlement were not directly felt in the Great Lakes region. 
Distance and a lack of legitimate provincial claims made this area 
inaccessible and comparatively unattractive. The French habitants 
living in the west lived in settlements which in some cases dated 
from the beginning of the century and which had developed a symbiotic 
relationship with neighboring Indian communities.
Men and women hopeful of staking a claim to the long-denied 
lands along the Ohio wasted little time moving west. By 1760 Penn­
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sylvania's provincial secretary, Richard Peters, reported a grow­
ing number of settlers following Forbes' Road to the Ohio, while 
others went west to take up farms abandoned during the Seven Years'
t q o  X99
War. ' °  Soon a f t e r ,  s e t t le r s  began p re s s in g  c la im s  to  th e  la n d .
Much of the pressure that was ultimately applied to army officers 
to relent on settlement restrictions, however, came from the same 
provincial governments and semi-priviate companies that had attempt­
ed to exploit the Ohio country before the war. The object of their 
attention was Colonel Bouquet who, to his credit, attempted to abide 
by the Easton Treaty and the army's own commitments to the Ohio In­
dians. The temptation to do otherwise must have been great. As 
early as September 1?60, Thomas Cresap of Maryland, acting for the 
Ohio Company, offered Bouquet a bribe in the form of a partnership 
and twenty-five thousand acres of choice land if the colonel would 
turn a blind eye toward the Company's activities. Bouquet refused 
to act, citing the Easton Treaty as the basis for his answer. That
he was not put off by the bribe or unfriendly to the Company's plans
is revealed by his stated support for settlement in principle, and
his suggestion that, once a plan for governing a new settlement was
better conceived, the Company should try a g a i n . T h e  significance 
of Bouquet's decision lies, however, in his insistence that treaties 
negotiated by royal officers were binding on all the colonies even
though , in  t h is  case , n e i th e r  M ary lan d  nor V ir g in ia  was in v o lv e d  in
201
th e  E aston  c o n fe re n c e .
The Company refused to be thwarted by legalities and enlisted 
the aid of Virginia's governor, Francis Fauquier. His lobbying
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efforts did. have some impact. Fauquier's protests directly to
Amherst resulted in Bouquet's having to defend himself against
charges of violating the colony's charter rights and of accepting
bribes from settlers and traders, presumably those whose interests
202did not coincide with the Company's. In direct correspondence 
with Bouquet, Fauquier was also able to obtain an agreement where­
by all those who could demonstrate a "just right" to lands based
203
on prior occupancy would be allowed to take them up again.
Of more immediate concern to Bouquet and the Ohio Indians was
the increasing number of squatters entering the Ohio region by way
of Redstone Creek and the Monongahela River. As early as 1?60
Pennsylvanians were petitioning their government against those who
"during the late hunting season, have gone in Companies far into the
Indian Country in pursuit of Deer and other Game, to the great Damage
204
and Displeasure of the Indians." Bouquet, responding to increas­
ed complaints from Ohio Indians, took more stern measures. In the 
fall of 1761 he issued a proclamation forbidding "any of His Majesty's 
Subjects to Settle or Hunt to the West of the Allegheny Mountains on 
any Pretence whatsoever" without specific orders from Bouquet or his 
superiors. Backing word with deed, Bouquet ordered squatters' cabins 
on the Youghiogheny and Monongahela rivers burned and their inhabitants 
driven out of the region.^^
While the army's eviction of quatters had some short-term im­
pact, there were far too few soldiers and too many civilians for 
Bouquet to effectively close the frontier. As the tide of immigration 
increased, Indian complaints likewise rose in number and intensity,
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particularly against hunters who further depleted scarce game re- 
206
serves. Indian protests did not stop with words. As the invasion
intensified, those who felt threatened retaliated with force; in
May 1762 George Croghan reported the killing of two Virginia hunters
at their camp near Redstone Creek. While Croghan passed the incident
off as the work of "Some Straggling Indians" whose motive was a
desire for the Virginians' rifled guns, it seems clear from the ris-
207
ing level of Indian discontent that other factors were at work.
While Bouquet was trying to stem the tide of white settlement 
in the west, Amherst was permitting exceptions to the injunction 
against western expansion. The reason lay in his desire to facilitate 
the occupation of the western forts and to convert these into self- 
sustaining bastions of English power in the region. While, on the 
une hand, the commander-in-chief supported restrictions on settle­
ments on the Ohio and ordered Bouquet to clear the region of squatters, 
he approved a scheme to establish a line of taverns along Forbes'
Road to facilitate transportation of men and, particularly, supplies, 
208
into the west. While this plan by itself may not have posed a 
serious problem for local Indians, it did point toward the eventual 
influx of more and more colonists. In the meantime, around the walls 
of Fort Pitt "Pittsboro" was being transformed from a name on the 
map to a bustling frontier community that served to show local In­
dians the shape of things to come.
In April 1761, less than a year after construction had begun 
on the fort, there was a population of 233 men, women, and children 
around the site. Added to this were 43 soldiers who lived alone or
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209with their families outside the fort. The majority of these peo­
ple lived either in the "Lower Town"— an area lying between the ram­
parts and the Allegheny River— or in the "Upper Town" which lay on 
the landward side of the fort just beyond the ditch. A few lived 
in what was called "the Artillery", a collection of buildings ly­
ing close to the Monongahela River and presumably built by, or for,
210the resident detachment of the Royal Artillery. Only 29 of the 
160 houses were occupied by what may be assumed to have been nuclear 
family units. Two houses in the Upper Town were also owned and oc­
cupied by women alone, one by Nancy Thomas and a child and the other 
by Ellenor Crawford and one other unnamed woman. While these women 
may have been widows, it is also possible that they were among the 
camp followers whom Bouquet sought to put out of business. The over­
whelming number of houses, many of which appear to have beer, rude 
shacks, were occupied by workmen employed at the fort or by fur traders. 
Of the latter, the names of Hugh Crawford, Thomas Calhoun, and George 
Croghan appear as does that of John Langdale, the Pennsylvania province 
storekeeper. Some of these establishments doubtless also served as 
taverns and, perhaps, brothels. The character of the community is 
further revealed by the fact that there were only 45 women and 25 
children as opposed to 163 men. The military residents included 23 
soldiers' women and 13 children.
There appear to have been no Indian complaints about this settle­
ment, although they were less than pleased with the fort itself. Cer­
tainly there were no protests directed at Pittsboro as there were at 
the squatters to the south and east. This may have resulted, in part,
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from a realistic assessment of the situation. More likely, given 
the large number of traders and the variety of goods available, the 
potential problems represented by this settlement may have been off­
set by the economic advantages it represented. The same cannot be 
said of another settlement scheme, this one directly supported by 
Amherst and located athwart the Niagara portage.
The attempt to establish settlements near Fort Niagara grew out 
of Amherst's wish to see that vital link in the army's communications 
more secure and less dependent on local Indians for portage and sup­
plies. At the same time, and as part of this larger plan, the general 
was initiating a ship-building program near the falls on Navy Island 
to further secure transport and communications, as well as a new fort 
at Sandusky. According to Amherst, an establishment at the Niagara 
portage would be advantageous to the fur trade as well as to the gar­
risons of forts Niagara and Schlosser, above the falls. Exactly how
this would come about he did not say, except to explain that the vital
211
portage could be better held if totally in English hands. Amherst°s 
plan awaited only an opportunity for implementation, which came in 
April 1761 in the form of a petition from former army captain Walter 
Rutherford on behalf of a company of former officers and fur traders. 
Their plan to establish a carrying trade and settlement met with Am­
herst's immediate approval and a grant for ten thousand acres of land
212
was issued, conditional on crown approval.
While Amherst may have had only portaging in mind, Rutherford 
and company clearly had other ambitions which they made little effort 
to hide. Their petition spoke of their already having sent people
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to the falls to huild houses "also horses and oxen as well for farm­
ing as for the Conveyance of Boats and Goods." They also indicated
their intent to obtain a title directly from the Senecas, an act in
213contravention of recent regulations. J Later protests by fur traders
at Niagara also suggest that Rutherford and his associates planned
to use their advantageous location to interdict the flow of pelts
before they reached Fort Niagara where, according to regulations,
21^ -traders had to conduct business. That the company actually moved 
beyond the planning stages of its various schemes is revealed in re­
ports from Niagara. Amherst acknowledged a letter from the fort 
dated July 13, 1761 that mentioned the arrival of horses, wagons, 
and various carpentry and portaging equipment. Sir William Johnson, 
who kept a particularly anxious eye on the situation, said that, while 
at Niagara en route to Detroit later in July, he found "some Carpenters
at work, finishing a large house for one Stirling, near the Falls,
21K
and have since heard others are shortly to be built thereabouts."
The portage installation soon came under fire from all quarters, 
including the local military commander, whose garrison the establish­
ment was to have supported. The biggest and potentially most danger­
ous losers were the western Senecas and Mississaugas who, for over a 
generation, had earned a living on the portage road. Johnson warn­
ed that the new buildings and equipment "must greatly add to the In­
dians' discontent, being on the Carrying Place." He went on to em­
phasize that even the Indians living there could not dispose of so
216
vital a piece of land on their own. Aside from the economic damage 
a settlement would do to the local Indians, the very presence of farmers
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and teamsters would, as Johnson pointed out, "confirm all the Nations
in the opinion they have long had, of our design of rooting them out 
217of their Country." This was particularly true for the western 
Senecas and those living on the upper Allegheny River. With Fort 
Niagara and the portage road firmly in English hands, the Seneca 
towns would be seriously exposed to attack if war broke out. Char­
acteristically, when war did come in 1763i the Senecas' main effort
was against the portage where they dealt the English a bloody defeat
218
and temporarily closed the road.
The traders at Niagara, for reasons already mentioned, saw the
Rutherford operation as "of the greatest prejudice to His Majestys
Interests" by interfering with free trade and causing unrest among 
219
the Indians. By-passing Amherst altogether, these traders direct­
ly petitioned the Board of Trade to cancel the grant and order Ruther-
220
ford and his men out of the region.
Finally, Major Walters at Fort Niagara voiced his objections.
His concerns were practical and immediate. In particular, he warned
about the supply and price of firewood for his garrison, since the
Rutherford grant embraced the timber areas normally used by the
troops for that purpose. In addition, he expressed concern about
the cost of maintaining the fort's livestock by now having to rent
221pasturage from the grantees.
Amherst's replies to these critics was quite in character. To 
the Senecas he reiterated what must have seemed a now hollow piomise 
to respect native lands "unless the necessity of the service" dictated 
otherwise. He also reminded them that Rutherford's activities were
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conditional on royal approval— small consolation to Senecas being
222
squeezed out of land and jobs. To Walters he said much the same
thing, insisting that Rutherford's activities were not meant to be
a settlement, only a portaging service; Walters clearly savi something 
223
different.
Amherst was unable to reply to the traders. Before he could,
he received orders from the Board of Trade in the fall of 1762 to
immediately stop this and other grants which might be pending. The
letter fell heavily on the commander-in-chief, who felt compelled
224
to compose a lengthy, defensive reply. In the meantime, somewhat 
reluctantly, he issued orders to Major Wilkins, the new commandant 
at Fort Niagara, to carry out the Board's directives. However, he 
explicitly ordered that Wilkins "not publish the orders to the In­
dians as that may be attended by bad consequences" by which he meant
225
his fear that the Senecas would seize the unguarded road. Even 
though the Rutherford settlement was officially undone, there is 
nothing to indicate that the buildings or their inhabitants were en­
tirely removed from the portage. It made little difference to Indian 
affairs, however, since the damage had already been done.
VI
While the army and Indian service attempted to cope with settlers, 
these agencies had to contend with a flood-tide of traders. Here, at 
least, orders from army headquarters appeared to be direct and un­
equivocal! trade was to be restricted to armed posts and regulated
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through a licensing system and instructions originating with the 
commander-in-chief or Sir William Johnson. However, as with other 
aspects of England's efforts to extend law and order over the west, 
the actual conditions under which trade was conducted seldom re­
flected the ideal.
Traders from the older colonies, as well as merchants seek­
ing opportunities to take control of the former French network in 
Canada, lost little time in going west. In fact, one of the problems 
involved in controlling trade was that traders, in many cases, arriv­
ed at western forts and Indian towns ahead of the soldiers sent to 
enforce regulations. As early as February 1759* James Kenny re­
ported that private traders were shipping their goods toward the 
Ohio and in late March a man working for George Clark returned from
2
the Youghiogheny with two horseloads of pelts obtained through trade.
The situation was similar on the Lakes where, at Fort Michilimackinac,
the garrison arrived in 1761 only to find two traders already there.
At the same time, Colonel Bouquet requested permission to issue passes
227for traders at Fort Pitt who wished to work out of Detroit.
While these traders soon covered the entire trans-Appalachian
region, the focal point of their activities was clearly the center
of the former French trading empire, the upper Great Lakes. In early
April 1761 traders from Pennsylvania were striking out for Detroit,
which soon became the hub of trade activities for men from that pro-
228
vmce as well as New York and Montreal. Others, such as Michael 
Teaffe, established stores at Sandusky, while several traders joined 
Henry Bostwick and Alexander Henry at Michilimackinac.The com-
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petition resulting from the scramble quickly saturated the Great 
Lakes market and compelled latecomers to consider other options.
By mid-May 1761, for example, former lieutenant Hambach of the Penn­
sylvania militia was writing to Bouquet that "the Trade at Detroit
is none of the Best" and mentioned that he and his partners were
230
at a loss to know what to do with their inventories. Part of 
their problem resulted from the fact that the Detroit habitants 
were still dealing directly with their old factors in Montreal and 
that the Indians were taking many pelts to Niagara, presumably for 
the better prices and liquor offered t h e r e . A s  a result, Ham­
bach, Robert Callendar, and Messrs. Spear and Vandervelden sought 
to shift their activities to the south, toward the Shawnee towns on
the Scioto River and the new Delaware towns on the branches of the 
232
Muskingum River.
Complaints made by Hambach, Callendar, and others, point to 
what these men saw as a drawback to trading at a few postsi over­
crowded markets. As Callendar indicated, one alternative was to 
leave the forts and establish trade in the Indian towns themselves.
The idea was appealing and was soon adopted by a large number of 
traders. James Kenny, at Fort Pitt, observed "Many Traders gone 
with Goods to Trade at ye Indian Towns" and reported that Pennsylvania 
trader Michael Teaffe had set off for the Miamis towns in company 
with several Seneca warriors. Hugh Crawford was reported to have 
been working at the Lower Shawnee Town in 1762, while Lieutenant 
Gorrell at La Baye mentioned that one Lottridge had lived all of 
one winter among the Indians on the Winnebago River, while another
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La Baye t r a d e r  was p re p a r in g  to  send men and s u p p lie s  to  In d ia n s
233
l i v i n g  a t  M ilw aukee . By th e  tim e  w ar broke o u t in 1763, th e
movement o f  t r a d e r s  d i r e c t ly  to  In d ia n  towns had reach ed  epidem ic
p ro p o rt io n s  in  th e  Ohio c o u n try . A l i s t  o f  tr a d e r s  re p o r te d  k i l l e d
th a t  y e a r  showed them to  have been in  v i r t u a l l y  e very  town west o f  
23^F o r t  P i t t .  On th e  L akes , th e  te m p ta tio n  to  go d i r e c t ly  to  I n ­
d ia n  custom ers was h e ig h te n e d  by th e  human geography o f  th e  re g io n .
The n a t iv e  p o p u la t io n , s c a t te re d  i n  v i l la g e s  and h u n tin g  camps th rough­
o u t th e  G re a t Lakes re g io n , was o fte n  f a r  enough away from  th e  f o r t s  
to  make tra d e  th e re  in c o n v e n ie n t and im p r a c t ic a l .  T ak in g  a c h a p te r  
from  th e  French e x p e rie n c e , M o n tre a l-b a s e d  t ra d e rs  a tte m p te d  to  o v e r­
come t h is  o b s ta c le  by ta k in g  tr a d e  to  th e  In d ia n s .
T h is  a c t i v i t y  a t t e s t s  to  th e  ease w ith  which t r a d e r s  co u ld , and 
d id , ig n o re  re g u la t io n s  des ig n ed  to  c o n tro l t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  The 
whole p o in t  o f  such o rd e rs  was to  keep t r a d e r s  o u t o f  In d ia n  towns 
where t r o u b le  co u ld  more e a s i ly  b e g in . A s ide  from  th e  obvious economic 
advantages t h a t  co u ld  a ccru e  from  tr a d in g  in  In d ia n  tow ns, o th e r  fa c to r s  
com pelled  tr a d e r s  to  d e fy  r e g u la t io n s . One was th e  in co n ven ien ce  o f  
h av in g  to  t r a v e l  between s p e c if ie d  p o in ts  by arm y-approved ro u te s .
I n  o rd e r  to  r e g is t e r  a t  a l l  m i l i t a r y  p o s ts  a lo n g  th e  ro u te  to  th e  f o r t  
w hereat t r a d e  c o u ld  be conducted tr a d e r s  had to  consume a d d it io n a l  
tim e  and ta k e  on added expenses. W ill ia m  P a tte rs o n , perhaps fe d  up
w ith  th e  system , p e t i t io n e d  to  be a llo w e d  to  by-pass F o r t  P i t t  on
235h is  way e a s t w ith  a  lo a d  o f  p e l t s .  O th e rs  may n o t have been so 
p ro c e d u ra l ly  o r ie n te d . S t i l l  o th e r  t r a d e r s ,  c o n fro n te d  w ith  R u th e r­
f o r d 's  a c t i v i t i e s  a t  N ia g a ra , may have been com pelled  to  use s im ila r
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tactics in order to survive in a highly competitive business. 
Finally, given the small force available to compel adherence to the 
rules, and the other distractions faced by the army and Indian 
agents, it seems to have been all too easy to ignore regulations, a 
temptation that many could not overcome.
The army was as ill-equipped to deal with the regulation of 
trade as it was most other aspects of its western mission. In part 
this was due to the paucity of manpower, all of which was tied to a 
few forts and unable to conduct patrols along well-used traders' 
paths. While the number of traders active throughout the west is 
difficult to determine, in areas like the Ohio country traders may 
have substantially outnumbered the soldiers posted to govern them. 
Furthermore, the spatial problems confronted by the army— too few 
men, too much land— served as an open invitation to traders to by­
pass the forts in favor of Indian towns. As Lieutenant Blane at 
Fort Ligonier observed, anyone who wished could easily avoid his
small post and there would be virtually nothing in Blane's power to 
237
prevent it. In addition, it appears that local commanders, be­
set by requests and perhaps influenced by bribes, decided not to
fight the trend and began issuing illegal passes allowing men to go
238
directly to the Indians.
On the other hand, the military could only be as effective as 
its leaders made it. With trade, as with diplomacy, orders were 
slow to arrive, contradictions arose and, no real "system" of trade 
was ever created before war began in 1763. It was not until the fall 
of I76I that Sir William Johnson was able to issue orders governing
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prices and the conduct of trade. By then, however, the trade was
well underway, having been re-opened on the Great Lakes months be-
239fore Johnson arrived. While these regulations must have been 
welcomed by harried officers, they still fell short of what was 
needed. What would have been a substantial help, given how the 
management of trade was actually being carried forward, was, as 
Lieutenant Blane suggested, lists of those traders authorized to 
work at each post for each trading season. In the absence of such 
checklists and agents to compile them, commanders were forced to
24accept a man's pass as authentic even though some passes were forged.
Further complicating matters was the apparent lack of coordination
of the issuance of licenses. What confused Blane was an order from
Bouquet prohibiting a trader named Stimble from trading at Ligonier
241
even though the man held a pass issued by Indian agent Crognan.
More serious was the jurisdictional conflict which arose involving
Brigadier General Gage, governor of Montreal. Gage, according to
the plan for regulation, could issue licenses to men living within
the Montreal district. He did so but often permitted traders to go
242
where there were no garrisons. Furthermore. Gage apparently dis­
puted the right of anyone else within his jurisdiction, in this case
243the Indian agents, to issue passes. The confusion was not lessen­
ed by Johnson's claim that all passes, throughout the west, should 
244bear his imprimatur.
Knowledge of these disputes could not have increased the con­
fidence of those charged with enforcing trade regulations. Neither 
would an awareness that, even if offenders were apprehended, there
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was virtually nothing that the army or Indian service could do 
to them. Although there is evidence that the army did make an 
effort to enforce order, it pales beside the volume of complaints 
and admissions that trade was not being conducted according to the 
plan. In one such case, a court martial at Port Pitt tried a French 
trader, Duperon Baby, for operating away from the forts. Even so, 
Bouquet was forced to admit that "most of the Indian Traders here
2^5take all possible methods to evade" the newly posted regulations. 
Johnson, equally exasperated, pressed the commander-in-chief to 
turn de facto regulations into law, under which offenders could be 
tried in royal or provincial courts. Amherst's reply was not en­
couraging. All he could do was suggest that reliable Indian agents 
be held responsible for policing the trade in such a way that court
2k6
action would be unnecessary. The limits of administrative power, 
based on executive decrees, was evident in Johnson's plaintive 
letter to New York's Attorney General, John Tabor Kempe. Asking 
for advice on how to prosecute offenders of the liquor regulations, 
Johnson ended his letter by admitting that "I am at a loss what steps
2^7are to be taken thereon." In truth, there were none, since no 
colony's authority extended over the western lands and Amherst's 
decrees lacked the force of law. All Indian and army officers could 
do was attempt to deprive repeat offenders of licenses or lucrative 
contracts as provisioning agents and sutlers at the forts.
Nothing better illustrates the problems associated with trade 
regulation than the attempt to suppress the liquor trade. By far
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the largest number of trade-related complaints dealt with liquor. 
Given its limited resources, the army actively attempted to confis­
cate all liquor within reach. But the rum trade continued unabated 
through the 1760s.
The early appearance and universality of the rum trade is made 
clear in correspondence coming from the west. In February 1759» 
farmers from the frontier counties of Pennsylvania were shipping 
liquor into the Ohio country. Colonel Hugh Mercer, commandant of 
the garrison left in the ruins of Fort Duquesne, did nothing to stop
the traffic, citing lack of orders and the absence of any laws govern-
2^
ing the transportation and sale of rum. The trade continued until, 
by mid-176l, it had become an established, if aggravating, element 
of the fur trade. No part of the west was free of rum and other 
beverages, but forts Niagara and Pitt appear to have shared the dis­
tinction of being awash in the stuff. Given their locations and 
strategic role as entrepots and meeting grounds for Indian affairs, 
this was perhaps inevitable. Also, as Captain Campbell reported 
from Detroit, his success in suppressing liquor at that post drove
potential Indian customers to Niagara where no such situation pre- 
249
vailed at the time. Likewise, it would appear from Campbell's
reports that much of the liquor entering his post came from the
vicinity of Fort Pitt, despite Bouquet's efforts to control trade at 
250
that end. Indeed, the ease with which liquor flowed at the forks 
of the Ohio is attested to by the clerk of the Pennsylvania trading 
store at Fort Pitt, James Kenny. He recorded instances of Indians 
purchasing liquor at or near the fort, an observation confirmed by
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Kenny's arch-rival, George Croghan. One aspect of this liquor
trade was revealed by Kenny, who claimed that anti-Quaker traders
were promising Delaware Indians liquor if they would cease doing
251
business with the Friends at the provincial store.
As the use of liquor continued so did complaints from traders 
who refused to countenance the practice. Those traders who on prin­
ciple would not sell rum complained of unfair advantages enjoyed 
by their competitors who used rum in barter. Albany traders, faced 
with such conditions at Fort Niagara, bluntly told Sir William John­
son that they could simply not carry on business under such circum- 
252
stances. Faced with the potential disruption of trade and the 
attendant loss of influence and control over the Indians, and con­
vinced that natives with liquor constituted an intolerable threat 
to frontier security, royal officials sought the total suppression 
of the rum traffic.
Military and civil officers confronting the problem were under 
no illusions as to the difficulty of their task. Colonel Bouquet 
complained early in 1761 that "it has not been in my Power yet to 
end the villainous Practice of selling Rum to the Indians." He also 
worried about the disorderly nature of the community around Fort Pitt, 
which allowed "the nightly Trade of Rum with Indians" to proceed
253
virtually undetected by the nearby garrison. One year later, 
after orders had been issued and steps taken to stop the flow of rum 
into the west, Johnson echoed Bouquet's concerns. Again, part of the 
problem was the ease with which settlers and traders moving along
25^
well-travelled routes could avoid detection by regular garrisons.
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Nevertheless, efforts were made to stop the trade, efforts which 
reveal both the magnitude of the problem and the variety of ob­
stacles that prevent an effective solution.
Although orders banning liquor in the west were issued by Am­
herst and Johnson as early as January 176l, it appears that their
255
impact was not felt for a full year. This situation reflected 
the difficulty post commanders had in implementing regulations and 
imposing order on a trading system that had operated virtually un­
controlled since early 1759 • Equally important was the speed with 
which the army was able to place troops west of the mountains. While 
substantial forces were available at Fort Pitt and along the Niagara 
Elver from the summer of 1759» the army was unable to occupy all 
the forts in the upper Great Lakes region until 1762. In the mean­
time, the occupation process proceeded in stages and was never able 
to keep pace with the growing trade. Consequently, imposition of 
controls on liquor came late and was less effective beyond the east­
ern part of the trans-Appalachian area.
Characteristically, the area around Fort Pitt witnessed one of 
the most persistent campaigns to stop the rum trade. In March of 
1?62, Bouquet was able to report that "since I am here, I have per­
mitted no Strong Liquors to be Sold, given, or Carried to the Indians",
256
a  p o l ic y  which he exten d ed  to  h is  o u tp o s ts . D is c o u n tin g  e f f o r t s  
to  p u t h is  a d m in is t r a t io n  in  th e  b e s t p o s s ib le  l i g h t ,  i t  appears  
from  o th e r  sources t h a t  B ou q uet’ s d e te rm in a tio n  was h av in g  some im­
p a c t . One F ra n c is  West o f  C a r l i s le  sought th e  c o lo n e l 's  a id  in  r e ­
c la im in g  money from  Andrew Heed to  whom, on c r e d i t ,  West had s o ld
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n in e t y - f iv e  g a llo n s  o f  rum. The l a t t e r  had been c o n f is c a te d  a t
F o r t  P i t t  and R e e d 's  l ic e n s e  re v o k e d . L ik e w is e , sm ugglers o p e ra tin g
n e a r Bushy Run were caught by tro o p s  and t h e i r  l iq u o r  d e s tro y e d .
The o f f i c e r  in  ch a rg e , C a p ta in  B a rn s le y , th re a te n e d  to  p ro secute
and j a i l  th o se  caught i f  th e y  d id  n o t s to p  h a ra s s in g  th e  s e rg ean t
2 57
who made th e  s e iz u r e .
On th e  o th e r  hand, B o u q u e t's  e f f o r t s  f a i l e d  to  d e te r  th e  more 
p e r s is t e n t  o r  th o se  whose p r iv i le g e d  p o s it io n  a llo w e d  them to  c i r ­
cumvent th e  r e g u la t io n s .  In d e e d , th e  in t e n s i t y  o f  B o u q uet's  mea­
su res  may have c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  sm uggling B a rn s le y  d is c o v e re d , 
and co u ld  be o f fe r e d  as one reason  why many tr a d e r s  t r i e d  to  s ta y  
as f a r  away from  th e  f o r t s  as p o s s ib le . The p o s t s u t le r  a t  Venango 
was caught sm uggling a p r iv a t e  supp ly  o f  .rum in to  th e  f o r t  w ith  th e  
g a r r is o n 's  r a t io n ,  though he had been warned re p e a te d ly  a g a in s t do­
in g  so . James K enny, a lw ays  a l e r t  f o r  tra n s g re s s io n s  by George 
Croghan, re c o rd e d  i n  h is  jo u r n a l t h a t  th e  In d ia n  a g e n t "has sen t up 
l a t e l y  a Q u a n tity  o f  L iq u o rs "  as d id  o th e rs , which r e s u lte d  in  "Many 
o f  ye S u t l in g  In h a b ita n ts  h a v £ in g j g o t kegs o f  i t  & Drunkeness makes 
i t s  appearance a g a in ."  How much, i f  an y , o f  t h is  l iq u o r  found i t s  
way to  th e  In d ia n s  Kenny d id  n o t say , b u t some u nd o u bted ly  d id , e i t h e r
th ro u gh  s a le  a t  i l l e g a l  t i p p l in g  houses o r  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  d i r e c t ly  
258
to  n a t iv e  towns.
W h ile  th e  problem  o f  rum tr a d in g  was w idespread  i n  th e  w est, 
th e  p o rta g e  a t  N ia g a ra  seems to  have been a m ajor p o in t  o f  e n try  f o r  
th e  t r a d e r s '  s to c k . O b s e rv a tio n s  by w e s te rn  o f f i c e r s  th a t  N iag ara  
seemed to  be a  m a jo r source  o f  t h e i r  problem s have been noted  e a r l i e r .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26k
Bouquet joined the chorus when he told Amherst that "Niagara was 
said to be the great Inlet for liquor" as well as the scene of
259
other violations of trade regulations. The large volume of
correspondence to and from Niagara tends to confirm this and sheds
light on the problems faced by those attempting to stop the trade.
It appears that efforts to suppress liquor trading began late
at Niagara, most of tne recorded activity dating from 1762. Early
in that year, Major Walters raided the local traders and confiscated
nearly two thousand gallons of rum and other liquors. In a report
to Sir William Johnson, he gave the particulars. Among the offenders
were Walter Rutherford, William Newkirk, whose death at the hands of
western Senecas later that year created such a stir, and Jean Baptiste
de Gouagne. The latter was an interpreter and agent in the Indian
service. A dozen of the traders involved petitioned Johnson
that such actions were unwarranted, since at the time they took out
licenses no liquor ban had been imposed. Amherst appears to have
agreed. He ordered Walters to allow the men to dispose of the liquor
but to ensure that none of it got into the hands of enlisted men or 
261
Indians.
While Walters' coup may have temporarily rid the Niagara area 
of liquor, those who traded in rum remained undaunted and the pro­
blem continued. One solution hit upon by rum traders was to shift 
operations in order to avoid official scrutiny. The site chosen was 
the former French post at Toronto, which had not received an English 
garrison. Toronto appears to have been "discovered" the previous 
year as an ideal place to trade beyond the bounds of regulations.
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En ro u te  to  D e t r o i t  f o r  h is  w es te rn  In d ia n  c o n fe ren ce , S ir  W illia m
Johnson mentioned trading at Toronto. Further, he condoned a side
trip by his deputy Jelles Fonda who, unable to sell his wares at
262Niagara, sought a better market elsewhere. From then on, Toronto 
figured prominently in offical correspondence as more and more traders 
resorted there. In June 1762, the Niagara garrison was forced to 
send a detachment to Toronto to determine whether the trading there 
was sanctioned by licenses. De Gouagne observed at the time that 
increased trading at Toronto threatened to ruin merchants at Niagara,
His conclusions were later confirmed by Johnson, who blamed Toronto 
for the general reduction in trade at Niagara and for hurting Indian 
relations. The post’s location, between Niagara and Detroit, astride 
a centuries-old trading route, also served to draw trade from the 
upper Lakes, to the detriment of men like Hambach and Callendar.
The Indian superintendent, ignoring his own agent's earlier participation 
in the Toronto business, was particularly adamant that no trade be 
allowed there under any circumstances.^^
Though no trade should have been permitted at Toronto by the 
terms of the new trade regulations, it was given something approach­
ing official sanction by General Gage in Montreal. Gage issued a 
number of passes to traders which, according to those who saw them, 
gave these men permission to trade at Toronto and, worse, to carry 
liquor into the west. Examples of these passes confirm the charges.
I t  appears  on c lo s e r  in s p e c t io n  t h a t  Gage was th e  v ic t im  o f  h is  own 
n a iv e te ,  la c k  o f  knowledge about c u rre n t m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  in  th e  w est, 
and th e  d u p l ic i t y  o f  th e  men w ith  whom he d e a l t .  In  a l e t t e r  to  N ia ­
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gara in which he mentioned complaints from Fort Michilimackinac
about the Toronto trade, Gage assumed that the Niagara commander
had put a garrison into the place. This assumption, a false one,
may explain why Gage continued to issue passes. It also says little
for his command of affairs in the region immediately west of his 
267
department. When he eventually learned of the true state of 
affairs, he roundly criticized Major Wilkins at Fort Niagara for not 
having taken the initiative in both informing him of conditions at 
Toronto and shutting the place down. Also, evidence suggests 
that traders licensed by Gage attempted to smuggle liquor into 
Toronto and to cover their actions by forgery or by altering their 
passes. Captain George le Hunte, commander of Fort William Augustus 
in the St. Lawrence River above Montreal, told of an attempt by Geo­
rge Knagg, who held a pass from Gage, to run boatloads of liquor 
past the fort at night. While le Hunte caught on to the trick, at
269least part of the cargo managed to pass upriver. Finally, as Am­
herst himself learned, passes could easily be forged or altered with-
270out much chance of detection except by the issuing officer. That
such actions were common cannot be overlooked and Gage may have been
the victim of this ploy as well.
The result of all of this was a renewed effort late in 1762 to
curb the illicit trade around Fort Niagara. Amherst directed stern
letters to Gage regarding his role in the affair and ordered new
271
efforts to end the Toronto liquor trade. He did not, however, 
totally ban all trade there. He merely ordered that the Niagara 
garrison send a detachment from time to time to ensure the continued
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272ban on l iq u o r .  ' There  i s  no in d ic a t io n  th a t  t h is  h a l f  measure 
had any more im pact th a n  s te r n e r  measures ta k e n  e ls e w h e re . I f  
n o th in g  e ls e , th e  problem  a t  N ia g a ra  dem onstrated  t h a t  t r a d e r s  
were f a r  more c r e a t iv e  i n  v io la t in g  th e  ru le s  th a n  th e  army was in  
e n fo rc in g  them.
E f f o r t s  to  s to p  s e t t le m e n t , c o n tro l th e  t r a d e ,  and to  r e - d e f in e  
th e  n a tu re  o f  A n g lo - In d ia n  r e la t io n s  a l l  r e f le c t e d  a  la r g e r  e f f o r t  
to  cope w ith  th e  conquest o f  New F ra n c e . These e f f o r t s  c le a r ly  de­
m o n stra ted  th e  r e a l  l im i t a t i o n s  o f  ro y a l power in  th e  w es t, as w e l l  
as th e  d ir e c t io n  and g o a ls  o f  r o y a l  p o l ic ie s .  Few tro o p s , i n d i f f e r e n t ­
l y  le d  and m o tiv a te d  co u ld  n o t hope to  make th e  a m b it io u s  p la n s  o f  
r o y a l o f f i c i a l s  a  r e a l i t y .  J u n io r  army o f f i c e r s  in  th e  f i e l d  c le a r ­
l y  saw th e  gap between p la n s  and th e  a b i l i t y  to  c a ry  them o u t and  
th e  danger in h e re n t  in  th e  d ir e c t io n  th o se  p la n s  were ta k in g . T h ra n s -  
A pp a lach ian  In d ia n s  g ra d u a lly  came to  s im i la r  r e a l iz a t io n s  as th ey  
a tte m p te d  to  make sense o f ,  and g a in  some c o n tro l o v e r , t h is  new 
A nglo -A m erican  in v a s io n .
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CHAPTER V 
The Q uest f o r  S e c u r ity )
The In d ia n  Search  f o r  Accommodation,
1758-1761
R eg ard less  o f  th e  o rd e rs  is s u e d , p re c a u tio n s  ta k e n , and fo rc e s  
m ustered by G e n e ra l A m herst, th e  degree to  which A ng lo -A m ericans  
were a b le  to  h o ld  and c o n tro l th e  west depended in  la r g e  measure 
on th e  In d ia n s  l i v in g  th e r e .  F a r  from  b e in g  p a s s iv e  o b servers  to  
what amounted to  a r e v o lu t io n  in  t h e i r  r e la t io n s  w ith  European in ­
tr u d e rs  and a renewed a s s a u lt  on t h e i r  la n d s  and independence, w e s t- 
te r n  In d ia n s  p la y e d  an a c t iv e  r o le  i n  p o s t-w a r  a f f a i r s .  They, l i k e  
th e  A ng lo -A m ericans who fe a r e d  t h e i r  p o t e n t ia l  fo r  war o r  sought 
t h e i r  la n d s  and p e l t r i e s ,  e n te re d  th e  p o s t-w a r p e r io d  w ith  c e r ta in  
e x p e c ta tio n s , g o a ls , and p e rc e p tio n s  o f  th o s e  whom th e y  c o n fro n te d . 
F u r th e r , th e  n a t iv e s  west o f  th e  A p p a lach ian s  were fragm ented  in to  a 
v a r ie t y  o f  in t e r e s t s ,  some o f  which d iv id e d  com m unities o r  cu t acro ss  
community l in e s  to  c re a t  som ething a k in  to  r e g io n a l c o o p e ra tio n .
I t  would be a m is ta k e  to  assume t h a t  a l l  In d ia n s  i n  th e  west 
were im m ed ia te ly  h o s t i le  to  in t r u d in g  c o lo n is ts  and t h a t  war was in ­
e v ita b le  from  th e  o u ts e t . N a t iv e  groups responded to  A nglo-A m ericans  
in  a. v a r ie t y  o f  ways based on lo c a l  needs, th e  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
c lim a te  in  t h e i r  re g io n s , and, most o f  a l l ,  on th e  amount and k in d  
o f  in fo rm a tio n  a v a i la b le  ab ou t th e  in t r u d e r s ’ in te n t io n s  and a c t io n s .  
These responses were in  a l l  cases ro o te d  i n  th e  s o c ia l  and economic
288
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
289
dynamics that had developed prior to the Seven Years" War, Indian 
actions in the face of renewed Anglo-American invasion represented 
an on-going process in the same way as did the actions of Amherst 
and Sir William Johnson.
Some measure of the expectations held t>y western Indians regard­
ing Anglo-American behavior and of the ways in which English officials 
explained royal policies to native audiences can be gained from the 
numerous councils held during the early 1760s. These meetings in­
cluded formal gatherings called to confirm peace and smaller, less 
formal, exchanges between men representing specific native interests 
and Anglo-American officials. In these meetings, royal agents work­
ed to create and maintain peace while extending "His Majesty's In­
terest." It was here that commitments were made and explanations 
of Anglo-American actions given. On their part, western Indians 
used these councils in three ways. First, they used the council 
forum to outline their policies and the bases upon which peace could 
be achieved. Second, such meetings allowed native audiences to hear 
the official Anglo-American position, which could then be measured 
against subsequent actions and used to formulate responses to those 
actions. Finally, when, as often happened, English words and deeds 
did not coincide, Indian leaders could voice opposition or complaint 
in public, thus placing and obligation on Anglo-American leaders to 
rectify matters to native satisfaction.
While royal agents tended to use the council as another tool 
for manipulating Indians through a combination of threats, mis­
information, promises, and half-truths, the Indian participants
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tended to hold another view. To them the council, and its proto­
col, represented a bond between people. Commitments made in such 
meetings, confirmed by the exchange of gifts, were meant to be 
carried out. This difference in outlook between royal expediency 
and native traditional values contributed in no small way to grow­
ing misunderstanding and resentment on both sides.
I
The first of these diplomatic encounters took place within 
days of General Forbes' occupation of Fort Duquesne. Responding 
to a call from Indian agent George Croghan, local Delawares led by 
Tamaqua arrived on December 4, 1758, having just missed the fatally 
ill general, who had departed for Philadelphia. The Indians' delay 
was occasioned by the discussion of the Easton Treaty, news of 
which had recently arrived by way of Pisquetomen and Christian 
Frederick Post.
At Fort Duquesne the Delawares were reminded of the power of
Anglo-American armsj a power reflected in the still-smoldering ruins
of the fort. In addition, Colonel Henry Bouquet emphasized that the
army's purpose was not to take possession of any lands but only to
drive out the French— the common enemy and disturbers of the peace—
and to protect those who, Bouquet promised, would "open a large and
entensive trade." Finally, the colonel urged Tamaqua to continue
working for a general peace by carrying news of the Easton Treaty to
1
Indians living west of the Ohio.
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C h a r a c t e r is t ic a l ly ,  Tamaqua responded c a u t io u s ly . W h ile  a g re e ­
in g  to  send messages w estw ard o f  th e  A n g lo -A m erican s ' p e a c e fu l i n ­
te n t io n s , he s tu d io u s ly  a v o id e d  any commitment to  h e lp  th e  army 
a g a in s t  th e  French tro o p s  who rem ained  in  th e  Ohio c o u n try . G iv e n  
th e  p ro x im ity  o f  those fo r c e s , Tamaqua's r e p ly  was a  w ise one. F in a l l y ,  
w h ile  voc ing  s tro n g  r e s e rv a t io n s  ab ou t E n g lis h  tro o p s  re m a in in g  on 
th e  O h io , Tamaqua, on b e h a lf  o f  th e  assem bled D elaw are  le a d e r s ,
ag reed  to  p e rm it a  two hundred-m an g a r r is o n  u nd er C o lo n e l Hugh
2
M ercer to  h o ld  th e - fo r k s  o f  th e  O h io . T h is  l a s t  concession  p e r­
m it te d  M e rc e r 's  tro o p s  to  hang on u n t i l  th e  fo l lo w in g  summer, when 
th e  a r r i v a l  o f  r e g u la r  tro o p s  under G e n e ra l John S ta n w ix , coupled  
w ith  th e  f a l l  o f  F o r t  N ia g a ra , made th e  A ng lo -A m erican  p o s i t io n  on 
th e  Ohio more secu re .
T h is  b r i e f  m e e tin g , la s t in g  ju s t  two d ays , c o n ta in e d  th e  essence 
o f  subsequent o f f i c i a l  exchanges. F o r t h e i r  p a r t ,  th e  A ng lo -A m ericans  
s tro v e  to  emphasize t h e i r  power and p e a c e fu l in t e n t ,  u n d e rs c o rin g  
th e s e  w ith  prom ises o f  t r a d e ;  a l l  in  r e tu r n  f o r  In d ia n  c o o p e ra tio n  
i n  m a in ta in in g  peace and a id in g , o r a t  le a s t  a c q u ie s c in g  in ,  th e  
presence o f  r o y a l  fo rc e s  s en t to  " p ro te c t"  n a t iv e  la n d s  and th e  fu r  
t r a d e .  I n  r e p ly ,  th e  In d ia n s  expressed  t h e i r  w il l in g n e s s  to  accep t  
c e r t a in  c o n d itio n s  f o r  peace— c o n d itio n s  t h a t  ten d ed  to  change o ver  
t im e — as lo n g  as peace and tr a d e  were fo rth c o m in g  and as lo n g  as  
A ng lo -A m erican  fo rc e s  made no a tte m p t to  usurp  n a t iv e  la n d s . A dd i­
t i o n a l l y  , th e  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  on th e  Ohio d id  n o t d e f in e  th e  December 
m eeting  as th e  b e g in n in g  o f  norm al r e la t io n s  b u t o n ly  one more s tep  
tow ard  th e  n o rm a liz a t io n  o f  r e la t io n s  between th e  two s o c ie t ie s ,
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norm alcy b e in g  d e fin e d  in  n a t iv e ,  n o t E n g lis h , te rm s . F in a l l y ,  
th e  December m eeting  was conducted , as  were o th e rs  o v e r th e  n e x t  
two y e a rs , in  th e  c o n te x t o f  t r a d i t io n a l  p r o to c o l,  com plete w ith  
th e  exchange o f  p re s e n ts  and wampum which marked th e  exchanges In  
c o u n c il as  b in d in g  on b o th  p a r t ie s .
The d ia lo g u e s  between w e s te rn  In d ia n s  and A ng lo -A m erican  
agen ts  co n tin u ed  to  expand, both  in  th e  number o f  p a r t ic ip a t in g  in ­
te r e s ts  and in  th e  substance o f  n e g o t ia t io n s . The w iden ing  d ip lo m a tic  
c o n ta c ts  which e v e n tu a lly  in c lu d e d  K ickapoos and K askask ias  from  th e  
I l l i n o i s  co un try  as w e ll  as In d ia n s  from  th ro u gh o u t th e  G re a t Lakes , 
r e s u lte d  from  s e v e ra l f a c t o r s .  One was th e  c o n tin u e d  in f lu e n c e  and 
a c t i v i t y  o f  Tamaqua and h is  s u p p o rte rs  w ith in  th e  D elaw are community. 
F u l f i l l i n g  h is  prom ise to  B ouquet, Tamaqua worked e n e r g e t ic a l ly  
th ro u gh o u t th e  w in te r  and s p r in g  o f  1 7 5 8 -5 9  to  a rra n g e  c o u n c ils  and 
communicate th e  substance o f  th e  E aston  T re a ty  and B ou q uet's  messages. 
H is  success was due in  p a r t  to  h is  own n e u t r a l p o s i t io n  and in  p a r t  
to  th e  sym bolic  r o le  h is  p eop le  p la y e d  in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r o f  
th e  w est. In  th e  extended  k in s h ip  te rm in o lo g y  t h a t  d e fin e d  such r e ­
la t io n s ,  th e  D elaw ares w ere re c o g n iz e d  as th e  " g ra n d fa th e rs "  o f  th e  
A lg o n k ia n  groups l i v i n g  w est o f  th e  O h io , ju s t  as  th e  D elaw ares w ere, 
in  tu r n ,  th e  "nephews" o f  t h e i r  nom inal o v e r lo rd s  and "u nc les" th e  
Ir o q u o is . T h is  te rm in o lo g y  d e fin e d  le s s  a  power r e la t io n s h ip  th an  
i t  d id  one o f  re s p e c t and d e fe re n c e . As d u t i f u l  g ra n d c h ild re n ,
G re a t Lakes In d ia n s  l is t e n e d  w ith  re s p e c t and t r u s t  to  messages r e -
3
c e iv e d  from  th e  o ld e r ,  w is e r ,  D e law ares . The in f lu e n c e  o f  Tamaqua 
and h is  peop le  was f u r t h e r  r e f le c t e d  i n  th e  subsequent A n g lo -In d ia n
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meetings wherein Tamaqua served as principal Indian spokesman and 
often opened the proceedings and established the agenda on behalf
kof other native participants.
While Tamaqua's labors and influence were decisive in bring­
ing about a rapprochement between the English and western Indians, 
other reasons emerge for the apparent eagerness of at least some 
natives to open negotiations and seek peace. The Seven Years' War 
had been costly to western Indians in a number of ways. Military 
campaigns not only cost lives but also kept a town's economic main­
stay— its young men— away for extended periods of time. The result 
was a disruption of trade, food procurement, and perhaps a decline 
in crop yields due to the absence of manpower to lcear and protect 
new fields. As long as the French empire in the west remained in­
tact and well supplied, such problems could be overcome by demanding 
higher prices for military aid. However, by 1758 conditions began 
to deteriorate. Colonel Mercer, at the site of Fort Duquesne, re­
ported that many Delawares "are starving at home" due in part to the 
loss of cornfields during their westward migration the previous sum­
mer in response to Forbes' march.^ Crop failures also seem to have 
struck the western Senecas in 1759 and this may have extended into 
the upper Ohio region. The following August, Colonel Bouquet report­
ed that Indians returning to Presqu'ile from Niagara were "being 
about Starved" and offered another explanation for this by noting 
that "the Deer £have[] now left the Lake."^ The extent to which In­
dians on the Great Lakes suffered from the same problems is reflect­
ed in reports from Detroit. Indian spies told George Croghan in May
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1760 that "the Inhabitants about D'Troit are much Distrest with 
the want of Provisions" and more important for Anglo-Indian re-
7
la t io n s  " In d ia n  goods a re  v e ry  scarce  th e r e ."  The b le a k  s ta t e  o f
affairs was confirmed by the town’s new English governor, Captain
Donald Campbell. He found the government storehouses "almost empty"
while noting the habitants' apparent joy at being relieved from war
and s u f f e r in g .  He f u r t h e r  observed th a t  th e  " In d ia n s  h e re  in  g re a t
distress for want of Ammunition" which made hunting difficult if not 
8
wholly impossible. Less is known about conditions beyond Detroit. 
While the 1757-58 epidemic and related wartime losses certainly 
affected Indians in the upper Lakes region, the impact on local 
economies is problematical. The absence of large concentrations of 
foreign troops and the hunting economy of many of the Indians living 
north and west of Detroit may have lessened the impact of the war. 
Further, Indians living south of the Great Lakes near French forts 
on the Maumee and Wabash rivers may have enjoyed a better supply of 
food and gunpowder than those living closer to the theatre of war. 
For these latter, the arrival of English troops on the Ohio, how­
ever poor their own circumstances, offered a chance to normalize
economic conditions and the trade upon which much of the natives'
9
livelihood had come to depend.
F o r some o f  th e  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  on th e  Ohio R iv e r  th e  p resence  
o f  E n g lis h  and c o lo n ia l  fo rc e s  was encourag ing  f o r  a n o th e r re a s o n . 
E a r ly  i n  January  1759 C olon e l M ercer g re e te d  a d e le g a t io n  o f  I r o ­
q u o is , D e law ares , and Shawnees who had come down from  th e  A lle g h e n y  
town o f  Conawango in  o rd e r  to  le a r n  th e  d e t a i ls  o f  th e  December m eet­
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in g  w ith  B ouquet. The Ir o q u o is  dom inated  th e  subsequent exchange, 
r e f l e c t i n g  th e  f a c t  t h a t  Gonawango was a Seneca town to  which D e la ­
w ares and Shawnees had a tta c h e d  th e m s e lv e s . In  a  p r iv a t e  m eeting  
w ith  M ercer th e  Iro q u o is  unburdened th em se lves . They u rg ed  th e  
E n g lis h  to  p e rs e v e re  in  th e  w ar a g a in s t  th e  French f o r ,  w ith o u t  
such a id ,  th e  Ir o q u o is  fe a r e d  th e y  w ould be d e s tro y e d  by th e  French  
and t h e i r  w estern  A lg o n k ia n  a l l i e s .  T e l l in g  M ercer t h a t  th e  French  
and O ttaw as were so c lo s e  t h a t  "one o f  them S i t t s  on my S ho u ld er, 
and th e  O th er on My A rm ," th e  Gonawango speaker warned th e  c o lo n e l 
t h a t  a  la c k  o f  re s o lv e  meant th e  d e s tru c t io n  o f  both Englishm en and  
In d ia n s .10 W arning f u r t h e r  t h a t  th e  D elaw ares and Shawnees cou ld  not 
be t r u s t e d ,  th e  Ir o q u o is  spokesman, Occondenage, in s t r u c te d  M ercer  
to  r e j e c t  p u b l ic a l ly  th e  o f f i c i a l  c a l l  by th e  In d ia n s  f o r  th e  E n g lis h  
to  w ith d raw  from  th e  O h io , in s t r u c t io n s  which M ercer c a r r ie d  o u t on
cue th e  n e x t day, th u s  a llo w in g  th e  Ir o q u o is  to  f u l f i l l  th e  o f f i c i a l
11
purpose o f  th e  m eetin g  in  o rd e r to  s a t is f y  th e  suspected  o n lo o k e rs . 
M ercer a m p li f ie d  th e  Ir o q u o is ' concern  to  h is  s u p e r io rs . He rem ark­
ed on t h e i r  " je a lo u s y "  o f  th e  w e s te rn  In d ia n s , e s p e c ia l ly  th e  D e la ­
wares and Shawnees who, M ercer b e lie v e d , would use th e  French to
12
"shake o f f "  t h e i r  dependence on th e  S ix  N a tio n s .
The Ir o q u o is ' concern about an a t ta c k  from  th e  w est i l l u s t r a t e s  
a n o th e r problem  c re a te d  by th e  w ar. As n a t iv e  groups engaged as 
a u x i l i a r i e s  f o r  th e  w a rr in g  Europeans th e y  r is k e d  s e t t in g  o f f  revenge  
wars and r e p r is a ls  th a t  had l i t t l e  o r  n o th in g  to  do w ith  th e  c o lo n ia l  
c o n f l i c t .  Going beyond th e  problem  fa c e d  by th e  G0nawango Senecas, 
w hich may have grown o u t o f  a p u re ly  n a t iv e  response to  a t ta c k  and
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counter-attack, the Six Nations proper faced a similar dilemma.
In 1760 the Indians living at Detroit were ready to go to war
against the Iroquois in order to avenge the killing of western
warriors by the Six Nations during the siege of Fort Niagara the 
13previous year. While such political conflict could prove ad­
vantageous to English designs, it could well prove disastrous to 
the Indians involved. An alternative to revenge-motivated warfare 
was presented by the Anglo-Americans on the Ohio who were calling 
on all western Indians to disengage from the war. This would be a 
useful and necessary first step toward resolving outstanding dif­
ferences between native groups.
Finally, English peace overtures began to look attractive in 
relation to declining French military power in the west, Through­
out the period from mid-1759 through early 1763, western Indians 
proceeded to re-evaluate their circumstances in light of the chang­
ing balance of power in the west, insofar as they were able to under­
stand it. Many who had reluctantly accepted French control of their 
lands and economies now sought to chart a new course. As a return­
ed captive said of the Detroit Wyandots, the campaigns of 1758 and 
1759 had demonstrated the inability of the French to maintain their
position in the west. As a result, "the most Sensible Indians are
14
for Standing Neuter." This neutral path, it was hoped, would dis­
entangle Indians from a war that had cost native groups dearly and 
had availed them nothing. That not all western Indians were over­
joyed at the turn of events was confirmed by an observer who noted 
that "the Chiefs of all Nations over the Lakes hath much more affection
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f o r  th e  F ren ch  th an  f o r  th e  E n g lis h " — an a f f e c t io n  born o f  a
15c e n tu ry -o ld  c o o p e ra tio n  th rough  tr a d e  and m utual in t e r e s t s .
The same c o u ld  n o t be s a id  o f  th e  newly a r r iv e d  A nglo-A m ericans  
who rem ain ed  u n f a m il ia r  and u n r e d ic ta b le . I t  was t h is  com bination  
o f  re a l is m  and a need to  know w hat th e  E n g lis h  in te n d e d  to  do w ith  
t h e i r  v ic t o r ie s  t h a t  le d  many In d ia n s  to  m eetings  a t  F o r t  P i t t  
and, l a t e r ,  a t  D e t r o i t .
The In d ia n s  who e n te re d  in to  th e s e  encounters  d id  not do so from  
a p o s i t io n  o f  m i l i t a r y  d e fe a t  b u t as equals  w ith  t h e i r  A ng lo -A m eri­
can c o u n te rp a r ts . In d e e d , th e y  used th e  c o u n c ils  as forums to  
a m p lify  t h e i r  own e x p e c ta t io n s  and to  v o ic e  t h e i r  demands and term s  
on which th e  E n g lis h  co u ld  ex p e c t peace. As s k i l l e d  d ip lo m ats  in  
t h e i r  own r i g h t ,  n a t iv e  le a d e rs  were aware o f  th e  g iv e -a n d -ta k e  
n ecessary  on such occas ions and w ere p re p a re d  to  concede c e r ta in  
p o in ts  in  r e t u r n  fo r  A ng lo -A m erican  assurances o f  coopera'' .on on 
m a tte rs  v i t a l  to  n a t iv e  in t e r e s t s .  What co m p lica ted  n e g o tia t io n s  
f o r  In d ia n  le a d e rs  was both  th e  lo c a l iz e d  n a tu re  o f  t h e i r  own so­
c ie t ie s  and th e  number o f  in t e r e s t s  t h a t  had to  be s a t i s f ie d  b e fo re  
any commitments co u ld  be made o r tx ’e a t ie s  r a t i f i e d .  In  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e , agreem ents co u ld  n o t embrace anyone who was n o t in c lu d e d , o r 
chose n o t to  be in c lu d e d , in  n e g o t ia t io n s . F o r exam ple, Tamaqua 
spoke o n ly  f o r  those D elaw ares  who re c o g n ize d  h is  a u th o r ity  o r  s tand ­
in g  as a n e g o t ia to r .  O th e rs , n o ta b ly  C u s ta lo g a 's  peop le  n ear Venango, 
a c te d  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  t h e i r  kinsm en to  th e  s o u th . F u r th e r , sachems 
co u ld  n o t make peace w ith  th e  A ng lo -A m ericans w ith o u t th e  c o o p e ra tio n  
o f  two p o w e rfu l in t e r e s ts  a t  homes women and w a r r io r s .  O nly w a rr io rs
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could end fighting by symbolically burying the war hatchet. Women, 
particularly among the matrilineal Delawares and Iroquois, would 
have to be mollified with gifts and other forms of compensation 
for lost kinsmen before they would agree to stop promoting raids 
aimed at restoring the dead through captives or scalps. Thus, 
Anglo-American responses in council and willingness to follow ac­
cepted customs and to give the necessary assurances were important 
if native leaders were to argue convincingly against continued 
hostilities and arrive at a consensus on peace. Fundamentally this 
meant that relations with the Anglo-Americans could only be re-es­
tablished on terms that satisfied native values and expectations. 
These, in turn, were defined in light of past experience with both 
the English and French and included an emphasis on reciprocity and 
overt signs of friendship, usually in the form of gifts.
The numerous meetings held in 1759 and 1760 defined the con­
ditions on which peace could be established and the framework with­
in which western Indians were willing to develop a cooperative re­
lationship with the Anglo-Americans. These councils also chart the 
growing interest among western Indians in peace from the fall of Fort 
Duquesne through the collapse of French power in the west in 1760.
On the Ohio early in 1?59> local Indians raised two issues that 
were to become constants in Anglo-Indian relations: the presence of
Anglo-American forces in the west and trade. The Gonawango Iroquois 
who spoke to Colonel Mercer in January had been delegated by the 
Delawares and Shawnees of that town to press the English to withdraw 
from the Ohio country, a request first made the previous December.
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While the Iroquois turned the meeting to their own purposes, the
subject of troops on the Ohio remained a real one for Indians in 
16
the region. The reason for native insistence on this matter was 
revealed in information supplied to Mercer by the Delaware Thomas 
Bull. According to Bull, the Ohio Indians who were otherwise dis­
posed toward peace with the English wanted the war taken "over the 
Great Water"— that is, away from Indian lands and people who wished 
to be spared the necessity of choosing sides in any future fighting.
The Quaker trader James Kenny also observed that "ye Indians do not
17
want us to remain here."
During a meeting with Mercer in July, a meeting which laid the 
groundwork for a full-scale peace conference the following month, 
the issue of English troops and forts was again raised. In a pri­
vate conversation with Pisquetomen following the council, James 
Kenny again recorded that "ye Indians are very jealous of ye English 
coming here with an army; they seem jealous of their lands being 
settled." He also mentioned his close interrogation during the 
meeting by Pisquetomen who wanted Kenny "to tell what ye English 
or ye General £stanwixj meant by coming here with a great army" and
1 Rreminded Kenny that, as a Quaker, he "should speak truth & not lie."
By way of a reply, the trader held to the official line; that the
1 9
troops were needed to keep the French out and to protect the traders.
Though western Indians from the Ohio country and Great Lakes
continued to urge royal officials to remove the troops, the soldiers
remained. And while resentment and apprehension continued to grow,
20little else was done for the moment. The reason, as Kenny's ex-
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change with Pisquetomen suggests, was trade. At a meeting in Feb­
ruary 1?59i Tamaqua again emphasized the important place trade re­
lations held in establishing peace. Given his current role as 
shuttle diplomat between the English and Indians living west of the 
Ohio, it was particularly important that the Delaware leader be 
able to carry back to the interested Indians tangible signs of Anglo- 
American interest in supplying desired and sorely needed goods. To 
this end, Tamaqua brought several of his own warriors "with their 
Skins and Furrs, in hopes that the Goods which you promised to send 
to trade with us are come."^ Colonel Mercer, whose own troops 
were reduced to a diet of horsemeat, dogs, and shoeleather, could 
only promise again that trade goods would be forthcoming, as indeed 
they were, in the form of James Kenney's outfit from Philadelphia
as well as numerous other traders who began to move west as winter 
22receded.
Throughout the year, at councils held in July and October, the 
call for trade was repeated, made more urgent, as one Ottawa explain­
ed, because "We have thrown away the French & must now depend upon 
23
you for Supplys." The price that would have to be paid, however,
was the continued presence of the garrisons. As George Croghan ex­
plained at the July meeting on the site of Fort Pitt, due to the 
state of war trade as it was conducted before 17j& could not take 
place. Rather, troops would have to build "strong houses" to pro- 
tect the traders. The implication, doubtless recognized by Croghan's
audience, was that the end of the war would mean the removal of the 
garrisons and the normalization of trade as it had been before the
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war. Disappointment grew when, after 1?60, the French departed 
hut the redcoats stayed and even extended their hold over the west. 
In the meantime, Croghan's explanation served as the perfect ration­
ale for maintaining an army in the region. Indians who complained 
or resisted risked the loss of trade and further hardship.
Closely associated in the Ohio Indians' minds with the con­
tinued presence of English soldiers was the issue of native lands. 
Reminding the Anglo-Americans of past abuses, Ohio Indian leaders 
in July 1759 put the colonists in mind of the commitment made by the 
crown at Easton the previous October to protect Indian lands from 
further encroachments. Subsequent assurances that native rights 
to lands they claimed would be protected, including a message from 
General Amherst, appeared to confirm Anglo-American sincerity.
Underlying initial Indian assumptions and expectations and,
consequently, their initial responses to Anglo-American incursions
into the west was a widely held belief that the present conflict
would end in the resumption of Indian-European relations as they
had been before 175^ » Indians living in the Great Lakes region
appear to have anticipated a French victory, hopes of which were
effectively dashed by the loss of Fort Niagara and the subsequent
25
disruption of trade and the loss of French prestige. Nonethe­
less, the idea that the English might win and hold what was then 
New France and the French trading empire in the west was something 
that appears not to have entered into native calculations on how best 
to deal with the current state of affairs. Basing their policies 
on the limited information they received and on past experience, many
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western Indians assumed that this war would end in the same status 
quo ante as had previous colonial conflicts. On the Ohio, the In­
dians who met Colonel Mercer expressed a strong desire to see their 
lands de-militarized as they had been prior to the French invasion 
of 1753.
As French fortunes continued to decline, more western Indians
sought some way of accommodating to the advancing Anglo-Americans,
but did so believing either in a French restoration after the war
or, at the very least, that the English would acknowledge and accept
26
cultural relations on the terms that had existed before the war.
One reflection of this outlook was the assumption that the Anglo-
Americans would continue to acknowledge Indian sovereignty and
equality through gift exchanges and through continued adherence to
other forms of native protocol. Commanders of English garrisons on
the Great Lakes reported that Indians expected gifts, particularly
ammunition for winter hunting, "as it was the Custom" as was also
the council protocol that military men seldom understood or ap- 
27
predated. To the Indians such expectations were reasonable as 
compensation for the use of trails, land, and food supplies, as well 
as a sign of friendship, however contrived. Ironically, in the in­
itial stages of their occupation of the west, royal officials con­
tinued the war-time practice of attempting to buy peace and coopera­
tion with gifts. While to the Anglo-Americans such actions were 
merely an expedient to be dispensed with as soon as possible, Indians, 
equally culture bound, interpreted the largess in very different 
terms. As the royal attempt to revolutionaize relations began after
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1760, western Indians began to measure English actions against the 
yardstick of wartime and pre-war relations, especially with the 
more generous French. In nearly every case the Anglo-Americans 
were found wanting.
While western Indians took full advantage of the treaty coun­
cils to state their positions, they also learned something of Anglo- 
American sentiments regarding peace and coexistence. First, English 
negotiators, whether Indian agents or military officers, were quick 
to re-affirm the promises made at Easton regarding the re-opening 
of trade and the sanctity of native lands west of the mountains.
At an important meeting at Fort- Pitt in July 1759 > one attended 
with great interest by Wyandots representing several Great Lakes 
groups, George Groghan promised that "the English will never vio­
late any of their Engagements to you or any of your Brethren of any
28other Nation, but hold fast the Chain of Friendship." He con­
tinued to assure the assembly that as soon as the French menace had
been removed a trade conforming to Indian desires would be fully es- 
29
tablished. Groghan's words were echoed by General John Stanwix, 
British commander on the Ohio. In October he met with western In­
dians to give his and the crown's stamp of approval to earlier ex­
changes and agreements. In so doing he promised that "everything re­
lating to the Peace made between us has been performed on our part"
30
and would continue to be. At subsequent meetings the same message
31of fidelity was passed to native audiences. The apparent sincerity 
of these messages was reinforced by the large gifts that punctuated 
the councils.
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However, the Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and the other west­
ern Indians they represented soon learned that English cooperation 
carried a price. As Amherst's message to the Indians, delivered
at Fort Pitt in August 1?60, emphasized, all agreements were con-
32
ditional on the Indians' behavior as "Good and Faithful Allies."
To Amherst this .meant that the Indians should cooperate with, and 
accept subordination to, the Anglo-Americans. The issue was never 
put that bluntly to native audiences, though the latter were not 
slow to understand the meaning of the new partnership. Rather, 
the Anglo-Americans defined "Good and Faithful Allies" as those In­
dians who would do two things. First, the Indians, especially those 
in the Ohio country whose attachment to the French had been at best
lukewarm, were expected to actively support the Anglo-American op-
33erations against the remaining French strongholds in the region.
Of far greater significance, however, was a caveat that appeared 
repeatedly in formal and informal exchangesi the return of English 
captives. Both demands found little favor among the Indians concern­
ed. Participation in military operations, while guaranteeing a flow 
of much needed supplies, nevertheless would not solve the fundamental 
problems created by native involvement in a European war.
It was the prisoner issue that truck the hardest. The link be­
tween permanent peace and the repatriation of captives first arose 
at Easton in 1758 and was amplified in subsequent negotiations.
Groghan told the Ohio Indians that "we do insist, that you also per­
form those [^ promises’] made on your part, by restoring to us our flesh 
and blood that yet remain among you, as we can never taste Satisfaction
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til this is done." General Stanwix also urged compliance when he 
told the October 1759 meeting that he insisted on the return of all 
captives. The same message was carried to the Great Lakes where, 
in December 1760, Detroit Indians were reminded of their earlier 
agreement to return captives, something Amherst expected them to 
do "forthwith."^
In calling for the return of captives, the Anglo-Americans had 
struck at two powerful and, at the moment, volatile elements with­
in native societiesj women and warriors. Among groups such as the 
Iroquois, Delawares, Miamis, and Wyandots, women were often initially 
responsible for the captives being taken when they called for raids 
to replace lost kinsmen. Prisoners subsequently taken became the 
property of the womens' families or the warriors who took them. Cap­
tives taken and adopted becamem in effect, full members of their new 
communities, filling the places left by deceased members. Returning 
such people to their own kind threatened to rend the fabric of native 
communities and could only be done with the consent of the families 
directly affected. A village leader's role in such an affair was 
limited to attempting to convince the families involved to give up 
white adoptees. For this, compensation in the form of gifts was re­
quired, gifts that had to come ultimately from the Anglo-Americans
36
who initiated the demand.
In the early stages of negotiations, the Anglo-Americans were 
reluctant, indeed unable, to impose stringent schedules for the re­
turn of prisoners. George Croghan, falling back on years of experi­
ence with western Indians, told natives at Fort Pitt that "we do not
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think it practicable for you to deliver up at once, or in any Place,
all our People." He thus acknowledged the complicated and tension-
producing negotiations within native communities that would re-
37suit from the demand for the captives. As time went on, how­
ever, and the Indians appeared to be falling behind in their com­
mitment to return the captives English pressure mounted, including
oQ
threats of trade sanctions against those who did not Cvmply.
This pressure was felt more strongly by the Ohio Indians than those 
in the Great Lakes region. The former appear to have held the over­
whelming number of captives, judging from the number subsequently
exchanged. Conversely, the Lakes Indians claimed to have very few 
39prisoners. The small number returned appears to bear this out and 
may be explained by the practice of ransoming captives to the French 
in return for money, supplies,and arms, a practice evidently not en­
gaged in by Indians further east who seem to have been more interest-
40
ed in strengthening their own communities through adoption. The 
pressure to return people who, by native standards, had become fully 
integrated members of local communities was increased by the linkage 
created by the Anglo-Americans between repatriation, trade, and 
peace.
II
The negotiations through which each side made its expectations 
known and during which hints of later tension and conflict emerged 
were part of a. necessarily elaborate, time-consuming process. For
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Anglo-Americans the goal was twofold.) to detach western Indians
from the French, and to establish peace with the natives which
would facilitate expansion. On the other side of the council fire,
the Indian participants also sought peace, hut measured in terms
of security, continued independence, and the re-establishment of
the pre-war pattern of relations. The climax of this peace-making
came late in the summer of 1759 when, at two councils on the Ohio,.
local Indians and some, but by no means all, of the Great Lakes
41Indians made peace with the English. Again, the moving force 
was Tamaqua who, as he had promised the previous winter, arrived 
with delegates from Detroit and the Maumee and Wabash vallies who 
were prepared to enter into the diplomatic exchange. The councils 
at Pittsboro also shed light on the motives that induced some west­
ern Indians to bury the war hatchet and explore avenues of accommoda­
tion with the Anglo-Americans.
Between July 5 and 16 George Groghan hosted a council which,
Ll2
by his own estimation, included nearly five hundred natives. Led
by the Delawares, the Indian representatives included Detroit Wyandots
who in turn spoke for other Indians living at or near Detroit.
While the Ohio Iroquois were present and their delegates followed
the proceedings closely, the council belonged to Tamaqua. It marked
the culmination of his efforts to bring trans-Appalachian Indians to
44
the fire with the English. As the Wyandots explained, they had
come representing eight other "nations" "as was agreed upon in a
Council held over the Lakes by the Beaver King [^ Tamaqua]] with their 
45
Nations. The purpose of the meeting was to fix conditions upon
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which peace could be made. The participants were civil leaders,
but they were mindful of the limitations of their authority and
k6the influence still held at home by their warriors. When asked 
to delay any formal negotiations until a major treaty council could 
be held in Philadelphia, the western delegates refused. Their reason 
was their insistence that peace be quickly confimred so that they 
might then urge their warriors to abandon both the French and thoughts 
of continued raids against Anglo-American settlements.
Tamaqua, speaking for both his own Delaware followers and his 
Shawnee allies, reaffirmed his own commitment to peace. More im­
portant, he took the initiative on the prisoner issue by releasing 
two adopted female captives. Their role in Delaware society as well 
as the degree to which Tamaqua looked upon them as kin rather than 
captives is revealed in his public remarks on the occasion. He re­
ferred to them as "my Mother" and "my Sister." His reluctance in re­
turning them was made evident by his insistence that "I love them as 
well as I do my own Mother and Sister" and his request that the 
English not "hide" them as he hoped to see them again. Finally, 
Tamaqua asked the English to show their sincerity by keeping their
Catawba Indian allies— avowed enemies of the Ohio and Lakes Indians—
I4 .9
out of the Ohio country.
Having made their own interests and needs known and having 
learned the conditions on which the Anglo-Americans were willing to 
make peace, the assembled Indians departed. One month later another 
meeting was held, this time to publicly bury the war hatchet. Again, 
Groghan had ex-tended the invitation, but as in the July meeting, the
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driving force appears to have been Tamaqua. On this particular
occasion the Anglo-Americans acted largely as observers, Groghan
having indicated that "my reason for calling them was to hear what
they had to say to each other" and to have those who had first taken
50up arms declare peace in open council. The cast of native char­
acters was significantly different from that of the July meeting. 
With the notable exceptions of Tamaqua and Delaware George, the 
participants were all "captains", that is, war leaders, represent­
ing most of the groups mentioned in the minutes of the earlier meet-
. 51mg.
Tamaqua, by reminding the warriors of the commitments he had
earlier received from their civil chiefs, asked them to take the
necessary steps toward comfirming peace with the Anglo-Americans.
In order to do this, the parties that had first sent out the call
for war had to call upon the other participants to stop fighting.
The Delawares, admitting their part in urging other Indians to
strike the colonists, did so, thus opening the road to peace. The
principal Delaware war leader then announced to the assembly that
"we take the Hatchet we sent you out of your Hands," after which,
with a display of the appropriate council wampum, he metaphorically
buried the war hatchet under the Tree of Peace where, he hoped, it
52"may never be found more." "Think no more of war," he urged the 
warriors, "but go a hunting, and travel this Road of Peace and visit 
your Brethren the English, and exchange your skins and furs, for 
Goods to cloth your Women and Children," thus underscoring once again 
the principal basis for peace: trade, both as economic exchange and
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53as a sign of continued good faith and friendship.
The encounters on the Ohio reveal more than the persistence of 
traditional council practices. These and subsequent meetings offer 
glimpses of both inter-societal relations and the state of affairs 
within native communities which influenced Indian efforts to deal 
with the Anglo-Americans. The agreements reached with George Grog­
han and later ratified by regional army officers were not considered 
by the Indians as binding on those who did not actively participate 
in the meetings. Tamaqua, for example, while speaking on behalf of 
both the Delawares and Shawnees, appears to have been supported by 
the same coalition that had existed in the fall of 1758. At the 
July 1?59 meeting he was accompanied by Delaware George, Shingas,
Keekysucung, Killbuck, and Captain Pipe, all of whom were prominent
5ip
in the encounters with Christian Frederick Post a year earlier.
Absent from the 1759 negotiations, however, were two important 
Delaware leaders, Netawatwees and Custaloga, Tamaqua, following 
accepted practice, could not presume to speak for these men and their 
followers unless delegated to do so. Whether he was so appointed is 
unclear, at least in the case of Netawatwees, who was not listed among 
those in attendance at the 1759 meetings. He may not have wished to 
participate or, equally likely, may have deliberately stayed away 
lest his known hostility toward the Anglo-Americans damage prospects 
for peace. He may thus have chosen to follow the course charted by 
Tamaqua. Netawatwees' absence may also be explained by the relocation 
of his own town to the Cuyahoga River, a move that was completed by
551760. Whatever the situation, Netawatwees did not appear before
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the Anglo-Americans until August of 1760 when he was part of a
Delaware group that came to hear Amherst's message to the west- 
56
ern Indians.
Characteristically, Custaloga remained detached from affairs
around Fort Pitt, although it appears that as early as January 1759
some Delawares from Venango were attempting to sound out English in- 
57tentions. Custaloga's detachment can be explained in part by the
presence of French troops in his neighborhood well into 1759* Also,
his close association with the Ohio Senecas, who were themselves
divided over how to deal with the Anglo-Americans, may have given 
58
him pause. Custaloga's absence from the 1759 meetings meant that 
he did not have to consider himself duty bound to accept their out­
comes, as George Croghan learned in 1760. While marching with troops 
bent on occupying the French post at Presqu'ile, Croghan reported 
that Custaloga's people "upbreaded Me between Jest & Ernest" tell­
ing "I tuck a very good Method to first Make a Road Throw thire
59
Cuntry and then Aquaint them I was going to Do itt."
The Lakes Indians who first appeared in the council records in 
July 1759 also represented specific groups rather than whole "nations". 
The particular identities of these people are more difficult to de­
termine, though it would appear that the Potawatomis, Ojibwas, 
and Ottawas represented part, or all, of their towns at Detroit and, 
perhaps, Saginaw Bay. Their close association in these meetings 
with the Detroit Wyandots would suggest this to have been the case.
F0r nearly a century these three groups and the Wyandots had been 
linked together in European accounts as the "three fires" or the
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"western confederacy" for which the Wyandots traditionally acted 
60
as public spokesmen.
The prestige and influence wielded by the Wyandots among west­
ern Indians is also reflected in their being designated spokesmen 
by the Kaskask.ias, Miamis, and other groups living west of Detroit 
who were interested in pursuing relations with the Anglo-Americans. 
Undoubtedly, these western groups could have, had they chosen to, 
spoken directly with royal officials. That they chose instead to 
work through the Wyandots reflects an acknowledgement of the special 
relationship the latter enjoyed with other western Indians, by whom 
they were called "grandfather". On a more practical level, previous 
Wyandot trade contacts with Anglo-Americans may have made them ideal 
go-betweens, much as Tamaqua's neutrality did for the Delawares.^
The role of the Iroquois on the Ohio continued to be ambivalent, 
as did the Anglo-American policy toward the League and its role in 
the affairs of the Ohio country. The situation that had existed 
can better be understood by making a distinction between the League 
Iroquois and the "Six Nations of Ohio" whose dominant members were 
the Senecas living on the Allegheny River above Venango. The latter 
group, under Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, had taken an active, indepen­
dent role in regional affairs before the Seven Years' War, while the 
League had chosen not to involve itself in the growing crisis on the 
Ohio. This pattern continued after 1758. At the July 1?59 meeting 
and again in October, the "Iroquois" mentioned in the council minutes 
were those from the Ohio. One of their leaders, Kayahsota, along 
with another Ohio Seneca, Tahaiadoris, was implicated in a Seneca
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effort in 1761 to organize a pan-Indian resistance to Anglo-American 
62expansion. The presence of Ohio Iroquois at these meetings, the 
role they played as spokesmen for some Algonkian groups, coupled 
with the absence of any strong voice from Onondaga suggests that 
the Ohio Iroquois were recognized as a dominant force in the region, 
not their elders in New York. When it suited their purpose, the 
Delawares and Shawnees also deferred to the Ohio Irowuois and ac­
knowledged their primacy in the area. For example, when pressed 
by General Robert Monckton to sell land to the settlers around Fort 
Pitt, Tamaqua directed the general to "our Uncles" the Six Nations.^ 
The Six Nations he referred to were those on the Ohio, not New York. 
Other Delaware groups, notably Custaloga's and those living at Cona- 
wango, maintained a closer subordinate relationship with the Ohio 
Iroquois that pre-dated the Seven Years' War. The League's presence 
in regional affairs was minimal and limited largely to supporting
Anglo-American policies and pronouncements, as was the case both
64-
during and after the 1758 Easton Treaty.
The Ohio Iroquois community was no more unified in its responses 
to the English than were other Indian groups. However, their grow­
ing hostility to the Anglo-Americans after 1758 stood in contrast 
to Tanaghrisson's decidedly friendly posture a decade earlier. Part 
of the explanation lies in the composition of the Ohio Iroquois com­
munity. After Washington's defeat in 1754- and Braddock's fiasco a 
year later those Iroquois who had supported the English vacated the 
Ohio country, going first to eastern Pennsylvania and then to New 
York Iroquois towns. Those who remained, largely Senecas, continued
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to pursue policies aimed at self preservation, which in this in­
stance included taking up arms for the French. The continuing con­
flict over policy was reflected in the competition between the Belt 
of Wampum, who supported the English, and Kanaghoragait £White 
MingoJ for leadership of the Ohio Iroquois after Tanaghrisson's 
death and Scarouady's departure.^ Kanaghoragait, Kayahsota, and 
Tahaiadoris appear as part of that element of the Ohio Iroquois 
traditionally labelled "pro-French". It is more useful, however, 
to view these men, who also had close ties to the Genesee Senecas, 
as favoring a policy of keeping the Ohio country free of European 
intruders, particularly settlers. Doubtless the close ties between 
the western Senecas and the French— Tahaiadoris was identified as a 
son of Philippe Joncaire— influenced their position. However, an 
east-west division within the Senecas is thought to have been long­
standing and rooted in purely local social dynamics which Europeans 
could, and did exploit.^ Further, as appeared so often in Indian 
complaints, the natives saw a clear distinction between English and 
French policies and favored the latter as being less threatening 
and more supportive of Indian goals. The internal division persist­
ed into the 1760s. In 1761 White Mingo, who had represented the 
Gonawango Senecas two years earlier, removed with a number of follow-
67
ers to a new village farther down the Ohio.
The relations between Indian communities, while important for 
understanding the environment within which choices and decisions were 
made, falls short of explaining why, in the relatively short period 
from early 1759 until the English occupation of Detroit, so many west-
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e ra  In d ia n s  dem onstrated  an in t e r e s t  i n  n e g o t ia t in g  w i th ,  r a t h e r  
th a n  f ig h t in g ,  th e  on-com ing A ng lo -A m erican s. Answers to  t h is  
q u e s tio n  la y  w ith in  th e  towns th a t  s e n t men to  th e  m eetin gs  as w e ll  
as t h e i r  g eograph ic  lo c a t io n .  A lo o k  a t  community and lo c a le  a ls o  
h e lp s  e x p la in  th e  h e h a v io r  o f  th o se  who rem ained  i n  arms o r  who 
showed a  c a lc u la te d  re lu c ta n c e  to  swing f u l l y  tow ard  accommodation.
One fa c t o r  in  th e  eq uas io n , o f te n  o v e rlo o k e d , i s  th e  co n tin u ed  
in f lu e n c e  o f  t r a d i t io n a l  le a d e rs h ip . Tam aqua's success i n  b r in g in g  
w a rr io rs  as  w e ll  as c i v i l  c h ie fs  to  th e  c o u n c il f i r e  t e s t i f i e s  to  
h is  and o th e rs ' c a p a c ity  to  overcome in t e r e s t  and g e n e r a t io n a l con­
f l i c t s  and to  work to w ard  a  consensus, however f r a g i l e ,  on th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  peace. The c o n f l i c t  between w a r r io rs  and c i v i l  c h ie fs  
by no means d isap p eared  a f t e r  th e  F rench  f l e d  th e  Ohio c o u n try . The 
war had p ro v id e d  o p p o r tu n it ie s  and in f lu e n c e  f o r  w a r r io r s  and war 
le a d e rs , advantages th ey  would have been r e lu c t a n t  to  g iv e  up.
Though v i l la g e  le a d e rs  o f te n  com plained t h a t  th e y  co u ld  n o t c o n tro l 
t h e i r  young men as a way o f  d e f le c t in g  blame f o r  damage done to  
c o lo n is ts  by r a id in g  p a r t ie s ,  i t  i s  n o n e th e le s s  t r u e  t h a t  te n s io n s  
p e r s is te d  between th e  two in t e r e s t s ,  te n s io n s  t h a t  were n o t le s s e n ­
ed as E n g lis h  p o l ic ie s  became b e t te r  known. Even so, dynamic le a d ­
e rs h ip  could  and a p p a re n t ly  d id  s e t exam ples and o f f e r  a l t e r n a t iv e s  
t h a t  s ta tu s -c o n c io u s  w a r r io rs  were re a d y  to  a c c e p t a t  le a s t  f o r  th e  
mement. T h is  i s  nowhere b e t t e r  i l l u s t r a t e d  th an  i n  th e  la r g e  num­
b e r o f  A ng lo -A m erican  c a p tiv e s  re tu rn e d  by In d ia n s  in  th e  Ohio c o u n try .
C h a r a c t e r is t ic a l ly ,  i t  was Tamaqua and o th e r  c i v i l  le a d e rs  who took
68
th e  le a d  in  r e tu r n in g  th e s e  p e o p le . The w a r r io rs  and th e  women
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who supported them appear to have followed this lead rather faith­
fully through 1762.
The reception initially given the -warriors and women by Anglo- 
American leaders may also have influenced them. The appearance of 
traders on the Ohio by mid-1759> and the continued practice of tra­
ditional protocol, including gift-giving, may have convinced many 
to wait and see what path the English might tred, despite linger-
69ing suspicions engendered by troop movements into the west.
Further, Anglo-American agents offered presents in return for cap­
tives, a practice which, intentionally or not, conformed to native 
practices. At least as important as trade to the warrior-hunters 
was their role as protectors of their communities and their ability 
to gain status at home by acts of war abroad. The early willingness 
of traders and political agents to dispense gifts, often in the form 
of ammunition, made protection and the hunting of game and traditional 
enemies easier, particularly when French suppliers were disappearing 
from the west.
The contraction and eventual destruction of the French trade
empire and military power may also have caused Indians to reflect
on the changes wrought by this state of affairs and to consider more
closely the words of those who urged a cautious effort to accommodate
with the English. General Stanwix lost little time in announcing the
fall of Quebec at his conference with Ohio and western Indians in 
70
October 1759- Earlier that year the Ohio Indians had seen the 
French evacuate their remaining forts along the Allegheny River.
This and the fall of Fort Niagara was felt in the Great Lakes area
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
318
as  w e l l .  F u r th e r ,  news t h a t  In d ia n s  l i v i n g  near N ia g a ra  had a ls o
i n i t i a t e d  c o n ta c ts  w ith  th e  E n g lis h  on seem ing ly  fa v o ra b le  term s
71may have in f lu e n c e d  some to  th e  south and w est.
Geography a ls o  h e lp e d  account f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  responses  
to  th e  A ng lo -A m erican  advance. L o c a t io n  gave some In d ia n s  an ad ­
van tag e  i n  coping  w ith  th e  d is r u p t io n  caused by th e  c o lla p s e  o f  
French  power in  th e  r e g io n . As James C l i f t o n  has p o in te d  o u t , f o r  
exam ple, th e  P otaw atom is l i v i n g  a t  S t .  Joseph and C hicago , by t h e i r  
c lo s e r  p ro x im ity  to  sources o f  French  s u p p lie s  by way o f  th e  I l l i n o i s  
co u n try  and New O r le a n s , were much le s s  in c l in e d  to  meet w ith  th e
E n g lis h  th a n  were th o se  whose base o f  t r a d e  re s te d  a t  , " ' t r o i t ,  where
72sto reh o uses  r a p id ly  em ptied  a f t e r  th e  f a l l  o f  F o r t  N ia g a ra .
S im i la r ly ,  th e  Shawnees a p p ear to  have e x e rc is e d  independence o f  
a c t io n  t h a t  e x a s p e ra te d  r o y a l  o f f i c i a l s .  A ng lo -A m erican  o bservers  
were u n iv e r s a l in  t h e i r  condem nation o f  th e  Shawnees as  s in g u la r ly  
"c o n c e ite d "  and d is tu r b e r s  o f  th e  peace and who, o f  a l l  th e  w estern  
In d ia n s , were most r e lu c t a n t  to  p a r t  w ith  c a p tiv e s . One P e n n s y l­
v a n ia  o f f i c i a l  went so f a r  as to  suggest b u i ld in g  a f o r t  a t  th e  Lower
73Town to  "p u t a  b r id le  upon th em ." The Shawnees' advantageous l o ­
c a t io n  a s t r id e  a  com m unications and economic c rossroads t h a t  l in k e d  
them to  th e  G re a t L akes , th e  M is s is s ip p i v a l le y ,  as  w e l l  as  w ith  
members o f  t h e i r  own s o c ie ty  l i v i n g  among th e  U pper Greeks in  Ten­
nessee , gave them a  f l e x i b i l i t y  d en ied  o th e r  In d ia n s  in  d e a lin g  w ith
in t r u d e r s ,  one t h a t  th e  Shawnees used to  r e s is t  A ng lo -A m erican  e x -
74p an s io n  u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  A m erican R e v o lu t io n .
Until the middle of 1760, distance from the English and easy
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access to supportive Seneca groups helps account for the aloofness 
of Custaloga's Delawares. Not surprizingly, Venango was the scene 
of an attempt in July 1759 by a man identified as Teedyuscung’s 
brother to stiffen Ohio Indian resistance to the Anglo-Americans.
It took direct intervention by Tamaqua, prompted by requests from 
western Indians, to squelch the plan and salvage the council ne-
75gotiations then under way. A year later, however, as the English 
army advanced up the Allegheny, the Venango Delawares changed their
76
tactics to meet the challenge of a potential foe closer to home.
The distance between the advancing Anglo-Americans and Ottawas
and Ojibwas of the Michilimackinac region, as well as the various
Indian groups near La Baye and south of Lake Michigan permitted
these people to assert their control of the land and their own
economies in a much more forthright manner than did Indians to the 
77
east. Conversely, the upper Lakes Indians were more prone to 
suffer economically as the French trade network collapsed after
1759.
Regardless of specific circumstances, western Indians' responses 
to Anglo-American peace overtures were universally marked by cal­
culation and caution. The negotiations on the Ohio, at Niagara in 
mid-1759i and at Detroit in December 1760 did not, as one scholar
has argued, witness the subordination of western Indians to English
78
influence or control. As Indians at the time acknowledged, native 
communities often needed trade and a more stable environment within 
which to repair the damage done by the recent war. But the Indians 
who met Anglo-American agents, no less than those who did not, con­
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tinued to pursue policies aimed, at preserving their security, in­
dependence, and economic wellbeing. Negotiations represented one 
of several strategies for dealing with the Anglo-American intrusion 
and the accompanying downfall of the old economic and political 
system. Hostilities continued between some western Indians even 
as negotiations continued with others. The continuing shift of In­
dian communities from the Ohio River west and south represents yet 
another response to the impending military occupation of the region. 
The flexibility of the natives' response is further illustrated by 
Gustaloga's Delawares, who moved from detachment to limited accom­
modation as circumstances and opportunities warranted. This cautious 
response to changing conditions led most western Indians toward a 
policy of wait and see and to cooperate with the invaders only as 
much as was necessary to ensure achievement of goals determined at 
home. None of this implies surrender to the inevitability of Anglo- 
American control over the west. Peace and friendship would depend 
in large measure on the ability and willingness of the invaders to 
adapt to and meet native ways and needs. Anything less would lead 
to continued friction.
Cooperation took many forms. In some instances, western Indians 
attempted to develop a symbiotic relationship with the Anglo-Americans 
by responding to the latter's particular needs, needs which could 
also be turned to native advantage. In other cases, native values 
and activities happened to mesh with Anglo-American policies to create 
what appeared, on the surface, to be mutually beneficial arrangements. 
In either case, from 1758 through l?6l many western Indian groups
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actively sought to establish ties with the invaders that were de­
fined in terms of equity and reciprocity as well as mutual interest 
or self-interest.
Participation in trade and cooperation in efforts to establish 
peace were themselves forms of inter-societal cooperation founded 
on native needs and interests. So, too, was the limited help the 
British army received from some western Indians in pursuing and 
apprehending deserters. In the latter case, such help may have been 
offered as an additional, tangible example of the willingness to es­
tablish friendly relations, particularly with the most worrisome, 
threatening, and least predictable element of Anglo-American society 
in the west. The Six Nations Indians who brought in deserters and 
wampum to neighboring Fort Niagara may have had just such a motive
79m  mind.
In a different area, western Indian attacks on the Cherokees 
and other southern Indians between 1?59 and 1763 reflected a will­
ingness to cooperate with the English against a common enemy. This 
cooperation, however, had more to do with traditional native values 
than with relations with the English per se. Rather than another 
case of a conscious choice to extend aid or friendship, Indian 
acceptance of an English call to war against the Cherokees illustrates 
a case of the coincidence of native and Anglo-American needs in such 
a way that western Indians could pursue their own interests while 
at the same time appearing to cooperate with the invaders. Of course, 
royal officials in the west and their superiors in New York viewed 
things differently. From their point of view, western Indian raids
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against the Cherokeess with whom the English fought a protracted
war between 1759 anci 17^2, served colonial ends by adding to the
pressure being exerted on the Cherokees, often ineptly, by royal 
80
troops. The more perceptive of England's Indian agents, however, 
also saw in the traditional native conflict a convenient way to keep
potentially dangerous enemies from combining against the settle-
+ 81 ments.
For the Indians involved, most of whom were Iroquois, Delawares, 
and Shawnees, the traditional basis of warfare counted for far more.
The deep emnity felt by the western Indians for those living south 
of the Ohio River was clearly demonstrated in treaty negotiations.
Ohio Indian leaders repeatedly warned the English not to bring the
82Catawbas into their lands. The noncommital response created anxiety 
about the possibility of an Anglo-Catawba attack on the Ohio communities. 
The generations-old conflict transcended any wars current between the 
Anglo-Americans and Cherokees. As an integral part of inter-societal 
relations, this north-south warfare offered an ideal avenue by which 
young warriors could acquire skill and prestige through battle. The 
low level of intensity allowed revenge raids to continue for long periods 
of time without doing serious damage to either side. Truces were period­
ically arranged, normally by colonial officials who sought to limit the 
conflict's impact on frontier settlements. But the tradition of raid­
ing continued, which made it easier for Ohio and Great Lakes Indians
8/.
to respond to English calls for aid against the Cherokees.
Not only did such calls encourage tendencies already present in
western Indian societies, they also gave the natives an opportunity to
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t e s t  th e  s in c e r i t y  o f  A ng lo-A m erican  p ledges  o f  f r ie n d s h ip  and a l ­
l ia n c e .  George Groghan was t o ld  th a t  a  number o f  In d ia n s , in c lu d ­
in g  D e law ares , Shawnees, M iam is, and Weas w ished to  go to  war b u t  
would d e la y  any a c t io n  u n t i l  th ey  "could  be assu red  o f  o u r F r ie n d -
85
s h ip  & S u p p o rt."  As th e  re q u e s ts  o f  in c re a s in g ly  numerous war
p a r t ie s  su gg est, th e  assurances th e  In d ia n s  expected  were ta n g ib le
as w e l l  as sym b o lic . C o lon e l Bouquet and Groghan a t  F o r t  P i t t —
which la y  a s t r id e  a  main n a t iv e  road  to  th e  south— sp en t much tim e
outfitting warriors en route to the Garolinas and, occasionally but
86
reluctantly, fed and supplies returning bands. Encouraged by Anglo-
American agents, who were quick to demonstrate their support for native
warriors, the western Indians engaged in raids in increasing numbers
and greater frequency until, by the summer of 1?62, the northern
r a id s  seem to  have reached  a  peak. L ie u te n a n t E l ia s  M eyer re p o rte d
th a t  th e  Wyandots o f  Sandusky were p a r t i c u la r ly  a c t iv e  i n  t h is  re g a rd
and his successor, Ensign Pauli, reported that in mid-February 1?62
87
n e a r ly  a l l  th e  w a r r io rs  had l e f t  f o r  th e  so uth . B oth  James Kenny 
and George Croghan reco rd ed  numerous p a r t ie s  pass in g  th rough  F o r t  P i t t
between April and December 1?62, many of which were composed of Ohio
• 88 Iroquois.
At least as widespread as participation in warfare was the prac­
tice, engaged in by Ohio and Lakes Indians alike, of supplying food 
to English garrisons. Amherst's message to the western Indians in­
cluded a request for land on which the troops could grow their own 
crops and, at Detroit in December 1760, the local chiefs were enjoin­
ed by Groghan to "Incourage your young Men to Hunt & bring their meat
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to  me f o r  which th ey  s h a l l  he p a id  i n  Powder & l e a d . ” B oth r e ­
quests  r e f l e c t  th e  a rm y 's  e f f o r t s  to  l i v e  o f f  th o se  i t  had come to  
c o n t r o l,  a p r a c t ic e  which had a lo n g  European p e t ig r e e .  The f a c t  
th a t  many w estern  In d ia n s  ro s e  to  th e  o ccas ion  may seem c u rio u s  when 
one c o n s id ers  th e  o th e rw is e  c a u tio u s  and l a t e n t l y  d is t r u s t f u l  n a t iv e  
response to  th e  re d c o a ts .
The e x p la n a tio n  l i e s  both  i n  th e  a rm y 's  s i t u a t io n  and in  George 
G roghan's rem arks a t  D e t r o i t .  Faced w ith  what were a t  tim e  in s u r ­
m ountable lo g i s t i c a l  p roblem s, C o lo n e l Bouquet and h is  su b o rd in a te s
found them selves in  genu ine  need o f  item s  t h a t  s k i l l e d  In d ia n  fa rm ers
90
and h u n te rs  could  s a fe ly  supp ly  i n  abundance) co rn  and m eat. F o r
th e  In d ia n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  w a r r io r s ,  th e  p ro s p e c t o f  a  cash and
c a r r y  b usiness  o f fe r e d  a  chance to  r e f i l l  d ang ero u s ly  d e p le te d  s tocks
o f  am m unition, e s p e c ia l ly  when in c re a s in g  d i f f i c u l t l y  was exp erien ced
91
in  o b ta in in g  th ese  s u p p lie s  th rough  o th e r  c h an n e ls . The In d ia n s '  
pro m is in g  bus in ess , l i k e  tr a d e  and th e  a s s is ta n c e  g iv e n  a g a in s t  th e  
C herokees, was based on m u tu a l needs and in t e r e s t s .  Success, as in  
o th e r  in t e r - s o c ie t a l  v e n tu re s , depended on th e  degree  to  which each 
p a r t ic ip a n t  upheld  h is  p a r t  o f  th e  b a rg a in  and re c ip r o c a te d  as th e  
o th e r  d e s ire d .
The developm ent o f  a  s y m b io tic  r e la t io n s h ip  based on th e  p ro ­
v is io n in g  o f  E n g lis h  tro o p s  was made e a s ie r  by both  th e  a rm y 's  eag er­
ness to  f i l l  i t s  s to rehouses and th e  ease w ith  which In d ia n s  could  
accommodate t h is  demand w i th in  th e  l i m i t s  o f  t r a d i t io n a l  v a lu e s  and 
p ra c t ic e s .  In d ia n  h u n te rs  could  c o n tin u e  to  engage i n  a c c e p ta b le  
a c t i v i t i e s  w h ile  tu rn in g  a  p r o f i t  from  and d e v e lo p in g  p e a c e fu l r e ­
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la t io n s  w ith  lo c a l  g a r r is o n s . The e x te n t to  which th e  arm y, p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  on th e  O h io , was dependent on In d ia n  s u p p lie rs  i s  e v id e n t  
from  a r e p o r t  by C o lo n e l M ercer a t  P i t ts b o r o .  P r a is in g  th e  D elaw ares  
and o th e r  lo c a l  In d ia n s  f o r  t h e i r  " z e a l & f i d e l i t y " ,  he emphasized
th a t  "b u t f o r  them o u r c ircum stan ces  co u ld  s c a rc e ly  have been made
92
known to  you, o r  s u p p lie s  so r e a d i ly  o b ta in e d ."
The bus in ess  seems to  have f lo u r is h e d . By mid-1761, m i l i t a r y
correspondence was f u l l  o f  re fe re n c e s  to  purchases o f  fo o d , p r in c ip a l ly
v e n is o n , from  th e  n a t iv e s .  The bus iness  had i t s  c e n te r  in  he Ohio
c o u n try  b u t o f f i c e r s  as f a r  away as th e  Wabash v a l le y  and S t .  Jo seph 's
R iv e r  were a ls o  engaging In d ia n  h u n te rs  f o r  as much m eat as  th ey  co u ld  
93d e l iv e r .  F o r some o f  th e s e  o f f i c e r s  th e  language b a r r i e r  proved  
troub lesom e. L ie u te n a n t  M eyer t o ld  h is  s u p e r io rs  t h a t  "The d e tach ­
ment s u f fe r s  by [ t h e  la c k  o f  a  com petent in t e r p r e t e r ]  and I  f e a r  w i l l  
s u f fe r  c o n s id e ra b ly  l a t e r ,  because in  o u r p re s e n t u n fo r tu n a te  p o s it io n ,
w ith o u t hope o f  any h e lp , we have need o f  them [ In d ia n s ]  both  f o r  th e
94
hunt and f o r  In d ia n  c o rn ."  M eyer a p p a re n t ly  overcame t h is  problem  
because, a month l a t e r ,  he was a b le  to  r e p o r t  enough v e n iso n  coming
95m  to  supp ly  h is  Sandusky g a r r is o n  f o r  th e  w in te r .
A no ther a s p e c t o f  th e  p ro v is io n in g  business was i t s  tra n s fo rm a tio n  
in to  a cash e n te r p r is e .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d e te rm in e  who was respon­
s ib le  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  th e  use o f  cash and c r e d i t  as payment f o r  s u p p lie s .  
C a p ta in  M a th e r, a f t e r  a  m eetin g  w ith  C u s ta lo g a 's  p eop le  a t  Venango
e a r ly  i n  l ? 6 l ,  observed  t h a t  " I  t o ld  them th e y  shod r e c e iv e  Ready Money
96
[ f o r  m ea t] which p le a s 'd  Them n o t a  l i t t l e . "  W h ile  h is  l e t t e r  sug­
g e s ts  t h a t  he in tro d u c e d  th e  id e a ,  M a th e r ’ s o b s e rv a tio n  o f  th e  D e la ­
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wares' response indicates their interest in such a deal and that they 
may have initially proposed the arrangement. Regardless, the Indian 
hunters soon proved themselves as adept at manipula.ting the market 
for food as they were in dealing with traders. While the officially 
quoted price of venison was two pece per pound, available evidence
97indicates that local commanders were forced to pay much more. En­
sign Robert Holmes at Fort Miami complained that the Miamis Indians
brought in little meat "and what they Bring I have to pay an Extre-
98
quentj^ sic^  price for." The tactic of withholding supplies until 
demand forced up prices seems to have been widespread. Lieutenant 
Meyer also reported only a "small quantity" of venison available for
99
which he was forced to pay over thirty-six shillings.
Not only were the Indians driving hard bargains, they also de­
manded "ready money" for their goods or refused to deal. Lieutenant 
Carre at Venango reported difficulties arising from the Delawares' re­
fusal to accept bills of credit drawn on Bouquet at Fort Pitt. Dis­
tance and the winter season certainly influenced the rejection of a
form of payment fraught with inconvenience, but one also detects a
100
suspicion of anything but hard currency. The question remains, how­
ever, of what numbers of Indian hunters did with relatively large 
amounts of cash. One obvious answer is that much of it found its way 
into the pockets of fur traders or sutlers, as did most of the money 
disbursed to pay the soldiers. Some may have been transformed into 
jewelry or traded to other natives. Another possibility is that much 
of the Indians' new-found wealth supported the illicit liquor trade 
throughout the west. Finally, some of the coins may have purchased
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arms and. ammunition later used against the English outposts. By
whatever route, it can be assumed that much of what Indian suppliers
earned left their towns rather quickly, something that should not be
surprizing given the lack of an exchange system based on coin within
native societies.
As the profits to be made from provisioning became evident, Indian
suppliers found themselves faced with colonial farmers and hunters,
as well as traders, eager to claim a share of the market. The army
would undoubtedly have preferred depending on its own people rather
than potential enemies and, to encourage colonial participation in
the provisions trade, the army paid more to frontier farmers than to 
101
Indians. Less well know was the attempt by traders in the Ohio 
country to become middlemen between Indian suppliers and military con­
sumers. Ensign Thomas Hutchins at Venango noted that local traders
were seeking permission to sell to the army stocks of corn they were
102then purchasing from neighboring Delawares and Iroquois.
The emergence of the Indians' provisioning business as a major 
enterprise may have caused new problems even as it enabled natives 
and soldiers to co-exist. One explanation for the continuing Indian 
movement away from the upper Ohio region in the 1760s has been an acute
103
shortage of game. Existing evidence makes it difficult to assess 
just how severe game depletion became by 1763 and military records 
yield only fragmentary information on the volume of meat purchased by 
the garrisons. It is possible, however, that the sudden increase in 
the region's population, which now included several hundred soldiers, 
workmen, traders, and their dependents, may have been sufficient to
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upset the previously favorable balance between man and animals.
Further evidence of this may also lie in the particular hostility 
Ohio Indians displayed toward colonial hunters, emnity that ended in 
several deaths and near-fatal clashes. As game supplies dropped 
native hunters may have seen these interlopers as a serious economic 
threat, whether these hunters were acting for themselves or in order 
to sell to the natives' military customers. In one instance the 
focus of an attack on Virginia hunters may have been their rifles, 
much improved weapons that made taking large or small game more likely.
It may be that local Indians, seeking every possible means of secur­
ing enough meat for themselves and trade, resorted to theft of superior 
weapons as well.
Finally, while it served as the basis for inter-societal coopera­
tion as well as an avenue whereby Indians could obtain needed supplies 
and information about the other side, the provisioning business did 
not create, as did the fur trade, a long-standing symbiotic relation­
ship between Indians and Englishmen in the west. Unlike the trade, 
the Indians' role as de facto quartermasters for the British army did 
not force the latter to accommodate to the natives to any great ex­
tent. The reason was the army's unwillingness to keep itself at the 
mercy of a potential enemy any more than it had to. Food, unlike furs, 
could be obtained elsewhere, and as the army slowly brought order to 
its supply system, aided by the growing number of settlers moving west, 
the Indians' role as suppliers was reduced to that of a useful alternative. 
In addition, while provisioning and services as military allies per­
mitted specific groups of Indians and Anglo-Americans to strike co­
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operative arrangements, the larger problems growing out of continued 
English expansion remained and intensified.
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CHAPTER VI 
The Failure of Accommodation,
1761-1762
Efforts by western Indians to adjust to the Anglo-American in­
vasion and the changes taking place throughout the trans-Appalachian 
region failed to result in a new, stable, peaceful relationship.
While royal officials spoke of enforcing the Easton Treaty and gave, 
often in good faith, promises of fair trade, protection for native 
lands, and friendship based on trust and mutual interest, it became 
increasingly evident to Indian observers that English deeds were not 
following the path marked out in council speeches. Even as trade was 
being re-established and as some western Indians sought ways of ac­
commodating to, and profiting from, the on-coming Anglo-Americans, 
native attitudes and the basis for Anglo-Indian relations were chang­
ing.
I
Western Indian relations with the Anglo-Americans had included 
friction and latent hostility from the start. As noted earlier, at­
tempts were made by Delawares to defuse militancy among Custaloga's 
people which threatened negotiations at Pittsboro. During the spring 
and summer of I76O the army was again faced with raids and threats of 
attack from Indians, primarily from the Great Lakes, who either re­
fused to participate in peace talks or who ignored the agreements
337
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reach ed  by t h e i r  w ar and c i v i l  le a d e rs . A t F o r t  N ia g a ra  C o lo n e l
W il l ia m  E yre  was warned by lo c a l  Senecas t h a t  w e s te rn  In d ia n s  were
th in k in g  o f  a t ta c k in g  and ta k in g  th e  f o r t  f o r  th e  F re n c h .^
From th e  O hio c o u n try  C o lo n e l Bouquet re p o r te d  enemy scouts n ear
h is  camp a t  P r e s q u ' i le ,  scouts  who l a t e r  ambushed and k i l l e d  s e v e ra l  
2.
o f  h is  men. F in a l l y ,  th e  te n s io n  between I nd ia n  s o c ie t ie s  c re a te d
by th e  c o lo n ia l  w ar th re a te n e d  to  e n g u lf th e  E n g lis h . George Croghan
found t h a t  some w e s te rn  In d ia n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  O tta w a s , O jib w a s , and
K ickapoos from  th e  I l l i n o i s  c o u n try  had d ec id ed  to  make revenge ra id s
on th e  S ix  N a tio n s  f o r  lo s s e s  s u ffe r e d  a t  th e  hands o f  th e  l a t t e r  a t
F o r t  N ia g a ra . A ccord ing  to  C roghan 's  in fo rm a n t, th e  In d ia n s  agreed
t h a t  th e y  w ould p ro b a b ly  have to  s t r i k e  th e  E n g lis h  as  w e ll  s in c e
" i t  would be im p o s s ib le  to  s t r ik e  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  w ith o u t s t r ik in g
3
th e  E n g lis h  l ik e w is e ,  as  th e y  were so c lo s e ly  c o n n ec ted ."
H o s t i l i t i e s  subsided  in  th e  wake o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  and th e  lo s s  
o f  F rench  a id .  B ut th e  re d u c t io n  o f  armed c o n f l i c t  d id  n o t s ig n a l  
th e  In d ia n s ' p a s s iv e  accep tan ce  o f  a  new p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r . The i n ­
dependence, t e s t in e s s ,  and c a u tio n  t h a t  m arked th e  t r e a t y  encounters  
appeared  o f te n  as w e s te rn  n a t iv e s  e v a lu a te d  th e  A n g lo -A m erican s ' p e r ­
form ance and found  i t  w a n tin g . Soon a f t e r  t r a d e  re -o p en ed  i n  th e  Ohio  
r e g io n , r e s id e n t  In d ia n s  d e te c te d  and com plained ab ou t r a d ic a l  d i f ­
fe re n c e s  betw een p r e -  and p o s t-w a r p r ic e s  and th e  q u a l i t y  o f  goods. 
C roghan, who served  as a  one-man c o m p la in t departm ent f o r  w estern  
t r a d e r s ,  re p o r te d  t h a t  th e  In d ia n s  "Com plained o f  th e  p r ic e  o f  
S tro u ds  say in g  i t  was d e a re r  th an  what th e y  fo rm e r ly  gave th e  T rad ers  
f o r  i t . "  He a ls o  noted  t h a t  th e  D elaw ares and Wyandots com plained
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o f  th e  "E x tra v a g e n t p r ic e "  charged by th e  P e n n s y lv a n ia  s to re  a t  F o r t  
P i t t  f o r  h u n tin g  sad d les  and th e  g e n e ra l p r ic e  sch edu le  a t  t h a t  es­
ta b lis h m e n t.^  T h is  and th e  i n i t i a l  s h o rt supply o f  goods in  th e
r e g io n  le d  many Ohio In d ia n s  to  q u e s tio n  th e  s in c e r i t y  o f  th e  o f t -
6
re p e a te d  p led g e  o f  an  abundant, cheap tr a d e .
C lo s e ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  tr a d e  w ere In d ia n  responses to  th e
p resen ce— o r  absnece— o f  l iq u o r ,  b o th  as an item  o f  t r a d e  and as a
custom ary c o u n c il re fre s h m e n t. Both t r a d e r  jo u rn a ls  and o f f i c i a l
7
documents a t t e s t  to  th e  e a r ly  re q u e s ts  by D elaw ares f o r  l iq u o r .
What i s  s t r ik in g  i s  th e  g e n e ra l am b iva lence  among In d ia n s  o v e r th e  
use o f  rum and o th e r  form s o f  a lc o h o l.  Tamaqua c a l le d  f o r  th e  "sp ar­
in g "  s a le  o f  l iq u o r  i n  1759* t a t  two y e a rs  l a t e r  was re p o r te d  to  have 
"approved much o f  th e  P r o h ib it io n  o f  th e  S a le  o f  S p ir i tu o u s  L iq u o rs
Q
to  th e  In d ia n s ."  O th e r Ohio In d ia n  le a d e rs  a ls o  th an ked  th e  E n g lis h
f o r  "keep ing  Rum from  them" and C usta lo ga  took i t  upon h im s e lf  to
s e iz e  a t r a d e r 's  l iq u o r  i n  h is  town and "gave th e  man a  severe  b e a t -  
9
in g ."  O neida Ir o q u o is  l ik e w is e  to o k  s tep s  to  ban l i q u o r  from  t h e i r
to w n s .1® However, o th e r  In d ia n s  h e ld  d i f f e r e n t  v ie w s . Wabbicommicot,
i n f l u e n t i a l  le a d e r  o f  th e  O jibw as l i v i n g  near F o r t  N ia g a ra , asked f o r
and re c e iv e d  l iq u o r ;  and ev idence suggests th a t  A m h e rs t's  ban on rum
s a le s , once i t  began to  ta k e  e f f e c t  e a s t o f  D e t r o i t ,  caused c o n s id e r-
11a b le  unhappiness in  In d ia n  towns.
The v a r ie d  response to  l iq u o r  p o l ic ie s  r e f le c t s  s e v e ra l n a t iv e  
concerns . C i v i l  c h ie fs  and , among th e  Ir o g p o is , c la n  m atro ns , w ished  
to  p re v e n t th e  consum ption o f  l iq u o r  w h ich , by m id -c e n tu ry , had c r e a t ­
ed a  w orrisom e s o c ia l problem  in  many n a t iv e  com m unities . C u s ta lo g 's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 ^
a c t io n s , w h ile  u n u s u a l, underscored, th e  d e s ir e  by community le a d e rs  
to  keep s o c ia l ly  and ec o n o m ic a lly  d is r u p t iv e  l iq u o r  o u t o f  t h e i r  
towns. On a  more p r a c t ic a l  l e v e l ,  sober h u n te rs  and w a r r io rs  could  
more e a s i ly  be c o n t r o lle d  and le d  by th e  powers o f  p e rs u a s io n , and 
were le s s  l i k e l y  to  engage in  d is p u te s  w ith  t r ig g e r -h a p p y  s o ld ie r s  
o r  t r a d e r s .  On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  grow ing resen tm en t th a t  p a r a l l e l ­
ed th e  im p o s it io n  o f  l iq u o r  re g u la t io n s  a f t e r  1761 may have r e f l e c t ­
ed a grow ing awareness by some t h a t  th e  re g u la t io n s  s ig n a lle d  a  s h i f t  
away from  t r a d i t io n a l  p a tte rn s  o f  r e la t io n s  w h ere in  rum had been a  
common and p o p u la r ite m , b o th  f o r  t r a d e  and n e g o t ia t io n .
O f a d i f f e r e n t  n a tu re  were c o n f l ic t s  w hich a ro s e  from  th e  i n t e r ­
a c t io n  between In d ia n s  and A n g lo -A m erican s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  th e  Ohio  
c o u n try . By f a r  th e  g r e a te s t  number o f  in c id e n ts  in v o lv e d  th e  g a r ­
r is o n s  i n  th a t  re g io n  and c o n s is te d  o f  b o th  c lash es  between s o ld ie r s  
and I nd ia n s  and n a t iv e  a s s a u lts  on m i l i t a r y  p ro p e r ty , la r g e ly  in  th e  
form  o f  h o r s e th e f t .
Indian attacks on soldiers appear to have proceeded from a variety 
of causes. Drunkenness was associated with the death of at least one 
soldier at Bushy Run in May 1760, and the wounding of three Ohio Iro­
quois resulting from a drunken fracas with the Virginia garrison at
12
F o r t  Venango e a r l i e r  t h a t  y e a r . T h e f t  by In d ia n s  may a ls o  have r e ­
s u lte d  in  th e  d ea th  o f  C o rp o ra l Sweeny o f  th e  V i r g in ia  R egim ent, whose 
r i f l e  was l a t e r  found in  th e  possess io n  o f  an  Ohio Ir o q u o is . More  
common, how ever, were in c id e n ts  o f  th e  k in d  re p o r te d  n e a r P r e s q u 'i le
where an  express r i d e r  was s to p ped , had h is  weapons, am m unition , and
1^
p ro v is io n s  ta k e n , b u t was "o th e rw is e  used c i v i l y . " The express
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r i d e r 's  e x p e rie n c e  o f f e r s  a  c lu e  to  th e  m o tiv e s  behind  such a s s a u lts
in  th a t  h is  fo o d , and th e  means f o r  a c q u ir in g  m ore, were ta k e n  tout
n o th in g  e ls e .  Economic n e c e s s ity  as m o tiv e  i s  r e f le c t e d  by a n o th e r
in c id e n t  re p o r te d  by th e  commander o f  F o r t  Venango. L ie u te n a n t
F ra n c is  Gordon re p o r te d  t h a t  s e v e ra l In d ia n s  in te r c e p te d  a  group o f
s o ld ie r s  en ro u te  to  h is  p ost from  F o r t  l e  B o eu f, " f e l t  t h e i r  Nap-
sacks f o r  P ro v is io n s , found  non and l e t  them e s k ip  w ith o u t fu rd e r  
15
m o le s ta t io n ."  Y e t a n o th e r m o tiv e  appears  in  a  c o n fro n ta t io n  be­
tw een a member o f  th e  F o r t  l e  B oeuf g a r r is o n  and th re e  u n id e n t i f ie d  
In d ia n s . The s o ld ie r ,  o rd e re d  o u t h u n tin g , was acco sted  by th e  I n ­
d ia n s  who " to o k  away £ h j i s  powder horn  & b u l le t s  & t o ld  him n o t to  
come o u t th e r e  any m o r e ." ^
N a tiv e  a s s a u lts  on o r  harassm ent o f  th e  army in  th e  Ohio co un try  
may a ls o  have been prom pted in  p a r t  by s im i la r  tre a tm e n t a t  th e  hands 
o f  s o ld ie r s .  I n  t h i s  re g a rd , th e  tro o p s  seem to  have g iv e n  as w e ll  
as th e y  to o k . An Ohio Seneca was shot and k i l l e d  n e a r F o r t  Venango, 
and D elaw ares l i v i n g  n e a r th e  f o r t  com plained th rough  C usta lo ga  o f
being  " I l l - u s e d ,  by s o ld ie r s  o f  [ ] th e j  G a r r is o n , and o f te n  In s u lte d
1?by them" as w e ll  as th e  re s id e n t  t r a d e r s ."  Robbery, w i l l f u l  des­
t r u c t io n  o f  p ro p e r ty , and p h y s ic a l v io le n c e  were a ls o  p a r t  o f  th e
18
Ohio In d ia n s ' b i l l  o f  in d ic tm e n t a g a in s t th e  arm y. What i s  s t r i k ­
in g , i n  comparing th e  a c ts  com m itted by each s id e  on th e  o th e r , i s  th e  
c o n t r o l le d ,  s p e c i f ic ,  l a r g e ly  n o n -v io le n t  n a tu re  o f  In d ia n -p ro v o k e d  
c o n fro n ta t io n s . By com parison, s o ld ie r s '  a c t io n s , w hether i n  r e ­
p r is a l  o r  n o t , ten d ed  to  r e s u l t  i n  a  h ig h e r  degree  o f  p h y s ic a l abuse 
and v a n d a lis m , and does n o t ap p ear d ir e c te d  a t  a s in g le  g ro up , though
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th e  Ohio Senecas l i v i n g  n ear Venango seem to  have ta k e n  a  d is p ro ­
p o r t io n a te  sh are  o f  th e  b ru is in g .
L o c a l commanders were aware o f  th e  problem  o f  s o ld ie r - In d ia n  
c o n f l i c t s  and were e q u a lly  aware o f  th e  damage such in c id e n ts  could  
do to  f r a g i l e  A n g lo - In d ia n  r e la t io n s .  Bouquet "recommended" to  L ie u ­
te n a n t C a rre  t h a t  every  p o s s ib le  s te p  be ta k e n  to  le s s e n  th e  f r i c t i o n  
betw een lo c a l  In d ia n s  and th e  Venango g a r r is o n . C a rre  and o th e rs  
com plied  by e n fo rc in g  t h e i r  commander's o rd e rs  t h a t  a l l  s o ld ie r s  o r
dependents b e lie v e d  g u i l t y  o f  a c ts  a g a in s t In d ia n s  be s e v e re ly  p u n is h -
19ed " th o ' th e y  M ig h t a t  f i r s t  have had th e  R ig h t on t h e i r  S id e ."  As
a  r e s u l t ,  a t  le a s t  two s o ld ie r s  o f  th e  R oyal A m erican  Regim ent were
20
g iv e n  w h ipp ings f o r  t h e f t  and van d a lism . Perhaps b e l ie v in g  th a t  
th e y  had r i g h t  on t h e i r  s id e  th e s e  and o th e r  s o ld ie r s  d o u b tle s s  h a r­
bored  more b it t e r n e s s  a g a in s t  t h e i r  In d ia n  ne ig h bo rs  a f t e r  th e  la s h  
th a n  b e fo re .
I t  does n o t ap pear t h a t  th e  m o tives  t h a t  le d  In d ia n s , as  in d iv id u a ls
o r  g ro u p s , to  harass  th e  army e x p la in  th e  s o ld ie r s '  a c t io n s . When
o f f i c e r s  d iscu ssed  th e  problem  a t  a l l ,  th e y  passed i t  o f f  as th e  r e s u l t
o f  a  la c k  o f  com m unication and u n d ers ta n d in g  between t h e i r  men and I n -  
21
d ia n s . In  t h is  th e y  w ere d o u b tle s s  r i g h t .  But th e y  f a i l e d  to  men­
t i o n  th e  c h a ra c te r  o r  c o n d it io n  o f  t h e i r  tro o p s , both  o f  which made 
a c ts  o f  v io le n c e  a g a in s t fe a re d  and desp ised  In d ia n s  more l i k e l y .
F u r th e r ,  i t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  th e  s o ld ie r s  a c te d  w ith o u t p ro v o c a tio n  
i n  a l l  cases. News o f  In d ia n  t h e f t s  o f  p e rs o n a l o r  governm ent is s u e  
ite m s  from  e n l is te d  men, as  w e ll  as t h in l y  v e i le d  th r e a t s  a g a in s t  
m i l i t a r y  game p oach ers , may have prompted a  c y c le  o f  a t t a c k  and
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r e t a l i a t i o n  in  which th e  s o ld ie r s '  f e a r ,  is o l a t io n ,  and f r u s t r a t io n  
c o l l id e d  w ith  In d ia n  w a r r io r s ' p e rc e iv e d  needs, d e s ir e  to  know and 
t e s t  th e  enemy, and eq ua l f r u s t r a t i o n  b ro u g h t on by e a r l i e r  u n s e t t l ­
ed a c ts  o f  v io le n c e . Adding to  th e  a lr e a d y  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  te n s io n  be­
tw een th e  a rm y 's  s m a ll, il l-m a n a g e d  o c c u p a tio n  fo r c e  and In d ia n s  who 
had no d e s ire  to  b e a r th e  o c c u p a tio n  was th e  n a t iv e s ' p ro p e n s ity  f o r  
s te a l in g  th e  g a r r is o n s ' l i v e s t o c k ,  e s p e c ia l ly  h o rs e s .
I n  h is  study o f  th e  P otaw atom is , a n th ro p o lo g is t  James C l i f t o n  
noted  b r i e f l y  th a t  th e s e  In d ia n s , and presum ably o th e rs  l i v i n g  south  
o f  th e  G re a t L akes , had begun to  in c o rp o ra te  horses  in t o  t h e i r  te c h ­
n o lo g ic a l a rs e n a ls  i n  s u b s ta n t ia l  numbers by th e  m id d le  o f  th e  e ig h t ­
een th  c e n tu ry . He adds t h a t  p re v io u s  c o n ta c t w ith  h orses  used by 
European s o ld ie r s ,  s e t t l e r s ,  and t r a d e r s  a llo w e d  th e  P otaw atom is to  
e a s i ly  absorb  t h is  ite m  o f  w estern  c u ltu r e  in to  t h e i r  own s o c ie t ie s .
I n  so d o in g , th e  h orse  began to  cause changes i n  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  p a t­
te r n s  ju s t  as th e  m usket, s t e l l  t r a p ,  and o th e r  European c u l t u r a l
22artifacts did in other aspects of native life.
Evidence from the Ohio country in the early 1760 s suggests that 
the same pattern was emerging in that region, though as yet no study 
has focused specifically on the role of the horse or other domesticated 
animals in Ohio Indian society. The fact remains, however, that Ohio 
Indians clearly sought horses and went to some lengths, and risks, 
to obtain them. The lack of any other source of this animal led in­
terested natives to appropriate them from the region’s biggest potential 
supplier: the army. From the Indians' perspective, the result was
the transfer of many horses to native communities under conditions
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t h a t  would n o t n e c e s s a r ily  have been lo o ked  upon a s  d is h o n e s t. From 
th e  a rm y 's  p o in t  o f  v ie w , In d ia n  h o r s e th e f t  q u ic k ly  grew  to  ep idem ic  
p ro p o rt io n s  and th re a te n e d  n o t o n ly  th e  a rm y 's  a b i l i t y  to  su pp ly  i t ­
s e l f ,  b u t served  as both  an  in s u l t  and a  c o n s ta n t re m in d e r o f  th e  
r e l a t i v e  ease w ith  which In d ia n s  co u ld  v io l a t e  a  g a r r is o n 's  s e c u r ity .  
The r e s u l t  was a  f u r t h e r  e s c a la t io n  o f  te n s io n  and a  grow ing m i l i t a r y  
d is t r u s t  o f  In d ia n s .
I t  i s  a ls o  p o s s ib le  t h a t  s te a l in g  horses and o th e r  army l i v e ­
s to c k  p re s e n te d  w a r r io rs  w ith  an o p p o rtu n ity  b o th  to  g a in  s ta tu s  a t  
home and to  t e s t  th e  re a c t io n s  o f  th e  in v a d e rs . I f  horses  were be­
coming a more im p o rta n t e lem ent in  n a t iv e  s o c ie ty , a s  th e  s t e a d i ly  
in c reas in g - e f f o r t s  to  o b ta in  them su g g es t, th o se  who o b ta in e d  o r  own­
ed them would be a t  an  economic and, p erh aps , p o l i t i c a l  ad van tage . 
H orse t h e f t  a ls o  dem onstrated  th e  e x te n t to  w hich s o ld ie r s  would r e ­
a c t  to  th r e a ts  w h ile  h and icapp ing  th e  a rm y 's  a b i l i t y  to  move and  
su pp ly  i t s e l f .  F in a l l y ,  h orse  t h e f t  may, in  many cas e s , n o t have  
been t h e f t  a t  a l l ,  b u t a p p r o p r ia t io n  o f  a n im a ls  d e f in e d  by In d ia n s  
as  s tra y s  o r  s to ck  which was g ra z in g  on p ro p e r ty  c la im ed  by n a t iv e  
f a m i l i e s .  I n  such cases , th e  horses became f r e e  f o r  th e  ta k in g  o r  
payment f o r  th e  use o f  In d ia n  p a s tu ra g e . I n  any e v e n t, Ohio In d ia n s  
soon le a rn e d  how th e  army chose to  resp o nd . O rders  w ent o u t to  shoot 
on s ig h t  any In d ia n  caught a tte m p tin g  to  ta k e  l iv e s t o c k .  The e f f e c t
o f  t h is  o rd e r  a t  P it ts b o r o  in  1759 i s  suggested by C o lo n e l M e rc e r 's
23o b s e rv a tio n  t h a t  lo s s e s  d e c lin e d  once th e  word g o t around .
Though w estern  In d ia n s  began v o ic in g  c o m p la in ts  ab ou t th e  n a tu re  
o f  t h e i r  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  A ng lo -A m erican s , th e y  d id  so in  a  l i m i t ­
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ed way. Prom the natives' point of view, the conflicts between In­
dians and soldiers grew out of the need to know the occupying forces 
and the need for items which the army in abundance. In either case 
Indian depredations were limited and controlled, more so than the 
army's response. In addition, little was said before 1761 about issues 
which became paramount two years later! land and the overall mean­
ing of English policies to native independence anc continued security. 
Indian speeches and actions between 1758 and 1761 represented the 
natives' initial response to a piece-meal, somewhat confused and hap­
hazard Anglo-American effort to organize and control the west. Char­
acteristically, most of the tension evident in these years arose in 
the Ohio country where the greatest number of troops and traders still 
resided. Between I76I and the end of 1762, however, the level of con­
cern and discontent among western Indians increased and spread be­
yond the Ohio River as more natives began to interpret Anglo-American 
actions in ways which began to limit options and preclude the continuance 
of peace on English terms.
The period from early 1761 through the end of 1762 saw a signifi­
cant increase in the level of Indian dissatisfaction with Anglo-Ameri­
can behavior. Further, as royal agents attempted to extend their gov­
ernment's control over the west, Indian concerns broadened to embrace 
issues and problems not previously expressed. Finally, the geographic 
scope of native unrest widened to include by the end of 1762 parts or 
all of the Indians living in the trans-Appalachian region. However, 
native responses to Anglo-American policies and actions tended to re­
main varied both in kind and intensity, reflecting local or regional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3^6
concerns, geographic location, and inter-societal relations. In 
each case the goal remained the same* to respond to the new realities 
brought about by English military success while at the same time pre­
serving native autonomy and a system of inter-cultural relations that 
worked toward that end.
Complaints about the trading system continued, and spread to the 
Great Lakes as traders, followed tardily by regulatory orders, moved 
west. Prices and the quality of merchandise continued to rankle In­
dian customers such as the Shawnees, who "made great Complaints in
the Name of all the Indians of the dearness of the Merchants Goods &
Zkthe low Price that was set on their Furs." Significantly, the em­
phasis began to shift from the traditional and perpetual haggling 
over prices and quality control to the nature of the new trading system 
itself. Indian consumers were acutely sensitive to changes in the manner 
of trade, particularly when it appeared to work against them or, worse, 
seemed to symbolize an English determination to subordinate them. As 
Amherst's and Johnson's regulations became known in the west, so the 
level of native discontent with the new system grew. As early as May
1761, Captain Campbell at Detroit reported that Indians from his vicinity
2*5were all going to Niagara "where there is noe control on selling Rum." 
More important from the Indians' perspective was the order restrict­
ing traders to armed posts. While Anglo-American diplomats tried to 
explain this as a precaution against the French, by mid-1761 many west­
ern Indians were unwilling to accept such specious explanations. Trader 
Robert Callendar experienced first hand the displeasure of Sandusky 
Wyandots who complained "because I would not sell them goods, as I
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had. formerly been a Dealler amongst them." At Fort Pitt, Bouquet 
also observed the Indians' sensitivity on this matter, noting that 
local Delawares and Iroquois "do not complain of anything, except 
that the Traders are not permitted to go to their Towns." He added 
that the Shawnees and traders were so eager to return to the old system 
that the latter were willing to overlook previous abuses at Shawnee 
hands in order to go to their towns. Bouquet refused.
The difference between the pre-war and post-1758 trading systems 
lay at the heart of these complaints. Prior to the Seven Years' War, 
traders, both English and French, had gone directly to Indian custom­
ers or operated out of posts, such as Michilimackinac, which were more 
trading communities than military establishments. Not only was this 
system convenient for Indian hunters, it also placed the principal 
trade encounter in a native-controlled environment. English regulations 
threatened to destroy this system which had accommodated those on both 
sides of the counter for nearly a century. By having to go to the 
posts to trade, Indians .experienced inconveniences and, in times of 
acute shortages of food and ammunition, real hardship as well. In ad­
dition, not all the former French trading posts were to be occupied 
under the English system. Further, given the general level of tension 
between soldiers and Indians and the decidedly military character of 
the posts after 1?58, trading at these establishments may have appear­
ed doubly undesirable. While all of this threatened western Indians' 
economic well-being, the impact went much farther. The Shawnees from
the Scioto River complained to Robert Callendar that the English "did
27not look upon them as brothers & friends."
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Closely associated with growing Indian resistance to the im­
position of a new trading system was the impact of Amherst's policy 
governing gifts and the sale of ammunition to he natives. Before 
1761 this had not been an issue in exchanges between western Indians 
and royal officials; as long as the English foothold in the west was 
uncertain and the war with France continued, the flow of goods was 
likewise guaranteed. However, events in I76O and the general's attempt 
to re-define the nature of Indian relations generated unrest on this 
matter as well. The Iroquois living at Conawango demanded ammunition 
as compensation for the inconveniences associated with English troops
in their country, especially as the army had established itself "in ye
28hart of our Cuntry & on ye Warrers Road." The Indians' expectation 
of payment for the appropriation or use of their territory and the in­
conveniences suffered by the cutting of the main avenue to the Carolinas 
was perfectly reasonable from the natives' point of view and in keep­
ing with traditional practices. The increasing reluctance of the 
army to honor such practices and its apparent determination to appro­
priate whatever it needed did little to lessen native fears concerning 
ultimate Anglo-American intentions. Though not yet widespread, re­
sentment over the colonists’ and army's reluctance to act in acceptable 
ways was growing, as the Detroit commander confirmed when, in early 
June 1761, he spoke of the necessity of maintaining a strong guard
over his post due to the Indians' discontent, partly rooted in the 
29lack of gifts. Adding to this was the increased native demand for
ammunition at a time when the English were less willing to meet that 
30
demand. Confronted with decreased English generosity, an unfavor-
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able trade system that necessitated the collection of more pelts that 
earned fewer goods, and renewed warfare to the south, warriors and 
their village leaders were hard pressed to keep themselves properly 
armed and their families clothed, fed, and protected. The added ne­
cessity for some of traveling greater distances to trade also tended 
to exhaust ammunition, expended in hunting along the way. Finally, 
the English practice of supplying south-bound war parties but not 
those coming home added to the economic burden as well as the negative 
image of Anglo-Americans developing in many native minds.
As the; army and its camp followers moved into the west, Indians,
particularly in the Ohio country, were forced to confront and deal
with new and far more ominous threats to their security. As early
as December 1759 Indians living in the vicinity of Pittsboro were,
according to George Groghan, "very Jealous seeing a large Fort build- 
31
ing here." That jealousy increased as the former French outposts 
at Venango, le Boeuf, and Presqu'ile were re-built and occupied by 
redcoats during the summer and fall of 1760. While direct evidence 
is lacking to indicate precisely how local Indians interpreted this 
activity, their actions leave little doubt as to their feelings. It 
was this chain of Ohio forts, more than any others in the west, that 
witnessed harassment of troops, livestock theft, and more violent con­
frontations between soldiers and Indians. Underlying these incidents 
appears to have been the Indians' growing resentment of English troops 
in their midst, especially since a similar French menace had only re­
cently been removed.
More disturbing still was the construction of new forts where
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
350
none had been b e fo re . I n  p a r t i c u la r ,  A m h ers t's  p la n  to  f o r t i f y  San­
dusky as a  w a y -s ta t io n  f o r  convoys moving between N ia g a ra  and De­
t r o i t ,  met w ith  p r o te s ts  and th r e a ts  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n  from, n e ig h b o r-  
32in g  Wyandots. A s id e  from  t h e i r  d is l ik e  o f  armed Englishm en in  t h e i r
m id s t , th e  Wyandots were exp ress in g  concern o ver a la r g e r  is s u e  th a t
touched o th e r  In d ia n s  as w e l l .  Sandusky stood a s t r id e  th e  m a jo r e a s t -
west t r a i l  l in k in g  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  and Ohio In d ia n s  w ith  th e  v i l la g e s
a t  D e t r o i t  and th e  u pp er G re a t Lakes . An E n g lis h  f o r t  th e re  posed
p o t e n t ia l ly  severe  problem s s in c e  i t  would a llo w  th e  army to  c u t
t r a f f i c  on th e  o ld  and w e l l - t r a v e l le d  ro ad .
The Wyandots o f  Sandusky responded by p ro te s t in g  to  Amherst who,
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ,  in s is te d  t h a t  th e  f o r t  be b u i l t .  L e f t  to  t h e i r
own d e v ic e s , th e  Wyandots a tte m p te d  to  e x a c t a t  le a s t  a to ken  r e n t  f o r
t h e i r  la n d  from  L ie u te n a n t  E l ia s  M eyer. A ccording  to  t h a t  o f f i c e r ,
t h is  c o n s is te d  o f  h is  be ing  " f r e t t e d "  by In d ia n s  p re s s in g  him f o r
" G i f t s ,  P ro v is io n s  &c which he had not to  g iv e  them ." He d id  n o t f a i l
to  n o te  th e  In d ia n s ' "uneas iness" o ver th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  th e  b lo c k -
33house t h a t  became F o r t  Sandusky. R ebuffed  o r a t  le a s t  l e f t  d is ­
s a t is f ie d  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  o b ta in  com pensation, th e  Wyandots a tte m p t­
ed to  accommodate w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e  w orking to  convince  th e  tro o p s  
to  le a v e . A f t e r  some d i f f i c u l t y ,  M eyer bought meat f o r  h is  hungry men, 
though i s  successor was l e f t  to  c o n fro n t s t i l l  sm oldering  Wyandot r e ­
sen tm ent. A t a  c o u n c il w ith  th e  In d ia n s , Ensign P a u l i  was t o ld  by 
"a head o f  Coonuduth Town^SanduskyJ" t h a t  h e ' l l  have i t £ t h e  f o r t j
34
b u rn t in  th e  S p rin g  when th e  houndersj^huntersj Gomes home." The 
t h r e a t  was n o t made good perhaps because, as P a u l i  n o ted , " th e  r e s t
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o f  th e  N a tio n s  a re  v e ry  q u i£ e j t  and most o f  th e  young men h erab ou ts
35are gone to ware against the Cherokees. Such circumstances may 
have precluded any immediate action against Sandusky although in 
1763 the Wyandots wasted no time in burning the troublesome post.
Making m a tte rs  worse f o r  th e  Ohio In d ia n s  was th e  s im ultan eo us  
in v a s io n  o f  t h e i r  la n d s  by peop le  who, by t r e a t y  and re p e a te d  p ro ­
m ises , th e  E n g lis h  were o b lig a te d  to  keep  o u t o f  th e  re g io n . I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  d e te rm in e  e i t h e r  when o r  th e  e x te n t to  which A ng lo -A m erican  
h u n te rs  and s e t t le r s  began m ig ra t in g  in to  th e  re g io n  i n  numbers s u f­
f i c i e n t  to  prompt a n a t iv e  r e a c t io n . Judging from  th o se  r e a c t io n s ,  
t h is  in v a s io n  had reached  a la rm in g  p ro p o rt io n s  by m i d - f a l l  17 6 1 .
From Redstone Greek British Sergeant McDonald reported "Crowds of 
Hunters" moving into the Monongahela valley in October. At the same 
time, Bouquet mentioned "repeated Complaints from the Indians" about 
the hunters who were competing with natives for the limited game in 
the area. It was this increased volume of Indian complaints that 
eventually led Bouquet to drive squatters out of the Ohio country.
Beyond the verbal protests registered at Fort Pitt, the Indians most 
affected by this invasion, Shawnees and Ohio Iroquois, took no action 
on the matter before 1762. The season may help account for this, as 
it did the failure of the Sandusky Wyandots to drive the English from 
that post. By late October villages were already making arrangements 
for winter hunts. Finally, although direct evidence is lacking, civil 
leaders may have continued to influence more volatile warriors and 
restrain them from any overtly hostile action.
Although the construction or re-occupation of forts and the
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appearance of colonists eager for land posed real and serious threats 
to the Ohio Indians, the Indians in the Great Lakes region were not 
similarly affected. In the first place, distance and lack of Anglo- 
American interest rendered the region immune from settlement. While 
French villages did exist at most of the larger trading posts through­
out the west, they had long been integrated into the bi-cultural social 
and economic system that had developed since the seventeenth century. 
Further, with the exception of the Niagara portage, the British army 
had as yet been unable to realize plans to occupy the western posts. 
Finally, the small garrisons which, by late fall l?6l, had been able 
to take over some of the former French posts, posed no serious threat 
to the security of the Indians living near them. The Great Lakes In­
dians undoubtedly recognized what the local English commanders were 
painfully aware of, that isolated twenty-man garrisons could be easily 
intimidated or destroyed by the vastly superior native population.
What may have given Great Lakes Indians cause for concern, however, 
was the sudden increase in military activity on the lakes beginning 
in mid-summer 1761. From July to October British forces under Major 
Henry Gladwin, numbering nearly four hundred men, travelled the upper 
Great Lakes and completed their occupation by establishing posts at 
St. Joseph, Michilimackinac, La Baye, Miamis, and Ouiatanon. This 
and the corresponding increase in supply traffic to and from these 
posts may have raised native suspicions about English intentions even 
as Sir William Johnson, speaking for Amherst and the royal government,
was at Detroit addressing western Indians in terms of peace and friend- 
37ship.
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Johnson's t r i p  to  th e  w est and th e  numerous m eetin gs  he h e ld  
a lo n g  th e  way co n firm ed  what E n g lis h  a g en ts  had been h e a rin g  from  th e  
In d ia n s . I t  a ls o  ra is e d  th e  a d d i t io n a l  is s u e  o f  th e  Covenant Chain  
and th e  r o le  o f  v a r io u s  w e s te rn  In d ia n  groups in  i t .  F in a l l y ,  th e  
t r i p  and th e  d ip lom acy t h a t  emerged from  i t  o f f e r  c lu e s  to  th e  p a r t i ­
c u la r  responses o f  w e s te rn  In d ia n s  to  th e  em erging E n g lis h  program  
f o r  th e  w est.
Johnson 's t r i p  was in te n d e d  to  " s e t t l e  and e s ta b lis h  a f i r m  and 
la s t in g  t r e a ty "  w ith  th e  In d ia n s  a t  D e t r o i t  and w ith  o th e r  w estern  
groups who had e a r l i e r  p a r t ic ip a t e d  in  c o u n c ils  a t  F o r t  P i t t .  I n  ad­
d i t i o n ,  th e  s u p e r in te n d e n t hoped to  d e fu se  grow ing In d ia n  resen tm ent
o f  th e  t r a d in g  system , and in tro d u c e  r e g u la t io n s  to  govern  th e  s e v e ra l
38
w estern  posts  as  w e l l  as answ er In d ia n  c o m p la in ts . L a s t ly ,  as John­
son subsequently  e x p la in e d  to  h is  s u p e r io rs , h is  d ip lo m a t ic  e f f o r t s  
were in te n d e d  to  c re a te  a  new E n g lis h -c e n te re d  In d ia n  a l l ia n c e  a t  De­
t r o i t  to  o f f s e t  th e  power o f  th e  League Iro q u o is  and th e  Ohio In d ia n s ,  
an a l l ia n c e  which he hoped would p la c e  th e  E n g lis h  a t  th e  c e n te r  o f
39power in  th e  west th ro u gh  an ad ep t p o l ic y  o f  d iv id e  and r u le .  Though 
t h is  was never announced to  th e  In d ia n s  in v o lv e d , Johnson 's  p la n s  were 
obvious enough to  th e  Ir o q u o is  to  cause them no s m a ll measure o f  con­
c e rn . At a  m eetin g  w ith  Johnson a t  F o r t  N ia g a ra  in  l a t e  J u ly ,  Onon­
daga sachems t o ld  him th e y  w ere " s u rp r iz e d  to  f in d  you a re  go ing  to  
c a l l  a C ou n c il a t  D e t r o i t ,  as  you know th e  C h ie f , and th e  o n ly  C ou n c il 
l i r e  burns a t  y o u r house, e x c e p tin g  t h a t  which we have a t  Onondaga." 
They f u r t h e r  rem inded  J0hnson t h a t ,  as  ag gressors  in  th e  l a s t  w ar, 
th e  w estern  In d ia n s  sh ou ld  p ro p e r ly  come to  him , by way o f  th e  S ix
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HoN a tio n s . T h is  concern  ab ou t th e  s ta tu s  o f  th e  Ir o q u o is  in  th e
E n g lis h  scheme f o r  th e  west was in c re a s e d  by th e  tre a tm e n t th e  S ix
N a tio n s  had re c e iv e d  s in c e  th e  f a l l  o f  Canada. A t t h i s  and e a r l i e r
m e e tin g s , Mohawks, O neidas , and Onondagas had a l l  r e g is te r e d  c o m p la in ts
about th e  u n f r ie n d ly  b e h a v io r  o f  s o ld ie r s ,  t r a d e r s ,  and la n d  s p e c u la to rs ,
a l l  o f  which was making them "uneasy ,"  e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  such in c id e n ts
f le w  in  th e  fa c e  o f  Johnson 's  e a r l i e r  and re p e a te d  prom ises o f  f a i r
H i
d e a lin g s  and co n tin u ed  b r o th e r ly  r e la t io n s .  T h is  and Johnson 's  d is ­
tu rb in g  r e f u s a l  to  a c c e p t " th e  A n t ie n t  Custom s u b s is t in g  between you 
and th e  f i v e  N a tio n s  o f  im m e d ia te ly  co nd o lin g  w ith  each o th e r  on any  
m ischance"— i n  t h is  in s ta n c e  th e  d e a th  o f  a  German fa rm e r a t  th e  hands 
o f  an O neida— suggested a  s h i f t  i n  A ng lo -A m erican  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  
b oth  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  and th e  Covenant C hain , re c o g n it io n  o f  which was
made when th e  Onondagas p ro te s te d  Johnson 's u np reced en ted  s te p  o f  g o -  
HZin g  to  D e t r o i t .
I n  r e p ly ,  Johnson e x p la in e d  t h a t  "Our Conquests in  t h is  C ountry  
b e in g  a t  p re s e n t v e ry  c o n s id e ra b le  o u r tra d e  and a l l ia n c e s  must o f  
course  be more e x te n s iv e  th a n  h e r e to fo r e ."  As a  r e s u l t ,  new c o u n c il 
f i r e s  would have to  be e s ta b lis h e d  in  o rd e r to  "S tre n g th e n  th e  Ex­
te n s iv e  A l l ia n c e  which c o n tin u e s  to  encrease by th e  a c q u is i t io n  o f  
N a tio n s , who a r e  d a i ly  coming in t o ,  and u n i t in g  them selves  w ith  u s ."
The "us" may have g iv e n  th e  S ix  Na t io n s  some c o n s o la tio n  as  to  t h e i r  
fu t u r e  r o le  in  th e  Covenant C hain . However, to  Johnson th e  Ir o q u o is  
had been reduced  in  im po rtance  as th e  lo c u s  o f  E n g lis h  in t e r e s t  and 
power in  N o rth  A m erica s h if t e d  from Onondaga to  D e t r o i t  and th e  Ohio  
c o u n try , re g io n s  where Ir o q u o is  in f lu e n c e  was a t  b e s t o f  l im i t e d  v a lu e .
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A t N ia g a ra , w h ile  a w a it in g  h is  s u p p lie s  and e s c o r t  to  be p o rta g e d , 
Johnson h e ld  m eetings  w ith  lo c a l  O jib w as  and Senecas. Each group  em­
p h a s ize d  t h a t  a  la c k  o f  am m unition was le a d in g  to  economic h a rd s h ip . 
W abbicommicot, spokesman f o r  th e  M is s is s a u g a s , t o ld  th e  s u p e r in te n ­
d e n t t h a t  h is  peop le  were u n ab le  to  p ro v id e  f o r  th em selves  "by reason  
o f  t h e i r  be in g  d eb arred  th e  l i b e r t y  o f  purchas in g  am m unition  to  k i l l  
game f o r  t h e i r  c a rry in g  on o f  t r a d e ."  He added a  re q u e s t f o r  to o ls  
and te c h n ic a l a s s is ta n c e  from  th e  f o r t ' s  gunsm ith  and lo c k s m ith .  
Wabbicommicot a ls o  "asked th e  reaso n  f o r  so many Men, & so much a r ­
t i l l e r y  p ass in g  b y ."
L o c a l Senecas, le d  by S onajoana, made s im i la r  re q u e s ts . In  ad­
d i t i o n ,  th e y  expressed i r r i t a t i o n  o v e r th e  t h e f t  o f  s e v e ra l o f  t h e i r  
horses  by s o ld ie r s  from  th e  f o r t  and g re a t  concern  o v e r  th e  d ea th s  o f  
Senecas a t  th e  hands o f  th e  F o r t  Venango g a r r is o n . Johnson was t o ld  
t h a t  th e s e  death s  had so u p se t th e  Ohio Senecas th a t  many o f  them had 
removed to  th e  Genesee towns, com m unities t h a t  q u ic k ly  g a in e d  a r e -
h.K
p u ta t io n  as  th e  c e n te r  o f  a n t i - E n g l is h  a c t i v i t y  among th e  Ir o q u o is .
A r r iv in g  a t  D e t r o i t  on Septem ber 3» Johnson was m et and welcom­
ed by a Wyandot d e le g a t io n  on b e h a lf  o f  th e  o th e r  c o u n c il p a r t ic ip a n ts .  
The In d ia n s  assem bled, num bering ab ou t f i v e  hundred p e o p le , in c lu d in g  
elem ents o f  th e  D e t r o i t  towns p lu s  M iam is , K ickap oo s , and O ttaw as and 
O jib w as  from  th e  Saginaw Bay v i c i n i t y .  I n  a d d i t io n ,  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
o f  th e  Ohio In d ia n s  le d  by Tamaqua and Mohawks who had accompanied  
th e  s u p e r in te n d e n t were i n  a tte n d e n c e . George Groghan, who had a r ­
r iv e d  ahead o f  h is  s u p e r io r , had p a r t ic ip a te d  in  p r e l im in a r y  m eetings  
w h ere in  th e  D elaw ares had met w ith  and encouraged th e  Wyandots to  con-
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time their efforts to establish peace with the English.
Having established the proper atmosphere for discussions by con­
dolences and formal exchanges of greetings, Johnson and his hosts pro­
ceeded to the main task of "renewing the old Covenant Chain" and con-
hn
firming the peace agreements made the previous year on the Ohio.
Johnson repeated the ritual promises of trade and English protection 
of native lands while reminding his audience that the war with France 
had been waged as much for the Indians' benefit as for that of the
48colonists. Symbolizing the new peace and the renewed Covenant Chain,
the superintendent also lit a new council fire, making Detroit the
center of Anglo-Indian relations in the west as well as underscoring
his own authority as director of England's Indian affairs in the region.
With this act went new pledges of friendship to those who took hold of
the Chain, a friendship to be sealed by "an extensive commerce on the
50most Equitable terms." In this act as in his other proceedings at 
Detroit, Johnson was quickly seconded by the Mohawk delegation led by 
the sachem Nickus from Canajoharie, the town with which Johnson enjoy­
ed the closest personal and political ties. Nickus' presence and 
participation served both Mohawk and English ends. His voice appear­
ed to lend Six Nations support to Johnson's diplomacy while at the 
same time underscoring the Mohawks' special relationship with the En­
glish. Nickus made a special point of this, telling the western In­
dians that "We are the Door of the six Nations" through which the
51westerners should step in order to deal with their new English allies.
In a lengthy and measured reply, the Detroit Indians offered 
their own conditions for continued peace. Speaking through the Wy-
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andot sachem Anaiasa, they accepted Johnson's offer of an alliance 
and the Covenant Chain, hut expressed the hope that "on your parts 
you will . . . never forget the Words you have now made use of, but 
that you will send us a plenty of goods, & that at a Cheaper rate 
than we have hitherto been able to procure them." Having thus es­
tablished the basis for friendship, Anaiasa moved to another point.
He apologized for the horse thefts prevalent at some of the posts, 
noting that it was not sanctioned by community leaders. Taking the 
offensive, he pointed out that "Many of our people having been fre­
quently abused as well by the Soldiers, as Inhabitants of this place, 
we therefore entreat you to take the same into your consideration & 
prevent them from so doing for the future." He then punctuated his 
reply with a complaint about both the high price and scarcity of 
trade goods, especially ammunition; the lack of which meant that "we
must shortly be obliged to leave off hunting entirely," a circumstance
52undesirable to Indians and Anglo-American traders.
Anaiasa's remarks were supported by both the Detroit Ottawas and 
Wabbicommicot, speaking for his own Mississaugas and other Ojibwas 
from Detroit and Saginaw Bay. Confirming his own group's intention 
to remain at peace, the Ottawa, speaker Macatepilesis made a point to 
define the basis of the Anglo-Indian relationship. Recounting the 
process that had led to the present council, he told Johnson that, 
since the Fort Pitt meetings, "we have begun to look upon you as
53Friends."
As the last official act of the council, Johnson delivered a 
large present as confirmation of the peace that now existed between
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the Great Lakes Indians and the English. At the same time he attempt­
ed to turn native relations to English advantage. He told the Wyandots 
that "he looked upon them as the head of the Ottawa Confederacy, for 
which reason he had lighted up a Council fire at the Detroit." In 
return for this mark of esteem, J0hnson hoped they would "take care 
to keep it £the confederacy] in good order, and not neglect their 
friends and Allies." He then dismissed them with a "rpivate present."^ 
No record of the Wyandots' reply remains other than that they promis­
ed to consider what the superintendent had said. Their status as pub­
lic spokesmen for the Detroit Indians was recognized at any rate and 
did not depend on Johnson's approval. The latter's action may also 
have represented an act of intimidation since, by implication, he 
could have chosen to bestow England's favor on another group, thus 
threatening the Wyandots* historic position as well as sowing the seeds 
of jealousy and discord within the Detroit community. As earlier En­
glish and French practice and Johnson's subsequent remarks on the coun­
cil suggest, both possibilities probably crossed his mind.
The Detroit council revealed both the particular concerns felt 
by Great Lakes Indians and the basis upon which they were willing to 
maintain peace with the Anglo-Americans. Absent was any public con­
cern about land and little complaint about treatment accorded natives 
by English soldiers who, even after the occupation of the west was 
substantially completed, were few and widely scattered. What interest­
ed the Detroit Indians most was trade and the manner in which relations 
with the English would be conducted. Given high prices, shortages of 
ammunition, and a scarcity of necessary goods and services due to the
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war, it is understandable that questions of trade took precedence. 
Beyond economic interests, however, lay the symbolic nature of trade 
and diplomacy. As Macatepilesis suggested, the western Indians would 
accept the Anglo-Americans as friends— that is, as equals. The Anglo- 
Americans were expected to return the favor through, among other things, 
the creation of a fair trade system, honoring traditional practices, 
and giving the natives no cause to fear for either their personal 
security or property.
Also absent from the dialogue was any concerted Indian reaction 
to the increased military activity on the Great Lakes. Johnson avoid­
ed any mention of the conquest of Canada beyond the fact that the 
French posts were now English and the garrisons posted to protect 
commerce. But as Wabbicommicot's inquiry at Niagara suggests, the 
future of the region was on the Indians' minds. The natives were told 
that troops were necessary since the war with France was not yet over. 
Explanations of this sort may have led to the assumption that the 
issue of which Europeans would eventually remain in the west was still 
in doubt, prompting appropriately cautious responses.
At the same time, however, the British army was doing little to 
allay whatever mute suspicions western Indians harbored. Captain 
Henry Balfour of the SO’*-*1 Regiment of Foot had been ordered to lead 
the reinforcements and their escort to the posts beyond Detroit.
Leaving that post on September 9> the same day the Indian council be­
gan, Balfour's detachment rowed north and west through the lakes, de­
positing garrisons at Fort St. Joseph and Fort Michilimackinac. At 
the latter post, Balfour met and talked with the Ottawas and Ojibwas
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from Mackinac, 1'Arbre Groche, and Manitoulin Island who, apparent­
ly, were not directly involved in the Detroit negotiations. He an­
nounced at the outset that he had "nothing but good things to say" 
to the assembly, but then proceeded with little tact to say things 
that were not so good. Balfour made no secret of the fact that the 
English had "conquered, and are become emtirely Masters of the Domin­
ions of the King of France in Canada." While no western Indian would 
have admitted that he or his lands were part of the French domain, 
Balfour's statement must have given his listeners cause to wonder
55about English intentions.
Though Balfour was quick to assure the Ottawas and Ojibwas that 
the soldiers had come to guarantee fair trade, his response to native 
requests for economic assistance was less than gratifying. While to 
the Indians such requests seemed not unreasonable given prevailing 
shortages, Balfour belittled them, blaming shortages and the generally 
poor local economy on intemperance and laziness. In reply to the 
Delaware who spoke for the Ojibwas, the captain told them they did not 
deserve the name of men "because you prefer a little Rum to your old 
people, your wives, ana your Children. You foolishly expend what you 
have, without ever considering that those who remain in your Villages 
are perishing of hunger." However true Balfour's observation may have 
been in particular cases, it stung his audience, men who, in straiten­
ed circumstances, were struggling to overcome the recent loss of several
56
important leaders. Adding insult to injury, Balfour agreed to give
57them aid "Thou' you do not Merit |_itj." The grudging manner in 
which their new "friends" met requests for aid, in addition to Balfour's
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Balfour's behavior may have made an already bad situation worse. 
Trader Alexander Henry had arrived at Michilimackinac from Montreal 
a month before the troops. Taken first before the Ojibwa leader 
Minavavana(le Grand Saulteux), Henry was left in no doubt cf the con­
tinued hostility of the Mackinac Ojibwas toward the English and their
expectation that the latter would treat them with equity in the custom- 
58
ary manner. At the same time, Henry learned that the Ojibwas wel­
comed an opportunity to trade, the war having left the, "in much want."' 
Aided by his Canadian guides, the trader was able to initiate trade 
and satisfy the Ojibwas as to his good intentions. His reception by 
the Ottawas of l'Arbre Croche was markedly different., with less hos­
tility and a more immediate interest in trade. Even so, the Indians
laid down the rules of exchange and credit and gave Henry no choice 
60but compliance. In each case, Henry's encounter revealed serious 
concerns held by the Indians, paramount of which were their determin­
ation to stand as independent people equal to the English, their in­
sistence on not being included in any capitulation of Canada, and a 
need for goods— both for economic reasons and as signs that the English 
would be willing to play by the rules and acknowledge regional power 
arrangements as defined by the natives. Balfour's proceedings could 
not have removed much of the latent hostility and tension that Henry's 
earlier meetings revealed.
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Great Lakes Indian responses to English diplomatic overtures and 
efforts to occupy the region are another illustration of one kind of 
strategy that emerged for dealing with the Anglo-American invasion. 
Like their counterparts in the Ohio country between 1758 and 1761, 
Great Lakes Indians chose to negotiate, to define the conditions on 
which peace and friendship could be built, and to guage the Anglo- 
American response to see if deeds matched words. Furthermore, the 
still uncertain fate of the French in North America and the small 
number of soldiers and colonists actually in the region— even after 
X'einforcements reached the western posts— made a conservative response 
possible and necessary.
To the east, however, the situation was different. Increasing 
disillusionment with Anglo-American behavior generated, by late 
1761, a more hostile response. The Seneca war belts which circulated 
in mid-176l demonstrated that even then some Indians on the Ohio and 
lower Great Lakes were beginning to see warfare rather than accommoda­
tion as the likeliest way of dealing with the Anglo-American invasion. 
The response of Indians outside the Ohio country to this call for war 
also illustrates further the extent to which regional and local issues, 
rather than a sense of "pan-Indianism", influenced decision making.
News of the war belts first came from Captain Campbell at De­
troit, who first learned of them about June 16 when they arrived at 
Detroit in the care of two Ohio Senecas, Tahiadoris and Kayahsota.^1 
Campbell's initial Information, quickly forwarded to Amherst, was in­
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com plete and vague, and d e r iv e d  from  lo c a l  F rench  s e t t l e r s .  A ccord­
in g  to  th e  c a p ta in , th e  b e lts  came from  th e  S ix  N a tio n s  and re p re ­
sen ted  a  p la n  to  o verth ro w  th e  E n g lis h , one t h a t  r e p o r te d ly  embraced 
" a l l  th e  In d ia n s  from  th e  Baye o f  G asp ie  to  th e  I l l i n o i s . "  The 
two Senecas in te n d e d  to  h o ld  a c o u n c il a t  Sandusky w ith  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  
from  th e  D e t r o i t  v i l la g e s  as  w e l l  as  D elaw ares and Shawnees from  th e  
Ohio co u n try  among whom, a c c o rd in g  to  C a m p b e ll's  so u rces , was Tamaqua. 
Subsequent e f f o r t s  by Campbell to  s to p  th e  Senecas a tte m p t to  e n l is t  
w estern  In d ia n  support and in q u ie r ie s  made by Johnson and o th e rs  r e ­
v e a l much about both th e  sources o f  h o s t i l i t y  and th e  n a tu re  o f  In ­
d ia n  in t e r - s o c ie t a l  r e la t io n s .
C a m p b e ll's  success in  le a r n in g  th e  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  p la n s  th e  b e lts  
re p re s e n te d  and th e  reasons t h a t  le d  to  t h e i r  c i r c u la t io n  was due in  
p a r t  to  h is  own t im e ly  know ledge o f  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  th e  Senecas. Armed 
w ith  in fo rm a tio n  s u p p lie d  by F rench  in t e r p r e t e r s ,  he re v e a le d  h is  ex­
te n s iv e , i f  s t i l l  in c o m p le te , know ledge to  th e  D e t r o i t  Wyandots who 
th e n  a d m itte d  th a t  th e y , as  th e  le a d in g  group in  th e  v i c i n i t y ,  had' 
extended h o s p i t a l i t y  to  T a h ia d o r is  and K ayahso ta , an a c t  in  keep in g
w ith  t r a d i t io n a l  p ra c t ic e s  and n o t n e c e s s a r ily  in d ic a t iv e  o f  Wyandot 
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sym path ies . Beyond t h i s ,  how ever, much o f  C a m p b e ll's  subsequent 
success re s te d  on th e  c o o p e ra tio n  o f  lo c a l  In d ia n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  
Wyandots. The c a p ta in 's  know ledge o f  th e  b e lts  may have th row n some 
In d ia n s  o f f  guard  and made them le s s  in c l in e d  to  commit them selves  
p u b l ic ly  to  th e  Senecas. Cam pbell h im s e lf  acknow ledged t h a t  th e re  
were e lem ents w i th in  a l l  th e  In d ia n  towns a t  D e t r o i t  which were j.n -
65
i t i a l l y  read y  to  su pp o rt a  c a l l  f o r  w a r. B u t, i t  i s  c le a r  t h a t
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Indian-centered, issues played a role as well and it was in council 
with the Wyandots and other Detroit Indians that the Senecas and 
their message were rejected.
Though Campbell took credit for preventing the local Indians from 
going to Sandusky for the planned meeting, his role may have been less 
significant than the Wyandots1 determination to retain control over 
regional affairs in their own town rather than let the initiative 
slip away to the satellite community at Sandusky. Tension between 
the two towns over direction of affairs was not new, and the rejection 
of the Sandusky meeting site appears to have resulted from Detroit Wy­
andot influence.^ Additional proof of the influence of the Detroit 
town came as the Senecas delegates pressed those at Sandusky to con­
duct the council anyway. According to Campbell, the latter "refused
6?to take up the hatchet without the Consent of the Nations here."
Faced with the ruin of their initial scheme, Kayahsota and Tahiadoris
agreed to go to Detroit where they held a council on July 3- Campbell
again learned of the proceedings from French informants whose services
68he highly recommended to Sir William Johnson.
At the meeting the two Senecas, addressing their remarks to the 
Wyandots, attempted to enlist local Indian support. In so doing they 
voiced a concern that, to this point, had perhaps been felt but not 
states by many western Indians. Producing a large red war belt, the 
Senecas accused the English of treating the Indians with much dis­
respect ar.i said further that "we have the greatest reason to believe 
by their behavior they intend to cut us off entirely; they have possess­
ed themselves of our Country" and warned that the Indians must act
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69now b e fo re  th e  E n g lis h  grew  s tro n g e r .
Though th e y  may have f e l t  sympathy f o r  th e  Senecas and th o se  who
had jo in e d  them , th e  D e t r o i t  In d ia n s  u l t im a t e ly  r e je c te d  th e  b e l t ,
w arning  th a t  " i f  you go on to  engage in  G o n ju n c tio n  w ith  o th e r  N a tio n s
a g a in s t  th e  E n g lis h  we s h a l l  lo o k  upon you as d is tu r b e r s  o f  th e  pub-
l i c k  t r a n q u i l l i t y ,  & w i l l  be o b lig e d  to  in te rp o s e  to  p u t a  s to p  to
70yo u r p ro c e e d in g s , & r e s to r e  peace and q u ie t  a g a in  in  th e  L a n d ."
The b e lts  went no f u r t h e r .  H aving  been d is c o v e re d  by C am pbell, K ayah- 
so ta  agreed  to  g iv e  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  S enecas' p la n  and T a h ia d o r is  in d i ­
ca ted  th a t  s in c e  th e  D e t r o i t  I nd ia n s  had r e je c te d  th e  c a l l  f o r  an
a l l ia n c e  "he would bury a l l  bad th o u g h ts  and fo r g e t  th e  in j u r ie s  done
71a g a in s t  them by th e  E n g lis h ."  Suosequent even ts  dem onstrated  t h a t  
th e  Senecas c o n tin u e d  to  remember.
The p la n  re p re s e n te d  by th e  war b e l t ,  as  re v e a le d  to  Campbell 
and l a t e r  by K ayahsota  to  George Croghan, showed th e  in s t ig a to r s  to  
have been w e ll  advanced i n  t h e i r  th in k in g  on how to  e lim in a te  th e  
E n g lis h  t h r e a t .  I t  a ls o  suggests  reasons f o r  i t s  r e je c t io n  by th e  
D e t r o i t  tow ns. H av ing  e n l is te d  th e  Ohio In d ia n s  and th o se  from  De­
t r o i t ,  th e  Senecas p lan n ed  a c o o rd in a te d  a t ta c k  on a l l  th e  w estern  
f o r t s ,  each group ta k in g  th e  p o s ts  c lo s e s t to  i t .  What i s  m ore, th e
p la n  e n v is io n e d  som ething a k in  to  a " p a n - Ind ia n "  movement by i t s  i n -
72e lu s io n  o f  th e  C herokees. I n  th e  p la n 's  g re a te s t  p o t e n t ia l  s tre n g th ,  
how ever, la y  i t s  g r e a te s t  weakness. There i s  no in d ic a t io n  t h a t  any 
groups o f  v i l l a g e  s iz e  o r  la r g e r  adopted  th e  p la n  o r  accep ted  th e  
b e l ts  though, as  Cam pbell suggested , th e r e  were In d ia n s  a t  D e t r o i t  
who were in  sympathy w ith  th e  Senecas. Cam pbell a ls o  re p o rte d  t h a t
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
366
the influential Tamaq.ua was at Sandusky with other Ohio Indians,
ready to meet the Seneca messengers. No other source places him
there, and his subsequent activities at the Detroit council in September
suggests that, even if he was at Sandusky, he rejected the belts.
Bouquet noted that the Delawares protested ignorance of any details
surrounding the belts and continued to serve as intermediaries in
73ironing out disputes between the army and the Shawnees. The records 
are silent, however, on the activities of the latter people, or other 
Delaware groups, especially those living close to the Senecas on the 
upper Allegheny River. It does seem likely, however, that Tamaqua's 
influence, coupled with economic need and the newly established re­
lations with traders and garrisons led these people to respond cautious­
ly to calls for war and to continue to bide their time.
Wyandot leadership also appears to have played a significant role 
in the outcome of the Senecas' council at Detroit. Beyond this, region­
al jealousies and different experiences with the Anglo-Americans also 
played a part. Detroit Indians, who had clashed with Iroquois warriors 
at Fort Niagara in 1759» nay have balked at cooperating with people 
who were still considered enemies. Related to this may have been Wy­
andot reluctance to enter into any relationship with part or all of 
the most powerful of the Six Nations, a relationship that could mark 
the end of Wyandot influence. Of greater importance was the Detroit 
Indians' unwillingness to rekindle war with the English at a time when 
trade was being renewed and life was returning to normal in some re­
spects. The Wyandots' admonition to Kayahsota and Tahiadoris not to 
disturb the peace relfected and unwillingness to return to conditions
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as th e y  had heen o n ly  months b e fo re . I n  a d d i t io n , th e  In d ia n s  on 
th e  u pp er G re a t L akes , w h ile  th e y  may have l is te n e d  a t t e n t iv e ly  to  
th e  S enecas' w ords, had no p a r t i c u l a r  reason  to  w ish  f o r  war a t  t h a t  
t im e . A t e a r l i e r  c o u n c ils  on th e  Ohio tr a d e  had been prom ised and  
in d eed  r e - e s ta b l is h e d ,  and th e  A ng lo -A m ericans had co n tin u ed  to  be­
have in  a c c e p ta b le  ways. The D e t r o i t  g a r r is o n , b a re ly  one hundred  
men, was v i r t u a l l y  th e  o n ly  E n g lis h  fo rc e  i n  th e  re g io n  b e fo re  th e  
f a l l  o f  1 7 6 l ,  and th e  n a t iv e s  had y e t  to  e x p e rie n c e  th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
o f  f o r t s  t h a t  hampered com m unications and which le d  th e  Senecas and 
o th e r  Ohio In d ia n s  to  f e e l  "hemmed in " .
W h ile  C am pbell was busy a t  D e t r o i t ,  George Croghan and S i r  W illia m  
Johnson were busy g a th e r in g  in fo rm a tio n  on th e  causes o f  In d ia n  hos­
t i l i t y  and on who p r e c is e ly  was in v o lv e d . Most o f  C roghan 's  in fo rm a tio n  
came from  K ayahsota  and T a h ia d o r is  who, a f t e r  t h e i r  c o n fro n ta t io n  w ith  
C am pbell, ag reed  to  c a r r y  messages from  him to  F o r t  P i t t .  T h ere , in  
m eetings  w ith  C roghan, th e y  e la b o ra te d  on th e  source o f  th e  b e l t s ,  th e  
messages th e y  re p re s e n te d , and th e  problem s th a t  had le d  to  t h e i r  c i r ­
c u la t io n .  I t  appears  t h a t  th e  in fo rm a tio n  came a t  a p r ic e j  Croghan 
r e f e r r e d  to  g i f t s  f o r  th e  two men b e fo re  th e  m eetings began. Kayah­
s o ta  made a  p o in t  od deny in g  t h a t  he o r  T a h ia d o r is  had asked th e  w est­
ern  In d ia n s  to  a t ta c k  th e  E n g lis h  im m e d ia te ly , making th e  Senecas' 
p la n  ap pear as a  c o n tin g e n c y , though t h is  c o n tra d ic ts  th e  substance
o f  t h e i r  m eetin g  a t  D e t r o i t  where th e  two had u rged  th e  In d ia n s  to  a c t
75b e fo re  th e  E n g lis h  co u ld  p re p a re  a  d e fe n s e . K ayahsota a ls o  employed 
as a reaso n  f o r  th e  Senecas' l a t e n t  h o s t i l i t y  th e  f a c t  t h a t  " th e  En­
g l is h  G e n e ra l [[AmherstJ had used th e  S ix  N a tio n s  v e ry  i l l  s in c e  th e
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re d u c t io n  o f  Canada"— a 'b e lie f  found by Johnson d u r in g  h is  w estern
t r i p .  T h is  le d  them to  b e lie v e  t h a t  " th e  E n g lis h  had some designs
a g a in s t a l l  N a tio n s  o f  In d ia n s ."  Though he m entioned  th e  "S ix
N a tio n s " , K ayahsota ended h is  d is c u s s io n  w ith  Croghan by p o in t in g
77o u t t h a t  th e  e n t i r e  scheme was " th e  Senecas P l a n . " ' '  More s ig n i f ic a n t  
s t i l l  was th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  a theme th a t  was to  become more w ide­
spread  o v e r th e  n e x t y e a r . F a r  from  in t e r p r e t in g  t h e i r  p la n  as  
h aving  l im i t e d  g o a ls , K ayahsota and T a h ia d o r is  t o ld  Croghan t h a t ,  once 
th e y  a tta c k e d  th e  E n g lis h , " th e y  expect a  fre n c h  Army to  R etake  Canada. 
The n o t io n  th a t  any a t ta c k  on th e  E n g lis h  would le a d  to  a French r e ­
s to r a t io n  r e f le c t e d  a d e s ire  to  r e tu r n  to  th e  more c o m fo rta b le , p re ­
d ic ta b le  p re -w a r arrangem ents and suggests th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  French  
a g e n ts . T a h ia d o r is  was id e n t i f ie d  as th e  Seneca son o f  P h i l ip p e -  
Thomas C habert de J o n c a ire , a  w ell-know n and re s p e c te d  French  p a r t is a n  
o f f i c e r  whose t i e s  to  th e  w estern  Senecas were a k in  to  Johnson 's  among 
th e  Mohawks. F u r th e r , Johnson was t o ld  a t  N ia g a ra  t h a t  th e  Seneca 
messages were c ir c u la te d  " c h ie f ly  in  C habert J o n c a ir 's  name, who . . . 
recommended i t  to  th e  Senecas t h a t  in  case th e  fre n c h  shou ld  be con­
q uered , th e y  were to  propose to  th e  o th e r  N a tio n s  to  u n i t e  & f a l l  upon 
79th e  E n g lis h ."  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  c o rro b o ra te  th e s e  s ta te m e n ts .
They may have been made to  le n d  le g it im a c y  o r  added w e ig h t to  th e  war 
b e l t s .  I t  i s ,  how ever, p o s s ib le  t h a t  e a r l i e r  messages from  J o n c a ire  
o r  o th e r  French ag en ts  may have prompted th e  Senecas to  b e lie v e  th e y  
cou ld  r e l y  on such a id  i f  th e y  chose war w ith  th e  A ng lo -A m erican s .
Much o f  what Croghan le a rn e d  from  th e  two Senecas a g reed  w ith  
in fo rm a tio n  s u p p lie d  by o th e r  Iro q u o is  so urces . These ag reed  th a t
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" th e  S ix  N a tio n s  lo o k  upon them selves to  be v e ry  i l l  T re a te d  by th e  
E n g lis h  G e n e ra l, and i n  p a r t i c u la r  th e  S in ic a s ,"  a  re fe re n c e  to  Am­
h e r s t 's  r e f u s a l  to  p e rm it them th e  s p o ils  o f  war d u r in g  th e  M o n tre a l 
campaign. These unnamed Iro q u o is  sources a ls o  p o in te d  to  th e  t r a n ­
s ie n t  n a tu re  o f  A ng lo -A m erican  r e la t io n s  by n o t in g  t h a t  " c o n tra ry  to  
t h e i r  In c l in c a t io n  th e y  . . . J o in 'd  th e  E n g lis h  to  encourage a l l  
t h e i r  young Men to  A c t in  fa v o u r  o f  th em ." T h is  e q u iv o c a l a l l ia n c e ,  
based on c lo s e  o b s e rv a tio n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  marks th e  p a th  
ta k e n  by many w estern  In d ia n s  as  French  fo r tu n e s  d e c lin e d . A lso  h ig h  
on th e  l i s t  o f  g r ie v a n c e s  was th e  E n g lis h  o c c u p a tio n  o f  N ia g a ra , which  
n o t o n ly  made normal t r a v e l  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  In d ia n s  b u t a ls o  th re a te n e d  
th e  l iv e l ih o o d  o f  th o se  who had p re v io u s ly  worked on th e  p o r ta g e . The 
in c lu s io n  o f  t h is  p o in t  suggests f u r t h e r  th a t  th e  d is a f f e c te d  Senecas  
in c lu d e d  th o se  l i v i n g  n e a r B u ffa lo  Greek and th e  f a l l s .  Coupled w ith  
t h is  was a  c o m p la in t t h a t  " th e  G e n e ra l [[g ave j away t h e i r  C ountry  to  
be S e t t le d ,"  a re fe re n c e  to  th e  D u n can -R u th erfo rd  p o rta g e  s e tt le m e n t  
scheme. These is s u e s , a lo n g  w ith  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  E n g lis h  were 
keep in g  them s h o rt o f  le a d  and powder and an g er o v e r th e  new tra d e  
re g u la t io n s  t h a t  p re v e n te d  tra d e  a t  n a t iv e  towns le d  th e s e  Ir o q u o is
to  conclude t h a t  " th e  E n g lis h  had a mind to  c u t them o f£ fJ  th e  fa c e  
80
o f  th e  E a r th ."  These sen tim en ts  e x p la in  why th e  Senecas were th e  
f i r s t  to  a c t  a g a in s t  th e  E n g lis h ; th e y  were a ls o  fe e l in g s  t h a t ,  in  
th e  coming months, would be echoed by in c re a s in g  numbers o f  w estern  
In d ia n s .
There i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  th e  w ar b e l t s ,  i f  not a l l  o f  th e  
s en tim en ts  th e y  exp ressed , were o f  Seneca o r ig in .  C a p ta in  Campbell
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was content to refer to the "Six Nations" in his reports, reflecting 
his own vague knowledge of Indian affairs. Sir William Johnson's in­
quiries, however, led to the Senecas, more specifically the villages 
in extreme western New York and the upper Allegheny River, and allow 
some tentative statements about how the belts could have been issued
a t  a l l .  Johnson f i r s t  le a rn e d  o f  th e  K a y a h s o ta -T a h ia d o ris  m iss io n
81
w h ile  n e a r F o r t  S tan w ix  on h is  way to  F o r t  N ia g a ra . He im m ed ia te ly
began q u iz z in g  lo c a l  Ir o q u o is  and pursued  h is  in v e s t ig a t io n s  a i l  th e
way to  D e t r o i t  w here, a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  th e  g e n e ra l m e e tin g , he
82confronted the perripetetic Kayahsota. Information supplied by
some Mohawks came from  a  v i l l a g e  "beyond C henussio"— t h a t  i s ,  on th e  
83
A lle g h e n y  R iv e r .  L a te r  a t  N ia g a ra , Johnson was t o ld  by lo c a l  Senecas
that the war belts were "set on foot by some Indians living on the
O h io , who had one o f  t h e i r  p eo p le  k i l l e d  a t ,  o r  n e a r F o r t  P i t t  l a s t
s p r in g , o th e rs  much abused by th e  E n g lis h " — a d e s c r ip t io n  t h a t  f i t s
8 Jj.
th e  Senecas l i v i n g  near F o r t  Venango. I n  a d d i t io n ,  both  Kayahsota
and T a h ia d o r is  were a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  Ohio and Genesee Senecas. I t
thus appears reasonable to assume that the belts originated either
with the western, Genesee, Senecas, or with those from the Ohio country,
or perhaps were sent jointly since the ties between these groups were
8Ss tro n g , th e  Ohio peop le  be in g  an o f f - s h o o t  o f  th e  New York group .
In making his inquiries, J0hnson repeatedly found Iroquois lead­
ers unfamiliar with the war messages. At Fort Brewerton, just west 
of Fort Stanwix, an Oneida sachem had heard only that Senecas had 
gone to Detroit to perform the condolence there on behalf of the Six 
Nations, in order to cover the dead from the 1?59 Niagara battle.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
371
When told of the war belts, the sachem, Sequaresera, "seemed greatly-
surprised, declaring solemnly that no such design had ever been agreed
86
to by the Six Nations." At Niagara the story was the same. The
Seneca sachem Sanajoana told Johnson that "No such Message £has]
87been ever to our knowledge sent by our Nation." Johnson, exasperat­
ed by what he believed to be stalling and equivocation, attacked Sana­
joana, telling him that he was thoroughly convinced that "any . . . 
Tribes of your Nation (tho' ever so remote) would not presume to under­
take so dangerous an affair without your Concurrence & approbation", 
and that "matters of the smallest importance are never agreed to with­
out the consent of you all." As a final gesture of disbelief, John­
son returned Sanajoana's council wampum— in affect calling him a
, . 88 liar.
Johnson's evaluation of traditional Iroquois practice, though 
substantially correct, ignored the possibility that these practices 
may have been circumvented by elements of the western Senecas and 
totally ignored by those on the Ohio. The belts appear to have or­
iginated with the warriors of these groups. Neither Kayahsota nor 
Tahiadoris was styled "sachem" and in none of the information supplied 
by Iroquois informants does it appear that the war messages were sanc­
tioned by any formal convention of civil and war leaders. Instead, 
it seems likely that disaffected elements from the Ohio towns, join­
ed by likeminded individuals or groups from the settlements near Nia­
gara, took it upon themselves to act independently of the constituted 
practices to which Johnson referred. The issues that led to the ap­
pearance of the belts— economic privation exacerbated by English
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policies, the occupation of key communications routes with the 
security threat that implied, and the generally threatening tone of 
Anglo-American activity— would tend to hear this out. All of these 
were circumstances that threatened the well being of local communities, 
one of the primary concerns of warriors. Further, complaints about 
shortages of ammunition suggest another factor. It may be that the 
belts reflected a growing division between the traditionally opposed 
interests within Seneca society, warriors and civil leaders. The 
latter, bent on maintaining social cohesion through peace and stability, 
may have found it more difficult to successfully confront those whose 
traditional function and avenue to status lay in warfare or its al­
ternative, hunting. This conflict of interest was as old as the 
Senecas but English policy and the actions of soldiers and colonists 
since the fall of Canada added new and troubling dimensions to the 
problem. The references to lake of ammunition, to Amherst's im­
perious treatment of Seneca warriors outside Montreal, and the in­
furiating treatment accorded them at the forts suggest growing alarm 
about status as well as concern about the Anglo-Americans' willing­
ness to behave in ways that coincided with native values and practices. 
Johnson himself saw evidence of the growing rift within Seneca, society. 
At a meeting in April 1762, Seneca warriors apologized for the late 
arrival of their sachems but asked that the council begin anyway since 
"we are in fact the People of Consequence for managing' Affairs, our 
Sachems being a parcell of Old People who say much, but who mean &
act very little, so that We have both the power and ability to settle 
89
matters." The desire for action on important issues and the per-
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ceived inability or unwillingness of established, leaders to act led 
to the assertion of authority by the one group within Seneca society 
the English had the most cause to fear. The emergence of Kayahsota 
at this time as a leader on the Ohio Senecas also signalled the ris­
ing influence of militants within the Seneca towns.
To varying degrees, this social conflict over how best to con­
front a growing external threat was played out in other native com­
munities throughout the west, tempered only by the influence of lead­
ers and the extent to which particular communities had yet been im­
posed upon by the advancing Anglo-Americans. By the end of 1762, how­
ever, those who still held out for accommodation were becoming a minor­
ity as the warnings sounded by Kayahsota and Tahiadoris took on a harsh 
reality that could not be ignored.
Ill
Though the Seneca war belts were intercepted, western Indians' 
hostility remained very much alive. During the winter and spring of 
1762, Anglo-American observers continued to hear about and investigate 
stories of Indian alliances and war belts all directed at the west-
90ern forts and other symbols of English power in the west and Canada. 
While much of this information reflected Anglo-American susceptibility 
to rumor and a predisposition to believe the worst since discovery of 
the Seneca belts, there can be little doubt that native unrest con­
tinued and, indeed, increased during the course of the year. At the 
same time, the tone of Indian complaints began to shift from specific
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issues toward a growing regional recognition that specific, un­
desirable Anglo-American actions and pronouncements were really mani-
91festations of something far more sinister.
Trade continued to generate complaints throughout 1762, com­
plaints directed not only at the price of goods but at the nature of
the new trade regulations. A growing sore spot was the breakdown of
92credit arrangements in the Ohio country. James Kenny observed that 
George Croghan1s permission to extend credit to native customers did 
not turn out well, "ye Indians paying, ye Credit stopsi there is dis­
satisfaction on both s i d e s . N o t  only did friction continue over 
trade in the Ohio country, it began to appear in the Great Lakes re­
gion where Lieutenant James Gorrell at La Baye was confronted with 
complaints about traders' conduct and was asked to underscore his
promise of redress with a "small" present as tangible proof of good 
9kwill. Captain Campbell also reported unrest at Detroit when the
95local Indians learned of the ban on liquor sales.
Similarly, western Indians stepped up their protests against the
shortage of ammunition. So angry were Detroit Indians that the fort's
commander worried about the consequences of their finding out that
the shortages were deliberate and hoped that Amherst had since changed 
96
his mind. At Fort Pitt, George Croghan underscored Campbell's con­
cern by observing that continued hostility among the Ohio Senecas was 
the result of "there Nott being alowed Amunision & Nessarys as they
97pass & Repass hear to Warr." Not confined to the neighborhoods
around these two forts, Indian discontent spread to the Miamis and
98
others living south of the Great Lakes.
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More ominous and potentially more dangerous than complaints about 
trade, however, was the marked increase in conflicts between Indians 
and local soldiers and settlers. In spite of Golonel Bouquet's pro­
clamation and other efforts to clear the Ohio country of illegal 
settlements, local Indians still found good cause for registering 
anger over the invasion. James Kenny observed that "It Grieves ye
Indians to see ye White People Settle in these Lands, especially in
99Virginia side Lthe Monongahela valley]. One reason for this was 
suggested by Croghan. Writing several months after Kenny, the Indian 
agent noted that the Ohio Indians were angry that the English had not 
compensated them for the lands now occupied by the forts and their 
surrounding settlements."^ An added worry for the Delawares came 
early in 1762 with the arrival in the Muskingum towns of Moravian 
missionaries. John Heckewelder, assistant to Christian Frederick Post, 
was soon made aware of the suspicion under which they both worked. 
Heckewelder reported that the Delawares fears "that this missionary 
scheme might prove a mere pretence, in order to enable the white peo­
ple to obtain a footing in the Indian Country. The Delawares'
suspicions seemd to be confirmed when Post began to stake out what 
the Indians believed to be far too extensive a tract for two austere 
Moravians, and ordered him to accept a much smaller plot, telling him
that they feared being "driven further back, as has been the case ever
102since the white people came into this country.!'
While some Ohio Indians were content to register verbal complaints, 
others, primarily warriors who felt most directly threatened, took a 
different tack. The result was a marked increase in attacks on Anglo-
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Americans and their property. Horsetheft, both as a way of obtain-
103
ing the desired animal and as a form of economic warfare, continued.
In addition, groups of warriors going south against the Gherckees 
killed livestock belonging to the army at Fort Pitt and near-by settlers. 
Robbery and other forms of harassment also continued in the Ohio country 
with economic need still a motive. Traders operating among the Shaw- 
nees were robbed as was the mustering agent of the Royal Americans.
The latter was prepared to defend himself but was prevented from do­
ing so by a companion when it became clear the Indians, probably Ohio 
Iroquois, were looking only for food. Faced with food shortages brought 
on by both game scarcity and limited supplies of ammunition, plus the 
high price of trade goods, these Indians left with some flour and a
1, , ,, 10 5small keg of rum.
The killing of Virginia frontier settlers by some Shawnees mark­
ed a dangerous escalation in the conflict between Indians and colon­
ists over land and control of the Ohio region. It also illustrates
the limited influence civil chiefs exercised over warriors who were
106
determined to act according to their own interests. The year 1762
was punctuated by several more Anglo-American deaths. In april two
Virginia hunters were found dead in their camp near Redstone Greek.
Though robbery was cited as the motive, it is more likely that anger
over the invasion of the Ohio country by such men was an additional 
10?
factor. In August, William Clapman, a trader, was killed near
Sandusky. The incident appears to have been the result of his two 
Panis slaves' desire for freedom, but they seem to have been aided 
by local Ottawas. The non-economic motives for Clapman's death are
10k
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revealed by an investigated by Fort Sandusky's commander, who report-
108
ed that after killing him, the Indians destroyed Clapman's goods.
Finally, in November, came news of the deaths of William Newkirk and
one other trader at the hands of the Senecas. Subsequent information
revealed that the killer or killers had fled to the Seneca town of
Ganestio, the same place to which disaffected Senecas had withdrawn
109
the previous year from Venango.
Besides reflecting the continuation of Indian efforts to stem
the tide of the Anglo-American invasion and forcing the invaders to
conform to acceptable behavior, the tensions and conflicts in the Ohio
country were symptoms of a combination of events peculiar to 1762.
The first of these was a widespread shortage of food and similar wide-
ranging illness among western Indians. It is difficult to determine
precisely when these occurred other than to say that they appeared
together. As early as September 1761, Ojibwas at Michilimackinac were
expressing their fear of hunger in the coming months."^ Captain
Campbell at Detroit was more specific in identifying the cause of
shortages in his locale when he reported that Indians and habitants
111
alike had experienced bad harvests that year. By year's end, local­
ized shortages of food were mentioned among the Iroquois and among In­
dians in the upper Allegheny region where severe weather also cut
112
short the winter's hunt. By the spring of 1762 John Heckewelder 
felt able to make the general assertion that "there was a famine in 
the land. " ^ 3
Little is known about the sickness that struck western Indians 
at the same time. In the records it is referred to simply as "sick-
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114
ness" or a "severe sickness" from which many natives died. Given 
the close proximity in time to the smallpox outbreak of 1757-1758, it 
is unlikely that that disease had struck again over such a wide area. 
Likewise, tropical dieases, which were prevalent later, were unlikely 
to have arrived at this time since the principal carriers, British 
soldiers who had returned from West Indian duties, had not yet arrived. 
More likely, the illness could have been a respiratory ailment, per­
haps influenza which appeared in the mainland English colonies in 
1761.115
Whatever the source, sickness and the attendant shortages of 
food were widespread. Acting on orders from George Croghan, Ensign 
Thomas Hutchins of the Royal Americans left Fort Pitt in early April 
to investigate the state of Indian affairs in the west and to collect 
information on the Great Lakes region. Traveling first north to 
the lakes, Hutchins returned by way of Michilimackinac and Fort St. 
Joseph on the lower Michigan peninsula. Here among the Potawatomis 
he first encountered the illness and privation the Indians were ex­
periencing. Even in early August the natives were still combating 
the disease and its consquences. The story was the same throughout 
the territory Hutchins traversed between Lake Michigan and the Ohio 
River. The Ouiatanons, Piankashaws, Mascoutens, Kickapoos, Miamis,
and Shawnees were all stricken. At the Shawnees1 Lower Town, Hutchins
117reported that "their People were sick and are Lying every day."
Coinciding with this crisis came the increased enforcement of 
Amherst's rules governing Indian affairs. Though this regulatory 
system had begun a year earlier in the Ohio country, its full impact
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was not felt for some months. By mid-summer 1762, however, Indian
reaction to restrictions on trade ~nd most of all on the efforts
by the English to abandon gift-giving and reciprocity was becoming
widespread and more emphatic, due in large measure to the more severe
impact Amherst's decrees now had on sick and hungry native communities.
Hutchins found widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which
Anglo-Americans were responding to the Indians and their needs. Through
planning or oversight, Hutchins was sent west without a store of goods
suitable for the gift exchanges that formed a necessary part of council
meetings. At Michilimackinac both Ottawas and Ojibwas were "much
disatisfied at their being disappointed" by not receiving any token
1XS
of friendship after talking with Hutchins. The same reaction was 
found elsewhere but had particularly negative affects on those groups 
badly hurt by sickness and food shortages. The Potawatomis were "great­
ly Surprised" that Hutchins had no means by which to help them in their 
trying condition, especially since they had expected that "Sir William 
Johnson wou'd send them some few Presents to keep their Women and Child­
ren from the Cold" since "their whole Nation was afflicted with Sick-
119
ness which Rendered them uncapable of hunting." Bitter over this
singular lack of regard for their welfare, the Indians gave Hutchins
a stern lecture and a thinly veiled warning of what might happen if
Anglo-American attitudes and policies did not change. The Ouiatanons
and Kickapoos told the ensign that "If we were to go to the French at
the Illinois they would give us ammunition at least" and suggested
120they would do just that if the English were not more generous.
Equally significant in the natives' eyes was the seeming refusal of
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the Anglo-Americans to make gunsmiths and blacksmiths available, an
important issue since native hunters were wholly dependent on European
121skills to mend firearms and other metal tools.
Hutchins got the message. To Gorghan he wrote that he found 
"in private conversation with them that they were not so well [[pleased^  
as I could have wished as they were disappointed in their Expectations 
of my bringing Presents for them." He added that the Indians were 
quick to point out that "during the Late War the french had always 
Accustomed themselves to make these People great Presents three or 
four times a Year and always allowed them a Sufficient Quantity of 
ammunition." Hutchins concluded by observing that the Indians "think 
it very strange that this Custom should be so immediately broke off 
by the English and the Traders not allowed even to take so much Am­
munition with them as to enable those Indians to Kill game Sufficient
122for the support of their families."
The sentiments expressed by the Potawatomis, Miamis and others 
demonstrated growing disenchantment with the Anglo-Americans and their 
efforts to revolutionize Indian relations. Especially embittering was 
Amherst's deliberate attempt to reduce natives to a controlled labor 
force while at the same time terminating long-standing customs and 
practices that lay at the heart of inter-societal relations. The in­
consistencies of such a policy were abundantly clear to Indian hunters
who found they needed to trade under what they considered inconvenient
123and extortionate conditions yet were denied the means of doing so.
When catastrophe struck at home, the English appeared willing to ignore 
the natives' needs and to be callously indifferent, an attitude that
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IV
The v iew s expressed by th e  In d ia n s  w ith  whom H u tc h in s  spoke were
w id e ly  h e ld  by 1?62 as grow ing numbers o f  In d ia n s  became a larm ed  a t
th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  E n g lis h  p o l ic ie s .  More o f te n  th a n  i n  th e  p as t
In d ia n  spokesmen re tu rn e d  to  a  c e n t r a l  themes th e y  w ished t h a t  th e
E n g lis h  would conduct them selves as th e y  had b e fo re  th e  Seven Y e a rs ' 
12bWar. C o in c id in g  w ith  t h is  was th e  c o n tin u e d , a lm o s t n o s ta lg ic ,
com parison o f  E n g lis h  w ith  French  p r a c t ic e s — a com parison th e  A n g lo -
A m ericans could  n o t w in . Th is  o u tlo o k  was expressed s e v e ra l months
b e fo re  H u tc h in 's  t r i p  by an  Ir o q u o is  w ar le a d e r .  Angry t h a t  h is  men
were be ing  d en ied  am m unition a t  F o r t  P i t t  f o r  t h e i r  homeward jo u rn ey
from  th e  C a ro lin a s , he p o in te d  o u t t h a t  " i t t  has a llw a y s  been a  Custom
Long b e fo re  t h is  W arr by both  ye E n g lis h  & fre n c h "  and " w h ile  ye W arr
between you & ye fre n c h  Seem'd D0u b t f u l l  you ware G enrouss a  n u f f
to  a l l  N a tio n s  B ut sence you have Conquerd ye fre n c h  . . . you Look 
125on us as Nobody."
T h is  was echoes by o th e r  Ohio In d ia n s . James Kenny observed in  
h is  jo u rn a l t h a t  th e  D elaw ares were uneasy o v e r th e  f a c t  t h a t  N e ta -  
watwees, now re c o g n ize d  as  " th e  C h ie f  Man o f  ye  D e law are  N a t io n ,"  
had been ig n o re d  by th e  E n g lis h , who had n o t made him any p re s e n ts  in
12
r e c o g n it io n  o f  h is  s ta tu s  and to  renew fr ie n d s h ip  w ith  th e  D e law ares . * 
Ohio Ir o q u o is  w a r r io rs  were a ls o  an gry  because th e  E n g lis h  would not 
su pp ly  t h e i r  r a id in g  p a r t ie s  a t  F o r t  P i t t ,  even though " a l l  th e  S ix
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N a tio n s  were promised, to  be S u p p ly 'd  h e re  by you, as  th e y  p a s t ,"
and fu r t h e r  t o ld  Groghan t h a t  such was t h e i r  r ig h t  "as being  th e
127
P r o p r ie to r s  o f  th e  L a n d ."
By th e  end o f  th e  y e a r , George Groghan was fo rc e d  to  a d m it th a t  
" th e  In d ia n s  Seem D is a p o in te d  I n  t h i r e  E x p e c ta tio n s  o f  p re s e n ts  as  
u s e a l & ap e a r V e ry  S u lky  & 111 Tem pered." T h is  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  
o f  th e  w a r r io rs  who, used to  b e in g  " In d u lg e d  by boath  fre n c h  & E n g lis h "  
and c a rry in g  heavy burdens o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  w e lfa re  o f  t h e i r  
p e o p le , were a c u te ly  s e n s it iv e  to  " t h is  Suden Change i n  o ur G e n e ro s ity
4. + K  M1 2 8to  them ."
In d ia n  f r u s t r a t i o n  and ap prehen s ion  were m a n ife s te d  in  two ways, 
both  ro o te d  in  t r a d i t io n a l  v a lu e s . Among th e  D elaw ares l i v in g  west 
o f  th e  Ohio R iv e r  th e re  appeared  a  p ro p h e t whose message o f fe r e d  a 
s o lu t io n  to  t h is  l a t e s t  a s s a u lt  on t h e i r  way o f  l i f e .  The p ro p h e t, 
N e o lin , was h im s e lf  one o f  s e v e ra l men who appeared among th e  D e la ­
w ares, both i n  th e  west and on th e  Susquehanna R iv e r ,  o f fe r in g  d iv in e -
129l y  in s p ir e d  messages to  t h e i r  p e o p le . The messages preached by 
th e s e  men sparked n a t i v i s t i c  r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  movements among th e  D e la ­
wares o f  which th e  one le d  by N e o lin  was d i r e c t ly  r e la t e d  to  a f f a i r s  
in  th e  w est.
In fo rm a tio n  ab o u t N e o lin  and h is  message is  l im i t e d  p r im a r i ly  
to  th a t  g a th e re d  by James Kenny from  In d ia n  in fo rm a n ts  a t  F o r t  P i t t .  
Kenny f i r s t  m entioned N e o lin  i n  O c tb e r 1762 when he w ro te  o f  "ye Im­
p o s te r  which is  r a is e d  amongst ye D e law are , in  o rd e r to  shew them ye  
r i g h t  way to  H e a v en ."18°  By th e  t im e  Kenny f i r s t  le a rn e d  o f  N e o lin ,  
i t  seems t h a t  th e  l a t t e r ' s  message had a lr e a d y  a t t r a c t e d  a  c o n s id e ra b le
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fo l lo w in g ,  though numbers and lo c a le  a re  a l l  b u t im p o s s ib le  to  de­
te rm in e . Kenny n o ted  t h a t  "The In d ia n s  a t  t h e i r  Towns make fe a s ts  &
p erfo rm  t h e i r  new d e v o tio n s  by D ancing , S in g in g  & sometimes a l l  K n ee l -  
131in g  & p r a y in g ."
The h e a r t  o f  N e o l in 's  message la y  i n  h is  in s is te n c e  t h a t  he D e la ­
wares co u ld  in s u re  t h e i r  s a lv a t io n  and c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y  by r e j e c t ­
in g  th e  v a lu e s  and te c h n o lo g y  o f  th e  Europeans and by re tu r n in g  to  
th e  ways o f  th e  f o r e f a t h e r s .  A ccord ing  to  a  "Book" o r  " In d ia n  B ib le "  
used by N e o lin  as  an  in s t r u c t io n a l  a id ,  a  copy o f  w hich was shown and 
e x p la in e d  to  Kenny, th e  D e la w a re s ' p a th  to  heaven had been b lo cked  
by th e  a r r i v a l  o f  Europeans and th e  subsequent d e c lin e  o f  n a t iv e  c u l­
tu r e  due to  th e  in f l u x  o f  a l i e n  id e a s  and goods. However, N e o lin
c la im ed  to  have re v e a le d  to  him a  new p a th , one th a t  co u ld  be g a in ed
132
o n ly  th ro u gh  c u l t u r a l  r e v i t a l i z a t i o n .  K enny 's  in fo rm a n t, James
Mokeson, re v e a le d  some d e t a i l s  on how t h is  r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  was to  be
a c h ie v e d . A ccord ing  to  him " a l l  th e  Boys a re  to  be T r a in 'd  to  ye  use
o f  th e  Bow & A rrow  f o r  Seven Y ears  Then to  l i v e  i n t i r e l y  on d r y 'd
M eat . . .  ye Women & A n t ie n t  Men may r a is e  & E a t Corn a t  ye E x p ira t io n
o f  ye Seven Y e a rs , to  q u i t  a l l  Commerce w ith  ye W hite P eop le  & C lo th e
133
them selves  w ith  S k in s ."  I n  a d d i t io n ,  th e  D elaw ares  were to  con­
c o c t and d r in k  a  p u r g a t iv e ,  "A S o r t  o f  B i t t e r  D r in k ,"  which i f  con-
13^
sumed by any n on -D elaw are  co u ld  cause d e a th .
N e o l in 's  message and th e  movement i t  g e n e ra te d  has been c h a ra c te r -
135
iz e d  as " a n t i - E n g l is h " .  A ng lo -A m erican  o b s e rv e rs  such as Kenny may 
have been a la rm ed  by what th e y  saw o r  h eard  and i t  a ls o  appears  th a t  
N e o lin  p r e d ic te d  t h a t  w ar betw een th e  D elaw ares and E n g lis h  would
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follow the breakdown of peace making efforts. Neolin's teach­
ing also identified Anglo-American society as the source of the Dela­
wares' current troubles. His message appears reactive and anti-English, 
however, only if viewed from an English perspective. Viewed from the 
Delawares' position, the revitalization could best be characterized 
as "pro-Delaware" since it offered a prescription by which this society 
could overcome the problems created not only by English expansion, but 
by two centuries of contact with Europeans generally. At the same
time, the Delawares would be preserving and promoting that which was
13?good and positive in their own culture. Beyond its spiritual im­
plications, the revitalization reflected the continuing process of 
social re-integration of the western Delawares, a process marked by 
the growing cooperation of the three clans and the emergence by 1762
of Netawatwees as the symbolic head of the Delawares living on the 
138
Muskingum River.
While the Delawares were responding to Neolin's message a more 
widespread transformation was taking place in western Indians' per­
ceptions regarding the Anglo-Americans. Ever since the dramatic 
turn of events that had transferred titular sovereignty of the west 
from France to England, western Indians had periodically expressed 
their expectation of Anglo-American vengeance for acts committed 
during the war. As early as May 1760 George Croghan was warning his
superiors that it would be necessary to allay the Indians' suspicions
139that revenge would be the ultimate goal of any English actions.
The following year James Kenny also observed that the Delawares seem­
ed to harbor "jealousies of ye English, having revenge or some ad­
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vantage in view." Kenny's enemy, Groghan, agreed. The Potawatomies 
and other Indians living in the Great Lakes region seemed equally 
predisposed to expect those whom they attacked to seek revenge if the
141
opportunity arose. This culturally conditioned outlook, like others
governing inter-societal relations, helps explain native responses to
Anglo-American words and actions. Yet, in this instance, Indian fears
and expectations were made worse and seemed to be confirmed by actions
taken by English officials. Thus in 1?60 Ottawas and Ojibwas had their
suspicions confirmed when they discovered that council wampum and pipes
given to the commander of Fort Niagara had been removed from their
customary place in the council room. This situation, resulting from
the officer's dispatch of the materials to Amherst, represented a
142
serious breech of council etiquette.
By 1762 the cumulative impact of new trade regulations, altered 
givt-giving policies, and the imperious tone taken by royal officials 
toward Indians had resulted in the widespread acceptance of the notion 
that English policies were deliberately designed to weaken the foe be­
fore the revenge attack was launched. Sir William Johnson found this 
outlook among Indians as far east as the St. Lawrence valley and Maine 
where the "Abenaquis have confessed to me that they are all greatly
alarmed at the many reports propagated amongst them, that the English
143intend to destroy them." In August the Wyandots at Detroit had in­
tercepted another Ohio Iroquois war belt, accompanied by the warning
144that "ye English are going to Strike them." By December acceptance 
of this view by western Indians was widespread. George Croghan's 
assistant, Alexander McKee, reported that the Shawnees "In Gineral
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are Discontented & grow more jelous Every Day of us & publicly Say
that ye English has a Designe of Gutting them of^fj of ELse they wold
Lett them have more powder and Lead." The Shawnees also pointed to
renewed pressure on them to return captives as a sure sign of English 
145plotting. Groghan told Colonel Bouquet that he had learned that
the Delawares, Shawnees, and Ohio Senecas "Say its full time for them
146to prepare to Defend themselves & their Country from Us." And,
he went on, "They Interpret the General's Frugality in Lessening the
Expense of Presents in a Design of Revenging what is past, being con-
147scious they Deserve to be punished."
While less direct pronouncements are available from the Great 
Lakes, the subsequent actions of many groups in that area reveal similar 
feelings. In addition, such sentiments expressed above were sent with 
belts and calumets to Indians at Detroit and the Wabash valley. Though 
less hard pressed than their counterparts to the east, the Great Lakes 
Indians were also experiencing the adverse impact of English policies 
and were expressing a desire to return to the pre-war system of re­
lations. Also, it is noteworthy that these expressions of concern
and determination to resist the Anglo-American revolution came large-
, - . 1 4 8ly from warriors.
Growing anticipation of hostile English action and a determination
to resist was revealed in one, possibly two, ways. First, the anti-
English outlook characterized by the Seneca war belts of the previous
year spread to groups which had previously rejected such overtures.
The Senecas "were Still continuing Mischief" and appeared to be direct-
149
ing their efforts specifically at the Delawares. By mid-March
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1762 reports had. come in suggesting that Ohio Senecas and Shawnee
warriors "had. joined, the Southerly Indians for to strike the English"
150
and were unsuccessfully trying to enlist the Wyandots. If true, 
this report would suggest that the Senecas and Shawnees were pre­
paring to end hostilities with their long-standing enemies in order 
to better equip themselves for what they were beginning to see as the 
inevitable conflict with the Anglo-Americans.
By September it appears that the Great Lakes Indians had also 
begun to accept the idea of an English conspiracy. Croghan received 
information about "a Great Council Held at the Ottoway Town above 
D'Troit" which included sachems and war leaders from the Ottawas, 
Wyandots, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis from Detroit "with some other 
Tribes who lived amongst those Indians on Lake Superior above Michili- 
mackina and Fort le Boef." The latter referred perhaps to Ojibwa bands
151
from Mackinac, Saginaw, and farther west. The meeting was held in
strict secrecy, from both other Indians and Englishmen, perhaps at
the request of "Two French Men ^ whoj came down with the Indians that
252
came from above Michilimackina in Indian dress." The council re­
solved to send delegates to the Miamis, Ouiatanons, Piankashaws, and 
Kickapoos to acquaint them with the proceedings but was careful to 
keep word of the meeting from the Six Nations. This last decision 
reflects the continued distrust that existed between the western In­
dians and the League. Also, it appears that the Indians, whose meet­
ing discussed the possibility of war with the English, feared that 
the latter would be warned by their Iroquois allies. Croghan also be­
lieved that any western Indian attack when it came would be directed
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153at both the colonists and the Six Nations.
Finally, in November, Colonel Bouquet learned of a "pretended
new conspiracy" embracing the Ohio Senecas, Shawnees, and Delawares
whose goal, according to Alexander McKee, was to "strike the English
15^
now living in their Country." Yet this information also reveals
continued regionalism and lack of cooperation that had marked Indian
efforts to organize the previous year. Bouquet was relieved to hear
that "the distant Nations £havej refused to join" those on the Ohio
and that the Miamis, who initially informed the English of the Ohio
Indians' activities, had likewise rejected the war belts then cir- 
155culating. However, at the same time traders operating among the 
Shawnees came back to Fort Pitt saying they were afraid to remain 
among them and "are of opinion that the Indians will Break out again
,,156m  war."
This ominous warning suggests the extent to which relations be­
tween Anglo-Americans and many western Indians had deteriorated in 
the space of two years. While these Indians attempted to convince 
the invaders of the necessity of conforming to time-honored practices 
or, in the case of the Ohio Indians, worked to create a mutually ad­
vantageous relationship through which peace could be promoted, a dis­
advantageous trade system, the seeming inability of the English to 
make good on a variety of treaty promises, and the persistence of an 
armed force in the west were all signs that, by late 1762, pointed 
to a concious unwillingness by the English to cooperate and promote 
peace. The result for the Indians was a growing feeling of appre­
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hension that had moved westward and had infected increasing numbers 
of native people. Assessing all that had been said and done by 
royal and provincial representatives from their own cultural per­
spective, western Indians were gradually moving toward the conclusion 
that English policies were designed to work to the natives' disadvantag' 
and to lessen their security. At the same time, this outlook result­
ed in the assumption that the ultimate goal of Anglo-American machina­
tions was the destruction of all Indians in the west. While no de­
cisions had yet been made about how to deal with these perceived 
threats, the native population in the west was, as Groghan's informants 
suggested, restive and sensitive to any changes in prevailing relations 
that might indicate further efforts by the English to rob them of 
their security, independence, or lives.
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CHAPTER VII 
Toward War, 1762-1763
Though the atmosphere surrounding Anglo-Indian relations had 
grown more tense hy late 1762, there was as yet no sign that western 
Indians were doing more than re-evaluating their position and Anglo- 
American actions. As 1762 drew to a close, however, circumstances 
proceeded to change in ways that continued to limit native options 
and strength the position of those who sought a quick military solution 
to the growing English menace.
One manifestation of growing militancy was the re-appearance of 
war belts among the western Indians. Reminiscent of the ones cir­
culated the year before, these later belts appear to have had the 
same sourcej the Ohio Senecas. In August reports of a belt reached 
Fort Pitt.1 Subsequent information confirmed earlier news. However, 
while the belt came from the Ohio, the Indians at Detroit responded 
to it without the prompting of Seneca messengers as had been the case 
the previous year. What is more, the council called to discuss the
war message embraced interested Ottawas and Ojibwas from Saginaw Bay
2
and Mackinac as well as local Indians. The meeting, details of which 
are sketchy, suggests a growing sense of solidarity on the part of In­
dians living in the upper Great.Lakes region.
In November came word that "ye Mingoes has a War Belt & Bloody 
Tomahawk now offering to ye Shawanas," a belt the Shawnees appear to 
have accepted and passed to the Miamis who brought it to the attention 
of the commander of Fort Miami later that winter.^ English officers
359
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characteristically dismissed the notion of impending war, perhaps
justifiably, given the late season. But James Kenny observed as early
as October that "Many of ye Old Traders say they are of opinion, that
4-
the Indians will Breake out again in War." By year's end even vet­
eran agent George Groghan was issuing warning of a general wave of 
native unrest and of the potential for war in the spring.^
I
The Anglo-American perception that western Indians were again 
restive was not unfounded. By the fall of 1?62, the new Indian policy—  
as defined and implemented by Amherst— of keeping the natives dependent, 
poorly armyed, and under the gun, had taken root throughout the west.
As conditions worsened, native responses— in the form of councils, 
calls for war, and increased efforts to build alliances— became more 
common. It would be difficult to assign one cause to this growing un­
rest. Rather, what Anglo-Americans witnessed and reported in late 
1762 resulted from the cumulative impact of trade regulations, military 
occupation, disease, and the Anglo-Americans' persistent disregard for 
traditional relations that extended over the previous three years.
The widespread sickness witnessed by Ensign Thomas Hutchins be­
gan to take its toll in other ways by the autumn of 1762. Among farm­
ing communities south of the Great Lakes, sickness and death threaten­
ed both planting and harvesting and resulted in shortages of corn.
Worse, hunting seems also to have been less successful. Again, re­
duction in the number of those able to work may account for much of
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the shortfall. Yet the difficulty that western Indians had in obtain­
ing needed ammunition and repair of firearms certainly added to the 
hardship— and increased the bitterness felt toward those who created 
and enforced such policies. To make matters worse, the economic and 
popuiation crisis did not end with reduced food stores as winter ap­
proached. Less food spelled additional hardships for people who now 
found themselves under the necessity of hunting more in order to buy 
at higher prices what their former allies had given freely.
Chronic shortages of ammunition made the task of supplying blankets, 
kettles, and other items more difficult and promised shortages when 
trade resumed in the spring. J0hn Heckewelder's general observation
that "there was famine in the [^ Delawares'J land" in 1?6Z was true of
6
other areas as well. In mid-July Ensign Pauli at Fort Sandusky was
forced to request additional supplies since "it is impossible to buy
venison" because "the present time is so hungry with the Indians that
7
they hardly able to keep themselves alife." Two months later, Lieu­
tenant Gordon at Fort Venango further undermined Indian relations by 
refusing supplies to hard-pressed Iroquois, even after the natives 
had produced a ration chit signed by George Croghan. In desperation, 
they plundered the garrison’s corn fields saying "they had not Eate 
Any thing for Three Days." Gordon, with only eight men under arms,
let the incident pass, though the treatment of his garrison less than
8
a year later suggests the local Indians were less forgiving. This 
situation was also reflected in the upper Great Lakes as well where, 
in late September, Major Henry Gladwin at Detroit reported that the 
Miamis and Ouiatanons "are very sickly, and almost destitute of Pro-
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9visions." Finally, Alexander Henry's experiences at Michilimackinac 
indicate that the hardships were not confined to the Detroit area, 
nor were they limited to the latter part of 1762. As late as June 
1763 Henry, in protective custody of his adoptive Ojibwa family, re­
ported that there was then "much scarcity of food . . .  we were often 
for twenty-four hours without eating.""^
Making a had situation worse for western Indians was the fact 
that trade relations with the Anglo-Americans had not improved, nor 
had the latter's willingness to extend aid and hehave in a friendly 
manner. The increasing difficulty Indians had in obtaining aid merely 
underscored the lesson learned in the wake of Hutchin's visiti the 
English had no genuine interest in Indians or in maintaining the time- 
honored basis for peace and friendship. This lack of aid and generosity 
took on an added dimension due to the continuing warfare between the 
Cherokees and Indians living in the Ohio region and lower Great Lakes.
As late as January 1763, Major Gladwin reported that Detroit Indians 
were preparing to raid the Cherokees in retaliation for an earlier 
attack.
The net result by the end of 1762 was, as Croghan explained,
growing Indian frustration with the consistent failure of the Anglo-
Americans to act in acceptable ways, frustration made worse by the
initial assumption, reinforced at early councils, that the English
would continue to maintain relations and generosity at pre-war levels.
Having been rudely disabused of this notion over the preceding three
years, many Indians had grown "Very Sulky & 111 Tempered ... In
12partickler ye Warrers of Every Nation."
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Adding to the disintegration of Anglo-Indian relations was the 
growing alienation of Indians who, previously, had shown marked re­
straint in the face of colonial and military encroachments and who 
had worked hard to arrive at some accommodation with the invaders. 
Principal among these had been the Delawares who, since the summer of 
1750, had supported Tamag.ua's peace-making efforts. By the end of 
1762, however, Tamaq.ua and a growing number of Delawares had become 
disillusioned and latently hostile to the Anglo-Americans. The catalyst 
for this changing attitude appears to have been the 1762 Lancaster 
treaty council between the Dclawaires and Pennsylvania. The purpose
of the meeting was to finalize the peace between the colony and the
13
Ohio Indians and to complete the repatriation of captives. To 
judge from English reports, the results were less than propitious.
While some captives were returned and others promised soon, the Dela­
wares left the council in a distinctly different mood from that in 
which they had arrived. On September 11, James Kenny had learned 
that Tamaqua had rejected treaty gifts from Governor Hamilton, and the 
following day observed that "The Beaver is return'd & seems unwell & 
not so cheerful as befor." Several weeks later, Kenny told Colonel
Bouquet that "ye Indians were much dissatisfied with ye Treaty at
l*fLancaster," a view shared by George Croghan.
There are several possible ways of accounting for the Delawares' 
change of attitude. Kenny observed that Tamaqua and other Indians 
just returned from the meeting "seem half Snow'd with Rum," a con­
dition which, if true, may account for Tamaqua's seeming unwell and 
"not so cheerful as b e f o r . A  temporary over-indulgence in liquor
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would, n o t account f o r  th e  p e rc e iv e d  change i n  a t t i t u d e  noted  by s e v e ra l
A ng lo -A m erican  o b s e rv e rs , though consum ption o f  rum may have been
sym ptom atic o f  o th e r  p rob lem s. Kenny a ls o  m entioned th a t  t r e a t y
g i f t s  were d iv id e d  "unequal" a t  L a n c a s te r , im p ly in g  t h a t  some n a t iv e
16
p a r t ic ip a n ts  may have f e l t  ch eated . As p r in c ip a l  D e law are spokes­
man, Tamaqua may have been g iv e n  a p r o p o r t io n a l ly  g r e a te r  amount o f  
th e  la rg e s s  and a t t e n t io n  which co u ld  have l e f t  him v u ln e ra b le  to  
c r i t ic is m  by o th e rs  not so fa v o re d . F in a l l y ,  Groghan noted  t h a t  a t  
l e a s t  some o f  th e  In d ia n s ' an ger stemmed from  t h e i r  "have in g  been  
Robd o f  a llm o s t  a l l  t h i r e  horses & o th e r  th in g s  on t h i r e  Way" from  
th e  c o u n c i l . ^
W h ile  p o s s ib le  b reaches o f e t iq u e t t e  o r  backwoods highwaymen may 
have c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  unease expressed by th e  D e law ares , o th e r  ev id en ce  
suggests problem s t h a t  c u t much d eep er and emphasized th e  d e t e r io r a t ­
in g  n a tu re  o f  A n g lo - In d ia n  r e la t io n s .  The t r e a t y ,  o s te n s ib ly  between  
P e n n s y lv a n ia , th e  w estern  D e law ares , and th o se  o th e r  Ohio In d ia n s  as ­
s o c ia te d  w ith  Tamaqua, was to  fo cu s  on p r is o n e r  exchanges and th e  f i n a l  
s e tt le m e n t o f  a f f a i r s  betw een th e  two p a r t ie s .  As i t  tu rn e d  o u t , th e  
P h ila d e lp h ia  Quakers and Teedyuscung once a g a in  used th e  m eetin g  as a  
forum  to  p ress  P a r t ic u la r  c la im s  a g a in s t  th e  p r o v in c ia l  governm ent,
p u t t in g  Tamaqua's d e le g a t io n  in  an u n co m fo rta b le  p o s it io n  between th e
18
p ro v in c e  and i t s  p o l i t i c a l  enem ies. In  a d d i t io n , i t  appears  th a t  
th e  t r e a t y  was used by p r iv a t e  in t e r e s t s  to  g a in  access to  tr a d e  on 
th e  t r ib u t a r ie s  o f  th e  Susquehanna R iv e r ,  som ething th e  D elaw ares  
"Tuck i n  a N o th e r L ig h t  Im agening  ye D e s ire  was to  S e t le  t h i r e  C u n try , 
and f l a t l y  D enied  ye G o vern ers  R e q u e s t . T h e  D elaw ares  may have
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come away particularly upset that a treaty of peace had been divert­
ed into both a political contest in which they had no stake and into 
another cover behind which Anglo-Americans could manoeuver for more 
land. Given the previous three years' experience on the Ohio, the 
Delawares may have been even less willing to forgive colonial in­
discretions.
Thus for a variety of reasons, the most basic of which was a 
history of Anglo-American efforts to unfavorably alter relations with 
them since 1759» the Dnlawares seem to have grown more disillusioned. 
By no means, however, was this true of all. John Heckewelder made a 
point of noting that, though the Delawares' friendship had "consider­
ably cooled", Tamaqua still appeared favorably disposed toward the 
20
English. For others, however, the Lancaster incident merely re­
inforced what Heckewelder had observed earlier that yeari a growing
21suspicion of Anglo-American motives and behavior.
The Lancaster Treaty, as well as the general condition of both 
western Indians and their relations with the Anglo-Americans, reinforc­
ed the prevailing notion that the English were planning to dispossess 
or destroy the natives. Yet there was little before late fall that 
would have indicated the inevitability of warfare, Croghan's warn­
ings notwithstanding. The war belts circulated earlier in the year 
alarmed the army but suffered the same fate as the belts passed the 
year before. Part of the reason was the persistent localism on the 
part of western Indians that continued to preclude cooperation across 
regional boundaries. The war belt sent from the Shawnees in the fall 
failed to rally the Miamis, who showed a singular lack of trust in
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others by rejecting the war message. According to Ensign Holmes, the
Miamis chiefs complained that "if we had ever so much mind to kill
the English, there is always some discovery made before we can ac-
22complish our design," perhaps a statement of the Miamis' desire.
Warfare to the south and severe problems at home in the after- 
math of the 1762 illness may have further distracted attention away 
from the Anglo-Americans and toward more immediate issues. In ad­
dition, the still unresolved state of Anglo-French relations may have 
prompted some, perhaps a majority, of Great Lakes Indians to bide 
their time under the assumption that, eventually, conditions would re­
turn to normal— defined as a French restoration.
On the other hand, as 1762 drew to a close, native dissatisfaction 
continued over the Anglo-Americans' refusal to comport themselves as 
Indians believed they should. Complaints persisted about the sudden
lack of friendship in the wake of English victories against the French
23and of the problem that forts and squatters continued to represent.
At the same time, at least in the Ohio country (for which more inform­
ation is available), no consensus had been reached on how to deal with 
these problems and the threat they posed to native independence. As 
late as the end of January 1763, a Shawnee was able to tell Fort Pitt's 
commander that "we were much divided in our Opinions [[concerning a re­
cent war belt], one half of our Warriors was for making War." How­
ever, the the absence of any agreement, the belt was sent back and
oh.
the Shawnees and Delawares remained watchful but uncommitted.
Thus it appears that in the Ohio country, and perhaps elsewhere, 
the late fall and winter of 1762 saw a continuation of a pattern now
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several years oldj a pattern of sporadic efforts by some to rally 
support for a plan of resistance, and the wrecking of those plans on 
the rocks of factionalism and indecision. While native frustration 
grew over what many now saw as deliberate English efforts to reduce 
them to dependency or destroy them altogether, the still unsettled 
conflict between France and England suggested that matters might still 
be resolved in ways that would guarantee the restoration of the pre­
war- balance of power and pattern of Indian-European relations. Such 
an outcome would enhance native freedom of action once again by e- 
liminating the necessity of dealing exclusively with the increasingly 
abrasive and dangerous Anglo-Americans whose only goals seemed to be 
the revolutionizing of Indian relations in ways that spelled disaster 
of the natives.
II
The difficulty in determining Indian actions and perceptions in 
the last critical months before the outbreak of armed resistance in 
May 1763 is the result of the singular lack o f information available 
for the Great Lakes region during that time. The contrast with the 
previous year is striking. The observations of men such as George 
Groghan and Alexander McKee more often reflect information gathered 
earlier in the fall by native informants or evaluations of fragmentary 
reports coming in during the winter months. The seasonal pattern of 
native life helps account for this. From October until the follow­
ing spring many Indians, especially those living beyond the Ohio, were
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occupied in hunting and trapping that took them away from permanent
2 5villages and neighboring forts or trading posts.
It cannot be assumed, however, that the dispersal of Indian com­
munities to winter hunting camps marked a diminution of the growing 
apprehension that had marked Anglo-Indian relations during the previous 
year. The picture that emerges by late spring 1763 suggests quite the 
opposite. From April through early June native hostility came to a 
head and exploded first at Detroit, later on the Ohio and in the region 
south of the Great Lakes. The conflict was also marked by the exit 
of leaders and the waning of groups previously associated with a policy 
of accommodation and the appearance of men, the Ottawa war leader 
Pontiac among them, who advocated the kind of resistance first suggest­
ed two years earlier by the Ohio Senecas. Unlike the situation in l?6l, 
however, by early 1?63 many more western Indians appear to have regard­
ed the military option as the only alternative to continued exploitation 
by the Anglo-Americans.
What triggered this change in attitude toward their own, and the 
invaders' position, and led to what may be described as a new consensus 
on war, was the arrival in the west of news that the Anglo-French war 
had finally been resolved in the form of a definitive peace based in
part on the cession of Canada to England, a settlement that effective-
27ly removed France from the west.
The arrival of this news among the Indians cannot be precisely 
dated. Colonel Bouquet informed Captain Ecuyer, Fort Pitt's commander, 
of the preliminary peace between the two crowns on December 22, 1762, 
although official word did not arrive at army headquarters in New York
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until the following January 21. On that day, General Amherst wrote 
to Major Wilkins at Port Niagara informing him of the peace and order­
ing a public display at the fort. Though not mentioned in the re­
cords, it can be assumed that similar instructions were issued to 
other western posts. A letter from Major Gladwin at Detroit, dated 
February 21 and sent in reply to Amherst's letter of January 21, in­
cludes congratualtions on the peace and the expected cession of Canada.2
When or how western Indians learned of the news is problematical. 
George Croghan noted on February 6 that he had complied with Amherst's 
orders that the Ohio Indians be informed of the treaty."' Indians 
farther west, as well as those on the Ohio, would certainly have 
learned at least some details from local garrisons and traders, though 
such information would have been unofficial and doubtless laden with 
rumors which never reduced its efficacy. It is also possible that 
news of the peace may have come into the Great Lakes region by way 
of the French in the Illinois country and New Orleans.
One thing does emerge, however, and that is the deliberate fail­
ure of the army and Indian service to make a formal, official announce­
ment of the treaty to Indians living outside the Ohio country. In early 
May, Amherst informed Croghan of an upcoming council between the south­
ern colonies and their Indian neighbors at which the peace treaty and 
cession would be explained. The commander-in-chief went on to observe, 
however, that "this had not Immediate regard to the Indians in the De­
partment where you are" and that regardless of "whatever Idle notions 
they may Entertain in regard to the Cession made by the French Crown" 
the Indians' opinions were of "very little Consequence" since they
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were expected  to  behave p e a c e fu lly  o r  s u f f e r  th e  consequences.
As f a r  as  Am herst was concerned , w estern  In d ia n s  now had no choice  
b u t obed ience  and c o o p e ra tio n , " fo r  th e  Peace m ust, a t  once, C u tt  
o f f  a l l  t h e i r  hopes o f  Encouragement from  th e  F rench , and th e y  w i l l  
See th e  F o l ly  o f  D is o b lig in g  U s ." -^
What th u s  became f o r  Am herst an  advantage born o f  th e  rem oval o f  
French  in f lu e n c e  o v e r dangerous In d ia n s  became, f o r  th e  l a t t e r ,  a  
problem  o f  m a jo r p ro p o r t io n s . The is s u e  was n o t th e  degree  to  which  
th e  F rench  had been o r  were a t  th e  moment encourag ing  o r  o th e rw is e  
a id in g  th e  w e s te rn  In d ia n s . The is s u e , from  th e  n a t iv e s ' p o in t  o f  
v ie w , was t h a t  th e  p o t e n t ia l  f o r  a id  shou ld  a  c o n f l i c t  b eg in  w ith  th e  
E n g lis h  was now a p p a r e n t ly  gone. And w ith  i t  went th e  In d ia n s ' b es t 
o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  fu t u r e  s e c u r i t y .  By hav in g  th e  p o t e n t ia l  o f  French  
s u p p o rt— p o t e n t ia l  r e a l iz e d  d u r in g  th e  p re v io u s  c e n tu ry — G re a t Lakes  
In d ia n s  co u ld  b e t t e r  w ith s ta n d  th e  c u r re n t  t h r e a t  to  t h e i r  s e c u r ity ;  
i n  e f f e c t  th e y  co u ld  c o n tin u e  to  " p la y -o f f "  Englishm en a g a in s t  th e  
t h r e a t  o f  a  renewed F ra n c o - In d ia n  a l l ia n c e .  W ith  th e  coming o f  peace  
th e  p la y - o f f  s t r a te g y  was l o s t .  That such an approach to  in t e r - s o c ie t a l  
r e la t io n s  had loomed la r g e  in  In d ia n  th in k in g  i s  r e f le c t e d  in  th e  h is ­
t o r y  o f  In d ia n -E u ro p e a n  r e la t io n s  b e fo re  th e  Seven Y e a rs ' War as  w e ll  
as in  th e  re p e a te d  e f f o r t s  to  g e t  th e  A ng lo -A m ericans to  conform to  
a c c e p ta b le  s ta n d a rd s  o f  b e h a v io r  by com paring them u n fa v o ra b ly  to  th e  
F ren ch . An en co u n te r between O ttaw as and L ie u te n a n t L e s l ie  a t  F o r t  
M ic h ilim a c k in a c  f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t e s  In d ia n  th in k in g . Hav in g  le a rn e d  
o f  u n re s t among th e  lo c a l  n a t iv e s ,  L e s l ie  was t o ld  t h a t  th e y  b e lie v e d  
th e y  co u ld  s t r ik e  th e  E n g lis h  w ith  im p u n ity  s in c e  " i f  th e y  a tte m p t
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a n y th in g  a g a in s t  th e  E n g lis h  h e re  th e y  could, r e t i r e  to  th e  I l l i n o i s . "
L e s l ie  p ro m p tly  moved th e  sq ue lch  any such n o tio n s  hy t e l l i n g  th e
Ottawas that an English army was even then (September 1?62) en route
to  New O rle a n s  i n  o rd e r  to  occupy th e  I l l i n o i s  c o u n try — a s ta tem en t
based w h o lly  on L e s l i e 's  im a g in a tio n , b u t one p e r f e c t ly  designed to
33h e ig h te n , n o t d e fu s e , a  te n s e  s i t u a t io n .
W h ile  th e  th re a te n e d  rem oval o f  th e  French c re a te d  a s e r io u s  
problem  f o r  G re a t Lakes In d ia n s  by underm in ing  one o f  t h e i r  p r in c ip a l  
s u r v iv a l  s t r a te g ie s ,  a d d i t io n a l  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  peace s e tt le m e n t s tru c k  
h a rd  a t  a l l  w e s te rn  In d ia n s . Not o n ly  were th e  French  to  r e t r e a t  from  
th e  w es t, b u t th e y  had ceded t h e i r  c la im s  in  t h a t  re g io n  to  th e  E n g lis h . 
In d ia n s  who le a rn e d  o f  t h is  were o u tra g e d , hav in g  n ever assumed nor 
acknow ledged French  ow nersh ip  o f  any la n d s  c la im ed  by n a t iv e  groups. 
George Croghan, w ith  some u n d e rs ta te m e n t, summarized news from  De­
t r o i t  by o b s e rv in g  t h a t  " th e  In d ia n  N a tio n s  t h is  way seem somewhat d is ­
tu rb e d  s in c e  th e y  h eard  o f  i t ,  and says, th e  French had no r i g h t  to
g iv e  away t h e i r  C ou n try j a s , th e y  say , th e y  were n ever Conquered by 
34any N a t io n ." ^  T ra d e r James Kenny was more to  th e  p o in t ,  n o tin g
t h a t  th e  D elaw are  le a d e r  Netawatwees "was S tru c k  dumb f o r  a c o n s id e r-
3*5a b le  tim e "  upon le a r n in g  o f  th e  c o n d itio n s  f o r  French w ith d ra w a l.
C o lo n e l B ouquet, i n  a  l e t t e r  u rg in g  Amherst to  e x p la in  th e  peace to
the western Indians, warned that "their fears for their land may be
36
in c re a s e d ."  E a r l i e r  in  th e  y e a r , A le x a n d e r McKee had w itn essed  
p r e c is e ly  w hat Bouquet fe a re d  as  he a tte m p te d  to  e x p la in  th e  peace  
t r e a t y  to  th e  Shawnees. A s s e r t in g  E n g lis h  r ig h t s  to  th e  west by v i r ­
tu e  o f  v ic t o r y  in  th e  w ar w ith  F ra n c e , McKee observed th a t  " th is
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seemed, to increase their Jealousy and they said plainly that the
37English would soon be too great a People in this Country."
Thus, as 1763 began, western Indians found themselves in a sit­
uation that some had warned of two years earlier. With the French 
officially gone from the west and with the Anglo-Americans claiming 
ownership of the region by right of conquest, Indians faced circum­
stances that few could have anticipated. Now the English, as the 
Shawnees feared, would indeed be "too great a People" with no one 
available to act as a counterpoise except the natives themselves. It 
must have seemed to many that the English effort since their occupation 
of the west to revolutionize Indian affairs had now paid off. Sudden­
ly, native options had narrowed as they confronted victorious and now 
unchallenged people who had consistently shown a lack of regard for 
the Indians' offer of friendship based on reciprocity and accommodation. 
The confusion that resulted from news of the peace and what it might 
mean could only have been increased by the Indians' long-held expectation 
that, given the opportunity, the Anglo-Americans would take their re­
venge for injuries suffered during the Seven Years' War. The opportunity 
appeared to have arrived. The fact that the English made no effort 
to communicate news of the peace to native leaders and the renewed in­
sistence that all prisoners remaining in Indian hands be immediately 
returned could only have added to the growing feeling of insecurity 
and "jealousy".
Given the Indians' assumptions about the meaning behind Anglo- 
American behavior over the past several years, and the radical change 
in the regional balance of power brought about by the unforeseen re-
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moval of the French, the choices remaining were few and none of them 
were wholly attractive! to do nothing and accept what would come, or 
act positively to regain the initiative and drive the threatening 
Anglo-Americans away. Both clearly involved risks, yet to do nothing 
meant, in effect, surrender either to destruction or at the very least 
continuation of the prejudicial manner in which affairs were being con­
ducted. By resisting, western Indians could both forestall the ex­
pected blow from the English and, hopefully, rid themselves of the 
myriad problems that had arrived with the invaders. By late spring 
many, though by no means all, Indians had chosen resistance as a way 
of preserving their world from the threats posed by Anglo-American 
domination.
One measure of the shift in emphasis toward war can be seen in 
the changes in leadership within Indian communities. As tension mount­
ed and the threat to native security grew, men who identified with war 
supplanted those who had argued for peace. This change came earliest 
among the western Senecas and those living on the Ohio. By mid-1761 
Kayahsota and Tahiadoris were actively involved in planning for wax' 
and declared themselves to be spokesmen for the Senecas as well as 
for other Six Nations Iroquois, an assumption of authority denied by
the sachems. Another warrior, Kindarunti, was also identified as a
39
"promoter of the Scheme to carry on a war with us." In all cases, 
warriors were challenging traditional leadership at home by advocating 
a military solution to the growing Anglo-American problem.
The same kind of transition appears to have taken place among 
the Delawares, though much later and in the wake of the Lancaster
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Treaty. Tamaqua, who for nearly five years had led many Delawares 
down the path of cautious accommodation with the English, appears 
to have stepped— or have been moved— aside by early 1763. The timing, 
reasons, and eetails cannot be recovered with certainty, yet by the 
time war broke out in May 1763» Netawatwees had emerged as the Dela­
ware "king", a position from which Colonel Bouquet later sought to
koremove him in favor of someone more pliable. The change of leader­
ship, and a corresponding change from peace to war, seems to have been 
finalized during the months after Tamaqua's return from Lancaster.
En route to the treaty, Tamaqua was accompanied by "king Netatwahelmy" 
(Netawatwees), suggesting .perhaps that the latter was already in as- 
cendence. At the treaty, however, Tamaqua was the leader of the Dela­
ware contingent and reprised his former role as spokesman for his own
4-1
people as well as for others who spoke through the Delawares. Little 
appears between the council and the outbreak of hostilities the follow­
ing summer. In late February the English at Fort Pitt learned of the 
Delawares' negative reaction to news of the Anglo-French peace. Chris­
tian Frederick Post, who had returned at that time from the Muskingum 
towns, made a point to describe Netawatwees's reaction, but said nothing
kzof Tamaqua or other Delaware leaders. John Heckewelder adds one 
final glimpse of the changes taking place within the Delaware communities 
and of Tamaqua's status. Early in 1763, Tamaqua reportedly informed 
the missionaries and traders operating among his people that he and 
other leaders could no longer guarantee their safety and urged them
43
to leave the region.
Tamaqua's popularity and influence may have fallen victim to the
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rising discontent resulting from the convergence of an unsatisfactory 
meeting at Lancaster, the revitalization message of Neolin, and the 
earth-shaking news of the Anglo-French peace. Faced with growing 
sentiment for war, Tamaqua may have bowed to the inevitable and step­
ped aside in favor of the more militant Netawatwees. The possibility 
cannot be ruled out, however, that Tamaqua's apparent eclipse was an­
other example of the deft political behavior that had served him so 
well in the past. By standing apart from the impending conflict, 
Tamaqua both avoided dividing his people and placed himself beyond 
recrimination by the English and in a favorable position to take ad­
vantage of any eventuality.
To the northwest there emerged yet another figure whose name and 
career have been irrevocably linked to native resistance! Pontiac. 
Irrespective of the virtual absence of any solid information about 
his early life, career, or position within his own society, volumes 
have been written about his leadership or native resistance and his 
role as the arch-conspirator and architect of the war which broke out 
in 1763. Of his role in leading the attack against English forces 
in and around Detroit there can be no doubt. His influence beyond 
Detroit— or even among non-Ottawas at that town— is at least problem­
atical and at best of no great historical significance. Taken out of 
the context of "great man" history or "pan-Indian" conspiracies, and 
placed in historical and regional context, Pontiac emerges as another 
example of the growing shift from toleration of Anglo-American en­
croachments to a belief that only war would restore a favorable balance 
of power in the west. As has been seen, it was the news that the west
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was to be delivered to the English that particularly threatened the 
Great Lakes Indians. Again, however, the timing and circumstances 
surrounding Pontiac's emergence at Detroit are difficult to ascertain. 
Aside from the so-called "Pontiac Manuscript", now attributed to De­
troit resident Robert Navarre, there is precious little to shed light
Zj-5
on Pontiac's activities before the spring of 1?63*
Pontiac's first recorded activity as a leader advocating war was 
a council held at the Ecorse River near Detroit on April 27> 1763.
At that meeting Pontiac attempted, and apparently successfully, to 
create a consensus for military action among the local Ottawas, 
Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and perhaps part of the Wyandot community.
His plan, which called for the solicitation of aid from other regional 
groups, echoed that presented by the Senecas over the previous two 
years. If one thing causes Pontiac and his followers to stand out 
in the historical record it is the fact that they acted where others 
previously had faltered. Much of this success may indeed have to do 
with his special character and will as his biographers have insisted. 
Yet the climate of the time and the universal and growing Indian per­
ception of the inevitability of war with the English makes it likely 
that Pontiac was also blessed by being at the right place at the right 
time. Nevertheless, action at Detroit served as an example to others 
throughout the west in the weeks following the outbreak of hostilities 
at Detroit on May 9-
Pontiac, Kayahsota, and Netawatwees were emergent leaders whose 
rise to influence reflected growing native convictions that Anglo- 
American power and aggression, real or imagined, could only be met
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by force if Indians were to preserve their independence. In a larger 
sense the emergence of these men reflected the continued function of 
traditional values in native communities. Faced with external threats 
and the inability or unwillingness of civil leaders to respond, the 
warriors, in whom were vested responsibility for supplying and de­
fending society, emerged to assert their traditional role. What re­
sulted in 1763 was the use of traditional means to combat an Anglo- 
American revolution in Indian-European relations.
Ill
While Indians in the Ohio country had long worked to keep their 
lands free of either French or English occupation, those living in the 
upper Great Lakes region had engaged in a relationship with the Canadian 
French that was economically beneficial yet not a threat to local autonomy. 
With the arrival of the English army and colonial traders, however, a 
system of economic colonialism based on mutual need and respect was 
threatened by a more aggressive form of imperial expansion based on 
political and military as well as economic domination. What is more, 
those who attempted to implement these new arrangements had previous-
4?ly been counted as enemies.
The extent to which western Indians were dissatisfied with Anglo- 
American practices was made known in the repeated requests that the 
new colonists behave more in accordance with former French practices.
By early 1?63 growing rancor over English policies led at least some 
Great Lakes Indians to define resistance in terms of re-establishing
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the pre-war system, including the restoration of the more "benign 
French trading network. Such a goal was reflected in Indian contacts 
with French officials still resident in the Illinois country after 
hostilities had broken out at Detroit. At Fort Ouiatanon, Lieutenant 
Jenkins reported in July that local Ouiatanons had asked the French 
to launch an attack against his post, a request that was denied. More 
suggestive was the message sent from the Detroit Ottawas to the French 
commander in the Illinois country. The speech indicated "both the 
sense of isolation felt by Detroit Indians since the French departure 
and the persistent hope that news of the Anglo-French peace and the 
cession of Canada were merely English lies and that French aid would 
soon be forthcoming.
The hope of a French restoration was doubtless reinforced by the
fact that the Great Lakes region contained in 1763 several hundred
habitants, traders, and a handful of priests, the remnants of France's
claim to the west. Precise figures on this Canadian French population
are unavailable. By far the largest number lived at Detroit, whose
population was placed by Colonel Bougainville at two hundred in 1757.
Three years later Captain Campbell found eighty houses in the town.^
Outside Detroit, numbers become even more vague. Alexander Henry
found thirty houses at Fort Michilimackinac, but said nothing about
those who may have lived away from the fort. Sir William Johnson
spoke of "Several French Familys" at Fort Miami and a like number at 
50Fort Ouiatanon.
These settlements had originated in the missions and trading 
stations established over the previous sixty years and had continued
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to survive on trade, subsistence farming and supplying food and ser­
vices to the traders and small military detachments at the major 
51
posts. Ties between these French and the surrounding Indians went 
beyond trade or mutual occupation of the land. By the end of the 
Seven Yeaz's' War there were a number of people— the metis— who were 
the offspring of Indian-French unions.
The radical shift in power in the west that so upset Indians' 
lives hurt the habitants and traders as well. Unable to obtain sup­
plies because of the war, these people were at least as porrly off 
as their Indian neighbors by the time English occupation forces ar­
rived. Native informants told the English in the spring of 1760 that 
"the Inhabitants about D'Troit are much Distressd," a picture confirm­
ed by Captain Campbell who reported that "we found the Kings Stores 
here almost empty" and the habitants "in great want of Every Thing. 
Anglo-American traders did a brisk business supplying French needs 
and though grop failures persisted into 1761 at Detroit, conditions
elsewhere seem to have improved to the point where outpost commanders
53were buying some of their meat and flour from local settlers.
What doubtless concerned the western French as much or more than
shortfalls in supplies was that their economic base, the fur trade,
was in the process of being aggressively taken over by Anglo-American
entrepreneurs. Further, as the inhabitants of a newly conquered land,
the French were placed under the same kinds of restrictions— for many
54of the same reasons— as their former native customers." Considered 
potentially hostile and a threat to regional security, the habitants 
and French traders soon began to experience the kind of imperial
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authority that had irritated and finally alienated the Indians. As 
early as l?6l efforts were being made to curb the activities of French 
trader Duperon Baby, who had managed to maintain his business con­
nections with the Shawnees despite the British army's occupation of 
55the Ohio country. The following year Amherst, on advice from Sir
William Johnson, took steps to insure that western garrisons stopped
the trading reportedly going on between the king's new subjects at
56Detroit and the French towns and forts in the Illinois country.
While royal officials had little to say about the day-to-day
activities of the French in the west, when war broke out in 1763 crown
agents were quick to blame them and other French "agents" for Indian 
57hostility. In part this predisposition was rooted in reports of
clandestine French activity associated with anti-English councils
and war belts over the previous two years. Johnson was told by Indian
informants, and was inclined to believe, that Frenchmen had been active
at the Detroit council in the late summer of 1762 wherein the subject
of war with the English had been discussed, Further, he was warned
that Frenchmen from the Illinois were attempting to turn the Shawnees
58into a hostile path by warning them of English "plots".
By the time Johnson learned of the appearance of two Frenchmen 
"dressed as Indians" at Detroit, news of similar activities began to 
arrive from other western posts. At La Baye, Lieutenant Gorrell re­
ported that local Frenchmen had tried, unsuccessfully, to alienate
59neighboring Indians from the English garrison. From Fort Pitt came
word of some "French on the Illinois that are striving to Spirit up
60
£the MiamisJ against the English." Later in l?6l, James Kenny was
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told that a French officer, accompanied by several Shawnees, had been
observing the fort and that the Shawnees believed the French would
6l
help them attack the post in the spring.
While such information suggests that French activities among the 
Indians had become widespread by 1762, English reports failed to identify 
either the motive behind such actions— beyond the assumption that the 
French were by inclination hostile to their new overlords— or which 
Frenchmen were engaged in "subversive" activities. Finally, while 
Johnson, Amherst, and others were willing to accept the idea that the 
French played a large, if not decisive, part in stirring up otherwise 
controllable Indians, it cannot be assumed that native resistance was 
primarily the result of outside agitation.
Though more research needs to be done on the nature of French 
relations with both the English and western Indians at this time, 
some tentative explanations can be offered as to why some Frenchmen 
would actively work to weaken Anglo-American control over the west,,
In the first place, the French, like their Indian neighbors, were 
faced with living under an alien regime that had recently been hostile 
and whose future plans for the west and i’s inhabitants were unknown. 
Large numbers of soldiers to be quartered and fed, and increasing re­
gulation of economic activity, coupled with the potential revocation
62of land titles and civil rights may have prompted some to resist.
Further, so long as war continued, some Frenchmen may have felt duty- 
bound to continue to wage war against the invader by whatever means 
were available. Small pockets of French soldiers continued to live 
among western Indians and may well have continued to urge resistance
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on the part of "both local French and Indians. There is also slight 
evidence that French Indian agents attempted to create what might be 
called a "doomsday" system for insuring native resistance even after 
French forces had left the west. Sir William Johnson learned that 
the French had left war belts with western Indians before departing 
in 1760, though Johnson's informant was quick to point out that other
6kissues, not the belts, were the source of current Indian hostilities.
Finally, and perhaps of greatar immediate concern, was the damage 
the Anglo-American occupation had done to the French fur trade. With 
the capture of Montreal, the French trading system passed under English 
control and was quickly re-established based on Anglo-American leader­
ship and money and Canadian expertise and labor. To Frenchmen living 
on the fringes of a vast trading empire such a change spelled disaster 
since credit and markets were now in the hands of foreign competitors. 
Trade factors at Detroit or La Baye, bereft of goods and ere t must 
have looked bitterly on as canoe loads of Anglo-American merchandise 
passed by headed for native customers. Lieutenant Gorrell gave some 
indication of the extent to which French traders were willing to go 
to keep interlopers out of their marketplace. In October 1762 he re­
ported that several French vo.yageurs, working for licensed Anglo- 
American traders, "did all in their power to persuade the Bay Indians 
to fall upon the English." Gorrell noted, probably correctly, that 
such actions were directed at hindering Anglo-American traders from 
approaching the western posts.^
When it came to identifying those Frenchmen involved in efforts 
to create Indian resentment or keep it at high levels, Anglo-American
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Chartres, New Orleans, or the other posts in the Illinois country 
and Louisiana were most frequently cited as the source of the unrest.
On closer examination, however, the picture is more complex. French 
military officers and civil officials undoubtedly continued to lend 
moral and material support to the western Indians as long as the war 
with England continued. Governor Kelerac of Louisiana reported as 
much in his dispatches to authorities in Paris. He also indicated 
that, once news of the peace reached him, he ceased such activities.^ 
That his actions were by no means singular is made clear by the res­
ponse of Captain de Villiers to Indian requests for aid in the summer 
of 1763< As commander of the Fort de Chartres garrison, de Villiers 
was in an excellent position to give support to the waring Indians. 
However, in a reply to the message sent from Detroit, he refused, cit­
ing his legal obligations and urged the Indians to reconcile themselves 
to English authority.^ In a similar message to the French habitants
at Detroit, de Villiers confirmed the news of a general peace and ask-
68ed the settlers to help reconcile the Indians and English.
Though the official French position after the spring of 17&3 was 
one of judicious non-involvement, the same cannot be said of the 
habitants and traders living in the Great Lakes region. Some of these 
appear to have actively sided with the Indians from the outbreak of 
hostilities, though in Detroit, at least, the French community was 
divided on the matter. Characteristically, support for the Detroit 
Indians came largely from "above 300 young men", traders, metis, and 
voyageurs, while the leading citizens such as Antoine Cuilliere, Francois
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69Meloche, and. Baptiste Gampeau, urged strict neutrality.
The principal motive of those Frenchmen who did support Indian 
resistance seems to have been self interest. In so doing, their 
goal— the removal of the Anglo-Americans— coincided with that of 
an increasing number of Great Lakes Indians. Lacking the means to 
drive the English away themselves, the French turned to the Indians, 
whose own anger and growing militancy offered a ready-made solution 
to the problem. At the s. me time, it is possible that after 1760 the 
French suffered from the same fragmented, often contradictory inform­
ation about their future as did the Indians. Thus, reports propagated 
by these French that King Louis's troops would return to restore 
peace and harmony in the west may have been more than the propaganda 
of interested political agents. They may also have been the sincere 
hope of another group of people suddenly faced with a radically different 
world. French activities among and statements to western Indians doubt­
less contained elements of both political calculation and genuine hope 
for a Bourbon restoration in the west.
While French efforts to support and profit from Anglo-Indian 
hostility cannot be denied, such efforts were at best only a minor 
contributing factor to the conflict that began in 1763. Indian hostility 
was rooted in issues and problems of which French activities were only 
one part. By their words and actions, certain French interests help­
ed sustain, but did not create, Indian resistance in the Great Lakes 
area and in so doing may have made warfare seem a more plausible option. 
The irony is that the Indians' decisions for war came at precisely the
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time when French aid., which Great Lakes warriors had counted on and 
expected, was denied.
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AFTERWARD
The war that began at Detroit on May 9» 1?63 took the English
completely by surprize despite warnings the previous winter. In
rapid succession, from May 2? to June 1, forts St. Joseph, Miami,
Ouiatanon, and Michilimackinac were taken, their garrisons bloodied
but largely left intact to be exchanged later.^ La Baye was spared
the fate of these posts; Lieutenant Gorrell was allowed to take his
troops unharmed to Montreal due largely to protection extended by local
Indians who had no desire to involve themselves on the side of traditional 
2
enemies. Though Fort Pitt was sporadically attacked beginning on 
May 27, the war in the Ohio country did not gain momentum until mid- 
June by which time all the outposts north of Fort Pitt had been swept 
away. It is noteworthy that the two most violent incidents of the 
war occurred in the Ohio country, rather in the Great Lakes. On June 16 
Ohio Senecas massacred the garrison of Fort Venango, having first forced 
its commander, Lieutenant Gordon, to compose a list of native grievances. 
Just weeks later, these same Indians succeeded in closing the trouble­
some English portage at Niagara and in the process destroyed a sub-
3
stantial part of the garrison there.
The timing of these attacks, carried out with speed, skill, and 
determination, suggests that local concerns and decisions, more than 
a centrally coordinated movement, was responsible for the actions.
There can be little doubt, however, that once word of the attacks at 
and near Detroit spread outside that area others, already predisposed 
to fight, took the cue and acted, though in accordance with their own
4-32
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concerns and in  ways b e f i t t i n g  t h e i r  own r e la t io n s  w ith  lo c a l  g a rr is o n s  
and t r a d e r s .  Thus, G re a t Lakes In d ia n s  d e a l t  more c h a r i t a b ly  w ith  cap­
tu re d  tro o p s  th an  d id  In d ia n s  i n  th e  O hio co u n try  where In d ia n -a rm y  r e ­
f ­
la t io n s  had lo n g  s in c e  so ured .
G e n e ra l A m h ers t's  r e a c t io n  to  news from  th e  w est was one o f  m ix­
ed d is b e l ie f  and o u tra g e , coup led  w ith  h is  e v e r -p re s e n t  a rrog an ce  to ­
ward th e  "savages" who had now p re s e n te d  him w ith  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  he
5
d o u b tle s s  had lo n g  a w a ite d . H av ing  been caught w h o lly  unp rep ared , 
th e  co m m a n d e r-in -c h ie f had o n ly  th e  s ic k ly  rem nants o f  reg im en ts  r e ­
c e n t ly  re tu rn e d  from  th e  West In d ia n s  to  send as  re in fo rc e m e n ts . In  
d e s p e ra tio n  he g a th e re d  to g e th e r  two s m a ll b a t ta l io n s  o f  H ig h la n d e rs
and anyone e ls e  who c o u ld  w a lk  and pushed them w est by way o f  F o rb es '
6
Road and th e  Mohawk R iv e r .  M arch ing  to  th e  r e l i e f  o f  F o r t  P i t t ,  now 
und er c lo s e  s ie g e , C o lo n e l B o u q u e t's  S cots encountered  and drove o f f  
a la r g e  fo rc e  o f  Senecas and D elaw ares  a t  Bushy Run on August 5 and 6. 
W h ile  d e c la re d  a  v ic t o r y  i n  o f f i c i a l  d is p a tc h e s  and by subsequent gen­
e ra t io n s  o f  h is to r ia n s ,  B o u q u e t's  en cou n ter was more o f  a draw . He 
managed to  g e t to  th e  f o r t  and evacu ate  s e v e ra l hundred c iv i l i a n s  y e t  
c a s u a lt ie s  am ounting to  tw e n ty  p e rc e n t o f  h is  fo rc e  p re v e n te d  th e  c o lo n e l 
from  c a r r y in g  o u t h is  in s t r u c t io n s  and re -o c c u p y in g  th e  s m a lle r  o u t­
p o s ts . S im i la r  r e l i e f  e f f o r t s  managed to  s u s ta in  D e t r o i t ,  th e  o n ly
o th e r  f o r t  w est o f  N ia g a ra  s t i l l  i n  E n g lis h  hands, b u t e f f o r t s  to  b reak
7
th e  s ie g e  th e re  m et w ith  d is a s te r .
E n g lis h  and c o lo n ia l  shock and f r u s t r a t i o n  o ver th e  new In d ia n  
w ar showed i t s e l f  in  two o th e r ,  more om inous, ways. S e t t l e r s  in  Penn­
s y lv a n ia , p a n ic -s t r ic k e n  o v e r  news o f  f ig h t in g  on th e  O h io , braced  f o r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
k3k
another round, of attacks. Fear boiled over into anger at Indians that
reflected a racial, rather than cultural, bias and exploded at Conestoga
8
and Philadelphia later that fall and during the following year. The 
array, particularly its senior officers, also displayed a contempt for 
Indians that went beyond a soldier's feelings for the enemy. Both 
Amherst and Bouquet discussed a number of alternative ways for dealing 
with hostile Indians, including the use of mastiffs in a manner remi­
niscent of Spanish conquistadors centuries earlier. Worse was their 
use of disease in a deliberate attempt to lessen the natives’ numerical 
and fighting advantage. Evidence revealed so far points without dis­
pute to the deliberate attempt to infect Ohio Indians with smallpox
9
at Fort Pitt during the summer of 1?63. That effort, coupled with 
the various illnesses brought into the west by infected soldiers, led 
to a new wave of sickness that played its part in weakening Indian 
resistance in the coming months."^
Ironically, as fighting reached a peak by late summer 17&3 and as 
British officers were reaching new depths in their efforts to defeat 
the enemy, the home government was promulgating an act to prevent 
abuses and disorder of the kind that had led to war. Responding less 
to Amherst's desire to reduce Indians to a conquered peasantry than his 
need for an enforceable Indian policy, the Proclamation of 1763 repre­
sented the first of a series of steps taken to assert royal jurisdiction 
over the west, as well as bring order to colonial expansion and ensure 
peace with the Indians through fair treatment and enforcement of treaty 
obligations. Embodying many of the recommendations proposed by Sir 
William Johnson since 1757 > the Proclamation included a provision for
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a boundary line between the colonies and the yet unorganized trans- 
Appalachian region, which was to remain under military rule. The con­
cept of a boundary, not finalized until 1?68, along with royal control 
of lands claimed by several provinces, never completely satisfied the 
needs of Indian affairs due to the persistence of administrative 
problems first revealed in the 1760s. Further, the Proclamation
came to symbolize a serious threat to provincial autonomy that increas-
11ing numbers of colonists felt duty-bound to protest and defy.
The British army's failure to mount successful offensives against
the Indians, sickness on both sides, and the Indians' inability to
sustain combat now that trade was disrupted led, by mid-fall 1763, to 
12a stalemate. Pontiac and his followers lifted the siege of Detroit 
and moved inland, to remain a threat to the English for several years.
On the Ohio, Fort Pitt continued to experience attacks until the ad­
vent of winter led to a mutually agreed upon cessation of hostilities.
Though exhaustion and military failure, coupled with the beginn­
ing of an English-induced epidemic among western Indians, contributed 
to an end of the fighting by November, other factors may have contribut­
ed as well. In the first place, many Indian groups appear to have had 
limited goals in striking the army and Anglo-American traders. For 
example, once the upper Ohio posts and the Niagara portage were elimi­
nated and neutralized, the western Senecas did not pursue operations 
further. Likewise, Miamis, Ouiatanons, and Ojibwas at Michilimackinac 
appear to have been content to see the source of their own local problems 
destroyed. Having demonstrated their willingness and ability to re­
move forts, soldiers, uncooperative traders, and squatters, many In­
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dians may have believed their war to have been over. Certainly Pontiac 
was an exception. Indeed, his activities after the fall of 1763 in 
trying to persuade others to fight and in soliciting, unsuccessfully, 
French aid, largely accounts for his standing in the historical re­
cord. In addition, winter demanded that warriors turn from hutning 
men to the more important task of hunting game, a task made more dif­
ficult this winter due to the war and the disruption of trade.
The coming of spring and summer would witness far less fighting 
as both sides moved back to negotiations as a way of settling an issue 
than neither could win on the battlefield. While the English ultimate­
ly re-occupied the west and, by the end of 1765, even extended their 
hold into the newly acquired Illinois country, their control of these 
lands was no less tenuous than it had been before 1763- Indeed, the 
Indians achieved a victory of sorts in the removal of Amherst, for 
whom the war turned into a distinct political liability, and his re­
placement by General Thomas Gage. Gage, concious of cost as well as 
the limitations of military power, decided not to re-occupy the small­
er posts in the upper Great Lakes and the Ohio country. Having failed 
to crush native resistance, the English, through Indian Superintendent 
Johnson, engaged in new negotiations directed at making good the terms 
embodied in the 1763 Proclamation. On their parts, western Indians 
began anew the complex pattern of bargaining— along the same local 
and regional lines— that had marked their earlier efforts to address 
the problems of the Anglo-American invasion. As English-colonial re­
lations deteriorated after 1765 the west played a less important role 
in royal planning, giving natives an opportunity to exploit new divisions 
within Anglo-American society while enjoying fewer English impositions.
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Notes for Afterward
^The best secondary accounts of the war itself are to be found 
in Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (New York, 1970), 
passim.i John Shy, Toward Lexingtom The Role of the British Army in 
the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965), 111-12^; the 
primary material is voluminous but the best material on military 
operations can be found in Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, 
eds., The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet (Harrisburg, 19^-19^3)) 
esp. series 21634, 216^ 9*
2
"Lieut. Gorrell's Journal," State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 
Collections, I & II (Madison, 185^), 38-^ 7.
^Peckham, Pontiac, 167, 22^ -25; Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffrey 
Amherst, Jun. lo, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 
2163^ , 212-13, Colonel Henry Bouquet to Amherst, Sept. 7> 1763> Ibid., 
263; Amherst to Bouquet, Oct. 3» 1783* Ibid., 281-82.
Ll
Peckham has made the arguement that the Indian war does not 
represent a pan-Indian "conspiracy" or movement, a point with which I 
agree, though for different reasons.
^Amherst to Bouquet, Jun. 6, 1763» Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet 
Papers, series 2163^ , 182-83; Amherst to Bouquet, Jun 23, 1763> Ibid.,
197-98; Bouquet to Amherst, Jun, 16, 1783) Ibid., 189-90.
P^eckham, Pontiac, 175» 206-207; Shy, Toward Lexington, 120-22; 
Amherst to Bouquet, Jul. 16, 1?63, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet 
Papers, series 2163^ , 218-19; on the larger issue of the military 
establishment in North America at the time see also Charles S. Grant, 
"Pontiac's Rebellion and British Troop Moves of 1763," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review >40 (1953)» 75-88.
7
On the impact of Bushy Run on the military situation on the Ohio 
see Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 11, 1763* Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet 
Papers. series 2163^ , 2k3-kM-', Bouquet to Major Campbell, Sept. 7, 1763, 
Ibid., series 2l653i 219-20; Amherst to Bouquet, Sept. 18, 1763) Ibid., 
series 21634, 272-73.
8
Bouquet to Amherst, Jun. 19, 1763» Ibid., 191; on the Conestoga 
massacre see Peckham, Pontiac, 219; on subsequent Pennsylvania-Indian 
relations see John R. Dunbar, ed., The Paxton Papers (The Hague, 1957)0
9
Bernard Knollenberg, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," MVHR 
1^ (195^ )» 489-9^ and Donald H. Kent's reply, Ibid., 762-631 see also
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"Memorandum" May 4, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, 
series 2.1634, l6l.
"^Henry Dobyns, personal communication Jan. 13, 1982, suggests 
that smallpox may have been only one, and perhaps not the most lethal, 
of several diseases introduced by British troops. See also J. Clarence 
Webster, ed., "Journal of John Montressor's Expedition to Detroit in 
1763," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 3 Ser. XXII (1928), 
22, hereafter cited as "Montressor's Expedition".
"'■'''On the genesis of the 1763 Proclamation and associated policy 
decisions see Shy, Toward Lexington, 4.5-83! Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian 
Relations in North America to 1763 and An Analysis of the Royal Pro­
clamation of 7 October 1?63 (Ottawa, 1981), 284-392.
12Amherst to Bouquet, Oct. 10, 1763* Stevens and Kent, eds., 
Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 284; Bouquet to Amherst, Oct. 24, 1763, 
Ibid., 288-90; "Montressor's Expedition", 23-25.
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CONCLUSIONS
Between 1758 and. 1762 Indians throughout the trans-Appalachian 
region attempted to adjust to the fundamental economic, diplomatic, 
and military changes wrought by French defeat and Anglo-American 
efforts to occupy and exploit the west. The loss of French support 
made resistance to the English more difficult, though it did not entire­
ly preclude such an option. It was native uncertainty about the nature 
of the Anglo-American invasion, the outcome of the Seven Years' War, 
and, of equal importance, the social and economic disruption caused 
by the war that initially directed many western Indians toward ac­
commodation rather than resistance.
Accommodation was initially sponsored by Tamaqua and those Dela­
wares who had opened talks with colonial and royal officials during 
the war. In a series of conferences on the Ohio and, after December 
1760, at Detroit, increasing numbers of western Indians tentatively 
agreed to cease hostilities and enter the renewed and expanded Cov­
enant Chain with the English. From the natives' perspective this con­
stituted not an admission of defeat, let alone conquest, but a willing­
ness to compose differences and establish peace as equals on terms that 
accorded with pre-war practices and native values. These terms includ­
ed a fair and abundant trade and the spirit of friendship and reciprocity 
exemplified by periodic renewals of treaties and exchanges of gifts. 
Western Indians also expected gifts as payment for, or tokens of, 
native ownership of lands and rights-of-way that the British army 
sought to use for its own purposes. Further, Indians in the Ohio
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co u n try  were an x io u s  t h a t  th e  s o ld ie r s  he removed from  t h e i r  la n d s  
as soon as p o s s ib le , th e  d e m i l i t a r iz a t io n  o f  th e  re g io n  be in g  an  
e a r ly  and param ount g o a l i n  a l l  n e g o t ia t io n s .
E f f o r t s  to  e s ta b l is h  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  A nglo-A m ericans t h a t  
were b oth  p e a c e fu l and m u tu a lly  b e n e f ic ia l  took s e v e ra l fo rm s. The 
ra p id  re -o p e n in g  o f  t r a d e  c o n s t itu te d  th e  most o bv io us . Beyond t h is ,  
th e  peace c o u n c ils  them selves  served  to  r e a f f i r m  fr ie n d s h ip  and c re a te  
an atm osphere w i th in  w hich n a t iv e  le a d e rs  and t h e i r  peop le  co u ld  make 
t h e i r  own needs known w h ile  le a r n in g  as much as p o s s ib le  ab ou t A n g lo -  
Am erican in te n t io n s ,  s tr e n g th s , and weaknesses. I n  a d d i t io n , in d iv id u a l  
com m unities developed  t h e i r  own s t r a te g ie s  o f  accommodation, n o ta b ly  
th rough  s u p p ly in g  n e ig h b o rin g  g a rr is o n s  w ith  food  and by a c t in g  as  
g u id e s , m essengers, and o c c a s io n a lly  as  r e t r ie v e r s  o f  army d e s e r te rs ,  
F in a l l y ,  In d ia n  com m unities i n  th e  Ohio c o u n try , which h e ld  th e  la r g e s t  
number o f  A ng lo -A m erican  c a p tiv e s  ta k e n  d u rin g  th e  l a t e  w ar, began r e ­
tu rn in g  th ese  p eo p le  i n  s u b s ta n t ia l  numbers even though such a c t io n  
p la c e d  a d d i t io n a l  burdens and s tre s s  on f a m i l ie s  and towns in to  which  
th e  c a p tiv e s  had o f te n  been ad op ted .
By mid-176l these efforts to adjust to changes in regional power 
relationships were being negated by English imperialism. For the Anglo- 
Americans, the period immediately following Forbes' victory in the 
Ohio country was also one of change and uncertainty. In the wake of 
the campaigns that finally led to the capitulation of Canada in 1760, 
traders, speculators, and prospective settlers rushed to take advantage 
of England's conguests, outstripping efforts by individual colonies 
and the army to control their activities. Moreover, officials in
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London had no program  a t  hand f o r  th e  management o f  th e  conquest o r  
th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  A n g lo - In d ia n  r e la t io n s .  Such a  program  would n o t be 
borthcom ing u n t i l  th e  summer o f  1763* I n  th e  absence o f  an agenda o r  
program  from  London, th e  A m erican co m m a n d e r-in -c h ie f assumed th e  r e ­
s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  o rg a n is in g  and c o n t r o l l in g  th e  new ly a c q u ire d  t e r ­
r i t o r i e s  t h a t  s tre tc h e d  from  th e  Bay o f  Gaspe to  Lake  S u p e r io r .
F u l ly  convinced o f  both  h is  governm ent's  a b s o lu te  r i g h t  to  th e  w est­
e rn  t e r r i t o r i e s  and o f  h is  own m oral and m i l i t a r y  s u p e r io r i t y ,  and 
e q u a lly  convinced  o f  th e  in h e re n t  tre a c h e ry  and w a r - l ik e  demeanor o f  
th e  n a t iv e  occupants o f  th o se  la n d s , G en era l Am herst moved to  reduce  
th e s e  In d ia n s  to  p ro p e r obed ience and c o n t r o l.  I n  d o in g  so he enacted  
a  s e r ie s  o f  re g u la t io n s  based la r g e ly  on narrow  m i l i t a r y  c o n s id e ra t io n s , 
w h ile  ig n o r in g  in fo rm ed  o p in io n  and a d v ic e  from  b oth  In d ia n  s e rv ic e  
o f f i c e r s  and h is  own f i e l d  commanders. Such a d v ic e , i f  fo llo w e d  and 
founded on th e  need to  g ra d u a l ly  accommodate In d ia n s  to  a new p o l i t i c a l  
o rd e r  w ith o u t p ro v o k in g  a war t h a t  c u rre n t E n g lis h  f ig h t in g  s tre n g th  
c o u ld  n o t fa c e , may have a l la y e d  a t  le a s t  some o f  th e  In d ia n s ’ sus­
p ic io n s  and l a t e n t  h o s t i l i t y .  As r e la t io n s  between v a r io u s  In d ia n  
groups and g a rr is o n s  s u g g es t, h o s t i l i t y  d id  n o t have to  be th e  im m ediate  
r e s u l t  o f  A n g lo - In d ia n  c o n ta c ts  in  th e  w est. Y e t Am herst pursued h is  
d e te rm in a t io n  to  secure th e  w est by red u c in g  th e  In d ia n s  to  a  s ta te  
o f  dependence on A ng lo -A m erican  power and good w i l l .  H is  g a r r is o n s ,  
composed o f  men e q u a lly  f e a r f u l  o f  and u n f a m il ia r  w ith  In d ia n s , u l t im a te ­
l y  came to  be a  dangerous burden as th e y  began to  e n fo rc e  t h e i r  g e n e r a l 's  
d ir e c t iv e s  g o v e rn in g  tr a d e  and d ip lom acy.
A m h ers t's  p o l ic ie s ,  t r a n s la te d  in to  a c t io n  f i r s t  in  th e  Ohio
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c o u n try , l a t e r  in  th e  G re a t Lakes re g io n , t r ig g e r e d  a  more h o s t i le  
response in  n a t iv e  com m unities a lr e a d y  s e n s it iv e  to  th e  s l ig h t e s t  
change in  A ng lo -A m erican  b e h a v io r . The a tte m p ts  to  r e d e f in e  tra d e  
and power r e la t io n s h ip s  as w e ll  as th e  sudden te r m in a t io n  o f  war­
tim e  la r g e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  much-needed am m unition , seemed to  n a t iv e  
o b s e rv e rs  to  s ig n a l th e  end o f  r e la t io n s  based on e q u ity  and an e f f o r t  
by th e  E n g lis h  to  r e v o lu t io n iz e  In d ia n  a f f a i r s  to  th e  d i s t i n c t  d is ­
ad vantage o f  th e  n a t iv e s . A f u r t h e r  d im ension  o f  th e  problem  ap pear­
ed in  th e  form  o f  renewed w a rfa re  between th e  In d ia n s  o f  th e  G re a t  
Lakes and Ohio co u n try  and t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  enem ies to  th e  s o u th . 
Though ro o te d  i n  n a t iv e  v a lu e s  and in t e r e s t s ,  t h is  new round o f  f i g h t ­
in g  was d i r e c t ly  sponsored by th e  E n g lis h  i n  an  e f f o r t  to  both  break  
Cherokee r e s is ta n c e  to  c o lo n ia l  expansion  and to  d iv e r t  n o r th e rn  I n ­
d ia n  e n e rg ie s  and manpower. A t  th e  same t im e , A m h e rs t's  in s is te n c e  
t h a t  new p o l ic y  d ir e c t iv e s  be e n fo rc e d  le d  to  a  n o t ic e a b le  re d u c t io n  
i n  th e  means by which In d ia n  w a r r io rs  co u ld  p ro v id e  f o r  t h e i r  f a m i l ie s  
w h ile  occup ied  in  d is ta n t  campaigns. The n e t r e s u l t  was th e  a l ie n a t io n  
o f  th e  w a r r io r s , a  v o l a t i l e  fo rc e  w ith in  n a t iv e  s o c ie ty .  F i r s t  among 
th e  Ohio Senecas, l a t e r  among e lem ents  o f  th e  D e la w a re s , Shawnees, 
and In d ia n s  l i v i n g  n e a r D e t r o i t ,  c a l ls  f o r  war a g a in s t  th e  E n g lis h  
w ere h eard .
Though th e  c a l l  f o r  re s is ta n c e  to  E n g lis h  expansion  f i r s t  emerged 
on th e  u pper O h io , i t  was n o t im m e d ia te ly  acc e p te d  by those  l i v i n g  
o u ts id e  t h a t  a re a . R e g io n a l in t e r e s t s ,  je a lo u s ie s  between com m unities, 
and th e  slow ness w ith  which E n g lis h  tro o p s  and p o l ic ie s  e n te re d  th e  
w est le d  to  d i f f e r e n t i a l  n a t iv e  resp o nses . Whereas th e  Ohio In d ia n s
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were more concerned about land and were experiencing changes in Anglo- 
American attitudes and behavior by mid-176l, the same was not the case 
farther west. There interest was directed primarily toward trade and 
on how the invaders would behave, measured against pre-war conditions. 
This regional, sometimes local, variation in response to the problems 
presented by the Anglo-Americans also precluded a unified response, as 
the Ohio Senecas discovered at Detroit.
While the Senecas were thwarted in 1761, the warning took on 
new meaning in the west only a year later. Pood shortages, an unsat­
isfactory trade system, and severe and widespread illness created a 
climate of anger and apprehension that encompassed much of the trans- 
Appalachian region: anger because of the manifest lack of expected
English help, apprehension because the absence of a friendly response 
seemed to confirm what most Indians were predisposed to believe, that 
the English were in fact preparing to take revenge for their losses 
during the Seven Years' War. The result was a two-fold change in 
native responses to Anglo-American policies and actions. On the one 
hand, the notion of an English and colonial conspiracy to destroy all 
Indians gained currency. On the other, pressures on Delaware society 
at this time brought about a new wave of cultural revitalization. The 
message preached by Neolin called for the purification of the Delawares' 
culture and souls through the rejection of all but native modes of 
behavior and values. Neolin's message, though directed toward his 
own people, reflected a strong desire to rid the west of the troubles 
caused by European, particularly English, inroads, a feeling that may 
have been shared by growing numbers of trans-Appalachian Indians by
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the end of 1762. Among many Great Lakes Indian communities, this 
outlook was reflected in a growing wish to see conditions in their 
region revert to the pre-1760 pattern of relations when the French 
dominated the trade and conducted themselves much better than the 
more abrasive, truculent English.
News of the Anglo-French peace and the impending cession of 
Canada— and the west— to the English, following hard on the military 
occupation of the upper Great Lakes, pushed Indians there, formerly 
reluctant to engage in hostilities, into the forefront of efforts to 
drive the Anglo-Americans out of the west. The news of peace arrange­
ments seemed to confirm the Indians' worst fears and accelerated the 
shift from accommodation to confrontation as options narrowed by the 
spring of 1763. Adding to native perceptions of English goals and 
alarm at the sudden removal of the French, and with it any opportunity 
to counter-balance English power, were the actions and words of dis­
affected Frenchmen living at the western posts. While documentation 
of Indian activities within Great Lakes communities in the months pre­
ceding April 1763 is scant, by spring a local coalition at Detroit, 
led by warriors such as Pontiac, prepared to use force to ri5 their 
locale of English troops and traders.
As the war belts that came from the Ohio Valley during 1762 
suggest, a similar transformation was under way there as well. In 
the months preceding the outbreak of war at Detroit, leaders who had 
counselled caution and accommodation were replaced by those who argued 
for a more forceful response to the growing Anglo-American threat. In 
both places, smoldering resentment over three years had given way to
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a commitment by many to armed resistance to the English effort to at 
once revolutionise relations and reduce the west's native population 
to economic and political subordination. The spark struck at Detroit 
in May 1763 helped ignite similar local outbreaks elsewhere as west­
ern Indians sought to regain the initiative and to restore inter- 
cultural relations to what they had been before the Seven Years' War.
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